

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
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LECTURES
ON THE
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF
MORAL GOVERNMENT,
AS THEY ARE EXHIBITED
IN THE FIRST THREE CHAPTERS
OF
GENESIS.

✓
BY JOHN M. DUNCAN,
Pastor of the Associate Reformed Congregation of Baltimore.

In the BEGINNING the WORD WAS, and the WORD WAS WITH GOD, and the WORD WAS GOD.—*John i. 1.*

The WORD WAS MADE FLESH, and DWELT AMONG US; and we beheld his GLORY, the glory as of the ONLY BEGOTTEN OF THE FATHER, FULL OF GRACE AND TRUTH.—*John i. 14.*

EVERY ONE OF US SHALL GIVE ACCOUNT OF HIMSELF TO GOD.—*Rom. xiv. 12.*

SECOND EDITION, REVISED AND ENLARGED.

VOL. I.

BALTIMORE:
CUSHING & SONS.
1836.

ENTERED according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1836, by
JOSEPH CUSHING, JOSEPH CUSHING, Jr. and JOHN CUSHING, in
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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

THE public having, as is supposed, called for a reprint of the "Lectures on the General Principles of Moral Government," the Author has availed himself of the opportunity to extend his illustrations of those principles.—Trinity—the term PERSON—election—divine power—and the relations of infants both ecclesiastical and moral, are the principal topics, on which he offers some new observations. The reader will find this additional matter in the fifth, tenth, thirteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth lectures of the present series. Several paragraphs on the same, or on other general subjects, and which are scattered through the work, may readily be recognised as now appearing the first time. The discussion has been very much amplified; but no change has been introduced, which would affect the integrity of the argument as formerly stated. Perhaps some of the illustrations of the subject of Trinity, and of the scriptural phrases under which it is supposed to be expressed, might have been exchanged for those which a more extended investigation has afforded. But they have for the most part, and indeed always excepting in the use of the term person and its adjuncts, been permitted to remain in their own connexions; and the reader has been left to judge of the comparative merits of both for himself. And this has been done the more readily, because the Author imagines that, if his first principles be scriptural, and if his conclusions be accurate, a new systematic arrangement of moral

doctrines will be required. In that case, or when the community shall have perceived the necessity for, and duly appreciated the character of, such an arrangement, a thousand pens more prompt, more able and better pointed than his own, will do ample justice to the general discussion.

The Author would farther improve the opportunity now afforded, to state precisely the OBJECT of his argument, and the PRINCIPLE on which his argument rests. This, it was supposed, had been done with great distinctness in the Lectures themselves; and even with a frequency that seemed to be almost wearisome. It would appear, however, that he was mistaken in his impressions; as, in many instances, the argument has not been apprehended, and the difficulty thrown, as might have been expected, from the mind of the reader, is set down as the fault of the writer. He would therefore, in the hope that his preface may be read, now say, that his OBJECT is to exhibit and illustrate the scriptural doctrine of *personal responsibility*; and that his PRINCIPLE is, that man has no *innate ideas*—that he cannot comprehend a pure abstraction—that he acquires his ideas by means of his corporeal senses—and that the knowledge which he may possess is conveyed to his mind by external symbols. The OBJECT is never forgotten through the entire discussion; and the PRINCIPLE is uniformly sustained, by applying it to *all* the relations which man holds, in view both of *persons* and *things*, both of *creation* and *redemption*. The doctrines which are advanced in reference to *Trinity*, and the original government by *law*—to the *Mediator* and the remedial government by *gospel*—to the material universe, and to positive institutions under both the legal and evangelical administrations, are framed in connexion with that OBJECT, and result from the application of that PRINCIPLE.

The reader therefore, if he wishes to apprehend the doctrines proposed, to understand the reasonings by which they are enforced, and to deal candidly with the author as a man like himself, must bear both the object and the principle in mind. The argument will otherwise be necessarily obscure to him, and his criticism will be more loquacious than accurate ; but the fault will be his own.

No system, human or divine, physical or moral, political or ecclesiastical, can ever be fairly appreciated by the man, who overlooks its elemental points. None should be more fully convinced of the fact, than the theologians of the present day. They do not understand, or they differently interpret, their own creeds and articles of association ; they hold protracted controversies, and are at a loss to understand each other, or to say whether they have been arguing about words or things ; while they unitedly charge the sceptic with dishonorably passing by the first principles of the system, which he so irreverently assails. One, who well knew the value of analysis, and who had often exposed the hasty argument of a boastful polemic, has remarked—" A free-thinker, when he hears some great doctrine of christianity, lets off a small objection and runs away laughing at the folly, or railing at the imposture, of all who venture to defend a divine revelation ; he gathers his brother unbelievers, and they unite in wondering at the weakness or imprudence of christians. He bolts into the heart of a grand religious system ; he has never adverted to its first principles ; and then complains the evidence is bad. But the fault in neither case lies in the evidence. It lies in the ignorance or obstinacy of the objector." "Knowledge," says Solomon, "is easy to him that understandeth."

Whatever may be the merit of the system developed in

these Lectures, however novel it may be considered by some, or however much it may be censured as heretical by others, the Author again assures his reader, that he asks for nothing but a candid examination of its positions. He courts no favor but for the TRUTH ; nor asks any indulgence from those who are capable of "looking a system through and through," saving that which every honorable mind cheerfully extends to well meant effort. With this consciousness, he again commits his publication to the watchful care of that providence, which ever throws its mantle over an honest heart—to the sympathizing care of the great High Priest, who never frowns ingenuousness from his throne, nor withdraws his Spirit from the man who fears and loves his name.

Baltimore, 1836.

DEDICATION.

*To the Members of the Associate Reformed Congregation of
Baltimore:*

DEAR BRETHREN—

You will recognise, in the following sheets, the substance of a course of pulpit lectures, on the first three chapters of Genesis, which I have just finished :—as well as of a series of biblical exercises, conducted with a class of young men, in your lecture room, two years ago. Though I neither love the toil, nor covet the honors of authorship, and advance no pretensions to “the art of making books ;” yet I have been induced to prepare the following pages for the press, in consequence of having been repeatedly solicited so to do ; and in the fond hope of relieving some ingenuous minds, which may have been greatly embarrassed by the technicalities of scholastic theology. I have endeavored to express myself in a clear and perspicuous manner ; though possibly in this I may have failed in many instances, as I seldom use my pen, and have now been compelled to write rapidly.

The views which you have already heard, and which are here presented to you in a form that will afford you an opportunity for more leisurely examination, are the result of my own researches—long, patiently and diligently pursued. This remark is made, because I know not to what

dark age, or to what wandering, whimsical and hated errorist, my ideas may be referred. A hard name is the magic wand, by which an angry, but feeble, disputant often metamorphoses the humblest pretensions into the mightiest misdemeanor. Already you know, if rumor utters a true report, I have been represented as worthy to bear the name and the reproach of almost every heresy which has ever appeared; while, like the BIBLE itself, whose paramount authority over the christian conscience, it has been my lot to proclaim and defend, I have had the singular felicity, or infelicity, of being successively claimed by all parties. The allegations, which have been thus so freely made, form no small commendation of the argument to which your attention has been invited; for, if different parties, professedly deriving their peculiarities from the bible, can so readily discern their peculiarities in the doctrines I have advanced, those doctrines and the bible must appear quite like to each other. And if, feeling the point of this remark, critics, who have so gratuitously expressed either their praise or their condemnation, should now change their ground, they may, perhaps, discover that opinions founded on hearsay testimony, or on supposed powers of intuition, or under the force of preconceived and obstinate prejudices, will always, most probably, be inaccurate. At all events, you will have it fairly in your power to correct the misrepresentations with which you have been most painfully and unkindly annoyed, as well as to show that an honest, well meant effort to elucidate *the philosophical principles* of christianity, by no means involves the abandonment of *christianity itself*. Human CREEDS, however antique and abstruse they may be, are not in your view, synonymous

with the GOSPEL.—The one may be renounced, while the other shall appear in greater beauty and simplicity.

You know well, that I never have aspired after, and therefore, in presenting the following work to your careful and candid perusal, cannot now be seeking to obtain, a dominion over your faith. The doctrine which you have uniformly heard from my lips, and which is here transcribed with my pen, has proclaimed your right to examine truth for yourselves, as the privilege and dignity of your intellectual existence; while the distinct assurance has been given to you by the Redeemer, that all his children shall be taught of God. You can bear me testimony, how affectionately and earnestly these high considerations have been pressed on your attention. If indeed the Master, whom I desire humbly and efficiently to serve, has by his Spirit, written my “epistle of commendation” on your hearts, I hope I know how to thank him for the official honors so graciously conferred, and at the same time to rejoice with you in your joy.

Most cheerfully do I INSCRIBE this volume to you. Twenty years have elapsed, since the pastoral care of the congregation was committed to my hands. Many have gone from among you, during that short period, to meet “the Lord in the air,” and rejoicing in the hope of his glory; and many more, I fondly trust, are peacefully waiting the call from on high, which shall summon them home. At the same time, other events have occurred, and painful to be remembered, which were the source of the keenest anxieties; and which are now alluded to, only because they awake the fond recollection of your uninterrupted kindnesses; while, from your own well formed convictions of

the value of christian liberty, you cheerfully sustained the struggle, in which the acquisition of the sacred boon involved you. With like magnanimity, I have no doubt you will maintain the blessing so secured. Your various sympathies and affectionate regards are, and ever shall be, most gratefully reciprocated: Nor shall my heart cease to plead for your spiritual and everlasting welfare, and that of your children, while the hand, that records its tenderest emotions, shall be able to subscribe the name of

Your brother and pastor,

JOHN M. DUNCAN.

APRIL, 1832.

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LECTURES

ON

MORAL GOVERNMENT.

LECTURE I.

INTRODUCTORY.

The divine constitutions—Value of the chapters under consideration—Present state of society—Personal responsibility—Mystery.

I HAVE announced my intention of delivering a series of prelections, on the first three chapters of Genesis. You may, perhaps, be aware, that in executing this intention, sundry questions might arise which are of a purely scientific character. It is no part of my design to state, or answer those questions. The object I have in view is a discussion of the general principles of God's *moral* government in our world, to which discussion your candid and patient attention is invited.

The history of MAN and the study of the BIBLE present to every inquirer after truth two great *constitutions*, which have been established by divine legislation—the one original, and the other remedial. They are respectively described as exactly corresponding with the intellectual attributes of human beings; as happily suited to their earthly condition; and as terminating in their weal or their wo, on principles of perfect righteousness. These constitutions are uniform.

ly, in the scriptures, denominated LAW and GOSPEL; and we speak of them in the most familiar manner, using those distinctive appellations without any reserve. Yet it is very evident that they are not, either politically or technically, fairly understood. A spirit of baneful controversy has long since converted them into topics of angry and embittered strife. At the present moment, the whole church has become the arena of most unhappy contention; and I fear, too much is not said, when the description is extended so far as to sketch out a moral aceldama, where ministerial plumes lie dishonored; and where, to rob a brother of his high and holy reputation, as a servant of Jesus, becomes the boasted exploit of sectarian ambition.

In undertaking to elucidate the principles of these two constitutions, I enter not the lists as a combatant. They fall under my cognizance in the regular discharge of official duty. The systematic arrangements under which I seek to detail my views, or to investigate the philosophy of the constitutions referred to, may indeed require many a painful allusion to the state of moral science, to the present condition of the church, and to the future times, whose melancholy prognostics crowd upon us so thickly and rapidly; but I have no personal quarrel to avenge, nor any sectarian animosities to indulge. The attempt has been induced by a peculiar interest I have been led to cherish in the chapters selected.

In them a group of most interesting *facts* is exhibited to your view. A series of transactions, peculiar on account of their simplicity, is related to have transpired: and the record of the whole is unincumbered with any difficult technicalities, unembarrassed by doctrinal speculations, and unbroken by sophistical argument arising from jarring systems: or, there is no portion of the sacred volume, which we can so easily divest of these disadvantages. The narrative presents, so to speak, a field of moral inquiry which has seldom been explored. It is a part of the holy scriptures on which a lecture or a sermon is rarely heard from our pulpits. While

the general mind may have thus been unwarily led to overlook it as unimportant, the facts and phrases will have a novelty and a freshness about them, and an opportunity will be afforded to look at divine things under other than the ordinary forms of illustration. Like our own beloved land, which has become the welcome asylum to the advocates of political liberty; who, tired of the oppression of some ancient regime, would gladly escape from the misrule of a crippled, but infatuated despotism; these chapters may afford, to a conscientious and independent inquirer after truth, a freedom of investigation, after which he sighed in vain amid the subtleties and mysteries of scholastic theology.

Let there, however, be no misunderstanding. I have not said that these chapters have never been examined. Use has been made of them. But commonly, they are supposed to state certain doctrines, which, after a course of previous instruction authoritatively communicated, they would *appear* to state. From such an appearance, easily discovered when a proper medium has been provided, those doctrines are *assumed* as true; and then the various assumptions thus derived, are carried into all parts of the scriptures, as containing the true principles of all wise and accurate biblical exegesis. Now the question which will meet you at every step in the analysis on which we are about to enter, involves the truth of those *assumptions*. If they shall be found true, the conclusions to which they lead must of course be sustained: because the reasoning by which they have been reached is not to be refuted. But if those assumptions are not true, the conclusions to which they lead cannot be defended. The many new premises which may be laid down, must be carried through all our scriptural exposition, and will modify every subsequent view which authority may have imposed, or education engrafted. The process is not very difficult, where candor is not lacking, or where prejudices are not suffered to reign in arbitrary and undisputed sway. A mind, thus furnished for investigation, is as un-

likely to be deceived, as it is likely to acquire truth; for its communion is with the God of truth, and its appeal for wisdom is to him who "giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not."

You may, perhaps, more distinctly perceive the propriety, and more cheerfully submit to the temporary guidance of the passage I have selected, if I plead in its behalf the example of the Master himself. When the pharisees came to him with a question which greatly agitated the schools of Sammai and Hillel, and asked, whether it was "lawful for a man to put away his wife," he answered, "what did Moses command you?" They readily replied—"Moses suffered to give her a bill of divorcement and to put her away." True, said the Redeemer—"For the hardness of your heart he wrote you that precept; but from THE BEGINNING of the creation God made them male and female." Back to the beginning, and to the records contained in these chapters, he carried these disputants, when they were controverting a point of moral law. May we not do the same? And are we not particularly, not only warranted, but induced to do so, when we discover, from his mode of explaining apparent difficulties, wherein certain things do not seem to harmonize with general and original principles, that those difficulties arise from mistaking the character and intention of some intervening circumstances, which were merely prudential and temporary? The Mosaic law was enacted by the divine lawgiver; yet it does not alter the original statute, when the condition of the world no longer required the contemplated indulgence, and society could return to her primordial relations. Possibly there may be some *other* matters besides those which are connected with the subject of divorce, and about which theologians may be as much divided as the two Jewish schools referred to; and in relation to which they may be equally fastidious, without possessing superior information. Peradventure an appeal to primeval ordinances

may be as clear and satisfactory in such cases, as in the precedent which has been furnished.*

But can we not all perceive, that, in the present day, there are special reasons, why a minister of the gospels tenderly and affectionately regarding the heritage which the Lord hath given him, should undertake such a discussion, and in a manner most consistent with his best judgment? We live in a singular age, when many christians act, and many ministers sustain their influence, more by *excitement* than by any other means. It is with pain I even hint at some of the meagre operations of the day. But the state of the case is as I have described it; and the revulsion must be felt by every intelligent mind. Is not the whole church deeply agitated? Are not religious communities every where thrown into distraction and turmoil? The innovations that have disturbed the mahomedan imposture—the encroachments which have invaded papal misrule—the various assaults against the union of church and state—the divisions between high church and low church, old school and new school, of which multitudes talk so significantly and freely—the outcry against sectarianism—the breaking up and threatened dissolution of old and established parties—the warm controversies to which voluntary associations have given rise—the social combinations which are starting up all around us, and in which the restlessness of the public mind seeks to expend its zeal—this new, this high, this varied excitement, which seems so little to regard ancient ordinances, and is pervading the whole of our moral interests—what means it all?

* Bonaparte's biographer reports him to have observed—"There are so many different religions, or modifications of them, that it is difficult to know which to choose. *If one religion had existed from the beginning of the world, I should think it to be the true one*; as it is, I am of opinion that every person ought to continue in the religion in which he was brought up—in that of his father." O'Meara, vol. i. 127.

Some are standing in great fearfulness, amazed at the scene before them. Others are weeping, and are trembling for the ark itself, because the fathers, who were so wise and good, so learned and holy, have lost their influence. And many are smiling with great complacency, promising to themselves that the falsehood of christianity shall soon be exposed, and that the progress of light and knowledge shall soon drive all priestcraft from the world. Though very different in their feelings, yet are they not all alike superficial in their views? Are not these conflicts too general—have they not approached with a pace too regular, and with an energy too powerful, to be discarded as unworthy of candid and patient examination? They must have a reason, and that reason must be commensurate with themselves. Some change must have occurred, involving the constitution of the human mind itself, to wake up all this diversified feeling: to call forth all this activity; and so deeply to interest, not only all denominations of christians, but all classes of human beings. And he who presides over the whole—the mediatorial prince who has foretold, from ancient times, the events which are to come to pass in the latter days, must be about to accomplish some glorious work. To be more particular:

In order to approach our subject by the most accessible avenue, permit me to ask you, why is it that the political world is so much agitated? Mankind are not more quiet as politicians, than they are as religionists. The fact every one knows. Revolutions and changing dynasties are too frequent, succeed each other too rapidly, are followed by consequences too marked, and are met by too many responses prompt and loud, not to rouse the intensest anxiety. Ought the fact to be explained? Or shall we stand off wondering at the phenomenon, weeping over the convulsion, or smiling complacently at the prospect of a catastrophe, in which all civil government shall terminate? Nay, you all know the reason of these perplexities. Your children know it. With

what enthusiasm *you* talk about liberty; How quickly *they* imbibe the spirit of independence you breathe. Not only so; but to our own American revolution, as commencing a new era in the political world, you ascribe the struggles of the nations after free institutions.

How came you to know all this? How does it happen that you so harmoniously agree as to the identity of a general cause, so mighty in its influence, so certain in its progress, and so varied in its results? You have not speculated at hazard. You have not theorised at random, nor reasoned without premises. You sat down and carefully pondered all you heard. You respectfully listened to your statesmen, while they leisurely discussed general principles, traced effects to their causes, and demonstrated the inappropriateness of ancient customs and laws. Your politicians were neither ashamed nor afraid to declare what they thought. They courageously met, or with manly fortitude endured, the difficulties attendant on their noble enterprise; and now, when they are gone, you celebrate their deeds, imitate their example, and prize, as your richest inheritance, the freedom they left you.

Grant to your ministers like liberty and boldness of speech, listen with equal patience and without prejudice, examine with similar candor and care, and you may as readily comprehend the cause of all that religious excitement which has occurred. The cases are parallel; for what you call *politics* is but a branch, and a very important branch, of *morals*. The law of God, James informs us, is "the law of *liberty*:" so that your profession calls upon you to subscribe to the doctrine of liberty, in its reference to Christ's kingdom. It is your privilege to be the freemen of the Lord. You are forbidden to call any man MASTER. Search then and see. Are you not under the dominion of an ecclesiastical lordship, which men have claimed the right to set up? Has the question of liberty been finally and fully settled by the reformers in their contest with papal infallibility? Do you live

under no restrictions created by a sectarian policy, which have been boldly defended? Feel you no oppression from the hand of ecclesiastical power? If you do, then may you easily comprehend the reason of the present excitement. If you do not, others do, and they have risen to complain. It is no part of their object to undermine christianity, or to decline into some of the heresies of which they have been so ungenerously accused. They love their Master, and bless him for his word. They delight in his law after the inner man, and live in intimate fellowship with him as their counsellor and their Lord; but they demand the *liberty* wherewith he hath set them free.

Many may still suppose that this subject of moral liberty has made but little impression on the religious mind. And so far as I have yet stated the matter, the remarks which have been offered will, perhaps, not be felt as very conclusive. Combatants on all sides seem to be very fond of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and of the ancient creeds, as well as of the annual statutes, of church courts. The deceptive ostentation, the dazzling magnificence of exterior policy, together with the show of official character, make a strong appeal to the *senses*. There are, therefore, other matters pertaining to the subject of *liberty*, which must be previously settled, and the discussion of which will elevate the human mind above the glitter and pomp of outward circumstance. Or, according to the favorite maxim of the creed defenders,—“no man turns against *creeds* until *creeds* turn against him,” which is in other words to assert, that no patriot turns against the political government of his country until he feels that government to oppress him—according to this maxim, the religious community will not lose their admiration of ecclesiastical and sectarian control, until the discussion of some previous questions shall have elevated their moral views. But then that discussion is now going on with fearful intrepidity, and ecclesiastical politicians are trembling for the shibboleth of their party. Nor must they be sur-

prised, or feel themselves entitled to break out into sarcasm and invective, because that those who are outside, as well as those who are inside, of the church, are deeply interested in the controversy. The matters at issue involve the interest and character of the human mind.—Let me explain:

On what ground may any man claim his *liberty*? God made him *free*, it may be answered. But on what principle has his Creator constructed his liberty? Is it not on the *individuality* of his being, or in view of his *personal* responsibility? And is not this same subject of *personal responsibility*, at this very moment, under discussion every where? If then you can rob a man of his own sense of individuality, or make him feel so inane that he ceases to regard the value of personal character; or if you can paralyze his *conscience*, and dissipate his self esteem; then you may, by mere *power*, call it civil or ecclesiastical as you please, prostrate his *liberty*. But rest assured, that in proportion as he recovers the feeling of personal character, the scale will be turned, and a crisis will come on, when the offensive statutes must be rescinded. If this is true, the day of ecclesiastical liberty has dawned, and is hastening to its meridian splendors. Men may hold to their creeds if they please, and talk about the value of ecclesiastical rule, and the impossibility of doing without it if they choose, but their hour is coming.

Take an illustration or two. Many have been resolving religion into an exclusive operation of *divine power*. But now, you every where hear the doctrine of personal responsibility urged with great point and force. Such expressions as the following, are become very common: “Men *may* be saved if they *will*: if they are not saved, the *fault is their own*.” And when the statement is thus unequivocally set forth, multitudes, who have lived on the faith of other times, are exceedingly startled. The preacher is immediately suspected of heresy—it may be pelagianism, or unitarianism; rumor begins her “many inventions,” and puts

forth her romantic tales; a series of heart-burnings is engendered, and ministers and elders learn to tamper with the conscience of their brother. It is a very curious question, and worthy of consideration—why are so many *old* christians offended, when they hear the sinner's perdition ascribed to *his own fault*? Do they mean to say, that the fault is God's? If they do not, why are they offended?

Politics, I have said, constitute a very important branch of morals, and involve the principles of *government*. The ideas which men may have adopted in relation to government, must be applied consistently, whether to a divine or human administration: and necessarily so. Now in the common discussions which grow out of regal pretensions, a controversy has long been pending, whether the *sovereignty* of kings and the *free agency* of the people are compatible with each other? Dreary and disastrous has been the experiment to which this matter has been subjected. At length, among ourselves, the sovereignty of rulers has been put under wholesome restrictions. The free agency, the individuality, the liberty of the people is *now*, in our land, the popular doctrine; and it is carrying its reforming influence into all parts of the world.

So it is in the christian church. The doctrine of divine *sovereignty* has long been stated in a form which is supposed to interfere with human *free agency*. Religious doctrines are often approached with a superstitious dread, as though it were unlawful to investigate such sacred mysteries. But the political maxims which have become established, are bringing, in spite of our fastidiousness, the subtleties of scholastic theology into comparison with themselves. This result cannot be avoided. Demonstrate the free agency of man, and on the principle of *free agency* he will reason every where. Show it to him first where the light is not too brilliant for his steady gaze, and after a little he will follow on to look at the same thing in more splendid connexions; nor will he be restrained by any legislative enactments

which men may frame. Under the government of God, are men *free agents*? If they are, how can this comport with the old doctrine of divine sovereignty? If they are free agents, are they not *personally* responsible to God; and then what becomes of the *ecclesiastical* sovereignty of *men*? In whatever sense sovereignty may be ascribed, yet it may well be asked, are *men* entitled to dominion over the human conscience, so far that they may make authoritative creeds as standards of doctrine? and, erecting those creeds into terms of communion, may they deprive a minister or a christian of spiritual privileges in the community where the providence of God may have located him?

Carrying the inquiry a little farther, another question arises. Can a man be personally responsible for that which he does not possess; or for that which he cannot perform? Do the scriptures proffer to the faith of mankind a doctrine of divine sovereignty, which represents it as demanding that which a man *cannot* render? In political controversy, the human mind has acquired other ideas of responsibility; and will no attempt be made to ascertain how far those ideas are compatible with our relations to the divine throne? Admitting, as every man must freely admit, the infirmities of human nature; and moreover admitting, as every biblical reader must freely admit, that without a Mediator we *can do nothing*; yet the question necessarily arises, does not divine sovereignty impose its commands on us, as on agents sustained by evangelic privileges? Is it not the sovereignty of a MEDIATOR of which the scriptures speak? Are they not describing the administration of "a merciful and faithful high priest" seated on the throne; who, having learned obedience by the things which he suffered, is regulating human concerns with a view to the *good* of men; and who, duly considering the infirmities incident to our condition, demand, nothing but that which we can render? Is not his government in morals precisely analogous to his government in

physics, in which human effort may be most unreservedly made, with a confident dependence on divine providence?

But then are we not *dead* in sin? Has not Adam's transgression defrauded us of all moral power? Is not this the condition of every man, until God makes him, in the exercise of his sovereignty, spiritually alive? While a man is *dead*, can he be personally responsible? If God shall not make him spiritually alive, can his perdition be referred to *his own fault*? These are the interesting questions which an age, grown inquisitive by political emancipation, is earnestly pursuing. And theologians have their hands full. Adam's sin is now the grand subject of debate; and particularly as its consequences are to be considered in reference to human ability and inability. After all, the question, in general terms is, whether, and how, each man is *personally* responsible? That he is so, every one is beginning to assert. Old systems will wither, and the arm that would uphold them will be paralyzed. The doctrines of personal responsibility, and of human liberty, are essentially the same; and as they stand connected, they are shaking to its centre every ecclesiastical establishment in christendom. If I tell not the truth, believe me not.

There is another matter which, in view of our present subject, deserves very special consideration. In every branch of science, men are very diligently engaged in making *improvements*. We can turn to no department of society where we do not observe this fact, and all the world seems to have been thrown into bustle by the literary and philosophical pretensions which, in every direction, are courting public respect and confidence. I am fully aware that those who are wise by hereditary statute, have caricatured "the march of mind;" and that even ministers of the gospel affect to be facetious, and try to be severely satirical, when "the signs of the times" are supposed to augur great and profitable changes. But after all abatement is made for the interesting representations of the influential, and the often-

times dogmatic, leaders of public disputes, the change in sentiment and feeling is imperceptibly, but surely, introducing its grand climacteric.

The character of the change, which is so visibly arranging its important preliminaries, after all, amounts merely to a well meant and determined attempt to simplify that which before was abstruse and mysterious. In other words, men are trying to understand and explain every thing, as far as their intellectual force or their varied observation can carry them. Even in your schools a very persevering effort is made, to bring down the various branches of education to the comprehension of the juvenile mind: nor is the process finished. In every direction old theories are yielding to new discoveries, and philosophers are abandoning speculation in pursuit of facts. And shall all this intellectual expenditure, various and enterprising as it is, accomplish nothing for the gospel, and bring no tribute to the church?

Theologians very frequently treat a reputed opponent quite cavalierly, and very fiercely, but inconsiderately, revile him as a heretic. On the present point they may be so disposed to resist any application of the preceding remarks to their own science, and proudly tell us that morals are always the same. But would they *aver* this to be the fact, in thus stating their objection? General principles may be much the same; but are not the principles of physics as uniformly the same as those of morals? Have sun, moon, and stars altered their courses, or is there any thing new under the sun? Yet in relation to all the different departments of science, the doctrines of philosophers have changed again and again; and may not those of moralists vary with equal ease and frequency? Can we maintain so improbable an idea, that because the principles of the divine government are always essentially the same, therefore the opinions of men, and even of good men, are always accurate? Has God himself never modified his dispensations, to meet any particular state of society? Was there no difference between

jewish ceremonies and the patriarchal ritual? Does not the gospel dispensation differ from both, and professedly presume on an increased amount of mental vigor, as though the church had escaped from childhood, and attained to full age? To say then, in the present connection, that morals are always the same, is either ignorantly or sophistically, to get away from the subject in hand.

But how stands the fact? Is there no room for improvement in the speculative opinions which men, and good men too, have promulgated in reference to religious principles? Are our theological systems so plain that they cannot be simplified, or so harmonious that no arbitrator is required? Will any enlightened man, belonging to any of the controversial parties, undertake to say, that in all points he alone is right? Are not all the contending sects confessedly asserting mysteries? And is there no danger of being in error, when they unhesitatingly admit, that in many respects, the subjects of their speculations are above their comprehension? Then again may not their plea of *mystery* be the very circumstance that betrays the necessity for investigation?

What is a MYSTERY? The general idea, if I mistake not, is, that a mystery is a certain something, in its own nature *incomprehensible* to human reason; which something is accordingly not to be defined. The doctrines concerning such points, may always be matter of debate; and as no one may pretend infallibly to decide what the facts concerning them are, ought we not to be very cautious how we receive such doctrines as articles of faith, and exceedingly careful, to say the least, that they shall not be too extensively multiplied? Our eternal all is at stake; and it is God's revelation on which we are required to meditate. Shall men rudely impose upon us their notions, telling us how venerable these are for their antiquity, and haughtily demand our assent, or superciliously condemn our hesitancy? Do they not feel that their whole statement is extremely startling and forbidding, when they apprise us that christianity is full of in-

comprehensibilities? Are there really any incomprehensible things in the gospel—might not some humble inquirer ask, without giving any serious offence?

I know very well that I am treading on dangerous ground. A thousand voices would instantly and tumultuously reply, the scriptures themselves speak undisguisedly of their own *mysteries*, and it is in vain to object to their statement. God forbid that I should utter one word disparaging to the scriptures; or breathe the most distant suspicion of their divine inspiration, or of their indubitable accuracy. But, perhaps, by a *mystery* they do not mean a certain something incomprehensible to human reason. It is worth our while to ascertain; for if they do not so denominate that which is incomprehensible, then the spell in which our investigation may be bound is dissolved. Some few quotations, in which instances of their use of the term will be afforded, may determine this question without any great dispute: take the following:

“Now to him that is of power to establish you according to my gospel, and the preaching of Jesus Christ, according to *the revelation of the mystery*, which was *kept secret* since the world began, but now is *made manifest*, and by the scriptures of the prophets, according to the commandment of the everlasting God, *made known* to all nations for the obedience of faith.”*

“But we speak the wisdom of God in a *mystery*, even the *hidden* wisdom which God ordained before the world unto our glory; which none of the princes of this world knew: but God hath *revealed* them unto us by his Spirit, for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, *the deep things* of God.”†

“Having *made known to us the mystery of his will*, according to his good pleasure, which he hath purposed in himself.”‡

“*By revelation he made known unto me the mystery*, as I wrote afore in few words; whereby when ye read, ye may

* Rom. xvi. 25, 26. † 1 Cor. ii. 7, 8, 10. ‡ Eph. i. 9.

understand *my knowledge in the mystery of Christ*, which in other ages was not made known unto the sons of men.”*

So then mystery is a mere *secret*, which may be made known, made manifest, revealed or uncovered.

In like manner the term is applied to human projects: “The *mystery* of iniquity doth already work.”† It is also used in reference to a rite or ceremony, or emblem: “The *mystery* of the seven stars.”‡ “I will tell thee the mystery of the woman and of the beast that carrieth her.”§ Among the heathen also, we hear of the various *mysteries* of their false gods. Early ecclesiastical writers used the word with the same signification; and it may be found in the communion service of the church of England in the same acceptance, and in reference to the Lord’s supper.

The term, therefore, in its scriptural use, is employed as an appellative of a mere secret which may not be, for a time, fully disclosed; and the advocate of incomprehensible things in religion must find out some other argument to justify his view. Christianity, as it is exhibited in the new dispensation, instead of being full of mysteries, is intended to do them away, and to bring out to light, that which had been long hidden or kept secret. Supposing then, that the popular systems of theology not only assert that there are, but actually teach to us, inconceivable things, and tell us that these matters are the *peculiarities* of the gospel, is there no room for improvement? Ought we still to maintain mysteries if the scriptures disown them? Or shall we adhere to matters which are incomprehensible in their own nature as indubitable verities, because that in any particular period of society, or in any given state of physical or moral science, they may not be explained?

But how has it happened that the term, and the thing of which the term is a sign, have been so often, and so much, misapplied? How is it that so generally among the clergy and

* Eph. iii. 4, 5. † 2 Thess. ii. 7. ‡ Rev. i. 20. § Rev. xvii. 7.

the pious, to say a word against mysterious doctrines is to be chargeable with extreme heresy, if not with infidelity itself? One great reason unquestionably is their advancing and maintaining various dogmas, which they themselves cannot explain. But I apprehend the cause lies much deeper, and is to be traced far back in the history of our race. The gloomy legends which are opened up to view by an allusion to preceding ages, many are apt to resolve into one universal, all pervading cause—*human depravity*. It would be folly in the highest degree not to admit the existence and the potency of the reason so promptly assigned. But an inquisitive mind asks for an explanation which will not be so general. There is a necessity to be more particular, and to look after the minuter operations of secondary agents.

We are told that there were mysteries from the beginning; or things which were kept secret since the world began. Starting at a point so very remote, we must follow society down, as it begins to extend and ramify itself. We may, perhaps, thus discover the object of our search. At first, all the various powers of government, civil and ecclesiastical, so to speak, were vested in the same individual. The prince was the priest, and the priest was the prince. This political arrangement would not only be established by a divine ordinance, but resulted from the nature of the case. Adam would be naturally looked up to as fairly entitled to all official honors, and his eldest son would as readily be acknowledged as his official heir. That particular association which is now called the *church*, did not arise until long after, when a double trial had been made of the efficiency of the original system that had placed the priest on the throne, or called the occupant of the throne to act as priest. This earlier institution, as long as it lasted, served to typify the official prerogatives of the promised Mediator, who is now a *priest upon his throne*. All government was at that time to have been exercised on *mediatorial princi-*

ples;—a fact which you may keep in mind, as it has an important bearing on the question, whether Christ died for all men or not; and decides the point whether the heathen are under mediatorial law or not. Civil government, as it was established after the fall, was intended to wear an evangelic character; so that all mankind were, and are, placed as much under the mediatorial institute, as they had been under the original law.

It is not necessary to trace society in the subsequent development and changes which it exhibits; to notice the union of church and state under the Jewish theocracy; the disruption of that union under the christian system; its re-establishment under Constantine; its continuance to the present hour, notwithstanding that nations have wept and bled under its blighting influence; nor to anticipate the probable state of affairs during the millennium, when they may revert to their primordial simplicity, and when every trace of official misrule may be obliterated from our distracted world. Enough has been done to obtain a position from which to look after the matter of inquiry.

In the state of society which has been described, it must be evident to every one, that official men were apparently entrusted with a great deal of *power*. The exercise of power is as liable to corruption, as any other attribute belonging to man. A restless ambition would very soon begin to excogitate schemes of aggrandizement, and be dissatisfied with any eminence short of absolute authority. The plan of operation would be covert, and its progress insidious, as mankind would not readily surrender their liberties. Every plausible mean, every ingenious artifice, every sophistical argument would be pertinaciously employed, in order to allay suspicion, and to secure the object. The prince, under such circumstances, and with such designs, would not fail to use his sacred functions, well knowing the regard which men have for the holy things of the Lord, and the excitement into which they are easily thrown by the seeming in-

terference of supernatural agents. The very moment that religion degenerates into superstition, the multitude, by exchanging intelligence for ignorance, and becoming credulous instead of thoughtful, are prepared for political slavery. And so, on the other hand, as soon as they break their political fetters and learn to think, superstition flies, and a pure and undefiled religion may quickly interest their feelings and absorb their souls. Under such a revolution, "a nation might be born in a day."

Laying hold of these peculiarities of our nature, which a mere politician often profoundly studies, the prince, in his march after *power*, soon learns to conquer the human mind, by appealing to its fears. A series of mysteries preserved with sybilline care, and generating a set of popular mystic notions, would be one of his happiest and most effectual expedients. The glory of the Lord would be changed into the most degenerate representations; the inner man would become reprobate; and a spiritual death, so often ascribed to Adam's sin as its single and omnipotent cause, would supervene. Every plan would then be accomplished which the despotic ruler had devised, and infatuated nations would preserve the very mysticism which defrauded them of intellectual resources, and converted them into serfs, and transmit it to their children. Such I take to be the origin of the false ideas of *mystery* that are abroad in the world, and by which a sacred and accurate term has been grossly misapplied.*

I would not be understood to say, that, comparatively speaking, while we are in this world, and are living by faith, we do not "see through a glass darkly," nor yet that there

* Bishop Warburton, in his Div. Leg. of Moses, B. II. S. 4. has handled this subject with great learning. The reader may there discover how much of pagan superstition has been incorporated in the papal system, whence protestants have derived so many of their notions. It was DEATH to intrude into "the mysteries." How much better is it now?

are no matters hard to be understood in the sacred volume; where, as Lactantius elegantly remarked, "an elephant may swim, while a lamb may wade." The point is here: if one man or one age—if many men or many ages, be incompetent to explain a certain truth, is that truth therefore, in its own nature, incomprehensible to the human mind? And if we are only emerging from a long period of darkness, in which kings reigned with unquestioned supremacy, and monarchies as such were reputed to be of divine right; a period in which councils determined articles of faith, and popes ruled in the temple of God as the vicegerents of "the messenger of the covenant;" are those matters, which could not then be satisfactorily explained, now to be viewed as beyond our mental grasp? Does it follow that what Calvin and Luther did not understand, no one else can elucidate? Or, in the multifarious effort which human intellect, free and independent, is now putting forth, are no discoveries to be made, no new combinations to be devised, no *secrets* to be told? If the theologian has risen to no higher moral elevation than this, it is no wonder that he feels his imbecility to control the commotions around him; and pitifully sighs over the disasters which fill his views by day and his visions by night. Better that the church had been supplied with ministers fresh from the circle of her own families, than from theological seminaries, which thus prove themselves to be but splendid deceptions.

Are not "many running to and fro, seeking after knowledge?" Is not intelligence every where diffusing itself? Have not men been long discussing human responsibilities on broad, general principles? I ask not whether any men are now more *learned* than their predecessors, or have read and written more books? but whether the mass of mankind are not acquiring a new intellectual character? Children ask their parents, who never thought beyond the range of their catechism, many appropriate questions which they cannot answer. And men, who are but larger children, looking

on the world around them, may propose to their ministers, who never travelled out of the periphery of their own sectarian system, many questions which the word *mystery* will no longer answer. The inquirer is not satisfied, and will not submit to rebuke. Whatever may be the final issue, such is the present condition of society. Inquiry is advancing; is growing importunate and intrepid, bold and adventurous; and they who mean to meet the approaching crisis, and to save the world from the delirious misrule of infidelity, must quit their creeds and turn to their bibles. If they will not, they may calculate on consequences which will prove these present days to be "but the beginning of sorrows."

We are informed by the Spirit of prophecy that a day of great glory is to dawn upon our world. That day cannot be far distant. A time of tribulation may, and in all probability will, intervene; but "the coming of the Lord draweth nigh." Is there any preparation to be made for his appearance? Will he do all by his own fearful judgments, or have we a part to act? Do any imagine, that the church shall remain as she now is,—broken up into parties, and distracted by incessant hostilities? Shall not these sects be dissolved, and some other ecclesiastical ground be marked out, where brethren can meet in unity, and where the divine blessing shall come down like the dew on Hermon? Are not the various parties heaving painfully, as though corroded by some mortal disease? The "power of life and death" has been taken away; and the reputation of many a maltreated son of truth is given up to be adjudicated by the world, which, like Pilot, ignorant of, and unconcerned about, the technicalities of sectarian law, can find no fault. Society at large is acquiring more liberal and benevolent feelings, and cares very little about the distinctions which were forged in the Master's name by the false philosophy of past ages. And what the immediate result may be, depends very much upon the official bearing of ministerial men and ecclesiastical

courts. Their haughty mien, their demand for punctilious conformity, and their unrelenting animosities, will only increase the difficulties and deepen the gloom. The high concerns of Christ's house, and the destinies of immortal souls must not rest on the will of well disciplined partisans, or the majority of votes in an ecclesiastical legislature. The day for such measures is gone by. A new era has commenced. It started well; for benevolence was its impulse, and the dissemination of truth was its object. But how has the scene changed! These very benevolent institutions, appearing as purely voluntary, have become apples of discord; and every heart that has preserved its kind feelings, or beats with fraternal love for dying men, is mourning at the altars of the Lord, and is sickened by the strife.

But if such a day as the Spirit of the Lord has predicted is really coming; if the time is at hand, and if a moral revolution is shortly to extend the Redeemer's kingdom to earth's utmost bounds, how could it be otherwise than that mankind should be greatly excited? Must not old institutions give place to those which a new ecclesiastical regency may establish? What else can any man, who has not given himself up to the sensualities of the scene around him, expect? What else can any man, but the lover of obsolete ordinances, or the child of mere animal feeling, desire? What else can a minister, who is not too superannuated to admire the energy of his children, or too juvenile to understand the value of official influence, or too confident to suffer even the Lord to work according to his good pleasure, anticipate? Have we never read the story of the antediluvian world, the discomfiture of Pharaoh's host, or the tale of Jerusalem's destruction? I protest to you, that I see not how the millennium can come, without such earthly doings as those which are now surprising the world. That they are begun and are in progress, only confirms my confidence in the elder brother, who, sitting as Lord on the throne of glory, presides over the perplexing, but purifying process

which his Spirit foretold. The immediate consequences, I confess, are deeply troubling; for society seems to be dissolving, and it is no wonder that "men's hearts are failing them for fear."

The foregoing, and such like views ever present themselves, when, according to the ability which the Lord hath given me, I endeavor to read society. They have driven me to examine the scriptures for myself. The result of the investigation shall be presented to you in the following course of lectures. I approach you with no authoritative *creed*, but offer to your judgment trains of thought which have deeply interested myself. You are responsible for yourselves. You have the bible in your own hands; you have the intellectual spirit which God has given you; you are surrounded by the various evolutions of the times; and you must carefully and conscientiously decide. Be not intimidated by the outcry of those who never ventured beyond the narrow articles of their party confederation, and perhaps can scarcely tell you even what is in them. Search, on your own responsibility, for the truth as it is in Christ. I ask you to attend to no speculations which rob your Master of his divinity; or predicate a dignity of human nature inconsistent with the indispensable necessity for a Mediator, and the gracious operations of the Spirit of God. I have no sympathies with Arian speculations, nor Socinian criticism. My simple object is to declare TRUTH as I have learned it; and all that I ask at your hands is magnanimity enough to listen to it. And if, under the hysterical excitement necessarily incident to a community full of morbid sensibilities, this cannot be awarded, I must leave you to the high judgment of conscience; and with him to whom we must all give account, when sectarian considerations will be of no avail.

LECTURE II.

Of God.—Reason and nature of the divine manifestations—Elohim—Trinity—Sabellianism—Arianism—Hilary and Augustin—Mosaic dispensation—Moses and Paul compared, in view of the manner in which they speak of God—Redeemer's explanation of Elohim—Propriety of the term.

MOSES has commenced his brief sketch of the early annals of our race, by asserting that "in the beginning God made the heavens and the earth:" at least, our translators have so rendered his language. To me, this declaration appears as a mere truism, a self-evident fact, which no man of common intellectual discernment would question. Some indeed, have affected to deny the existence of God; or have talked about the eternity of matter, as though they really understood what they said, or whereof they affirmed. But then the scriptures have remarked, that only "the fool hath said in his heart there is no God." The apparently abstract proposition, which shows itself on the face of the text, would then seem to be uttered with a degree of formality altogether unnecessary. Perhaps it may not be so; and my observation may be censured as, to say the least of it, a piece of mere fastidious criticism. The sequel will evince whether the preceding comment is accurate or not; and whether, in the discussion on which we are entering, it has any importance.

Certain it is, that theologians have considered the naked proposition, as given by our translators, to be abundantly plain, and have confidently built upon it their numerous and conflicting systems. Having presented it to their pupils or readers, they immediately proceed to discourse about God, as though the subject of which they treat were really

within their reach. How many beautiful and elaborate essays, detailing and illustrating the divine perfections, have appeared, awakening public interest and commanding public admiration. The human mind has thus been absorbed, and has wasted all its energies in contemplating a mere abstraction. Omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, infinity in every direction, our moralists have labored to delineate, when they would speak of their glorious Creator. They have confessed the subject to be incomprehensible, and seem to have thought that they have done enough to satisfy any modest inquirer, when they have stated in grandiloquous phrase, that which they did not understand. They have thrown us to the circumference of a circle, and left us to pace an eternal round.

But it may be asked, whether it is intended to deny, that omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence, do belong to God? Certainly not. But I do intend to ask, what these terms mean? Explain to me, for example, what *omniscience* is. It imports, some one may reply, the knowledge of all things. But then again, the question may be pressed, what are we to understand by ALL THINGS? And an answer, stating all that theologians have labored to conceive and to express, may not be so easily framed. If indeed I should be referred to the heavens and the earth as the works of God, as we are told by Moses, that—"in the beginning God made *the heavens and the earth*," there would be no difficulty in comprehending omniscience, or any of the terms which have been employed, or their application. For we can easily form our ideas of Jehovah and his attributes, by what we know, or by the objects which are within the range of our perceptions, and by which he intended to teach us of himself.

But have our theologians been contented with this display? Have they not stretched their imagination far, very far, beyond these limits; and, carrying us out of our own world, begun to descant upon illimitable space, and the in-

finite God filling illimitable space? And what do you know now? You have sought to rise to the contemplation of objects beyond mortal ken, and are presuming to traverse regions where the great Creator has furnished no guide. Worlds there may be, systems of worlds there may be, spreading themselves out in infinite space, or revolving round the throne of God as their eternal sun; but the question is, what do we know about them? Who can tell what God is doing in them, or among them, or describe in what manner he has revealed or manifested himself unto them? Yet, ignorant as we are, these are the fields in which we have been speculating about *Godhead*. Here we suppose ourselves to have studied the divine character with the greatest accuracy; and on abstractions of which we have in vain endeavored to form some intelligent notions, we have erected our various systems. We cannot be satisfied with discoursing about omniscience, omnipotence or omnipresence, as these relate to the world with which we are connected; but, attaching to the momentous subject of God's moral government all our own conjectures, and basing our theories on the abstract perfections we ascribe to him, we have made religion a mere tissue of most perplexing mysteries. Hence our continual controversies, that involve almost every moral principle about which the mind of man can be employed, and that even now seem to be no nearer their termination than when they first commenced.

To me it appears abundantly plain, that here, where Moses commences his account, in the heavens and the earth, or those hosts of created objects of which the human mind can take cognizance, we necessarily find our limit. Beyond these we cannot go. Any attempt which may be made, is a wasteful expenditure of intellect, and must end in fruitless conjecture. Doubtless there is a great deal beyond these limits; but it is impossible for us to attain to that which has not been brought within our own mental range. Even our own future state of being is above our compre-

hension, and is so represented to us in the scriptures themselves. Paul informs us, that when he was caught up into the third heavens, he "heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter." And John says, "it doth not yet appear what we shall be, but we know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is." Of course, if we are not fitted to know, to see or to hear, things which are unrepresented in this material system with which our existence is connected for the time being, we must form our ideas of God from those views he has afforded of himself, and must speak of his attributes as he has *manifested* them. Whatever is beyond this world is mystery, i. e. is a *secret* to us.

It belongs not to man to perceive SPIRIT abstractedly considered. We cannot perceive or know each other's spirit, excepting as it is exhibited in its appropriate form, or by some external act. And as God is a SPIRIT,—so said Jesus to the Samaritan woman,—we cannot know him, unless he shall manifest himself by and in his works, or shall assume personal *form*. The necessity under which we are thus placed is found in the very constitution of our nature, and must exist so long as it shall be characteristic of us to acquire our ideas by means of our corporeal senses. The divinity of Jesus Christ, to use popular language, is not so *irrational* a doctrine, nor is it so destitute of evidence to be derived from the nature of things, and from the nature of man, as some have confidently pretended. The real truth is, that it is founded in the nature of things, and in the nature of man, and therefore the scriptures have taught it. And those who have defended this doctrine, have, I think, essentially weakened their own argument, by basing it simply on the sovereignty of Jehovah.

It is necessary to pursue this topic a little farther. How can any man explain to me wisdom, goodness and power, as attributes of God? Of abstract qualities the human mind can form no idea, whether they are predicated of God, of

man, or of any creature. The scriptures certainly occupy this ground in undertaking to teach us of God. "The heavens," they say, "declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handy work. Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night sheweth knowledge. They have no speech—no language—their voice is not heard, nevertheless their line is gone out through all the earth, and their words to the end of the world."* "That which *may be known of God* is manifest in, or among them, for God hath showed it unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, *being understood by the things that are made*, even his eternal power and Godhead, so that they are without excuse."† "He left not himself without a witness, in that he did good, and gave us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness."‡ Take away these outward exhibitions of Jehovah, in which he has, says Paul, manifested that which *may be known* of him, and what philosopher can give us any idea of God? or explain what is meant by his wisdom, goodness or power? Undoubtedly there may be a God, good, wise and powerful; and he may be known, loved and admired by other intellectual beings differently constituted from ourselves; but we can have no perceptions of him. A blind man knows nothing of color—a deaf man is utterly ignorant of sound. In like manner we must be entirely unacquainted with the existence or character of God, unless he be manifested to us, and in a mode suitable to our nature. No reasonable controvertist will deny this. The only alternative is blank atheism: a doctrine in maintaining which, any man, even the veriest heathen, Paul tells us, would be perfectly inexcusable.

If the preceding argument shall be admitted as conclusive, then the *principle* of a divine manifestation, i. e. of God's manifesting *himself* to man, is conceded. The *neces-*

*Ps. xix. 1. 4.

†Rom. i. 19, 20.

‡ Acts xiv. 17.

sity for such a manifestation is also traced, and with equal clearness and certainty, to the constitution of human nature. And if the principle, so far as it has been carried, or in its application to the heavens and the earth, be correct, why may it not be equally true, if its application shall be extended? The test in this extended application of the principle, will be the same as in its original application : i. e. if the manifestation which God made of himself in the heavens and the earth, be rational and necessary, considering the peculiarity of the human constitution, then a further manifestation of him will be equally rational and necessary, if the peculiarity of human nature shall call for it. On this simple view of the character of man, or of the necessity arising from the constitution of his nature, must rest the whole *reason* for the fact, and the doctrine, of the divinity of the Saviour. “Such an high priest *became* us”—“in all things it *behooved* him to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be a merciful and faithful high priest.”

God having manifested *himself* to us by the works of creation and providence, and that manifestation being made in such a manner as is suited to our mind *in its present mode of subsistence*, is there no necessity that the Creator should proceed farther? Can we now be satisfied, or will we not pursue our inquiries? Is it unnatural or irrational to seek after *personal intercourse*, or communion, with that being whose works have introduced him to our acquaintance? Is it unphilosophic to suppose that God would make such an arrangement as to render it possible for us to have a nearer and more spiritual view of him? If he should do so, would it not be very desirable to us? And would not any intellectual communication which he might make be highly advantageous? We are not governed by mere *instincts*. Endowed with immortal spirits, which must ultimately return to God who gave them, we are formed to reflect and reason ; and, carrying our investigation as far at least as our own nature affords mate-

rials of thought, we pause on the connexions between matter and spirit, as the loftiest subjects which can interest us. The laws of mere physical substances, however useful or important in their own places, do not limit our intellectual view. Going beyond these, we are found to commune with PERSONS. Having a *personal* subsistence, our best associations are necessarily with those who subsist in a like manner. We could not have any very high or appropriate enjoyments, if we were surrounded by the lower orders of creatures, and had no companionship with beings of equal powers, and like affections. Adam in paradise needed a companion. His Creator said—"it is not good that the man should be *alone*." If then we had no higher manifestation of Jehovah than that afforded by the substances belonging to the material universe, it is evident that he would not have employed the best symbol, nor furnished an exhibition of himself equal to our intellectual apprehensions.

Of *personal* subsistence we have well defined ideas; and if that were not predicated of Jehovah, our communion with him must be of the lowest description. We would either become atheistical, or, in spite of ourselves, rushing into *personification*, we should locate the dwelling of the great Spirit in the sun—the moon—a star—a man—an animal—a vegetable. Our safest refuge, our most refined ideas, would, in those circumstances, be found in anthropomorphism; for what higher notions of *personal* subsistence, or of its attributes, could we have than those derived from ourselves? There is no intermediate order of intelligences, with whom we have any familiar intercourse, whose standard of living, or modes of operations, could originate in our minds any better speculation. And the scriptures, whenever they introduce such classes of beings to our notice, always clothe them with *personal* forms. Nor only so; but we are emphatically told, that man was made in the image and likeness of God. There must there-

fore be a *personal* manifestation of God ; and the term PERSON—of which more hereafter*—the term PERSON, of which, in its application to deity, theologians tell us they can form no accurate idea, must have in that application the same import that it has every where else ; or the science of theology would sink as much below, as mere abstractions rise above, our intellectual level.

How stands the fact as reported by the laborious historian ? Have not men been continually employed and agitated by inquiries about God—his nature—his subsistence ? Has there ever been a nation without her Gods ? It will not avail to refer all this to priestcraft ; for whence was priestcraft derived ? How did it happen that this abused and despised system of political sophistry should have furnished the lofty conceptions of God and of eternity ? conceptions with which the philosopher's ideas of chance and annihilation compare, like matter compares with mind—a brute with a man—or a taper with the sun. And when philosophers abandoned the religion of their fathers, could they elude the idea of God ? or eradicate it from the world ? Did Socrates—did Seneca—did Plato—did Cicero—who but, as the scriptures affirm, a fool, ever did, say in his heart there is no God ? No impression is more universal or uniform, than this—there is a God ; nor any inference more general or natural than this—we owe him our homage, and he ought to be worshipped.

But under this impression and inference the questions necessarily arise—how shall we worship him ? Where shall we meet him ? in what form shall we address him ? with what service will he be pleased ? Take Faber's great work on the Pagan Idol, or his Mysteries of the Cabiri, or Bryant's Observations, for your guide, and see how the heathen world laboured and heaved ! Ignorant of the personal manifestation Jehovah had made of himself, and in-

*See Lecture V.

competent to estimate the subsequent manifestation in the flesh which he had promised, how ingeniously, yet wretchedly, they systematised their personifications ! The tradition of Adam and his three sons, united with that of Noah and his three sons, originated the idea of a succession of worlds ; and that of the great Father triplicating himself as the head of each. Then the host of heaven being blended with their divine heroes, the sun, moon, and stars called for adoration. Nor has infidelity, when she talks of the great temple of nature, done any thing more than throw the whole together, in one confused, undistinguished, mass ; or, falling from the high ideas of *personal* existence, which the nature of man suggests, she abets mere materialism on the one hand, or is irrecoverably lost in profitless abstractions on the other.

Thus we have reached a point where, from the very necessities of our nature, a farther manifestation of God, than that afforded by the material universe, becomes indispensable. There is no intermediate symbol between that general manifestation, and a *personal subsistence* ; and to go beyond this last, is to pass out of the system to which man belongs. A manifestation by a personal subsistence (the Word) is the very thing we need. Withhold it, and mankind must either sink into the grossest superstition, or be conscious of an obligation which they have neither ability nor opportunity to meet. Nor is this all ; but turning away from the evils of life, under the strongest desires after glory, honor and immortality, eternity becomes a blank, and men grow frantic with wild conjecture ; or sinking into apathy, they die like the brute. The necessity for a *personal* manifestation of Jehovah is found therefore, in the constitution of man.

Again : God is a *spirit*, and man has a *spirit*. Here is similitude. Common attributes and common principles, throughout nature, lead to association. Accordingly this is the very basis on which the scriptures have erected their

whole moral superstructure, depending for its strength and beauty on an endless variety of moral affinities. Man, they say, was made in the image of God, and the highest point of intellectual effort which they recommend to him, is to think, speak and act like God. The God of the bible is the God of nature ; and what he has written in the bible, he has inscribed on nature. Natural and revealed religion are the development of the same essential moral principles. Christian philosophers yield half their argument, as I believe, when they represent christianity as an *original system* : for the characteristics of christianity are, in fact, only the modified operation of the original institute. The gospel is intended, by its remedial agency, to retrieve at last, when Jesus shall surrender the kingdom to his Father, the disaster which has been introduced by the fall, so far as that can be done in consistency with the free agency of man.

I have remarked that what is written in the bible is inscribed on nature ; particularly in view of the fact that man is made in the image of God. Hence we find, throughout the whole history of our race, that men are like the gods whom they worship. If the gods be supposed to be sensual, their worshippers are sensual : if the gods be cruel, their worshippers are cruel : if the gods be intellectual, their worshippers are intellectual. Even now, when men make the world the great object of their admiration, they become like it. When they contemplate the spirituality of the Redeemer's character and government, they become spiritual : beholding or reflecting his glory they are changed into his image. The denominations of christians who view God in all the benevolence which he has written in the scriptures, or carried out in his providence, are observed to imbibe like gracious affections ; while those who think him harsh or always mysterious, go down to the grave unreconciled in their feelings, and doubtful as to their destiny. This is human nature. It cannot be otherwise. The

brightest, the holiest, the most philosophical idea which the human mind can conceive, is that of resembling God.

Nor is this all. Association among human beings is founded on the same principle. The child imitates his parent, and grows *like* him; the servant imitates his master, and grows *like* him; the pupil imitates his preceptor, and grows *like* him; the soldier imitates his commander, and grows *like* him; the subject imitates his prince, and grows *like* him. Whatever character a man knows to be above or superior to his own, and which he at the same time admires and loves, he will not fail to resemble; and that just so far as he contemplates it. That God should present himself within the range of human observation, and in the way best calculated to attract our notice and excite our admiration, is the certain and only effectual method of either elevating man when innocent, or restoring him when fallen. I repeat it: this is human nature—both its philosophy and its religion. God manifested in *personal form*, instead of being an irrational view of the divine operations, is one of the most rational in the whole range of morals. The doctrine of Christ's divinity is founded in human nature; while the exhibition of his mediatorial character is the purest display of every moral excellence which it is desirable for man to possess, and is exactly suited to our present state of sin and suffering. He who is like Christ, is a holy, dignified, heavenly, happy man.

In this way human beings have always estimated the subject of God. They have uniformly recognized the necessity for an *image*, from which they could derive becoming ideas of the *personal* perfections of their Creator. Moses speaks with great frequency and familiarity of the divine *appearances*, and severely censures the image worship into which the nations around him had declined. All the heathen have preserved the early error. And Paul, while he represents Christ as the image of the invisible God, yet condemns the gentiles, not on account of the general me-

diatorial principle in which they confided, but because they *changed the glory* or similitude—for glory is *manifested excellence*—of the incorruptible God, into an image made like to corruptible man, &c. The later errorists have gone a great deal farther; and, rushing into a wretched extreme, have disgusted the intelligent, and abused the ignorant, by filling their churches with pictures and images. Throughout the christian church, by the formation of voluntary associations, a series of sectarian affinities have been created; and each devotee is like, and true to his party. Each has his sectarian views of God, or, as Stillingfleet expresses it, “Imperious, self-willed men are apt to cry up God’s absolute power and dominion as his greatest perfection; easy and soft-spirited men, his patience and goodness; severe and rigid men, his justice and severity: every one according to his humour or temper, making his God of his own complexion.” Even the sceptical philosopher himself has expended all his vigor in his researches after some intelligible idea of God; and is lost in the immensity of an inconceivable abstraction.

Having shown, as I believe, the impossibility that mankind should form any accurate or satisfactory idea of Jehovah *abstractedly* considered; that the constitution of human nature renders a *personal* manifestation of God indispensably necessary; that theologians, in attempting to lead us beyond the exhibition which God has made of himself, have done nothing but entertain us with their conjectures, and confound us with their mysteries; and that when the proposition introduced by Moses,—“In the beginning God made the heavens and the earth,” is considered as the starting point for such unprofitable speculations, he must be entirely misunderstood; let us proceed to inquire more particularly what the sacred historian does mean.

If we now turn to the hebrew text, we shall find that a literal translation would very materially change the declaration, at present under discussion. We should then have

the following proposition :—"In the beginning THE ELOHIM made the heavens and the earth." The term *Elohim* is in the plural number ; so that *plurality* is thus predicated of the Creator. How ? In what sense ? The inquiry is important, if for no other reason, yet because it will lead us away from those metaphysical abstractions in which theologians and philosophers have so freely indulged, when speaking or writing of our general subject.

That the proposition which is now offered may be distinctly apprehended by those who have no acquaintance with the hebrew language, let it be observed, that the original word which I have merely *anglicised*, has been frequently rendered GODS, by our translators. Thus : "God doth know, that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as GODS, *Elohim*, knowing good and evil."* "All the GODS, *Elohim*, of the nations are idols."† Suppose for the sake of illustration—and let it be remembered that I make the supposition merely for the sake of illustration—suppose that our present text should be rendered thus :—"In the beginning THE GODS made the heavens and the earth." Would not this translation very materially affect the character of the Mosaic proposition ?

The subject therefore which we have now to investigate, is this :—what does Moses mean ? what do the whole scriptures mean, by the ELOHIM ? Our inquiry is manifestly of paramount importance, and we must pursue it very carefully and deliberately.

In the outset of our investigations we shall be met by the remark, that the peculiar manner in which Moses speaks of GOD, has been often observed before ; and that the fact has been as often confidently urged as a strong argument in favor of the doctrine of a divine TRINITY. This plea is not to be denied. But then the question starts up before us, what do theologians mean by TRINITY ? The word is not

*Gen. iii. 5.

†1 Chron. xvi. 26.

Ps. xcvi. 5. †

scriptural. None of the prophets, none of the apostles, have used it. It is not to be found, even in the apocryphal books. What then shall we understand by the term? Or what is the doctrine which it is intended to express?

Have not our theologians, in using the fact to which we are now adverting, doubly perplexed moral science? Have they not, instead of leaving us to the contemplation of one inconceivable abstraction, absolutely given us *three abstractions*? Have they not taught us that there are three omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent PERSONS? And yet have they not resolutely maintained that there is but ONE God? We shall then be under the necessity of inquiring what is to be understood by the term PERSON? I do not object to its use, if it is understood in its proper sense. But if it is to be taken in an improper sense, or rather as having no determinate sense—the way in which theologians do employ it, imagining that in its proper sense it cannot be applied to Jehovah—if, I say, it is to be taken improperly, then, like TRINITY, it is unscriptural. Our translators have rendered the greek term HYPOSTASIS, used by Paul in the first chapter of his epistle to the Hebrews, by the word PERSON; and they have done right. But still our translators were theologians; and, as such, were advocates of the doctrine of “THREE PERSONS in the Godhead.” They have consequently attached to the term the meaning, as far as any meaning was given, which was ascribed to it after the council of Nice.

While I do not object to the term when used in its proper sense, as I shall explain at large hereafter,* and as I have remarked that theologians use it in an improper sense, it is necessary to inquire more particularly what they do mean?—or rather what they do not mean? They do not mean to say, that there are three distinct BEINGS, for that would make three Gods. Neither do they use the

See Lecture V.

term, as it is employed when we speak of a *man*; for that would make three distinct BEINGS, and of course three Gods. But they find, as they suppose, PERSONAL attributes and operations ascribed in the bible to the Father; in like manner they find them ascribed to the Son and the Holy Spirit; and hence they infer, that there is a *something*—that there is a distinction of some kind—in the divine ESSENCE: which something or distinction they cannot express by any better term than PERSON, while yet they profess to have no clear or well defined idea of its import; and having thus expressed their doctrine, in words which they acknowledge themselves unable to explain, they give up the whole matter as an incomprehensible mystery.

One of their late writers has expressed himself on this subject in the following words: “Of the precise import of the term *personality*, as applied to a distinction in the divine essence, or of the peculiar nature and mode of that distinction, I shall not presume to attempt conveying to your minds any clear conception. I cannot impart to you what I do not possess myself;—*and convinced as I am, that such conception cannot be attained by any*, it had been well, I think, if such attempts at explanation by comparisons from nature and otherwise, had never been made. They have afforded to the enemies of the doctrine, much unnecessary occasion for burlesque and blasphemy.”* Even Augustin himself, one of the most distinguished of the Latin Fathers and who took a very active part in the discussions on this subject, which were prevalent in his age, considered the phrase THREE PERSONS, not as being precisely accurate, but merely preferable to silence. He viewed the subject as above human comprehension, and therefore did not know how to speak about it. Thus it is estimated at the present day: and those who are not satisfied with the representations which are made, are afraid to touch it, or find a very convenient

* Wardlaw's Discourses, pp. 10, 11.

escape under the general impression, that the whole affair is an inscrutable mystery.

I know of no ecclesiastical matter whose history exhibits more distracting anxieties among divines, or more of that kind of speculation which men pursue under the guidance of false philosophy, while the scriptures themselves are forgotten, than this very controversy about the trinity. I have time to state but a few general facts.

This controversy appears to have followed the introduction of the Grecian philosophy into the church, in the *second* century; and though various heresies were started, yet the christian doctors in general, down to the *fourth* century, appear to have "entertained different sentiments upon the subject" of Godhead, "without giving the least offence; and discoursed variously concerning the distinctions between Father, Son and Holy Spirit, each one following his respective opinion with the utmost liberty."

In the *third* century, Noetus of Smyrna, "an obscure man," taught that the supreme God united himself to the man Christ, and was born and crucified with him. He and his followers were hence called *Patripassians*, as they maintained that the *Father* of the universe died for the sins of men. Their idea does not appear to have been entirely thrown out of the church to this day; for we often hear of a suffering, expiring, rising God.

About the middle of the same century, Sabellius appeared, and maintained that "a certain *energy* only, proceeding from the supreme parent, or a certain *portion* of the divine nature, was united to the Son of God, the man Jesus; and he considered, in the same manner, the Holy Spirit, as a *portion* of the everlasting Father."

Both these views of trinity had been promulgated in the preceding century—one by *Praxeas* "a very distinguished man and a confessor at Rome;" and the other by *Theodotus*, "a tanner, yet a man of learning and a philosopher, and by *Artemas* or *Artemon*, from whom originated the Ar-

temonites." Still, historians feel it to be very difficult to state with precision what the sentiments of these individuals were. The latter view, under the name of *Sabellianism*, has figured most conspicuously in controversial theology; and though no two writers agree in their account, or pretend accurately to define what *Sabellianism* was, yet the epithet is very freely used, and very dogmatically applied to a reputed heresy, and even by those who have never been distinguished for their enlarged acquaintance with ecclesiastical antiquities. By this means, the community, who have no opportunity of ascertaining what Sabellianism was, are led to imagine that it was a hateful something, full as bad as, if not worse than, unitarianism itself.

The account which I have just given, has been taken from Mosheim's ecclesiastical history. I have preferred his statement to that of any other, because I believe that the author is fully entitled to all the praise he has received, as the best writer in his department with whom the public are, or have the opportunity to be, acquainted:—Because Arius, whom every one acknowledges to have been a very acute and subtle reasoner, charges Alexander, whom the orthodox would uphold, as promulgating *Sabellianism*:—and because that Alexander himself, in repelling the charge, asserts that Sabellius taught the doctrine of "separations and effluxes of parts." His view then, as Arius supposed, was not materially different from the orthodox statements; because it involved a distinction in the divine essence itself—or, I should rather say, in Jehovah as a self-existent Being. When these "separations or effluxes of parts" take place, or are presented, what matters it whether you call those parts by the inadequate term PORTIONS, or by the term PERSONS, which no one professes to be able to explain? If therefore, there is any Sabellianism countenanced in the church, it is by the trinitarians themselves. They are the Sabellians of the present day; and if Sabellianism be heresy, they are the heretics. Permit me then, most distinctly and

pointedly, to throw off an imputation which no speculations of mine have deserved, and to refer it in honest appropriation to those to whom it is due.*

While the doctrine of Sabellius was frequently condemned, the church, so far as any general facts can be stated, appears to have been divided in sentiment, even when a formal decision was attempted. In the *east* the trinity was explained as being *one essence and three substances*: and in the *west* as *one substance and three persons*.

At last a crisis occurred. Alexander, bishop of Alexandria, "on a certain time, in presence of the priests that were under him, and the rest of the clergy," as Socrates the historian informs us, began to discourse somewhat "more curiously of the holy *trinity* and the *unity* to be in the trinity. Arius then being one of the priests placed in order under him, a man very skilful in the subtleties of sophistical logic, suspecting the bishop to have brought into the church the erroneous doctrine of Sabellius the Africk, and being kindled with the desire of contention, set himself opposite against the opinions of Sabellius the Africk, and as it seemed directly against the allegations of the bishop." An ecclesiastical war was thus commenced; the whole church was thrown into fearful commotion; *council* after *council* was called; *creed* after *creed* was framed; the civil arm was employed; and from that day to this we have the doctrine of the *three persons* on the one hand, or that of Arius and its consequences on the other. So then on both sides, the controvertists must trace their origin to the *fourth* century; and their unceasing strife is as fair a comment as could be desired, on the value of *creeds and confessions of faith*. In this review, unitarianism can boast but little; for the most part she is shorn even of the little glory that Arius left her.

* See Letters of Alexander and Arius—Mosheim, Murdoch's Trans. vol. i. pp. 343--4. Note; and my Essay on Creeds, chap. viii.

It is really painful to read the account given of those times by Hilary, who was perfectly familiar with their contentions, and whose authority is not to be disputed. Thus he writes—"It is a thing equally deplorable and dangerous, that there are as many *creeds* as there are opinions among men; as many doctrines as inclinations; and as many sources of blasphemy as there are faults among us; BECAUSE WE MAKE CREEDS ARBITRARILY, AND EXPLAIN THEM AS ARBITRARILY. And as there is but one faith, so there is but one only God, one Lord, and one baptism. We renounce this one faith, *when we make so many different creeds*; and that diversity is the reason why we have no true faith among us. WE CANNOT BE IGNORANT, THAT SINCE THE COUNCIL OF NICE, WE HAVE DONE NOTHING BUT MAKE CREEDS. And while we fight against *words*, litigate about new questions, dispute about *equivocal terms*, complain of authors, that every one may make *his own party* triumph; while we cannot agree, while we anathematize one another, there is hardly one that adheres to Jesus Christ. What change was there not in the creed last year! The first council ordained a silence upon the *homoousion*; the second established it, and would have us speak; the third excuses the fathers of the council, and pretends they took the word *ousia* simply; the fourth condemns them, instead of excusing them. With respect to the likeness of the Son of God to the Father, which is the faith of our deplorable times, they dispute whether he is like in whole or in part. These are rare folks to unravel the secrets of heaven. Nevertheless it is for these CREEDS about invisible mysteries, that we calumniate one another, and for our belief in God. We make *creeds* every year; nay every moon we repent of what we have done, we defend those that repent, we anathematize those that we defended. So we condemn either the doctrine of others in ourselves, or our own in that of others; and reciprocally tearing one another to pieces, we have been the cause of each other's ruin."

Even Augustin himself, describing his own times, says—
 “That the yoke once laid upon the Jews was more supportable than that laid on many christians in his age—
 For the christian bishops introduced, with but slight alterations, into the christian worship, those rites and institutions by which formerly the Greeks and Romans, and others had manifested their piety and reverence towards their imaginary deities; supposing that the people would more readily embrace christianity, if they perceived the rites handed down to them from their fathers, still existing unchanged among the christians; and saw that *Christ* and the *martyrs* were worshipped in the same manner as formerly their gods were. There was, of course, little difference in these times between the public worship of the christians and that of the Greeks and Romans. In both there were splendid robes, mitres, tiaras, wax tapers, crosiers, processions, lustrations, images, golden and silver vases, and innumerable other things alike.”*

Such is the account given of those deplorable times, whence the contending parties on the subject of trinity have derived their doctrines. A modern writer, whose candour may be highly admired, and whose literary pre-eminence none will question,† has, in a very short paragraph, described the deep and dreadful fall of ecclesiastical men.—“In about *three hundred* years after the ascension of Jesus, without the aid of secular power, or church authority, the christian religion spread over a large part of Asia, Europe and Africa, and at the accession of Constantine, and convention of the council of Nice, it was almost every where throughout these countries in a flourishing condition. In the space of *another* three hundred years, or a little more, the beauty of the christian religion was greatly corrupted in a large part of that extent, its glory defaced, and its light almost extinguished. What can this be so much

* Murdoch's Trans. p. 331, vol. i.

† Lardner.

owing to, as to the determination and transactions of the council of Nice, and the measures thus set on foot, and followed in succeeding times?" Is it not a melancholy and tearful tale? In what, I pray you, may the advocates of CREEDS, or the idolaters of these early saints, so enthusiastically glory? Surely the generality of christians, who censure so severely their heretical brethren, eulogize so highly the virtues of the fathers, and so confidently talk of the good old ways, cannot have the most distant idea of the facts in the case;—facts which they may all know by reading a few pages of ecclesiastical history.

The controversy has never yet been settled. Though men in power have been able to fling obloquy upon the ecclesiastic who dared to question the popular dogma, and to fill the public mind with the most appalling suspicions of his integrity, yet the reader of ecclesiastical history well knows, that the subject has been often canvassed, notwithstanding the fearful risk incurred. He will readily remember the contests occasioned by *Peter*, surnamed the *Fuller*, and the formula of concord offered by the emperor *Zeno*, commonly called his *Henoticon*, in the *fifth* century:—The agitated questions in the *sixth*, "whether it could be properly said that ONE of the trinity was crucified?" and, "whether it was proper to say, Christ's person was compounded?" As well as the sect of the *Tritheists*, headed by *John Ascunage*, who "imagined there were in God, three numerically distinct natures, or subsistencies, all perfectly alike and connected by no common vinculum of essence;"—The mandate of *Hincmar* concerning the *trine God*, which the Benedictine monks refused to obey, in the *ninth*:—The notion advanced by *Joachim*, abbot of *Flora*, who "denied that there was in the sacred trinity, a SOMETHING, or an ESSENCE, which was common to the three persons: from which position it seemed to follow, that the union of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, is not a simple or natural union, but merely a moral union, like that of several

persons all having the same views and opinions," in the *thirteenth*:—The imputations thrown on *Calixtus*, in the *seventeenth*!—and at a later period the discussions which were started, and the fears that were excited, by Burnet, Maty, Clarke, Waterland, and even by Dr. Watts—whose psalms and hymns have been so long popular; and yet, whose sanity, as well as orthodoxy, has been questioned by many, who would deserve a great deal of praise, had they imitated his candor, or displayed his intellectual power.

The preceding sketch, though rapid and imperfect, is entirely sufficient for the purpose for which it has been introduced. It serves to show what consequences have followed the reverence that has been paid to the Grecian philosophy, and the surrender of individual liberty to ecclesiastical dominion. And what has been gained? A dogma which no man ever pretended to explain; expressed in terms which all admit must be understood in a sense both unique and improper; and from which so many are revolting so rudely, or to which they bow so reluctantly. Timidity and superstition seal many lips in silence, while literary objectors forget the dignity of the subject in the ingenuity of verbal criticism. And is it then a criminal and presumptuous feeling which prompts researches beyond the period when this series of evils commenced? May we not go back and ask what was believed concerning Jehovah, when the only inquiry was, whether there were more Gods than one? Controversy existed, but assuredly the question was not how many PERSONS there are in the godhead? This question the scriptures have not discussed, though they have most freely remarked on the iniquity of idolatry. And should we ascertain what that doctrine was, when prophets and apostles wrote, are we to be censured as the abettors of INNOVATION? Rather do we not discard innovation, and obey that good old direction, which has been so often quoted amiss, and with a very sanctimonious air—"Thus saith the Lord, stand ye in the ways, and see, and ask for the old

paths, where is the good way, and walk therein, and ye shall find rest for your souls."*

I object then to the popular doctrine on this subject, because the terms in which it is expressed are not scriptural; because they came into the church long after the apostles had gone to their rest, and are the technicalities of a most degenerate and contentious age; because they required more synodical force and civil authority to bring them into the church, than can now be obtained to keep them there; because no man can even pretend to explain them; because they never have done any thing but engender strife, and prevent the lover of the Son of God from understanding his gospel; and because we are explicitly commanded to speak the things which "are *freely* given to us of God, not in the *words* which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Spirit teacheth, comparing spiritual things with spiritual."†

Objecting to these terms and phrases, for the reasons which have been stated, I propose to throw them all aside, and to examine the scriptures on this subject for myself. Can any of my brethren condemn my purpose? Why should I not see truth with my own eyes? Will God refuse to give grace and wisdom to a man who honestly intends to "search the scriptures" for himself? Or is it impossible for a prayerful student to acquire a knowledge of God from the bible, when God is REVEALED in the bible? I apprehend that there must be some mistake about this matter; and that the idea of an inscrutable mystery has alarmed us all, by a great deal, too much. Is it not humiliating that we should be speaking of God in unintelligible language? and when we see so many driven from the altars of our Master by this very fact? Brethren, I must examine this subject, if in the end I fail. But I address myself to the task with a manly, yet humble, confidence, that I shall not be unsuccessful. Is not this the province in which we are all called to exercise FAITH.

* Jer. vi. 16.

† 1 Cor. ii. 12, 13.

The question returns upon us—what does Moses mean by ELOHIM? Let us carefully and patiently pursue this inquiry.

In the progress of ages, terms not unfrequently change their import entirely; and even when they do not, yet their illustration may be very much modified by a new combination of circumstances to which they may be applied. It is therefore one of the best methods of ascertaining the force of any term, which a writer may use in any particular age, to consider whether that term had any special import or reference in the age in which he lived. Moses appears in his official character and relations, when writing this history. We must read his historical chapters, as those of the old testament APOSTLE, commissioned to establish the Jewish commonwealth; a measure on which Jehovah had resolved for particular reasons. The object for which he wrote may throw a great deal of light on the terms he employs. And as he thought a brief history of the preceding state of the world to be necessary to accomplish the end he had in view, perhaps the general prefatory facts which he records may be equally relevant in our present researches.

By referring to his account, we find that Cain and Abel, a few years after the FALL, are introduced to our notice. Cain is represented as being exceedingly offended—perhaps because for some misconduct, he had been despoiled of his birthright, and disrobed of his *official* honors, as his father's successor. The scriptural facts and comments certainly place the character of Abel in bold relief, and show that Cain was a dishonored, and a dishonorable man. He resents the affront by murdering his brother, and finally departs from the presence of the Lord, to dwell in the land of Nod. His going out *from the presence of the Lord*, is a very peculiar phrase, and imports, as might be readily shown, his abandonment of the ceremonial establishment which God had erected, when he placed the cherubim of glory in a tabernacle, at the east end of the garden of Eden. The service

required by the law of this mediatorial dispensation, it is very evident from the story, he had first despised or corrupted. His departure to the land of Nod, was a virtual, if not a malignant, rejection of the ritual which had been given to his father. In other words, he denied the doctrine, and disowned his allegiance to the authority, of the Mediator. After Abel's murder, and Cain's apostacy, Seth becomes his father's *official* heir. From him proceeds a race of *official* men, known in the history as the sons God. These sons of God, in process of time, so far lose their integrity as to marry the daughters of men, or the daughters of Cain. The result was *official* infidelity, and most lamentable degeneracy. At last Noah stands alone as *officially* righteous; and Jehovah, entering into covenant with him, brings the flood upon the earth. The crime of the antediluvian age appears, then, to have been the rejection of the Mediator—it was INFIDELITY.

The mediatorial constitution was renewed in Noah, and a farther promise was given that the Lord would not again curse the ground any more for man's sake. But mankind corrupted their way *a second time* before the Lord; and though their crime was not precisely the same with the antediluvian rebellion, yet it was so fearful in its character, and so degrading and desolating in its consequences, that something must be done, or truth would be driven from the earth. They did not *deny*, but they *corrupted*, the mediatorial institute. They *changed the glory* of the incorruptible God into an *image* made like unto corruptible man. They did not sink into sheer infidelity, but they declined into *idolatry*. And it was in order to counteract this state of things, or to preserve the knowledge of God as revealed in the Mediator, that Jehovah entered upon that new and peculiar course of legislation, which is called, in the scriptures, *the mystery of his will*; and which commenced with the call of Abraham from the midst of his idolatrous family. To carry out this general benevolent purpose, his descend-

ants were first *elected*, as the gentiles were afterwards. It is in this very connexion that Moses receives his commission. He was sent to bring the children of Abraham from Egypt, and to conduct them to their official station in the land of Canaan, as the *elect* of the Lord. Of course the specific object for which Moses was consecrated, and for which the nation was chosen, was to proclaim the knowledge of the true God, in opposition to *polytheism*. "The law was added because of CORRUPTIONS." *

There is not the least indistinctness in the conclusion we have reached. Moses never loses sight of his object, but most solemnly and emphatically charges the people respecting it.—"Hear, O Israel, JEHOVAH, our ELOHIM, IS ONE JEHOVAH."† In this connexion then, we must consider and explain the term, after whose scriptural import we are inquiring.

Observe, Moses says—OUR Elohim! Were there any OTHER *Elohim*? Yes: many, very many. The gods of the heathen, which were innumerable, were called *Elohim*:—"all the *Elohim* of the nations," says the psalmist, "are idols." And this is the contrast which Moses would present;—"Jehovah, OUR *Elohim* is ONE Jehovah," or God: the *Elohim* of the nations are MANY.

But more than this: the nations imagined that there was "a great universal Father, himself one and many," and that from him "a divine emanation proceeded; who, assuming the form of a man, has descended from heaven for the purpose of reforming and instructing and reconciling the human race. Nor, according to the speculations of the gentiles, has this descent been accomplished *once* only: on the contrary it has *often* been accomplished, and at each descent, the emanation is in some sort esteemed a new PERSON, and is distinguished by a new title. This is paganism as explained and received throughout the east; and to this

* Gal. iii. 19.

† Duet. vi. 4.

day prevails among the Hindoos.”* Thus the *Elohim*, among idolaters, included many GODS, and many EMANATIONS, descending in the form of MAN, for mediatorial purposes: but OUR *Elohim*, says Moses, is only ONE Jehovah.

Why then did Moses use the term *Elohim* at all? Would it not, instead of counteracting idolatry, rather countenance and perpetuate it? Or does he intend to convey the idea of a *divine emanation*, proceeding from heaven, and assuming the form of a *man*, for mediatorial purposes? Or if the term *emanation* is altogether unscriptural, and entirely disproportioned to the magnitude of the subject, did he design to teach any analogous doctrine? It evidently appears that the idea of *plurality*, in some form or other, is to be predicated of God, or the word could not have any other than an injurious tendency; as all the idolatrous nations most abundantly testify, by the use they have made of it. Could Moses then jeopard so carelessly the character of the dispensation he was commissioned to introduce? While he was professedly condemning polytheism, could he so inconsiderately establish it among his own people? Or was it impossible for him to impart the knowledge of the true God, and give a detailed account of the works of Jehovah, without making this representation?

Is it then necessarily true, that there has been an *emanation* from Jehovah, or something analogous to it, appearing among men, and *in the form of man*? I see not how an affirmative answer can be avoided. On the contrary, if we proceed with Moses, in his history, we shall find that he actually, unequivocally; and more than once, states the fact, that God *did appear in the likeness of man*. Read the short sketches he has given of Abraham's life and of Jacob's life.† There is no escape from a testimony which is so clear and explicit. And if there can be no escape, then in the fact of a divine manifestation unto men, we have the reason for

* Faber's Three Dis. vol. 2, p. 395.

† Gen. xviii. 1—33; xxxii. 24—32.

the use of the plural noun ELOHIM, and its various adjuncts. From the nature of the case, this ancient apostle could not speak in any other way; and the doctrine which the phraseology implies was indispensably *necessary*, both to correct the aberrations into which idolaters had fallen, and to announce to mankind the ONE JEHOVAH.

It is worthy of special notice that Moses, when he recapitulates the account of the creation with a view of displaying the *political relations* in which Adam was placed, employs the compound term—*Jehovah-Elohim*—as the official title by which God was designated; and this title is used throughout the last two chapters under consideration. It is, as I understand it, equivalent with LOGOS, or WORD. And had our translators made us as familiar with the hebrew term JEHOVAH-ELOHIM; as they have with the hebrew term JEHOVAH; or had they marked the distinction between the two titles, as they have in the new testament distinguished between GOD and WORD; or had we noticed the difference between JEHOVAH, and LORD GOD, which the translators have made, the subject of trinity would be, I apprehend, better understood at present.—We shall have occasion to observe this peculiarity hereafter.

The foregoing argument may be illustrated and confirmed, if we call up a similar representation made by the apostle Paul, in his first epistle to the Corinthians. Like Moses, he had occasion to condemn the idolatry around him; and to oppose to it the revelation of the true God which had been made. In arguing on the propriety of eating meat offered in sacrifice to idols, he remarks, “There be gods MANY, and lords MANY: But to us there is but ONE God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him; and ONE Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him.”* As though he had said,—“The heathen have *many* gods, and *many* lords proceeding from them in the likeness of men; but we have only ONE God, and ONE Lord proceed-

*Ch. viii. 5, 6,

ing from him—THE LORD FROM HEAVEN, in the likeness of man.”† Is this not the plain and evident meaning of what he has said?

It might, in reading this passage hastily, or for sectarian purposes, be imagined that the apostle had no intention to represent Jesus Christ as any thing more than a *mere man*. But where would be the point of the contrast? The heathen did not think their LORDS to be mere *men*, but considered them to be so many *emanations* from the GODS; which, having accomplished the object of their descent, returned and were re-absorbed in deity. This is the doctrine which Paul was opposing. And what would an ingenuous heathen understand him to mean by the *one Lord* Jesus, but ONE EMANATION from the ONE God, and the *only one* that could be acknowledged? Here then we have Moses and Paul in the same attitude. Though they lived in very different ages, and were official men under very different dispensations, yet they state precisely the same moral problem. Moses says—“Jehovah OUR ELOHIM is one Jehovah,” and records the fact of his appearing in the likeness of a MAN: and Paul says—“we have ONE God, even the Father, and ONE Lord Jesus Christ,” who did appear in the fashion of MAN, and denominates him THE LORD FROM HEAVEN; and all this too in an argument against IDOLATRY. Evidently this LORD of whom Paul speaks, belongs to the ELOHIM of which Moses speaks; and in both cases there is but ONE JEHOVAH:—ONE GOD, of whom are *all things*, the heavens and earth and all their host, and we in him; and ONE LORD, by whom are *all things*, the heavens and earth and all their host, and we by him. The two inspired writers give us the very same ideas.

The Redeemer himself explains the term ELOHIM, in the same manner in one of his arguments with the Jews, when he asks—“If he called them ELOHIM, (Gods) TO WHOM

THE WORD of GOD CAME, say ye of him, whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world.—Thou blasphemest, because I said—I am ELOHIM (the son of God).”* This being the import of the term under consideration, Moses must use it in its own official sense; and so we will have JEHOVAH and Jehovah-ELOHIM; or as Paul says—God and LORD. Hence it is we hear of the VOICE of Jehovah-ELOHIM; because whenever Jehovah, by the assumption of FORM, shall be recognized as ELOHIM, his word is communicated to us by that FORM, as his ministerial organ, in the same way that the *form of man* was afterwards his ministerial organ. And hence it is that John, instead of using the hebrew official term JEHOVAH-ELOHIM, takes the most significant greek term LOGOS, or WORD.—But to this particular illustration we shall hereafter return; and in the mean time, merely remark, that the term ELOHIM is used in reference to the CREATOR as *manifested* to his creatures—to the Redeemer, as God *manifested* in the flesh—to ANGELS, and to men, as secondary agents whereby Jehovah would *manifest* his truth, and reveal or execute his purposes. Elohim is the title of *magistracy*, and belongs to the official organ, by which God, who is a SPIRIT, communicates his word, or will, to men.

Our discussion conducted thus far, has enabled us distinctly to perceive that the scriptural representation of Jehovah offers to our consideration JEHOVAH and Jehovah-ELOHIM, or ONE GOD and ONE LORD. Such has been the biblical fact from the beginning; and such it is now;—equally characteristic of creation and redemption. Would it not be difficult, nay impossible, to express the whole of this fact, without plural nouns, pronouns, verbs and adjectives? Is there any alternative, except it shall be to employ more nouns than one, and say, JEHOVAH, and Jeho-

* See Lecture V. John x. 34, 35, compared with Psalm LXXXII. 6.

vah-ELOHIM, or God and Lord? Such is in truth the proper use of the plural form of a word; it saves repetition, and would never be more needed than in an infantile state of society and of language, when words could not be very numerous, and distinctions could not be very minute.

But when the fact is thus ascertained, that the scriptures speak so freely of *Jehovah* and *Jehovah-Elohim*, or of *God* and *Lord*, and when the necessity for plural words so immediately follows, what inference shall we draw? Are there two Gods equal to each other; or one supreme God, and another subordinate God? By no means, all the inspired writers would reply. There is no truth about which they are more positive, than that there is but ONE GOD; nor any in which reason would more promptly or entirely sustain them. Polytheism too, as it has existed in the world, has ever given the rein to the most licentious fancy, degraded the individual character, and desolated the social joys, of man. It has been the very desecration of the human spirit, in the temple where Jehovah has called it to minister to his glory.

But what shall we do with this scriptural exhibition of our Creator? Can any doctrine of trinity be more perplexing than this *duality* which is thus demonstrably asserted in the bible? Jehovah, Jehovah-Elohim, and Spirit, are not more embarrassing to the philosophic moralist, in view of the unity of God, than Jehovah and Jehovah-Elohim, or Father and Son, are: nor would it be more easy to explain the one mode of expression than the other, on any received hypothesis. To say that there are *two persons* in one case, or *three persons* in the other, is only to change the terms and keep the difficulty.

Let it be remembered, that in human nature itself there is a NECESSITY for a *manifestation of Jehovah in personal form*, if the preceding argument be at all accurate or conclusive. If man cannot perceive spirit, abstractedly considered, and if God be, in and of himself, a spirit, then either God must

manifest himself to us, or we must remain entirely ignorant of him. Suppose that Jehovah should manifest himself in *personal form*, according to the condition of our nature—would we not speak of him as *God*, and *God manifested*? In this second view, would there be any impropriety in the application of a term, or a title, which would express the *object* of that manifestation, or the *relation* in which Jehovah would consequently stand to us? Suppose that term, or title, should be LORD:—would there be any impropriety in the phrase God and Lord? Would the phrase imply that there are two gods, or two PERSONS in Godhead? Would there be any thing difficult or abstruse about such a use of terms, under such circumstances? Is it not precisely what our nature calls for? And to our view, who are informed that God is a SPIRIT, would it not create all the distinction which, after all, we can perceive?

Suppose still farther that, amid the many philosophic or religious errors which have been taught in the world, it should have been maintained, that there had been *many* such manifestations, and that these had been proclaimed to us as so many different *lords*; would it not thereby have become necessary to inform us that there is but one God and one Lord;—ONE INFINITE SPIRIT, AND AN APPROPRIATE MANIFESTATION OF THAT SPIRIT? Certain it is, whether the explanatory suggestion just made, be correct or not, it contains the very thing that human beings need; and expresses those very peculiarities which are ascribed to the LORD. He does come to *manifest* God unto us; and on the principles of law which he thus announces, are we governed. He is an *image* of God to us: he is our *king*. Under these two distinct views is he continually represented, in both the old and new testaments. Beyond this manifestation of Jehovah we cannot go. Immediately, on making the attempt, we launch into the region of pure spirit, which we are not competent to perceive or to know. Beyond the law, thus derived, we have no duties: and any discussion of moral obligation

which would carry us above the administration of this enthroned Lord, would finally plunge us into mystery, and leave us to perish amid our own vain conjectures and superstitious apprehensions.

Thus far, it appears to me, that our way is clear, and the explanation distinct and unobjectionable. If any important particulars are supposed to have been left unnoticed, or not to have been exhibited with sufficient variety of illustration, let it not be forgotten, that I have merely commenced the discussion; and given the details of the subject in their own order, as they have been suggested by the progress that has been made. Here then I pause for the present.

May God give us "the Spirit of power, of love, and of a sound mind," and finally bring us to his heavenly glory, that we may SEE HIM AS HE IS.

LECTURE III.

*Jehovah-Elohim or Word—Two-fold manifestation of God
—Word made flesh—FORM of God—FORM of man—
NAME—Appearances to Abraham and Isaac and Jacob—
To Moses—Scriptural statements reconciled.*

SOME have maintained that, in the Mosaic system, nothing can be found that could have been designed to exhibit in its purity the doctrine of a MESSIAH, or even to preserve it at all.* This position is one of the most inaccurate, not to say inconsiderate, which a philosophic moralist could advance. It has already been shown, that both *natural* and *revealed* religion, as they have been distinguished, are based

* Michaelis' Com. on the laws of Moses.

upon the constitution of human nature; and that therefore the doctrine of JEHOVAH and Jehovah-ELOHIM, or of ONE GOD and ONE LORD, is essentially characteristic of both. Mankind can have no other idea of Jehovah; and never have attempted to advance any other, without winding up their speculations, either in sheer infidelity or fulsome idolatry. In fact Moses appeared in the midst of a period when the world had lapsed into idol worship; and was professedly engaged in erecting a system designed to restore to the earth the knowledge of the true God; i. e. of JEHOVAH and Jehovah-ELOHIM. Hence he uses the plural noun ELOHIM. And though, in common with other official agents whom heaven has employed to proclaim to us the truth, he states a *double view* even of this doctrine of Jehovah, as shall presently be evinced; yet, while his legal economy rests on the *primary* idea of God, as known from the beginning, and as stated in these three chapters, his whole system was expressly intended to lead the people to the MESSIAH. "The LAW," says Paul, "was our school-master, to bring us unto Christ;"* i. e. Moses was officially occupied in teaching to mankind the *elementary* principle of God's moral government among men, on purpose to convince them of the necessity for its *mediatorial application*. Or, showing the peculiar character of the original *manifestation* which God had made of himself, he intended, or Jehovah intended by him, to prepare the world for another *manifestation* in the FLESH; which is the sum and substance of the mediatorial scheme.

There may be some apparent novelty in the preceding statement. The idea of a double manifestation of Jehovah—designed to be accommodated to our intellectual nature, and for the purpose of our holding fellowship with him—may at first sight, seem to be, at least, exceedingly equivocal. Yet the *fact* exists, and is clearly stated in the scrip-

* Gal. iii. 24.

tures. It has been overlooked, and a great deal of confusion has resulted, both in the general interpretation of the scriptures, and on the subject of the TRINITY. For, as has already been remarked, christianity has been represented as an *original* system; the remedial principle has not been clearly exhibited; the argument on the subject of Christ's divinity has been very defective; and the analogies of nature command little confidence. But on this point, something more is necessary than mere assertion. I then resume the *analysis*, and, returning to the records which Moses has furnished, call your attention to a particular circumstance which he has stated, and to its general illustration.

In the third chapter, speaking of Adam and Eve, after they had eaten the forbidden fruit, he remarks—"They heard the voice of the LORD God,"—Jehovah-Elohim it is in the hebrew—"walking in the garden in the cool of the day."† The question naturally arises, what does Moses mean by JEHOVAH-ELOHIM?" And to many it may seem to be a question that can be very easily answered. But perhaps they may not have attended to it very closely, and may not be aware of its general bearing on the moral government of God.

Faber, in his *Horæ Mosaicæ*, and in his treatise on the three dispensations, considers the being, thus manifested, to have been "the anthropomorphic Word;" or a corporeal manifestation of Jehovah—the only begotten Son in *human form*.

Mr. Scott remarks on the place—"Some visible tokens of the Lord's presence, *perhaps in human form*, seem here intimated, of which we shall hereafter find undeniable instances; and which should be considered as *anticipations of his incarnation, who is called the Word of God*, though the word rendered *walking* may be referred to the VOICE, and not to the LORD."

There is evidently a great deal of indistinctness in the preceding statements. PERHAPS, says Mr. Scott, IN HU-

† Gen. iii. 8.

MAN FORM. Mr. Faber has the very same impression; THE ONLY BEGOTTEN SON IN HUMAN FORM, he says, but leaves the whole matter very obscure.

Now, it appears to me, that the first difficulty with which we meet in an investigation like the present, will be the cause of all the other difficulties which may follow: and that our great effort should be, to remove from our way that which first involved us in embarrassment. I therefore deny that Jehovah-Elohim, whom Adam and Eve heard walking in the garden, was the "anthropomorphic Word"—*the only begotten Son in human form*—or the Lord's presence *in human form*. I may be considered to be exceedingly adventurous; but the following argument requires that I should take this stand. Let my reasons be carefully examined. They are the following:

1. Whoever Jehovah-Elohim was, Adam and Eve, it is evident, were quite familiar with his voice. They knew his voice when they heard his approach; and betrayed no fear, but that which necessarily arose from their knowledge of his character. On the contrary Adam says,—“I heard thy voice in the garden, and I was afraid, *because* I was naked.” He then *knew* the voice of Jehovah-Elohim, and the reason of his fear was, simply that he was *naked*. Under other circumstances he would not have been afraid.

In like manner, Jehovah-Elohim refers to previous intercourse, or to former occasions when he had appeared. “Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof *I* commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat?” To which Adam replies,—“The woman whom *THOU* gavest to be with me, she gave me of the tree, and I did eat.”

If by Jehovah-Elohim we are here to understand the anthropomorphic Word, or an appearance in *anticipation* of his incarnation, it will certainly follow that every previous appearance was perfectly similar in its character. The *Creator, as such*, was then not revealed or manifested in *personal form* to Adam at all, on this hypothesis; nor was

there any MANIFESTATION which would have corresponded with his unsinning obedience to the law. As a matter of course, he *must fall*, and so one half of the divine constitution is left entirely out of view. For, supposing that Adam had kept the law, would there have been no personal intercourse between him and his Maker? Or would that intercourse have rested on mediatorial principles?—Most assuredly there must have been a distinct manifestation, which Jehovah made of himself, to our first parents; and which was suitable to their condition in their original probation, or as being under LAW, and not under GOSPEL. And when Moses undertakes to give an historical sketch of these early transactions, his reference must be to that *first* manifestation; nor could any thing be known of the *second*, until the promise of “the Seed of the woman” was given. Hence it is that he uses the official title JEHOVAH-ELOHIM, which sounds so strange to our ears, because theologians have not used scriptural language. Any other exposition would be a mere supralapsarian subterfuge, which would involve the divine proceedings in the grossest inconsistency.

2. The supposition, that by Jehovah-Elohim we are to understand the anthropomorphic Word, i. e. an appearance in human form, and in *anticipation* of his coming in the *flesh*; would be a burlesque on the judicial character he assumes. For such an appearance would proceed upon the fact that Adam had sinned: whereas that was the question to be tried. “Who told thee,” said the Lord, “that thou wast naked? Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat?” These hasty judgments, these decrees of condemnation, laid up amid the councils of eternity, from which there is no escape, and of which we hear so much, may suit the abstractions of some sectarian theologues; but they belong not to the judicial policy which the scriptures have acknowledged. God does nothing on arbitrary principles; nor does he govern us by laws, or condemn us by sentences, which are beyond

our comprehension. The very reason why he manifests himself in personal form is, that whatever may be interesting to us in his character and proceedings, shall be brought within the range of our perceptions. Take as an example, in which the remarks just made are unequivocally sustained, the conversation which Jehovah had with Abraham before the destruction of Sodom: "Because the cry of Sodom and Gomorrah is great, and because their sin is very grievous, I will go down now and *see* whether they have done altogether according to the cry of it, which has come unto me; and if not *I will know*. If I *find* fifty righteous men—if I *find* forty and five—if I *find* thirty—I will not destroy the city."* Take away from us this view of the divine administration, and there may be justice in it; but there is no possibility that we should perceive its justice. Evidently the hypothesis, which has been commonly received, throws away, as unworthy of the slightest attention, the whole individuality of man; or exchanges it for some inconceivable abstraction, with which it is no intention of our heavenly Father to torture our little faculties. Theologians have thus inconsiderately abandoned PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY at the outset.

3. The indistinctness with which the terms—Voice and Jehovah-Elohim—have been presented to the christian mind, is the cause of all the embarrassment that has existed on the subject of the trinity. For, finding that the *Logos* or *Word* was known from the beginning; taking the term *Logos* (Word) as equivalent with VOICE, instead of exchanging it for JEHOVAH-ELOHIM; and discovering that by the *Logos* all things were made, and that the divine distinction, expressed by the term *trinity*, existed before the incarnation; it has been confidently affirmed that this distinction belongs to the divine essence; and, moreover, that as *Father, Son, and Holy Spirit* are the peculiar terms expressive of that distinction, as it is precisely stated to us in the new

* Gen. xviii. 20—33.

testament, then Father, Son, and Holy Spirit exist in the divine essence. Hence the doctrine of three *portions*, or three *substances*, or three *persons*, in the divine nature. Hence also the doctrine of the eternal *generation* of the Son, and the eternal *procession* of the Holy Spirit. These doctrines, while their own advocates do not pretend to explain them, have ever been the occasion of irreconcilable controversies. But if ELOHIM is only in a *first* manifestation of God, what the Son is in the *second*, the subject of *Godhead*, or rather the embarrassment which theologians have felt in relation to that subject, is greatly relieved. For then they would be under no necessity to run up their speculations so high; or to infer, from the previous existence which is ascribed to the Word, that a thréefold distinction is predicated of the divine essence itself. The distinction would result from, and be characteristic of, the *manifestation* which Jehovah made of *himself* at first; and for the purpose of intercourse with man; which manifestation is called JEHOVAH-ELOHIM. And thus a very little reflection or scriptural research, I conceive, would make the whole matter as intelligible to us, as any other part of divine revelation.

4. The apostle John, referring to these very transactions of which Moses writes, observes—"In the beginning the WORD WAS, or subsisted, and the Word was with God, and the Word WAS God;—all things were made by him, and without him was not any thing made that was made." Of course the WORD of which John speaks, and Jehovah-Elohim of which Moses speaks, are identical. But the Word, according to both, was not *man*, but was *God*. AFTERWARDS, the apostle continues; "The Word was made FLESH, and dwelt among us." This quotation appears to me to afford positive and decisive testimony in favor of the doctrine advanced; i. e. that there have been two distinct manifestations, in which God has exhibited himself to mankind—Jehovah-Elohim and the Word made flesh—both equally resulting from the constitution of human nature;

and suited, the one to man as he was originally created, and the other to man as he is a sinner. They seem to be so precisely analogous, that the mind which recognizes the truth of the Mosaic account of the fall, and perceives the propriety of, and the necessity for, the *one*, can be at no great loss to perceive the propriety of, and the necessity for, the *other*; but will sensibly feel, that if either be scriptural or rational, the other must be equally so. The christian will thus have the divinity of his Saviour *demonstrated*; while the dissenter on that subject will have a new and difficult task thrown into his hand, in an attempt to perform which he may possibly be convinced of his palpable and mischievous error.

5. The apostle Paul, in his epistle to the philippians, startles us by making a similar statement. Speaking of the Lord Jesus, he describes him thus: "Who, being IN THE FORM OF GOD, thought it not robbery to be equal with God; but *made himself of no reputation*; divested or emptied himself, and *took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men.*"* Here we have this double exhibition again,—THE FORM OF GOD, and THE LIKENESS OF MEN; nor only so, but Christ Jesus is represented as *divesting* himself of *one* form, and taking upon him the *other*. At the same time it must be evident to every one, that the FORM of God does not mean the ESSENCE of God, seeing that Christ could not divest himself of the divine essence. There is then a *form of God*, and there is a *likeness of men*, in which God has exhibited himself to human view;—in other words, there have been *two* distinct manifestations of Jehovah; and Moses is referring to the *first* when he tells us of Jehovah-Elohim walking in the garden, and of our first parents' hearing his voice.

6. The apostle John, whom we have already quoted as furnishing us with very clear testimony on this point, further remarks: "No man hath *seen God* at any time; the

* Ch. ii. 6, 8.

only begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him :”* and again in one of his epistles, “No man hath seen God at any time.”† He also represents the Redeemer as observing—“The Father himself, which hath sent me, hath borne witness of me. Ye have neither heard his voice at any time, nor seen his *shape*, or FORM, or visible appearance.”‡ “Not that any man hath seen the Father, save he which is of God, he hath seen the Father.”§ “He that hath seen *me* hath seen the Father.”|| These declarations or expressions may be compared with another remark Matthew reports him to have made, when speaking of his “little ones:” “Their angels do always behold *the face of my Father which is in Heaven.*”¶ These varying phrases and differing statements may be readily reconciled upon the principle of a twofold manifestation; particularly when the subsequent references to the old testament shall be duly considered. But the allusion to *form*, other than that which is mediatorial, is too frequent and striking to be explained in any other way.

7. When the ceremonial institutions of the former dispensation were in the progress of their proclamation, a very singular interview between God and Moses is described. Moses prefers the following petition: “I beseech thee, show me thy glory.” To this, perhaps, inconsiderate prayer, God answers; “I will make all my goodness pass before thee, and I will proclaim the NAME of Jehovah.” “Thou canst not *see* my face, for there shall *no man see me and live.* And the Lord said, behold there is a place by me, and thou shalt stand upon a rock, and it shall come to pass, while my glory passeth by, that I will put thee in a cleft of the rock, and will cover thee with *my hand* while I pass by; and I will take away my *hand* and thou shalt see *my back parts*, but *my face* shall not be seen.”** In the book of Numbers also,

* John i. 18. † 1 John iv. 12. ‡ John v. 37. § Ch. vi. 46.
 || Ch. xiv, 9. ¶ Mat. xviii. 10. ** Exod. xxxiii. 18, 20—23.

when Aaron and Miriam had spoken against Moses, Jehovah appears in behalf of his servant, declaring: "With him will I speak mouth to mouth, even apparently, and not in dark speeches, and the *similitude of Jehovah* shall he behold." Here then again we have the similitude or *form*, not of *man*, but of Jehovah—i. e. Jehovah-ELOHIM; I say not the form of *man*, because God says to Moses—*Thou canst not see my face*; for there shall no man *see me and live*.

In connexion with the preceding facts, two or three others are recorded which seem to be of a totally different character. It is said that Jehovah appeared to Abraham and conversed with him, yet Abraham did not die. Jacob also, before he had met with Esau on his return to his own country, called the name of a particular place PENIEL; observing, I have *seen God* face to face, and my life is preserved.* Thus then God was *seen*. But in both of these cases he appeared in the form of a *man*, as the history explicitly states; for, as "the gospel was preached beforehand to them," the divine appearance was necessarily mediatorial in its character.

We have then again this double manifestation of Jehovah very clearly asserted; nor only so, but Moses is placed in circumstances which distinguish him as an official man from all other men. The occasion had some peculiarity about it, which belonged exclusively to itself, or to no other period which has transpired since the fall. Accordingly in his charge to the people he so speaks of it: "For ask now of the days that are past, which were before thee, since the day that God created man on the earth, and ask from the one side of heaven unto the other, whether there has been any such thing as this great thing is, or hath been heard like it? Did ever people hear the voice of Elohim speaking out of the midst of the fire, as thou hast heard, and live?"† And what was the peculiarity? We know of none other than that the Sinai covenant was a dispensation of LAW. Its

* Gen. xxxii. 24—32.

† Deut. iv. 32, 33.

principles were, DO AND LIVE;—TRANSGRESS AND DIE. Now it is evident that the very same thing was promulgated to Adam before the fall, and constituted the great characteristic of his original probation. As, therefore, Jehovah was now reviving the principle of LAW, as it is distinguished from that of GOSPEL, which belongs to the christian dispensation; he appeared in the character of LAWGIVER, and not of MEDIATOR; in the form of Jehovah, and not in the form of MAN; and hence it was, that he spake from the midst of FIRE, which was in regard of the first manifestation his appropriate emblem; for Paul says, when writing to the Jews, “Our God is a consuming fire.” The propriety of this view would fully appear, if the nature, design and operation of the two dispensations were fully understood. It will devolve upon us to look at them hereafter.

On the other hand, the appearances to Abraham and Jacob were purely mediatorial. The LAW was not given to these patriarchs. On the contrary, Paul assures us that, “the scripture foreseeing that God would justify the heathen through faith, preached the GOSPEL before to Abraham, saying, in thee shall all nations of the earth be blessed.”* The reason of this also will hereafter be considered. In the establishment of the Sinai covenant we have something analogous to the original institute given to Adam; and in the Abrahamic covenant a repetition of the subsequent promise—“the Seed of the woman shall bruise the head of the serpent.” And with the two, the double manifestation of Jehovah precisely corresponds.

On a particular occasion God is represented as speaking unto Moses in the following manner:—“I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, by the name of Almighty God; but by my NAME Jehovah was I not known unto them.”† This seems to be exceedingly singular language, to any one who is familiar with the previous history;

* Gal. iii. 8.

† Exod. vi. 3.

for the word JEHOVAH occurs in it, with great frequency, not simply as an epithet which the superior knowledge of the historian enabled him to employ, but it is used by the very individuals who, according to the text, we might hastily suppose, were entirely ignorant of it. For example: while Abraham was on the mount, whither he had been called to offer his son in sacrifice, and after the solemn ceremonies of that interesting scene were over, he called the name of the place JEHOVAH-JIREH. Critics have found considerable difficulty in adjusting the seemingly contradictory statements.

It is farther evident from the observation of Eleazar—"Blessed be *Jehovah-Elohim* of my master Abraham"—that Abraham knew this peculiar title which Moses uses in two of the chapters before us. By this, I should suppose, we are to understand that Abraham knew that JEHOVAH-ELOHIM, who was in the beginning, appeared to him in the form of a MAN; in the same way that the new testament disciple knows, that the WORD, which was in the beginning, has been "made flesh." It would be then equally true, that Abraham no more saw Jehovah-Elohim in his own proper PERSON, than the new testament disciple saw the Father. The declaration—I am Almighty God—would be equivalent with the declaration—"The Father is in me; and I am in the Father," or with this—"All power in heaven and in earth is given unto me."

Dr. Shuckford considers the translation of the passage before us to be faulty; and observes, that the "best and most accurate writers have remarked on the place, that the latter part of the verse should be used interrogatively, thus: By my name Jehovah was I not known unto them?"* It is the more objectionable, that this author should have so readily and entirely adopted this explanation; because, he himself observes—"That it is remarkable, from the writings

* Shuckford's Connexions, vol. 2, p. 400.

of Moses, that there were *two different and distinct* PERSONS known and worshipped by the faithful from the days of Abraham; GOD whom no man hath seen at any time, and the LORD who at divers times appeared unto them. The LORD who appeared to them is allowed by the best and most judicious writers, to have been the same divine PERSON who afterwards took upon him the seed of Abraham, and was made man, and dwelt among the Jews.”*

In correspondence with the observations made by Dr. Shuckford, Dr. Watts remarks—“Trypho, the jew, in his dialogue with Justin Martyr, maintains that there were two present in the appearance made to Moses in the burning bush, viz: GOD and an ANGEL; that the angel appeared in the flame of fire, and that GOD IN THE ANGEL spake with Moses.” To which Justin replies, that that may very well be granted according to the christian doctrine. And indeed Trypho’s opinion seems to have been generally received and approved amongst the more ancient jews; for Stephen teaches us, ’twas an angel who appeared to Moses in the bush, yet that God himself spake these words to Moses—“I am the God of thy fathers.”†

Bishop Warburton gives a different interpretation. He observes that—“The religion of NAMES arose from an idolatrous polytheism,” and that on the part of Jehovah, a “compliance with the religion of NAMES was a new indulgence to the prejudices of the Jews, as is evident from the following words: And God spake unto Moses, and said unto him, I am the Lord: and I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, by the NAME of GOD ALMIGHTY, but by my NAME JEHOVAH was I not known to them. That is, as the God of Abraham, I before condescended to have a *name of distinction*: but now, in compliance to another prejudice, I condescend to have a *name of honour*. This seems to be the true interpretation of this very difficult text;

* Vol. 2. pp. 401—2.

† Watts’ Glory of Christ Dis. 1. sec. 1. Justin Martyr lived in the second century.

about which the commentators have so much perplexed themselves.”*

It is very evident to an attentive observer, that both the difficulty and the explanation arise from considering the term NAME to refer to the mere *word* JEHOVAH; which reference would be the more readily made by the reader of our English version, because it represents Jehovah as saying, in the first clause of the text,—“I appeared *by the name* of Almighty God.” Indeed our translators have italicised the words which are not in the original, intending thereby to admonish us of the fact. But might they not, when seeking for explanatory terms, with equal propriety have rendered the passage thus—“I appeared *in the form* of Almighty God”—or AS Almighty God? AN APPEARANCE is spoken of, and that must have been in FORM of some kind: and the history of the facts reports it to have been in the form of a MAN.

The term NAME means the representative of a being or thing. Thus it was accordingly used. So God speaks of the angel that went up before his people—*my name is in him.*† So also in later times he spake by his prophets, concerning his people and their habitation—“I will bring them unto the place that I have chosen *to set my name there.*”‡ In like manner baptism is now administered, not in the *names* of, but *in the name* of, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. NAME is therefore a term particularly referring to some external *manifestation* which Jehovah makes of himself. The meaning of the passage then would be this—“God appeared to Abraham, to Isaac and to Jacob, in the *form* of, or manifested as, Almighty God, which was the FORM OF MAN: but in the *form* of Jehovah, which Paul tells us was the FORM OF GOD, he was not known unto, or *perceived* by, them. The ideas conveyed are precisely those which have

* Div. Leg. of Moses, vol. 2, p. 287, B. 4, sec. 6.

† Exod. xxiii. 21.

‡ Neh. i. 9.

already been noticed, in the apparently contradictory phrases—"I have seen God face to face," and—"no man can see my face and live." The whole is perfectly plain upon the principle of a double manifestation of God.

This interpretation of the text which has been quoted is confirmed by the accompanying circumstances, and I would paraphrase it in the following manner:—In the form of MAN I did appear to Abraham, to Isaac and to Jacob, but in the form of Jehovah I never was manifested unto them. But now I will manifest myself to thee in the form of Jehovah. It is my purpose by thy ministry to bring the people out of Egypt, and to put them in a peculiar relation to myself, as my elect people, and to do among them such things, as well as to display myself among them in such a manner, as no other nation has ever witnessed. In the form of Jehovah, or as Jehovah-Elohim, I will deliver to them the LAW; that they, being placed under it, and by its oppressive operation being shut up to the faith of a Mediator, may be a standing monument to all nations, that no man can be saved by the works of the LAW.

8. The last circumstance which I shall notice in proof of this double manifestation of God, is derived from the conversation which Satan is reported to have held with Eve. The adversary does not appear accurately to have understood the moral position which our first parents occupied in paradise:—at least Eve felt herself to be under a necessity to *explain*, after hearing his remark. Yet he makes no mistake in speaking of God himself; for he denominates him the *Elohim*, just as Moses does. How should he be competent to express himself with so much exactness in the one case, and under such apparent embarrassment in the other?

The whole subject of angelic agency, many theologians hold as an exceedingly equivocal matter. Why they should thus discard from their consideration an interesting analogy, derived from the intellectual world in illustration of moral

science, it may not be worth while, at present, to inquire. If God has created *one* race of intellectual beings, there is nothing unphilosophical in the idea that he should have created *another*. If the animal and mineral worlds are full of varieties, there is no unanswerable argument against like varieties existing in the intellectual world. And if sin is discovered in one part of God's intellectual empire, there is nothing so exceedingly repulsive, as some men affect to consider it, in the supposition that sin may be found in some other part of his intellectual empire. "He," as Mr. Locke observes, "that will not set himself proudly at the top of all things, but will consider the immensity of this fabric, and the great variety that is to be found in this little and inconsiderable part of it which he has to do with, may be apt to think, that in other mansions of it there may be other and intelligent beings, of whose faculties he has as little knowledge or apprehension, as a worm shut up in one drawer of a cabinet hath of the sinews or understanding of a man, such variety and excellency being suitable to the wisdom and power of the maker."* Accordingly Moses introduces Satan to our notice, not only as using a common term with himself in designating *Jehovah*, but as speaking with perfect familiarity on the subject of *the knowledge of good and evil*, to which Jehovah-Elohim afterwards refers, as actually belonging to other parts of his dominion:—"Behold," says he, "the man has become as one of us, to know *good and evil*." The Redeemer too has explicitly informed us, that in the resurrection, when all the natural relations are done away, we shall be LIKE the angels. There is then a similitude between these higher orders of intellectual beings and ourselves. The point of dissimilarity between us appears to consist in the *natural relations* which distinguish our present mode of existence, and belong not to them; and of course, in their not having been placed

* B. II. ch. 2, sec. 3.

under any thing like that form of political government which has been called *federal representation*. They seem to stand simply on their personal responsibility; hence *all* of them have not *fallen*. Some have rebelled, while others have retained their integrity. And it would be very difficult to assign any philosophical reason, why we should not take the deepest interest in contemplating and understanding this mode of intellectual and moral existence. But if this analogy can be thus traced, both scripturally and rationally, the reason why Satan uses the term *Elohim* is very apparent; for then there is a *manifestation* which God makes of himself to *them*, as well as to us. This cannot be supposed to be in the form of MAN. Of course, there is a double manifestation of Jehovah, agreeably to the doctrine I have advanced. In fact, singular as the circumstance may seem, we find that the angels were themselves called Elohim. Satan could therefore use the term intelligently.

Hence, in the book of Job, Satan and the sons of God are represented as *presenting themselves before* THE LORD. The occurrence is stated to have taken place on a *certain day*; to have been repeated on a subsequent and similar occasion; and the incidents are described with considerable minuteness. The whole scene, in view of the phraseology employed, is very much like that drawn out in the fourth chapter of Genesis, where Cain and Abel appeared at the door of the antediluvian tabernacle, within which were the cherubim of glory—the emblem of the invisible God.

Isaiah also with most thrilling interest depicts a vision with which he was favored in the year that king Uzziah died, when he says, “I saw THE LORD sitting on a throne, high and lifted up, and his train filled the everlasting temple. Above it,” he continues, “stood the seraphim; each one had six wings; with twain he covered his *face*, and with twain he covered his *feet*, and with twain he did *fly*.”

And one *cried* unto another, and said, holy, holy, holy is JEHOVAH of hosts; the whole earth is full of his glory. And the posts of the door moved at the voice of him that cried, and the house was filled with smoke. Then said I, wo is me, for I am undone, because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips; for mine eyes have seen the KING, JEHOVAH of hosts.”*

In like manner Jesus says, speaking of his “little ones,” —“THEIR ANGELS do always behold the FACE OF MY FATHER WHICH IS IN HEAVEN.

Surely the testimony of a twofold manifestation in external form, which Jehovah has afforded of himself—the one in THE FORM OF GOD, or as Jehovah-*Elohim*, and suited to man in his state of innocence, as well as to angels in heaven; and the other in THE FORM OF MAN, or as the Word made flesh, suited to us in our state of sin—is clear and undeniable. According to the usual ideas of the trinity, what can theologians do with the fact?

But after all, you may, perhaps, inquire what this manifestation was? It has been supposed that the Word, or Son, was the *second person of the trinity*, and that, in the relations between God and his intelligent creatures, established by the personal exhibition contemplated, the *second person* is the representative of the whole deity. Sabellius, in preferring to say, a certain *portion*, or *energy*, advocates essentially the same view, and merely changes the term. Arius violently breaks away from the whole subject, and talks about a lesser god; thus teaching the doctrine of *two* gods, while he complains of his opponents because they taught that of *three*.

The heavens and the earth are said to be a manifestation of Jehovah, in which his character is displayed with great beauty and brilliance. Whom do they manifest? The *second person of the trinity*—or God *himself*? Certainly the scrip-

* Isaiah vi. 1, 5.

tures do assure us that the heavens and the earth were framed by the Word of God. This is the doctrine of *faith* which they teach. But, at the same time, do they not as clearly assert, that the *Godhead* is thereby set forth to our view?—"The invisible things of him are clearly seen by the things which are made—even *his eternal power and Godhead.*"

In like manner, we are informed that in Christ Jesus "*dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily.*"* A distinction, a portion, a person, separate from other portions or persons, as belonging to Godhead, is not even hinted at. *All* the Godhead—all the *fulness* of the Godhead—dwelleth *in him* BODILY. Any distinction which is supposed, subsists merely between God *himself* and the *bodily residence* in which he dwells. And any other view, his apostle would inform us, is mere "philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men."*

Again—Christ is said to be the *image of God*†—the image of the *invisible God*†—the brightness of his glory, and the *exact image of his person*. And God is declared to be "IN CHRIST, reconciling the world unto HIMSELF." Hence the gentile world is condemned for changing *the glory of the incorruptible God*, into an image made like to corruptible man.

Jesus speaks of himself in a manner equally explicit:—"THE FATHER IS IN ME:"—"He that hath seen ME, hath seen the FATHER; and how sayest thou then, shew us the FATHER. Believest thou not that I am in the FATHER, and the FATHER IN ME? The words that I speak unto you, I speak not of myself, but the FATHER THAT DWELLETH IN ME, he doeth the works. Believe me that I am in the FATHER and the FATHER IN ME."||

The original manifestation *in the form of God* is described in like terms. "Show me thy *glory*," or grant me a

* Col. ii. 8, 9.

† Col. i. 15.

† 2 Cor. iv. 4.

|| John xiv. 9, 11.

view of thy personal appearance, said Moses; to which he received for answer—"thou canst not see my face, for no man can see me and live." God himself is then *invisible*—yet the *similitude* of this invisible God, Moses was permitted to behold. Isaiah also, in vision, saw the king—JEHOVAH OF HOSTS. And Christ speaks of "the FACE of his Father which is in heaven."

The mediatorial appearances with which Abraham and Isaac and Jacob were indulged, had the same general character. JEHOVAH conversed with Abraham before the destruction of Sodom. JEHOVAH *appeared* to him again, and said, "I AM ALMIGHTY GOD; walk before me, and be thou perfect." He afterwards told Moses—"I *appeared* to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, as ALMIGHTY GOD; but by MY NAME JEHOVAH, or in my form as Jehovah-Elohim, was I not known unto them."*

Can proof more ample or explicit be desired, in order to show that in all these cases the BEING who was manifested was God *himself*? A distinct appearance there was;—various appearances there were; the exterior form was different, according to circumstances; but that form was always inhabited by *God himself*. And indeed what is there improbable, unnatural, or incredible in such a view? Or was there not evidence enough of the fact, when the heavens and the earth started into being—when the bush on fire remained unconsumed—when the mountain burned to the midst of heaven—when Christ wrought his wondrous miracles? Is there the least necessity to waste our ingenuity in framing some perplexed and abstruse hypothesis? What more can be gained or desired?

Perhaps these various appearances may be charged with bringing a great deal of confusion into this branch of moral science. But let it be remembered that this confusion is not the result of the argument now advanced: for, whether that argument be true or false, these *appearances* are all

* Exod. iii. 14.

matters of historical fact, which I have not created, but simply arranged. And why should they introduce any confusion? Are not the circumstances to which they respectively belong, sufficiently distinct to account for the variety which has occurred? Two systems of moral government are delineated—*LAW* and *GOSPEL*—the first consistent with the *form of God*, and the second with the *form of man*; or the *revival of law* and the prophetic announcements of *gospel*, are described, each sustained by its own appropriate divine *manifestation*.

In the mere fact of change of *form* no difficulty can exist; because every one must know that change is the property of form, its susceptibility for which is apparent in every direction. Our bodies pass through endless changes, from infancy to manhood—from manhood to the grave—from a natural into a spiritual state. Christ was transfigured—metamorphosed—changed his form on the mount; appeared in more forms than one after his resurrection; talked of his flesh and bones, while his apostles speak of his glorious body in heaven. The glory of the Lord of old was a flaming fire in a bush—a pillar of fire in a cloud—an “infolding” flame over the cherubim. The Spirit was recognised at one time in bodily shape, like a dove; at another in cloven tongues like as of fire. Angels have been viewed as men; and again, with a countenance like lightning, and raiment white as snow. But all this change of form, which some corresponding change in external circumstances may call for, does by no means involve or imply the destruction of identity; the same intelligent agent may still be officiating under all these exterior changes.

In relation to the subject under consideration, the identity is most carefully and scrupulously preserved.* He

*It was to explain and illustrate this identity, that Dr. Watts wrote his fanciful treatise, entitled “the Glory of Christ.” He taught in that treatise the pre-existence of Christ’s human soul; but evidently was not entirely satisfied with his own theory.

“made *himself* of no reputation—laid aside, divested *himself* of the form of God, and took upon him the form of man. The Word which was GOD was made FLESH. The second ADAM is the LORD from heaven. My FATHER is in me—the angels behold the FACE of my FATHER which is in heaven. The SON is the brightness of glory, and the exact image of his PERSON. Now can they who have been in the habit of viewing Jehovah as filling illimitable space, as every where present, as manifested alike, and at the same time, to both angels and men, feel any difficulty in the idea, that he sustains two distinct manifestations, suited to two distinct orders of intelligences, who are for the time being in different circumstances? Or can there be any great labour of imagination required to conceive the fact, that, when this difference of circumstances shall be obliterated, or when human beings shall be “like the angels,” the original manifestation which Jehovah made of himself in *the form of God*—the NAME JEHOVAH—shall be equally suitable to all, and Christ shall surrender the kingdom to his FATHER, so that GOD shall be ALL AND IN ALL? May not he, who covers himself with light as with a garment, assume or lay aside external form, as may be most advantageous to his creatures, without leading those creatures into polytheism, or inducing them to suppose that in his own *nature* there must be *three persons*?

On the received hypothesis of the trinity, or viewing the LORD as the *second person*, how will the identity be sustained, when the scriptural fact is under consideration, that the WORD, which in the beginning was *God*, in the fulness of time became MAN? Or on the Arian hypothesis, that the Word was GOD, but not the *supreme* God, how shall the identity be preserved in view of his becoming MAN? Neither of these systems can in the least degree relieve the apparent embarrassment into which we are thrown by this change in exterior form. But if Jehovah, with a view to the exhibition of HIMSELF to the creatures he intended

to call into being, should assume external form, and before their creation should determine so to do, where is there any difficulty? And if any event should occur in the history of any portion or class of those creatures, in consequence of which that personal exhibition of himself should be too glorious for them to behold; is there any difficulty then brought in, if he should be graciously pleased to condescend to the infirmities of those creatures, and manifest himself in *another* form, better suited to their capacities? Or must we believe that the one cannot exist when the other is proposed, without contradiction or collision? There does not appear to me to be any very distressing *mystery* in the *principle* of such a theory. On the contrary it would seem to proclaim an act of grace, as interesting and intelligible as it is suitable and needful.

But I would go a step farther, and observe, that there is not only an identity carefully displayed in view of the divine appearances; but an identity of *legislative principle* is as distinctly retained. The object in both the cases which have been described is precisely the same. The intellectual perfection and the spiritual blessedness of *man* are avowed as the design of both law and gospel. Any representative character which may be ascribed either to the first, or to the second, Adam, looks to the same result. That is, the children of men under the operation of either the paradisiacal, or mediatorial, constitution, can attain to the joy of the celestial kingdom only on the principle of their *personal* holiness. Whether they be called to do or to BELIEVE, the consummation to which they look forward must be their likeness to God. And when the end shall come, their final position shall be such as was originally contemplated, and as has just been stated: they shall be as the angels of God, the peculiarities of their earthly existence shall be past and gone, and God shall be ALL AND IN ALL. But these remarks anticipate the views which properly belong to the mediatorial constitution.

And now, perhaps, the question may be asked, what was this FORM OF GOD? In attempting to meet this question, I think it necessary to remind you, that it is no part of my object to start an original speculation on the subject of Godhead. My intention is to endeavor, irrespective of the scholastic and mystified explanations with which contending sects have filled the church, to present what the scriptures themselves have said of the divine manifestations. It would seem then, that the *form* of God is not, according to their report, the ESSENCE of God: else the Lord could not have laid it aside. Nor only so: but when humbled to be found in the likeness of *man*, we still hear the language appropriate to indwelling *godhead* “In him dwelleth *all the fulness* of the *godhead* bodily.”—“My *Father* is in me.”—“The *Father* that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works.”

Neither was this form *the angelic nature*: for it is expressly called the form of GOD. Nor yet was this form that of *man*; because the assumption of human nature is the very object, for the accomplishment of which the form of God was laid aside.

The corresponding phrases which are used are—*similitude* of God—*face* of God—*name* of God—*appearance*, or *shape* of God—*presence* of God—God *dwelling* in. So that there seems to be no alternative. It is the form in which God manifests himself to both angels and men, viewing the latter as they were originally constituted; in which the angels constantly behold him; and in which we shall at last see him, when the interests and concerns of this system shall be wound up.

Would you press the question any farther? Then the scriptures add, “God is light;”—“Our God is a consuming fire.” Ask you more? Pause and reflect. Remember, Moses could not look and live. Remember, Isaiah bowed his head and cried—I am undone—mine eyes have seen the KING, Jehovah of Hosts: Remember, that Paul, caught up into paradise, heard unspeakable words, which it is not law-

ful for a man to utter. "Jehovah dwells in LIGHT which no man can approach unto; no man hath seen him, nor can see him." We must be satisfied with contemplating the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ. *Hereafter*, we shall see, and know, and be like to, God AS HE IS. There I leave this momentous theme. The scriptures carry me no farther than simply to exhibit JEHOVAH-ELOHIM, by whom the divine communications were originally made. By him "the word of God came."

LECTURE IV.

Of God—JEHOVAH—The SPIRIT—Analogies—Trinity stated—Terms explained—Views of the divine operations in relation to the government of man.

THUS far the discussion has merely delineated, as I suppose, the scriptural view of the WORD of God, or Jehovah-ELOHIM. Theologians have denominated him the SECOND PERSON of the trinity. The preceding argument exhibits him as God HIMSELF manifested in personal *form*; and so manifested, because that the human mind having no *innate ideas*, but deriving its impressions from external things through the medium of the corporeal senses, cannot SEE Jehovah, or acquire the knowledge of him in any other way. I speak, of course, of the human mind in its present condition, or as dwelling in an animal body, and surrounded by the almost endless varieties of a material system.

It may now be asked—what shall we understand by JE-

HOVAH? and by the SPIRIT,* as distinguished from Jehovah-Elohim? And unless these questions can be distinctly answered, it were vain to proceed in our discussion; nor could we hope to explain the corresponding terms—FATHER and HOLY SPIRIT—which are used in relation to the mediatorial manifestation. These terms in connection with the term SON, are inconsiderately employed by biblical critics, to express the whole subject popularly called TRINITY; and, carried back without any reference to the import of JEHOVAH-ELOHIM as a divine title, are applied to the divine essence. Hence the *mystery* of the TRINITY, or of a TRIUNE GOD. Let us then try to meet these questions.

1. What are we to understand by JEHOVAH?

No one who has bestowed even common attention on the varied, yet continuous, argument which has been given in the preceding lectures, can be at much loss to answer this question. Jehovah is of course God HIMSELF:—the self-existent SPIRIT, whom we cannot see, and who has been pleased to manifest himself to his creatures, in appropriate and personal form. The Father, the Redeemer said, is IN ME:—the Father that DWELLETH IN ME, he doeth the works. In Christ, at one time says Paul, “dwelleth *all the fulness of the Godhead bodily* ;” and at another, “GOD IS IN Christ, reconciling the world unto HIMSELF.” It was JEHOVAH who appeared to Abraham, and said, *I am Almighty God*. The king, whom Isaiah saw, was *Jehovah of Hosts*. The voice which Adam and Eve heard in the garden, was that of *Jehovah-Elohim*. The Word, in the beginning was GOD. The idea is very simple. There is a God, all nature harmoniously and loudly speaks. And if he should manifest himself in external or personal form, by what obliquity of mind

*In the first edition I used, in this part of the discussion, the terms FATHER and HOLY GHOST; stating, at the time, that I did so on account of their familiarity. Apprehending that, what I supposed to be an indulgence to general feeling has contributed to a misunderstanding of my views, I have in the present edition taken the terms used by Moses.

can the *fact* be so grievously misunderstood, as to lead to the supposition that there are two gods; or to involve the subject of his UNITY in the least difficulty? By what principle of fair or philosophic ratiocination, can it possibly follow that there are the *supreme*, and a *lesser*, God—distinct and separate beings? And above all,—where is the propriety of the speculation which, supposing it to have become necessary that this manifestation should be made in the FLESH, pertinaciously maintains that no other pretensions are set forth, than those which belong to mere—it may be frail and peccable—humanity? In all such evasive theories, however rational they may be supposed to be, I can discern nothing but a fragment of the ancient idolatry.

To illustrate the subject by analogy:—If we were discoursing of a mere human being, what should we consider to be the MAN? Is it not the *mind*—the intellectual *spirit*? Is not this evidently Paul's meaning, when he says—"If *I* do that *I* would not, it is no more *I* that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. I find then a law that when *I* would do good, evil is present with me; for I delight in the law of God, after *the inner man*; but I see another law *in my members*, warring against the law of my *mind*, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin, which is in my members. So then, with *the mind* I MYSELF serve the law of God, but with *the flesh* the law of sin."* The *mind* is the *man*; but the mind is not a PERSON.

If the apostle's expressions should, by any ingenious controvertist applying them to some favorite speculation, be wrested from us, then what shall be done with the Redeemer's argument on the resurrection? Jehovah had proclaimed himself to be the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob: but said Jesus, "God is not the God of the *dead*, but of the *living*." These patriarchs are therefore still living, notwithstanding their bodies have long since been commit-

*Rom. vii. 14—25.

ted to the dust. Or, again to return to the apostle Paul, how shall we understand him, when, with a heart full of heavenly anticipations, he writes—"We are always confident, knowing that whilst we are at home *in the body*, we are absent from the Lord: we are confident, I say, and willing rather to be *absent from* the body, and to be present with the Lord."* The body is not the *man*; but the home, the tabernacle, in which for the present the man resides. Have we then two distinct *men*, or *persons*—one *supreme* man, and one *lesser* man,—or are we all *BODY*—a mere material lump? Assuredly the spirit is the man; and when that spirit is clothed with external form, without which we could have no knowledge of or intercourse with him, he is still the same intelligent agent. And now we have a *PERSON*—Thus God is or *SUBSISTS*.

The fact of a double manifestation on the part of God, which has been abundantly proved, neither weakens nor perplexes our analogical argument; but on the contrary, affords us an opportunity of extending its application. For there is a *natural* body, and there is a *spiritual* body; and the *changes* which man experiences, in view of those different modes of existence, does in no way affect his *identity*, however they may modify his personal form or exterior appearance. So, when the *LORD*, who made all things, and who was *GOD*, laid aside the *form* of God, and took upon him the *likeness* of man, no argument can arise from the glorious transaction against the fact that it is still the same infinite and eternal *SPIRIT*, manifesting *HIMSELF*. Here then I may safely leave this interesting topic, as having been amply illustrated;—nothing, that I can perceive, is left to torture an humble and honest inquirer. To proceed:

2. What shall we understand by the *SPIRIT*? Moses informs us, that in the beginning, "the earth was without form and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep, and *THE SPIRIT OF GOD* moved upon the face of the waters."

* 2 Cor. v. 6—8.

I shall not stop to meet the representations of those who would tell us that the word here translated *Spirit* signifies *wind*; and that the appended words, *of God*, are merely intended to express a *mighty* wind;—as when it is said, trees of God, and mountains of God, the meaning is *tall* trees and *great* mountains. It is sufficient to observe, that in these remarks we have a very good specimen of what theologians, who glory much in their literature, call *criticism*. Many sectarian theologians repose a great deal of confidence in criticism; and not unfrequently, though unintentionally, indulge in their nice philological distinctions at the expense of every thing which can be valuable to them as accountable beings. Whether there was a great wind employed at the time or not; or whether the SPIRIT derives an appellation from the air, as the best symbolic representation of his varied influences, I shall not delay to inquire—nor would it be worth while. If the following argument does not exhibit the great matter itself, very little could be gained by exposing the imbecility of a mere verbal subterfuge; but should the scriptural doctrine be fairly set forth, any honest reasoner would readily dispense with his philology for the sake of his morals; or rather, he would discover, that by mistaking the one, he has learned to misrepresent the other; and would quickly succeed in adjusting any discrepancy which may be apparent, but is not real.

The general argument on which I am about to enter, requires some preliminary observations, which may render it more acceptable, and add not a little to its force.

1. That the operations ascribed to the SPIRIT are to be referred to an intelligent agent, cannot be reasonably denied, if the following and such like scriptural passages are deliberately considered:—"When HE, the Spirit of truth is come, HE will guide you into all truth: for he shall not speak of HIMSELF; but whatsoever HE shall HEAR that shall HE speak; and he will show you things to come. HE shall glorify me: for HE shall receive of mine, and shall show it

unto you.”*—“While Peter thought on the vision, the SPIRIT said unto him, behold, three men seek thee. Arise therefore, and get thee down, and go with them, doubting nothing; for *I have sent them.*”† “As they ministered to the Lord, the Holy Spirit said, separate ME Barnabas and Saul for the work whereunto *I have called them.*—So they, being sent forth by the Holy Spirit, departed unto Seleucia.”‡

2. That the SPIRIT is GOD is equally clear from these texts;—“The FATHER that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works:”—“If I by the SPIRIT of God cast out devils.”—And “Peter said, Ananias, why hath Satan filled thine heart, to lie unto the HOLY SPIRIT? Thou hast not lied unto men, but unto GOD.”—“Now the LORD is that SPIRIT; and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.”||

3. The SPIRIT is never represented in the scriptures in any *personal* form, or in a distinct *personal* manifestation. On the banks of Jordan he descended on Jesus “in a bodily shape like a dove.” On the day of pentecost, when the disciples were filled with the Holy Spirit, there appeared unto them cloven tongues like as of fire, and it sat upon each of them.” But in neither of these cases was *personal* form assumed. Such events may indicate the class of secondary agents he employs, as originating nothing concerning *himself*, but taking of, and ministering about, the things that are Christ’s. They go no further.

4. As the SPIRIT is never said to have assumed *personal* form, he is never for that reason recognised in the scriptures as a distinct object of religious worship. The reason is very evident. God is not the object of religious worship to man, excepting as he is manifested. By the SPIRIT, and through Christ, we come to the Father. The necessities of the case, as has already been shown, call for a man-

* John xvi. 13, 14.

† Acts x. 19—20,

‡ Acts xiii. 2—4.

|| 2 Cor. iii. 17, 18,

ifestation of God in *personal* form. Without it we must seek him in his works, and worship him in them; which has been sufficiently exposed as idolatry. As then the SPIRIT is not to be viewed in *personal* form, so, if we were to recognise him as a distinct object of worship, we should be left to a like result, and must bow to him in a bible, a crucifix, a consecrated wafer, or a saint, which is the most heartless of all idolatry. The ordinance of baptism recognises the matters in which we are to *believe*; and the apostolic blessing refers to the several *characteristics and operations* which have been set forth as distinguishing Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; but in neither case is a direct act of religious address to the SPIRIT, as such, either expressed or implied. Nor yet does the Redeemer hint at such a service, when he tells the Jews, that all men are required “to honor the Son even as they honor the Father.” No, nor yet Paul, when contrasting christianity with the heathen mythology, in view of their respective objects of worship:—“To us,” says he, “there is *one God*, even the *Father*, and one *Lord Jesus Christ*.” And even the heathen, though they had many gods and many lords, yet had but these two classes of objects of worship; seemingly intimating that the fact has been from the beginning just as I have stated it.—I presume it is distinctly remembered, that in these observations reference is made to the SPIRIT as officially distinguished from JEHOVAH; or that I am explaining the relative use of official terms.

Having offered these preliminary remarks, I proceed with the question before us—what is the SPIRIT? I must, however, be indulged with the liberty of taking what may seem to be a circuitous route, in order to answer it. As the idea, which I shall offer in solution of this universally conceded mystery, may be treated as my own, I must be permitted to choose my method of representing it.

When the apostle Paul wrote his first epistle to the Corinthians, he noticed in connexion with other things a particular

case of crime which had occurred among them ; in reference to which they had not conducted themselves either discreetly or faithfully. This case he undertakes to adjudicate :—"I verily," he says, "as absent in body, but present in *spirit*, have judged already as though I were present, concerning him that hath so done this deed, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, when ye are gathered together, and MY SPIRIT, with the power of our Lord Jesus Christ, to deliver such an one to Satan."* What is the import of this singular language? In what way could Paul's SPIRIT be in the Corinthian church, when his body was absent? The common-place idea, that a man can translate his thoughts thousands of miles in an instant, will not explain the apostolic phrase ; because those distant objects which might interest his feelings, could not, in that case, be in any manner conscious of his intellectual operations. The fact would be quite different in the Corinthian church : it would be, to use the apostle's own language, "as though he were present." The whole assembly would have felt "as though he were present;" and the disciplinary process would have been conducted, "as though he were present." From the force and feeling of his official authority, there was no escape. His individuality was recognised, though he was not personally, or really, present. Yet a second or a different PERSON is not implied in the phraseology which the apostle uses.

A similar idea is advanced by the same apostle when he reports the faith of Abel.—"By faith Abel offered unto God," he says, "a more excellent sacrifice than Cain ; and by it, *he being dead, yet speaketh*." So one age lives on the thoughts excogitated by the *spirits* of some preceding age. The spirits of the fathers hover around the summit of Zion, and are conjured at pleasure into our sanctuaries and ecclesiastical courts, to frown on every man who dares to

* 1 Cor. v. 3—5.

think for himself; and to visit on his guilty head the sad consequences of heresy. By creeds and catechisms, and ponderous tomes of lofty pretensions, those fathers, being dead, yet speak. It is perfectly astonishing how far such influence is exerted, and with what easy credulity men submit their own immortal minds to its destructive control.—“Whatsoever time, or the heedless hand of blind chance,” says Milton, “hath drawn down from of old to this present, in her huge drag-net, whether fish or sea-weed, shells or shrubs, unpicked, unchosen, THOSE ARE THE FATHERS.”

A friend writes a letter, or publishes a book. His *spirit* is recognised, is felt, in every sentence, in every line. The reader discerns the attributes of his character, and not unfrequently fancies that he hears the tones of his friend's voice.

An individual of political, literary, or official merit, may be so distinctly felt in the community to which he belongs, as to command universal admiration for some signal service he has rendered. Or he may be envied for his superior attainments and standing; and be reproached and maligned by multitudes, who had not grace enough to acknowledge their obligations to him. But when the rude hand of death shall have dissolved the tie that bound him to an ungrateful world, envy retires, suspicion sleeps, and his voice is heard with deliberate and respectful attention. His *spirit* speaks.

A prince, screened from public gaze within his own palace, or seldom leaving the metropolis of his empire, yet exerts a powerful influence—legislative, military, or otherwise—to the utmost extent of his dominions. His *spirit* pervades every department in his administration; and millions who never saw him respectfully mention his name, submissively bow to the symbols of his authority, and enthusiastically eulogize his virtues. They would fight, they would bleed, they would die, for his honor; and for his gratification would chant the praises of a victory, that leaves to many a bereaved widow and houseless orphan, their tears

as their meat night and day. Social influence is one of the most powerful springs of human action, productive, at one time, of a thousand blessings; and at another, the parent of as many ills. Yet in none of these cases is a new PERSON supposed to be present.

But we must take another and a farther view of Paul's spirit. He gloried in a hope beyond this life, and in scenes of bliss amidst which his spirit should dwell, when his martyred body should rest in the dust. How he exulted, when this subject occupied his thoughts and employed his pen! "I knew a man in Christ fourteen years ago," he said, "and of such an one will I glory—I knew such an one caught up into the third heavens; how that he heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter." Whether "he was in the *body* I cannot tell, or whether he was out of the *body* I cannot tell." In what way these unspeakable words were communicated to him, or what was the mode or manner of action in which his *spirit* was employed, he could not explain. Perception by means of our corporeal senses he could readily have stated; but perception in the case described, or when the spirit reaches its celestial atmosphere, he was unable to define.

Ardently did he desire to depart and be with Christ. Amidst all his earthly troubles, his *spirit* rose into communion with his beloved Master, and coveted to be absent from the body and to be present with the Lord. Then, like Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, of whose etherial essence and celestial destiny the Sadducees seemed to be so stupidly ignorant, he should live and behold and praise his glorified Redeemer. In heaven, independent of this material tabernacle beyond whose powers the spirit now perceives no objects, hears no melody, and accomplishes no designs, it shall exert all its faculties. What then if the *spirit* of Paul, which had been burdened with the care of all the churches while on earth, should even now hover over our altars, and feel the deepest, but a melancholy, interest in our distractions?—

Though invisible to us, we would in such a case speak of his presence and individuality.

But if this cannot be, still we know that *angels*, acting out a celestial character, living, moving and operating on the principles of *celestial existence*, are appointed to a ministry on account of the heirs of salvation. They encamp round them that fear the Lord, and watch over many a timid, trembling, desponding child of grace. How far their agency may extend, or what various concerns may fall within their range, no one can fully tell. It is the *fact* that I wish to be distinctly noticed, and which is my reliance in following out my subject.

Having stated the scriptural *facts* in relation to intellectual *creatures*, so far as they are relevant to the object of our present inquiry, I shall next endeavor to ascertain, whether Jehovah offers any analogous representation of *Himself*? For if we shall find that a train of influences or operations correspondent with those which have been predicated of created spirits, is ascribed to him, while at the same time his actual, though invisible, presence is distinctly and undeniably affirmed, nothing farther can be desired.

Man, it is said in the bible, was made in the *image* of God. There can, therefore, be nothing either extravagant or improbable in the idea, that God is *like* man. In fact, "our ideas of the divine character are all taken from archetypes found in our own, because we have none other wherefrom to describe any thing conceivable to our imaginations." More particularly will it seem to be rational and satisfactory, when we recollect that the special doctrine of a Mediator is, that he "who was in the form of God, was made in *the likeness of men*; and that it *behooved* him in all things to be made *like unto his brethren*, that he might be a merciful and faithful high priest." The point of resemblance between God and man has been supposed to be purely intellectual and moral. Hence the image of God, as man was created in it, has been said to consist in "knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness." Admitting this view to

be correct, the analogy, of which we are in quest, would exist in the intellectual operations, or in the action of *spirit*, ascribed to God and man; of course the influences of the *spirit* of man, which have been so particularly detailed, would lead us to infer *similar influences* exerted by Jehovah. And the fact of those influences, analogically traced, as far as the representations previously made of the *spirit* of man would allow us to go, would explain the whole scriptural doctrine of the SPIRIT.

But let us hear Moses himself on this subject of the divine image? He reports the matter thus:—"And the ELOHIM said, let us make man in OUR image, after OUR likeness." It is not GOD abstractedly considered, it is not JEHOVAH viewed in and of himself a pure SPIRIT, whom man resembles; but he is made like the *Elohim*. What then is meant by the Elohim? First, God is a *Spirit*; so also is *man*. Secondly, God has manifested himself, or, as a Spirit, he dwells in *external form*. The fact is the same with man: his spirit inhabits a *body*. Thus we have a double resemblance. And may there not be a *third*? May not God as a *Spirit*, considered as manifested in external form, act independently of that form, as the spirit of man does? and may not a doctrine of influences, large, important, and varied, which he shall really superintend or sustain, ensue? Should this be the fact, would it not explain, would it not in truth be, the very doctrine of the SPIRIT? Can any thing farther be desired to place the whole subject in clear and intelligible exposition?

Let us appeal to the law and to the testimony. The apostle Paul evidently states, and with considerable precision, the view of the Spirit of God which has been inferred by analogy.—"The SPIRIT," he says, "SEARCHETH all things, yea, the deep things of God. For what *man* knoweth the things of a *man*, save the *spirit of man which is in him*? EVEN so the things of God knoweth no man, but the *Spirit of God*."*. This is certainly writing in terms which are

* 1 Cor. ii. 10, 11.

very plain and positive ; and the very analogy, by which I have endeavored to illustrate our subject, is thus employed as the best, if not the only one, by which the inspired writer could explain himself to the apprehension of his readers. The *spirit* of man, within him, carefully *reflects* on the purposes he has formed, and the circumstances under which those purposes are to be developed. In like manner the *Spirit of God*—within the form that he has assumed, shall I say—*reflects* upon, carefully considers, and oft-times reviews, the various designs of mercy he has proclaimed ; as well as their most gracious and effectual application to the changing condition of human beings. The same general doctrine is taught by the Lord himself, when he promised to his disciples, that he would send them the Spirit. “Howbeit,” said he, “when HE, the *Spirit* of truth is come, he shall guide you into all truth ; for he shall not speak of HIMSELF, but whatsoever he shall HEAR, that shall he speak.” *Hearing* and *reflection*, both of which are ascribed to the Spirit of God, may well go together, and are very happily sustained by the analogy which is selected.

I shall be chargeable with no presumption, nor yet with a puerile yielding to an errant fancy, if I now call up and apply the particular cases of intellectual operation in which the spirit of man is known to act, independently of its bodily form. We now no longer know Christ after the *flesh*. “The heavens must receive him until the times of the restitution of all things.” But his SPIRIT is with us.—I mean not his human spirit ; though even in that application the principle of our argument would be sustained. But he is God manifested in the flesh ; and therefore the reference is to the Spirit of God. The Spirit of truth is abroad, convincing the world of sin, of righteousness and of judgment. And who does not perceive the fact ? Whose heart does not feel the attractions of his grace ? Whose soul does not tremble under the denunciation of his wrath ?

Nor only so. Jesus, while on earth, though *felt* throughout Judea, in the synagogue, in the temple, in the sanhedrim, in Herod's court, in Pilate's chamber, yet was an object of envy, of reproach, of malignant revenge. His followers were few. The fickle multitude, easily assembled, were as quickly dispersed. One disciple betrayed him; another denied him; the rest forsook him and fled. A few devoted females wept at his cross, or were early at his sepulchre. An astonished centurion confessed his power; and an expiring robber sued for his mercy. But what more? He said himself to his disciples—"it is expedient for you that I go away; for if I go not away, the Comforter will not come." He went and the *Spirit* came. With what power the apostles spake! What mighty works they performed! What land did they not penetrate? What philosophy did they not confound? What mitred priest did they not humble? What idol god did not totter on his base? Do I say more than the facts in the case will warrant, in remarking, that a much greater amount of practical moral influence was felt after the Redeemer's death, than while he lived?

Books, as the instruments of intellectual power, have also been adduced in illustration of this subject. Holy men of God have written the bible. They have written it as they were moved by the Spirit. And what honest mind does not perceive and feel the *Spirit of God*, in every sentence, in every line? Or can there be any thing more unseemly than to be heard praying for the Spirit, while we put the scriptures out of the way, traduce them as unintelligible, seek not to be intimately acquainted with them, or substitute in their place, avowedly or virtually, the books of controversial and embittered theologians? What a spectacle in an age of revivals;—in a period when every sect has bosomed within itself the principles of its own dissolution!

In like manner the Son of God may be viewed as an ex-

alted Prince, seated on his throne—in glory—at the right hand of the Majesty on high—far out of our sight—not personally seen on earth. But his *Spirit* is in all parts of his mediatorial dominions. Every old testament prophet—every new testament apostle—every humble saint has the Spirit of Christ in him: all the world is under his tuition, and every unbeliever resists his grace, and foolishly courts his wrath.

But all this argues, it may be said, mere *influence*; and may be resolved into simple *emanation*, without evincing the presence of any individual agent. Suppose that such be the fact. Is there any thing in the scriptures, or in the systems of popular theology which men laud with so much fulsome adulation, to forbid us to speak of the Spirit's *influence*?

But has our schedule of familiar analogies yet run out? Was not the spirit of Paul traced to its heavenly habitation, “shining in full glory,” really enjoying his Saviour’s love, though his body is in the grave? Have not *angels* been adduced, as ministering *spirits*, acting on the principles of the celestial world? And above all, may we not thus speak of the Spirit of God or of Jehovah himself—who is every where present, invisibly, yet really, superintending all the widely diversified interests of the mediatorial empire? To this point it has been my object to carry this discussion; and it has never been lost sight of for a single moment. The spirit of the believer, singing the praises, and shouting the alleluias of redeeming love, while yet his bodily lips are sealed in death, is not a mere *emanation* from an annihilated or mouldered being. It is the man *himself*, in spotless robes, and with his golden harp, fully conscious of his own identity.

It is here worthy of observation, that Moses, when speaking of the agency of the SPIRIT in creation, denominates him the Spirit of “ELOHIM.” If then Jehovah-Elohim was a divine hypostasis, or PERSON, as man is while dwell-

ing in the body, it is very clear that the phrase, "Spirit of Elohim" is analogous with "spirit of man;" and it is equally clear that, as the phrase, "spirit of man," does not express a distinct PERSON, but is applied to man's intellectual operations irrespective of his bodily presence, we have no mode of explaining the phrase, "Spirit of ELOHIM," but that which implies corresponding operations.

The scriptural view of God which, if I mistake not, has been very distinctly ascertained, is simply this:—JEHOVAH, is God *himself*, considered as he is in his own being—an infinite, invisible, eternal Spirit: The WORD, or Jehovah-Elohim, is God *himself*, as he has assumed, and is revealed in, *personal form*, with the view of manifesting himself unto his intelligent creatures, that they might enjoy *personal* intercourse with him. The SPIRIT, is God *himself*, acting invisibly, or not in personal form, yet really, in his providential superintendence over his works. Every one can distinctly perceive in this delineation, that there is but ONE GOD; and no one can feel any necessity to advance the inexplicable dogma, that there are *three persons* in one God. No philosopher would ever describe man as *three persons*, and but ONE MAN. Or if any sophist, vain of his power of philosophic refinement, should so represent the human being, the world would leave him to his self-complacency, and mind their own business under the guidance of their own common sense apprehensions. Yet the same threefold view, which has been taken of God, may be very consistently taken of man. But the subject of *Godhead* has been so mystified by the ancient philosophy, either oriental or grecian; and so obscured by men, who, offended with the grossness of the vulgar idolatry, diverged into most extravagant speculation; or so uniformly represented as incomprehensibly mysterious, by theologians who were deceived by a false philosophy, and who scarcely ever thought of breaking away from its trammels; that man-

kind have helplessly mistaken their unintelligible statements for good sense and scriptural truth.

But if we had not reached a conclusion so rational and simple, yet it is evident, that the threefold view of God which the scriptures so clearly state, arises entirely from the *manifestation* which he has made of himself to his creatures. As to God, considered in his own being, he is, said Jesus, A SPIRIT. There are not, there cannot be, *three persons* in a *Spirit*. Predicated of the human spirit, the absurdity of such an idea would immediately appear: and no analogy could be pointed out in any direction. Nor is the notion of Sabellius a whit better; while that of Arius must be condemned by its own terms. For which of the phrases—three persons—three portions—a supreme God and a lesser God—would be most appropriate, in commenting on the scriptural view which has been presented?

The precise use of the terms, however, that have been employed in the scriptures on this subject, has not yet been pointed out: and there may be a necessity that this should be done, in order to possess a full apprehension of the whole matter. Then suffer me to call up to your recollection the fact, which has been so variously illustrated, that the bible has noticed *two* distinct manifestations, which Jehovah has made of HIMSELF. One in the form of *God*, and the other in the form of *man*: one as *Creator*, and the other as *Redeemer*. When agents derive their *names* from the operations they conduct, from the object they have in view, or from the circumstances under which they act, those names may change; or they may not be equally applicable to, or expressive of, every mode of operation, or every phase of character, or every class of social relations, in which we may be required to contemplate these agents. MAN is a generic term. But all men are not magistrates, bishops, civilians, or physicians. So here. The terms which are used in reference to God as manifested to us, are not equally appropriate to every view in which his charac-

ter, work, or official relations, are set forth. *Word, King, Lord, Image, Glory*, are appellations which belong to both *manifestations*; because the general principle they are intended to express is equally characteristic of both. The phrase *form of God*, can be properly applied only to the *first*. The phrase *form or likeness of man*, with the words *Jesus, Christ, Saviour, Prophet, Priest, Captain*, can only be properly applied to the *second*.

So also the terms *Father, Son, Holy Spirit*, arise from or belong to the mediatorial manifestation, and not to the original view which God gave of himself, excepting so far as the term FATHER is a general political title. This observation may not at first appear strictly accurate; because such passages as the following may seem to be in direct hostility to it:—"God hath in these last days spoken unto us by his SON, by whom also he made the worlds:"—"Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, to-day, and forever." I have not been careful in the selection of examples in which the supposed conflict with my remark may apparently exist; because I intend, at present, to make but one explanatory observation: and it is this;—that the scriptures evidently show great concern to preserve in our minds the idea of a *political identity** in view of the twofold manifestation of which they speak. This consideration, highly important in itself, and affording an irrefutable argument in favor of the *divinity* of our Saviour, would readily explain and remove such seeming discrepancies. The *Word*, which was in the beginning, was made *flesh*:—the second *Adam* is the *Lord from Heaven*. You never hear Jesus say, referring to the divine nature, as characteristic of his mediatorship,—“The SON OF GOD who dwelleth in me, he doeth the works;” though he does make such a remark of the FATHER dwelling in him. You never hear him say, alluding to his divine nature,—“If I by the SON OF GOD cast out devils;” though he does say, that he did cast out devils by the

* See Lectures V. and VIII.

Spirit of God.—On the contrary he says, “The Son can do nothing of *himself*:—I can of *mine own self* do nothing; as I *hear* I judge.” The terms *Father, Son, and Holy Spirit*, I feel perfectly safe in repeating the remark, are strictly applicable to, or are used in view of, the second manifestation alone; and arise from the following circumstances: Jesus had no earthly father; God was his father: hence the relation of *Father* and *Son*. Any farther idea, conveyed by the use of these terms, is purely official, or political; as we shall hereafter see.—Again. There is an *evil* spirit which reigns in the hearts of the children of disobedience;—the God of the world—the prince of the power of the air. In opposition to whom, and in reference to the better, to the heavenly and purifying influence exerted in the divine providence, the Spirit of God is denominated the HOLY SPIRIT; or it may be, and more probably is, that as God has erected a CHURCH, which is a community of SAINTS, or a HOLY NATION, the Spirit takes his official epithet from his operations in that church, and is hence styled HOLY, or “the Spirit of holiness;” as he has been called “the Spirit of bondage and fear” under the Mosaic dispensation, and “the Spirit of adoption,” or “of love, of power, and of a sound mind,” under the new economy. The term GHOST is applied to disembodied spirit, but is a very improper appellation in this connexion, and is borrowed from Saxon superstition.

In regard of the first manifestation, the terms which are used are, Jehovah, Jehovah-Elohim or Word, and Spirit. And they are as demonstrably expressive of the scriptural doctrine which has been advanced, as the terms *Father, Son* and *Holy Spirit* can be. The opponent, who may be offended because his own ideas are not sustained, may criticise my use of terms, but the principle is preserved in all its distinctive force and character.

I have farther to observe that, in view of this twofold manifestation, there are *two* distinct *works* ascribed to God

—*creation and reconciliation*; there are also, in the same connexion, *two different conditions* spoken of, in which *man* is personally exhibited—*innocence and sin*; and there are *two distinct forms of government* described, under which man has been placed—*law and gospel*. These several particulars I would class thus: 1. Jehovah, Jehovah-Elohim or Word, and Spirit—creation—man in innocence—law. 2. Father, Son and Holy Spirit—reconciliation—man in sin—gospel.

Before this lecture is closed, we may call up again, for the purpose of farther illustration, the object which Jehovah designed to accomplish by these manifestations of HIMSELF. Some things have been brought to light in the recitation of the biblical texts that have been quoted, which I have omitted to notice, intentionally reserving them for a separate argument in the conclusion of this exercise.

It has been rendered very evident, as I think, that the *necessity* for such divine manifestations is to be traced to the constitution of human nature. God is a *Spirit*, and man cannot *see* him. Yet that we should have personal intercourse with him, is an idea equally natural, rational and desirable. As intellectual beings; material agents cannot possibly be the ultimate object either of our thought or feeling. We rise to the intellectual world, and to the moral relations which belong to it, by the impulse of our being. Atheism is pure absurdity all round. Then it results, that Jehovah must occupy such an attitude with regard to us, as will make this personal intercourse practicable and pleasant. And as he denounces idolatry as highly criminal, while its own history betrays it to be degrading in the very extreme; he has not taught us, either by the attributes of our own nature, by the analogies of his works, or by any scriptural or oral revelation, that his object can be obtained in any other way than by his assuming personal form. And even then if this personal form, so assumed, has no correspondence with our individual powers of perception, the object in view cannot be

attained; the aspirations of our immortal nature remain unsatisfied; and we are driven back to degrade ourselves amid the sensualities of the material world.

Admitting such a personal form to have been assumed, and with the explicit design of placing the knowledge of God within our reach, can our knowledge of God go beyond that exhibition? If we can pretend to more than conjecture, when we attempt to transcend such a manifestation; or if, in making such pretensions, our views should be either distinct or accurate, would it not follow that the exhibition itself is incomplete, or is not commensurate with our nature? Again the object in view would be lost. But philosophers and divines have trifled with the human mind, by mistaking the terms in which Deity speaks of himself; or, disregarding the application in which he employs those terms, they have, by a series of incomprehensible and unprofitable abstractions, converted into pure mystery "that which may be known of God." They have talked about, and reasoned from, omniscience, omnipresence, omnipotence, goodness and justice, as though they could judge of these attributes otherwise than by "the things which are made," or which, in the kind providence of God, have become "visible." And all this they have done at the same time that they were conscious they could not have accurately judged of the intellectual powers of a fellow man, but by his *works*.

Some scriptural declarations which the preceding argument has thrown in our way, appear to me not only strongly to bear upon, but most happily to illustrate, the important topic thus again called up. I refer to them with considerable confidence, because they seem to be peculiarly appropriate.

1. God says to Móses,—“I appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, AS ALMIGHTY GOD.” Again he says—“By my NAME, JEHOVAH, I was not known unto them.” Now the facts in the case are, that God did appear to Abra-

ham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, in the form of a MAN: and that he did appear to Moses on the mount, in a form, the FACE whereof Moses could not *see* and *live*. The particular circumstance to which I would call your attention is, that while Moses could not see Jehovah in one *form*, in the other—the form of a *man*—he appeared to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, as ALMIGHTY GOD. So he said to Abraham, when he did appear, “I am ALMIGHTY GOD, walk before me and be thou perfect.” Where then are the proportions—what is the moral symmetry—between ALMIGHTY GOD and THE FORM OF MAN, on which an intelligent, sanctified, christian spirit may dwell with satisfaction and profit?

When Jehovah promised to Abraham that a son, in whom his seed should be called, should be born unto him, some doubt was expressed or betrayed in relation to the possibility or probability of the promise ever being fulfilled; and the question was asked, “Is any thing *too hard* for the Lord?” Has he not *power*? Will he fail to fulfil his word? When again, at a moment peculiarly interesting and well calculated to try the patriarch’s faith, he was commanded to offer his son in sacrifice, he immediately obeyed the divine summons; “accounting,” says Paul, “that God was *able* to raise from the dead.” Such are the accompanying phrases and facts which the history affords of the good man’s faith in the exhibition which had been made to him. Extending our ideas in a corresponding manner, we should eventually embrace all the varieties of human life; and our faith would distinctly anticipate an exercise of *power*, as far as the nature or consistency of our earthly circumstances could require. The issue would be an entire confidence in the mediatorial ability of the Son of God to sustain in efficient and successful operation, all the secondary agencies of his own spiritual kingdom. We should then remember, that no calculations on mere *omnipotence*, no *waiting* for an exertion of divine *power*, while the means are disregarded, or considered as unnecessary formalities can possibly be justified.

Instead of all those deliberations which terminate in no useful purpose, and lead to no practical results, we should reflect more maturely on the moral proprieties which our own free agency would imply. Whatever God in inscrutable sovereignty might do would never constitute the problem of our painful and distracting thought; but, with an intelligent eye and a submissive heart, we should diligently engage in evident duty, and act in morals as we do in the common affairs of life. "All power," said our risen Lord, "is given unto me, in heaven and in earth." It is a delegated power of which he speaks; and the sphere of its operations is this general system, with which our existence is connected. Within that sphere he must act consistently, abiding faithful, as one who "cannot deny himself;" and doing for his vineyard whatever *can* be done. No power is predicated of his official character, beyond that which is coincident with the essential principles of our nature; so that our own free agency cannot possibly be set aside.

If I were discoursing of political forms of government among men, my argument would be readily understood. Every one knows the difference between a pure despotism, where the will of the prince is the law, and a limited government, in which the principles of a known constitution become both a restraint on the ruler, and a guaranty to the subject. The first of these issues in slavery, degradation, and weakness; the second is characterized by liberty, honor and strength. The intellectual being acquires power in proportion as he acquires intelligence; and never loses his power until his integrity is gone. The greatest glory a ruler can win for himself, and the greatest blessing he can confer on the multitudes whom he governs, are to multiply the means of education. An intelligent people, other things being equal, are always the most powerful. In either case, however, we would talk of *all power*; but the phrase would not have the same import in both. In the one case, it would refer to an absolute sovereignty, which no

one could certainly define ; in the other, the constitution would both restrict and determine its meaning.

Such is the fact in relation to our present subject. We are all talking about divine *power*, as an abstract perfection, without reference to any constitution or laws. To speak of that which God *cannot* do is almost considered to be blasphemy. The idea no one seems able to catch ; while the scriptural query—"What could have been done more to my vineyard, which I have not done in it?"*—is, like one of Paul's difficult sayings, "hard to be understood." Now the bible gives us a very different account of this matter. There a constitution is provided ; laws are enacted and promulgated ; and the government which is spoken of is that of a superintending providence, carrying out the principles of the constitution, and faithfully sustaining the operation of the laws. ALL POWER, then, in this connexion, means that power which is contemplated by, and consistent with, the constitution and laws.

In fact, to put us under such a form of government whose principles we can understand, and whose interests we can appreciate, is the very object which God has in view in manifesting himself in *personal form* ; and is the very demand which the intellectual nature of man necessarily makes. As among men intelligence will make better citizens than swords and bayonets can produce ; so in the government of God, enlightened consciences will make better moralists and more holy men, than can ever be produced by earthquakes and tempests. Devils can tremble without being reformed ; and many a frightened criminal has violated solemn promises, which he had not principle enough to fulfil. Jesus Christ did not come to encompass us with mysteries, but to enlighten our understandings. And in proportion as we escape by his tuition from mere abstractions, and acquire clear perceptions of his character and government, we grow in moral efficiency, and abound.

*Isa. v. 4,

in spiritual peace. We may not then be waiting for some sovereign operation of divine power to make us holy; neither need we be afraid of some overwhelming judgments coming, we know neither whence, nor why. But by the light which he has imparted, and the clear and undisputed truths which we may obtain, we may walk peacefully on toward his heavenly habitation, confiding in his faithfulness.

2. The apostle Paul represents the Spirit of God as SEARCHING all things. How can such a term be applied to the *omniscient* God? The Redeemer also says, that the Spirit shall not speak of HIMSELF, but what he shall HEAR, that he shall speak. Where is the propriety—what is the import—of the remark? When Jesus would explain, he represents the Spirit as convincing men of sin, of righteousness and judgment; as taking those truths which are integral matters in the mediatorial constitution, and illustrating them to the apprehensions of the human mind; and, as a kind preceptor, patiently waiting on the slowness of our intellectual operations. “The deep things of God,” which he *searches*, are those which belong to God—not abstractedly considered, for he is not to speak of *himself*—but to God as manifested in personal form. They are such moral and ecclesiastical mysteries or secrets, as he, dwelling in the ancient prophets, testified beforehand in relation to the sufferings of Christ, and the glory that should follow. Just, says Paul, like the spirit of man in *him*, reflecting on his various interests in the world, and looking after the best means of advancing them. Sometimes, when men turn from the ways of righteousness, and resist the Spirit’s influences, he is grieved; when they repent, he alters his course; and when they abide faithful, he cherishes and comforts them. The phraseology describes an official agency, measured out, not according to the abstract perfections of Godhead; but presented in just and accurate proportions with the system whose operations it superintends. A pro-

vidence is proclaimed, which, instead of breaking up all responsibility, and metamorphosing the human mind into a mere mechanical agent by a despotic sway, is most benevolent in all its dispensations; and which, like that of a limited monarchy, or a "constitutional" government, is not only consistent with, but wisely and patiently cherishes, the free agency or intellectual liberty of its subjects. The human mind cannot be evolved in any other way. God has not formed his creatures that afterwards he may disregard the attributes by which they are distinguished; nor called into being a concatenation of causes, with a view to a corresponding series of effects; that afterwards he may nullify those causes by absorbing them in the mighty action of his own abstract perfections.

It is well known that there are many who indiscriminately refer every event to the councils of eternity; and consider it to be the execution of some invisible decree, secretly formed in the divine mind, before ever the heavens or the earth were. They argue from the *omniscience* of God, as a mere abstract perfection of his nature; and, confounding foreknowledge and foreordination together as incapable of being distinguished, they have elaborated a system which has driven one half of them into fatalism; and so far perplexed the other half, that they know not how to keep out of fatalism. Now the Spirit of God is not thus represented in the texts which have been quoted. Foreknowledge there unquestionably is; predestination there unquestionably is; but a withering and demoralizing doctrine of *fate* there is not. General outlines are specified; minute facts are sometimes foretold; and both belong to a course of intellectual operations, to which any wise man, and that in proportion to his wisdom, is competent. In this very feature of character, Paul declares man's resemblance to God, in one of the texts under consideration. But neither prescience nor predestination is carried out so far as to preclude *reflection* on the part of man; nor that

analogous exercise on the part of the Holy Spirit, here called *searching* the deep things of God. Theologians in their speculations on this subject have run up their metaphysics a vast deal too high, either for their own consistency, or for the comfort of mankind. The apologies for indolence and unbelief which have thence been derived; the subterfuges which the disingenuous have thence learned so artfully to affect; the toil and distraction in which the humble and sincere have thereby been involved; and the quenching of the Spirit within them which must certainly follow, and of which some ministers have been *scientifically* guilty, when an offer of salvation is to be made unto ALL;—these and such like consequences have both flowed from, and unanswerably refuted, the cold system to which I refer.

On the supposition that God *has* revealed himself in *personal* form, while in this respect he is *now* removed from our view; and taking into consideration the *providence of God*, which has been so emphatically declared by inspired men; some such train of spiritual operations as has been described, must be carried on from the nature of the case. And if, in regard of them, God is represented either as a gracious *governor*, uniformly seeking the welfare of those whom he rules; or as a loving *father*, whose parental solicitude is exceedingly great, there can be no serious difficulty in an endeavor to ascertain the character of those operations. How would a *father* deal with an errant child? Would he not admonish, reason, entreat, warn, chastise, forbear?—Would not his *spirit* continually hover around the beloved object? Would not all means be employed—not merely those which might be purely paternal, but whatever the social circle could afford—to reclaim the wanderer? Should repentance or reformation be accomplished, and the prodigal return, what would a *father* do? Or if repentance should not follow, but crime should lead to crime, until all means have been repeatedly tried, and forbearance has been exhausted; must not his benignant spirit, griev-

ed and distressed, retire?—All has been done that *can* be done; and amid tears, entreaties, expostulations and warnings, the irreclaimed culprit rushes on perdition as his fate.

Now God is *our Father*. His commands are with us, sustained and illustrated by his own *personal* representations; and his *Spirit* attends us, using all the means consistent with either our own nature, or that of the system with which we are connected. How affectionately he entreats! How tenderly he expostulates! With what condescending familiarity he reasons! How kindly he warns! How reluctantly he chastises! How long he forbears! Whom does he reject that repents and returns? When resisted, does he not grieve? Does he hastily, or without many and sore provocations retire? And when he departs, has not every thing been done which could have been done, and done in vain? Is there any farther dispensation—any other Saviour—another sacrifice? Or in this providential course, has not sin against *the Son of Man* been often borne with? Has not the blasphemy against the *Holy Spirit* at last been perpetrated—“despite been done unto the Spirit of grace.” If then all has been done that could be done, and no more sacrifice for sin remains, is not the reason abundantly evident, why that blasphemy is UNPARDONABLE? The system of grace has been violated to its utmost limit, like as when Adam ate the forbidden fruit. No other system, introducing more extensive provision, has been revealed. There can be no relief, as no moral influence is known, nor has ever been suggested, by which REPENTANCE can be produced. And hence Paul declares it to be “impossible to renew” such an one “to repentance.” Where repentance is not exhibited, PARDON cannot be extended, on any principle of moral government with which we are acquainted.

3. Our Redeemer has informed us, that the “FATHER judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment to the SON.” The reason of this arrangement is also assigned:—

“because he is the SON of MAN.” And further, even the character of the judicial process is declared—“AS I HEAR I judge, and my judgment is just.” But very differently have theologians represented this matter. As on the one hand they have absorbed human free agency in the divine omnipotence, and taught men to reason out the divine omniscience into fatalism; so here on the other, they have set off divine JUSTICE, clothed in all the terrors of its own incomprehensible infinitude. They have reasoned about *infinite sin*, and *infinite penalty*, and an *infinite satisfaction* to divine justice, capable of saving ten thousand worlds, until it is absolutely impossible for any man, by such a technical standard, to form a correct idea of his own moral character or habits. Then again, to meet allegations so fearfully mysterious, others have talked about *infinite mercy* until all judgment is lost in a doctrine of universal salvation.

But this subject, like the preceding, must be interpreted in consistency with the PERSONAL manifestation by which Jehovah's rectoral relations with us are established. The Father HIMSELF judgeth no man, even as the Spirit speaketh not of HIMSELF. Of course, as the doctrines taught to us are within the range of our perceptions, so the judgment to which we are amenable is correspondent with our capacities of action. The sentence which occurs is not the result of an estimate which *infinite justice* has formed; for every man shall give an account of *his works*. “AS I HEAR, I judge,” says the Son of man: “and my judgment is JUST:”—not merely in view of abstract legal principles, but with a distinct and clear reference to the facts in the case. He alludes not to his own accurate foreknowledge, nor to his individual opinions previously made up: but to that which he HEARS—to the testimony that may be adduced when the books shall be opened.

Look again at the interesting disclosure. God “hath appointed *a day*, in the which he will judge the world in

righteousness, by that MAN whom he hath *ordained*.”* Consider well I pray you who he is. Remember that he is the Lord, your brother, who assumed your nature; who learned obedience by the things which he suffered; who was tempted in all points like as you are, and is therefore *able* to succor them that are tempted; who has a fellow feeling for you in all your infirmities, and who is *touched* with the tenderest sympathy, when you suffer. Remember that he was made *like you in all things*, on purpose that he might be a *merciful and faithful high priest*—even now, when he sitteth as a PRIEST ON HIS THRONE. Take then the subject of *judgment* into your own deliberate and rational consideration, instead of giving way to the metaphysical extravagances which array *infinite justice* against your own littleness. Abandon those inappropriate and inaccurate technicalities which confound all your ideas, drink up your spirits, tangle your faith amid unintelligible conjectures, and paralyse your arm, while extending it “within the vail,” you would lay hold on the High Priest’s throne.

Connecting the three foregoing items together, while they separately appear to be in perfect good keeping with those divine manifestations of which the scriptures speak, they seem to me to unfold, with peculiar beauty and vividness, the very object of those manifestations. For if the nature of man requires them; and if God, instead of retiring within himself, steps forth to exhibit himself, with the intention of meeting the necessities of our nature; the several trains of operations which have been affirmed, must certainly follow. And if we are to imitate his example, or to carry out into the social relations of life any general principles of political government which he has taught us, then the preceding argument is accurate and conclusive. For it has actually embodied, in his own example, those principles of legislative and judicial policy, which are indispensable to government among men. Nor can it be a very abstruse

* Acts xvii. 31.

proposition to any one, that the government of the human mind, whether administered by God or man, must proceed on the same elemental principles;—simply, because it is the *human mind* which is to be governed, and its intrinsic character and active powers are the same in both cases.

My view on this subject may not be cabalistical enough to please those who are ever roving through “the ideal world of abstract unsubstantial beings;” or who are afraid that light may lead to error. Certain it is, that our theme has been divested of its supposed mystery; and that the mixture of false philosophy and sectarian theology which the traditions of past ages have imposed upon mankind with so much empiricism, has been treated with very little ceremony. An honest man, guided by views so simple, may well turn from the mere sectary, or say to him, as Diogenes did to Alexander—“only please to stand out of my sunshine.” I make no-apology for my hostility to dogmas which no mortal man can explain to me; which cannot be found in the scriptures; and which are the stereotyped decisions of the partial councils of a degenerate age:—dogmas which display, it is true, the royal signet; but then that signet is the representative of an authority, generated near four centuries after my Master had gone to his rest, and was neither known nor acknowledged by either himself or his apostles. But if the views, simple as they may be, are scriptural and rational, or if they carry their own demonstration to every unprejudiced and candid mind, I desire no more. If, on the other hand, they are faulty and defective in all these respects, while I shall be glad to see them overthrown, I shall rejoice that attention to the scriptures has been sufficiently roused to expose their sophistry. My heart has no unhallowed interest to maintain—no selfish ambition to gratify. The Lord is judge over all the world, and SEARCHES every bosom. To his holy word I bow with supreme and unreserved reverence. May all the saints learn submission to the law of ALMIGHTY GOD.

LECTURE V.

Spirit and Soul and Body—Hypostasis or Person—Elohim and Son of God equivalent titles—The Redeemer's explanation of ELOHIM—Official men called Elohim—Angels called Elohim—Political Analogies.

Although the subject of the divine MANIFESTATION has been largely discussed in the preceding lectures, yet its illustrations may be extended much farther. My own deep solicitude to make the views which have been offered, if possible, perfectly plain, has induced me to invite your attention to other scriptural details. And fondly would I hope that, in arranging some materials of a philosophic argument, which are derived from portions of the sacred volume that merit attention on their own account, you will lose none of your interest in the general theme. The great principle on which we set out will still be farther developed; and, by development, will be more fully demonstrated. That principle, you remember, is that man derives all his ideas by means of his senses; or, as lord Bacon observes,—“The limits of the human power and knowledge lie in the qualifications wherewith man by nature is endowed, for acting and perceiving, and again in the state of things presented to him; and beyond those limits his instruments and abilities can never reach.”

We have endeavored to illustrate the Trinity, as it has been termed, by comparing the scriptural statements of the divine manifestations with the constitution of man. To this train of investigation we have been led by no conceit of our own, but by the Spirit himself. He has unequivocally and frequently asserted that man was, and is, made in

the image of God. Of course it is both lawful and proper for us to inquire, in what the similitude consists? In fact ignorance of the one implies ignorance of the other; and correct views of the one will necessarily lead to correct views of the other; else there is no meaning in the assertion that the two are ALIKE. In then attempting to explain the scriptural declaration "that man was made in the image and likeness of God," are we presumptuous when we undertake to trace the resemblance? Must not the biblical expositor necessarily pursue such a course? Can any system of philosophy which throws the subject into other and foreign connexions be entitled to our confidence? Or, when the lovers of mystery pass by the visible symbols by which Jehovah himself exhibits truth, and which are perfectly consistent with the nature and operations of human intellect, are those expositors doing any thing else than covering their own weakness under an inappropriate technicality?

On this principle of exposition—or on the scriptural fact, so broadly and unequivocally stated, that man was made in the image and after the likeness of Elohim, I have hitherto based my argument. My remarks have, however, been confined to one view of that principle; i. e. the likeness which man bears to Elohim has been considered as PERSONAL. Every human being, in the constitution of his own individual person, or as having *spirit* and *body*, is made in the likeness of God. Jehovah, in himself considered, is a Spirit; so also man is a spirit. Jehovah assumes external form, and the human spirit is clothed with an external form. On the supposition that the scriptural facts have been accurately stated, the likeness is unequivocal; and no lover of mystery can dispute it. To pass by these facts, and to search after likeness in some other connexion, while professedly engaged in an attempt to explain the bible, is to overlook the premises which belong to the subject. Whatever other premises may be adopted, it matters

not: the theologian and the philosopher have started wrong; and though they may reason most logically, yet their whole argument must be a mere sophism. In fact it is this sophism which they have called MYSTERY.

Though a second view of the general principle is stretched out on the biblical page, as we shall see hereafter, yet let us at present return to this primary view, for the sake of estimating a particular phrase employed by the apostle Paul, and which evolves a philosophic idea of great value and beauty. In closing his first epistle to the Thessalonians, with a heart heaving under all the excitement produced by official inspiration, and yearning over the difficulties which seemed to embarrass some honest disciples, he uses this singular language;—"And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly: and I pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and body, be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ."* SPIRIT, AND SOUL, AND BODY—what does the apostle mean? Are there *three constituent parts* in human nature? The subject is not more curious to the physiologist than it is important to the moralist and perplexing to the theologian. Let us endeavor to ascertain what the apostle meant, or to trace the distinction which he has stated.

It is scarcely worth our while to enter into any verbal criticism, to which the greek term, here rendered WHOLE, has given rise: a passing remark, however, may not be improper. The term is compounded of two words, which, taken together, signify *the whole lot*. A very acute critic has observed concerning it—"The word signifies the whole of a thing given by lot; consequently the whole of any thing; and here the whole frame of our nature, OUR WHOLE PERSON. Accordingly, Chandler has showed that this word is applied to a *perfect city*, whose buildings are all standing; and to a *perfect empire* which hath all its provinces, and to an *entire army* whose troops are undiminished by any acci-

* 1 Thess. v. 23.

dent or calamity ; and a man is said to be thus *entire*, when he hath all his members of body, and faculties of mind :—*the entire person*, consisting of spirit, soul and body.”* The apostle James uses the word in a similar manner, when he says—“Let patience have her perfect work, that ye may be perfect and *entire*, wanting nothing.” But to return to the broad question—what does the inspired writer mean by SPIRIT, AND SOUL, AND BODY ?

The general idea which has been, and, as I believe, still is entertained in relation to this physiological distinction is, that BODY is a mere appellative of the animal frame ; that SOUL expresses the principle of life which animates that frame, or that which is the seat of the different affections and passions, sensations and appetites : and that SPIRIT signifies the intellectual, immortal part of man. The distinction has been variously stated, and perhaps I shall furnish you with a more accurate idea of the doctrine of theologians and philosophers in reference to it, by quoting their own observations.

Chandler says—“This threefold division of man is agreeable to the sentiments of the ancients, who considered him as a being compounded of the *mind* or *spirit*, the principle of rational life ; of the *soul*, the principle of the sensitive life ; and of the *body*, the mere animal, brutal, or vegetative part.”

Whitby remarks—“Here the apostle justifies the ancient and true philosophy, that man is, as Nemesius styles him, a compound (hypostasis) of *three different parts*. This was the doctrine of the Pythagoreans, as we learn from Jamblicus, who, having told us that man consists of soul and body, adds that the *soul* consists of *two parts*, one endued with reason, and one without reason. This also was the philosophy of the Platonists, as we learn from Nemesius, Sallust and Laertius, who inform us that there is in man a *soul irrational*, which follows the affections of the body ; and

* See Macknight and Chandler on the place.

a *mind* which useth the body as its instrument, and fights against it. This also was the doctrine of the Stoics; whence Antoninus saith, the three constituent parts of man are *the body, soul and mind*. Irenæus and Clemens of Alexandria and Origen say the same. Mr. Le Clerc is very positive that this philosophy is false, and that there is nothing in man but his body and his reasonable soul; but he saith nothing to sustain this confidence against those two excellent philosophers, Gassendus and Dr. Willis, who have established this philosophy beyond all reasonable contradiction. Nor can the conflict betwixt the *mind* and *spirit* and *flesh* mentioned by the apostle† be explained; nor can any man tell what the ruling principle in us is to govern, without admitting this *inferior soul* as the fountain of all our sensual appetites; or even tell us what it is to *die*, unless it be to make this *inferior soul*, which consists in the motion of the animal spirits and the sensitive appetites they produce in us, to cease to act, or move as formerly.”

Thus much have we been confidently taught by philosophers and theologians, ancient and modern. May we dispute what they say? or is all farther inquiry foreclosed? Is all this philosophy true? Has man *two souls*—a superior and inferior? Or was Mr. Le Clerc right when he boldly asserted that there is nothing in man but his body and his reasonable soul? Shall we let go tradition, and turn to the scriptures? You see there is some collision—the matter is not fairly or finally decided.

The question has a very important bearing on our general subject. For if philosophers and theologians cannot tell us what the human hypostasis or PERSON is, or if they cannot tell what man is as a compound of three different parts; and if man is made in the image and after the likeness of God, is it any matter of wonder that they should fail to explain what the divine hypostasis, or PERSON, of which Paul speaks, is? or that they should be incapable of intelligently or in-

* Rom. vii. 14—25. Gal. v. 16—17.

telligibly declaring what the divine compound, scripturally called Elohim, and theologically denominated Trinity, is? How should any man, whether he glories in reason or in revelation, understand any subject of whose symbols and types he has no accurate nor established ideas? Dogmatism under such circumstances, we may safely leave as the boast of antiquity. But, unless we mean to disgrace the age in which we live, turn recreant to the promises of a moral reformation given by him

Who plants his footsteps in the sea,
And rides upon the storm,

or quench the inspiration which he is breathing over the nations, we must discard all such official empiricism, and try again the question for ourselves.—We return to the inquiry, what does the apostle mean by SPIRIT and SOUL and BODY?

In the hebrew bible there are two words—*Ruach*, (Spirit) and *Nephesh*, (Soul) and in the greek new testament, as well as in the septuagint or greek translation of the old, there are two words—*Pneuma* (Spirit) and *Psyche*, (Soul) which are as distinct in their own languages as Spirit and Soul are in English. These terms are never confounded together; but are as different as terms can be in their general import and in their actual use. The septuagint in translating, or the new testament in quoting, the old testament are very exact in rendering *Ruach*, (Spirit) by *Pneuma*, (Spirit) and *Nephesh*, (Soul) by *Psyche*, (Soul.) Spirit and Soul and Body are not then mere indifferent or equivalent terms, occurring only in the text which has been furnished. As symbols of separate ideas, those terms are incorporated in the languages in which the scriptures were written. And from the quotations already given, various philosophers as well as theologians have referred to the difference as belonging to the philosophy of human nature. So that, in the constitution of the human person or hypostasis, we may most clearly recognise what might be called Trinity: and

the confident controvertist might be very properly asked whether he would explain that trinity as implying THREE PERSONS?

It may next be remarked, that these terms are applied to brutes. That they have bodies none will stop a moment to dispute. That they have souls is admitted by all, and is plainly taught in the scriptures, if the application to them of the hebrew *Nephesh*, (Soul) or the greek *Psyche*, (*Soul*) can be any evidence in the case. For example:—In the account given of the creation, Elohim is represented to have said—"Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature that hath a living (*Nephesh*, *Psyche*) *soul*. Thus also he spake to Noah—"And with every living (*Nephesh*, *Psyche*) *SOUL* that is with you, of the fowl, of the cattle, and of every beast of the earth with you, &c." Other instances might be collected, but these must suffice. That spirit is applied to them must also be admitted, for Solomon says—"Who knoweth the *spirit* (*Ruach Pneuma*) of a man that goeth upward, or the *spirit* (*Ruach Pneuma*) of the beast that goeth downward to the earth."* In this single instance, in which the term *spirit* is applied to brutes, you will please observe that it is not so used until that thing, which had before been familiarly called soul, has left the body. Whatever may be its destiny, it does not belong to our discussion to determine, nor even with Solomon to ask, "who knoweth?" But we have a right to inquire in view of the ancient and popular philosophy, whether brutes have TWO SOULS?—one rational and superior, and the other irrational and inferior. If we shrink from an affirmative reply, then we must abandon the philosophy which offers such a speculation in tracing the distinction between soul and spirit in reference to man. That philosophy, it seems to me, must necessarily be false. How can it be true?

But still farther let it be observed, that these same peculiarities are affirmed, or predicated of God. Singular as
Ecc. iii. 21.

the idea may appear to you, yet the scriptures sustain it as literally true. That spirit is predicated of God, no one will question who is not ignorant of the doctrine and influences of the Holy Spirit, or who remembers that Jesus said—God is a SPIRIT. That body or form is alike ascribed to him, must have been rendered very apparent by our preceding argument in reference to the twofold manifestation which Jehovah has made of HIMSELF. But can Elohim be said to have a SOUL? or can that Soul be, in any correct sense, distinguished from his SPIRIT, and so as to make the description of him ENTIRE, when we ascribe to him Spirit and Soul and Body? We have no reason to be afraid to listen when God himself speaks. Hear what he says—“I will set my tabernacle among you, and my SOUL (Nephesh, Psyche) shall not abhor you.”* “I will destroy your high places, and my SOUL (Nephesh, Psyche) shall abhor you.”† “And they put away the strange gods from among them, and served the Lord: and his SOUL (Nephesh, Psyche) was grieved for the misery of Israel.”‡ “Your new moons and your feasts my SOUL (Nephesh, Psyche) hateth.”§ “Behold mine elect in whom my SOUL (Nephesh, Psyche) delighteth.”|| Other passages of a similar character might be adduced; but I presume they are not needed. Soul then, as well as spirit and form, is in the bible ascribed to God. Is not trinity in God analogous to trinity in man? Is not man made in the image and after the likeness of God? Are not the two ALIKE?

Shall we now assert, according to the philosophy so confidently advanced, that there are TWO SOULS in God?—one rational and superior, and another inferior and irrational. May not this view have suggested the Arian peculiarity? Or is it an improbable hypothesis that this very philosophy naturally or logically leads to that mischievous sophism? May I not again assert that the common idea in reference

* Lev. xxvi. 11.

† V. 30,

‡ Jud. x. 16.

§ Is. i. 14.

|| Is. xlii. 1.

to the distinction between soul and spirit is necessarily false? or ask, how can it be true?

I know very well that it may be, or has been, said that these terms are employed by Jehovah, when speaking of himself, out of condescension to our infirmities; as he must use our own language in addressing us, or not be understood. But this explanation concedes the very principle on which our argument is based; viz. that as we are not competent to perceive or comprehend a mere abstraction, or as we have no innate ideas, and acquire no ideas excepting by means of our senses, Jehovah must descend to our level. We cannot perceive or comprehend pure spirit;—not even the spirit of a fellow man; and much less God who is a Spirit. Or,—for I desire the principle of our argument to be fully apprehended—as another has finely observed, “Whatever independent existence may belong to qualities, we can only come to the knowledge of them by the substances wherein they inhere: nature exhibits nothing abstracted to our view; the abstract must be learned from the concrete. We should never have known what whiteness was, had we not seen something white; nor hardness, had we not felt something hard. So neither could we have known what justice or goodness were, had we not seen the actions of men, and observed how their sentiments influence their behaviour.”* As then, for the purposes of fraternal fellowship, the spirit of our fellow man must be clothed with external form, so God must condescend to be clothed with external form, in order that we may hold communion with him.

The simple difference between the concession thus made and the doctrine advanced in these lectures, is, that the one makes the condescension a mere figure of speech, the other contemplates bodily form. The one is personification, the other is person. Which is best? is most suitable to the peculiarities of human nature? or most effectually secures the

* 'Tucker's Light of Nature—Intr. p. xxiv.

object in view? Which comports best with the fact that man was made in the image and after the likeness of God? Which quadrates most evidently with the endlessly varied series of emblems under which God has exhibited himself? with the numerous appearances recorded to have occurred during patriarchal times, and at the opening of the Mosaic economy? or with the history of all the marvelous and gracious transactions of God manifested in the flesh? When the three angels appeared to Abraham, one of whom is afterwards recognised to be the LORD, and when they did eat of the morsel which the patriarch prepared, was all this a mere figure? Would you convert a biblical reality into a sectarian metaphor? Or how is it that the advocates of physical power glide here so easily into moral influence? But we shall presently return to this inquiry. The original question must now be answered—what is the difference between SPIRIT and SOUL?

You remember that, speaking of Jehovah as he is in himself, the Redeemer says, he is a Spirit. This view is predicated of Jehovah irrespective of any external form he may assume, and without any reference to person or personification. Whenever you speak of hands, feet, face or mouth, you allude to something more than Spirit. The scriptural application of these terms to God led the apostle Paul to speak of his PERSON; and induces some theologians to adopt the exegetical idea of personification. Without one or the other of those views it is impossible to explain biblical phraseology; because that phraseology is incompatible with all our ideas of spirit. No trinitarian would brook the imputation of advancing the doctrine of THREE SPIRITS, when he says that there are three persons in the Godhead. Such a use of terms is altogether incongruous.

In like manner, when speaking of the human constitution, we readily describe it as comprising spirit and body: and in general terms talk of spirit and matter, of spiritual

things and carnal or material things, as though this were a familiar and well understood distinction. So Paul speaks of the spirit and the body—of the mind and the flesh—of being “put to death in the flesh and quickened in the spirit.” The difference cannot be more strikingly set forth than by calling up the common idea that the body is mortal and the spirit immortal.

On a certain occasion, when Jesus after his resurrection appeared among his disciples, they were affrighted, and supposed that they had seen a spirit. He immediately sought to calm their fears, and remarked—“a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have.” And afterwards his apostle affirmed that “flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God.” The body returns to the *dust*, and the spirit returns to *God who gave it*.

Taking these general ideas together, there can be no difficulty in ascertaining the import of the term spirit—*Ruach* or *Pneuma*. It is used in allusion to the intellectual part of man as it is in itself, or as it is in a state of existence separate from the body, or in view of any series of influences and actions which may be referred to it independently of his bodily presence. So also the term is applied to God, when we would speak of him as he is in himself, or as he may act independently of the external form he may have assumed. The terms HOLY SPIRIT are used in reference to Jehovah, or to any series of operations which he may carry on among men, in this connexion: We cannot see the FACE of God and live—Jesus has gone to the Father, and we henceforth know him no more “after the flesh.” There is really then no more confusion or difficulty in the double use of this term in relation to Jehovah, than there is in the double use of it in reference to man. And as we cannot speak of man and his operations in any other way, seeing that his spirit is clothed with *body*, that it may exert an influence without a bodily presence, and that it may exist in a separate state when the body is mouldering in the grave;

so we cannot speak of Jehovah in any other way, if he has actually assumed external form, if that form is removed from our sight while we yet feel his influence, and if he may, independently of that form, be every where present and superintend all his works.

Admitting all this to be true, it still remains for us to ascertain the import of the term SOUL? And here it is to be remarked, that the hebrew *Nephesh* and the greek *Psyche*, which are so frequently rendered soul, mean a breathing frame—a frame or body that has breathed—the blood in which is the life. Hence Paul represents Adam, when first formed, to have been A LIVING SOUL. Of course, the term soul must somehow or other refer to the principle of life in the body. Now, as the apostle James tells us that “the body without the spirit is dead,” it will follow that the indwelling of the spirit is the principle of life. SOUL then is a mere technicality belonging to the spirit as embodied. It is still that same intellectual part of man, which we have been describing as spirit.

I would not be understood to say, that the intellectual part of man is not, or cannot be, properly called spirit, while residing in its animal body; for in this connexion it does not become material, nor cease to be spirit. In the scriptures it is very frequently, while embodied, denominated spirit. But on the other hand, I am not aware of any instance in which the term SOUL is applied to man’s intellectual self, when presented apart from, or irrespective of, his bodily relations. Even in the case of brutes, that thing in them which, while they live, is called soul, is, when escaped from its animal frame and descending to the earth, denominated spirit. “The spirit (*Ruach*, *Pneuma*) of a beast,” says Solomon, “goeth downward to the earth.”

The distinction between soul and spirit then is simply this:—SPIRIT means the intellectual part of man, viewed in contrast with, or existing separate from, or acting independently of, the body. SOUL is that same intellectual

part of man in its embodied state. And if this distinction be both philologically and philosophically accurate, Mr. Le Clerc was perfectly right when he said that "there is nothing in man but his body and his reasonable soul." The idea of an inferior, or irrational soul in man is as futile in philosophy, as the notion of an inferior God, attributed to Arius, is in theology. And we may consider ourselves to have acquired an idea, in both departments, clear and intelligible. For as man, considered as mere spirit, cannot be the object of our perceptions, nor a companion in our daily intercourse, so we can have no knowledge of, nor communion with God, viewed as simple spirit. But when the human spirit is clothed with external form, and soul is introduced to our companionship, i. e. when the thinking spirit is brought to act on principles belonging to the world in which we dwell, all difficulty ceases, because the mere abstraction is removed. So, when Jehovah assumes form, and soul is predicated of him, a companionship is thereby possible upon the principles of our own nature; and the divine actions become the appropriate subjects of our thought and observation.

The foregoing remarks being true, it necessarily follows, that spirit and soul and form being predicated in the scriptures of God, it is their intention to exhibit to us a divine PERSON. A mere personification does not meet their representations. It is the thing itself they describe. Not that God, who is a pure Spirit, has form or body considered in view of the constitution of his own nature, so to speak; but, for the purpose of manifestation to us, he assumes form—"the form of God," as Paul observes; and this form being thus assumed, his Spirit dwelling in that form, and acting consistently therewith, SOUL is thus presented, and a PERSON or hypostasis is brought to our view. There are not THREE spirits dwelling in THREE distinct forms, begetting the idea of THREE distinct souls, and so constituting THREE PERSONS. Such a notion is contrary both to the

scriptures and to philosophy ; and has nothing correspondent with it in the nature of man. Yet this is the real amount of the popular doctrine on the subject ; and it is no wonder that the doctrine is so determinedly assaulted by some, while it is said to be mysterious by its friends. The most strenuous advocates of trinity, popularly so called, admit the difficulty, and say, in reference to the term PERSON—“ We mean something of a quite different kind from the person of a man upon earth. But it is a word we must use, like the word FATHER, because we have no other word to express it by : ” * i. e. they wish to throw in upon the human mind an idea, which has no nearer symbol in language than a term which is a symbol of something entirely different ; which very term the Spirit himself employs to explain the subject, in view of which they declare that term to be utterly incompetent. But why should they be so fastidious as to the import of the term, when the very things which are confessedly the constituent parts of the *human person*, i. e. SPIRIT and SOUL and BODY, are declared to characterize the divine person ? The real difficulty is here. They cannot use that term in its proper sense while they maintain that there are three divine persons. Could they admit the idea that there is but ONE DIVINE PERSON, then they would necessarily and easily explain the facts, on which they base their doctrine, by an accurate philosophy of Spirit and Soul and Body.

Some might probably consider the preceding views as nothing more nor less than a revival of the old doctrine of anthropomorphism, or the idea of God having a “ human shape ; ” and would consequently reprobate the whole argument as a mere platform on which the idolatrous ceremonies of the heathen might be re-exhibited. Or at least it might be supposed, that in pursuing such a mode of reasoning, we should be merely treading in the steps of Lactantius, a christian FATHER of the fourth century ; who,

* Leslie's Works, Fol. vol. i. p. 226.

in defending christianity against the notion of pagan philosophers—"That God could not be angry, and therefore could not reward or punish," "contends strongly," says bishop Warburton, "for God's having a human form."*

This criticism, however, would betray an entire misapprehension of the views expressed. The idea urged in the foregoing remarks is not intended to degrade the Creator, by making him like man, as the ancient idolaters did; but to elevate man by making him like God. And that very elevation of man, not only corresponds with his nature and the design of his existence, but is the supreme object of the whole divine administration in the world. Nay, in the execution of that object, Jehovah-Elohim does finally humble himself to be found in "human shape," or in "the form of a man." And would any christian, who could be supposed to make the objection I am considering, reject the mediatorial manifestation, as the old heresy of anthropomorphism? or as the witless conceit of Lactantius?

But let it be remembered, that our present argument does not embrace the mediatorial manifestation at all. That will come up for consideration in its proper place. We are now speaking of the first manifestation—of the original PERSON or hypostasis of which "the Son was the exact image," and of which alone, in view of God, "spirit and soul and form" are predicated. We are not referring in our argument at all to a human shape; but to "the form of God," in which God, who is a Spirit, dwelt at first; and in connexion with which alone we hear any thing of "the soul" of God. When we come to look at the Spirit of God dwelling in a human form, we shall find that the scriptures never speak of the soul of God in relation to that manifestation. In that case the SOUL was human; because "the man Christ Jesus" had a human SPIRIT. We cannot, therefore, in maintaining our present views, however peculiar they

* Div. Leg. of Moses, vol. i. p. 394-5, B. 3, sec. 4.

may be thought to be, be fairly charged with diverging into anthropomorphism, or any other ancient absurdity, either of pagan philosophers or christian fathers.

But if our argument has not yet overcome the popular prejudice on the general subject, or if we are still thought to be compromising the dignity of the scriptural doctrine, when we exhibit the human person to be made like the divine Person, and hold forth the idea of one divine Person, let us go a step farther. An apostle tells us that the Son of God was "the exact image of God's Person."* Here then is a Person of God. But here there are not THREE divine Persons. If there were three, who could understand the apostle's declaration? If there be but ONE, who can misunderstand it? If in relation to that one "the form of God" is spoken of, and of that "form of God" hands, feet, face, and back parts are predicated, then the two manifestations—the two testaments—nature and revelation—God and man—the original Elohim and every image, both personal and official, precisely correspond and harmonize. The whole subject is divested of abstraction; and, by the use of appropriate and competent symbols, is brought within the range of our perceptions, agreeably to the divine design.

But still you are afraid of idolatry. And why? You cannot conceive of Jehovah dwelling in one place more than in another, you say. But can you conceive of him in any other way? Try it. God is every where present. What is *every where*? Infinite space—would you reply? And what is infinite space? You are helping us to understand one abstraction by introducing another. You know no more about infinite space than you do about abstract deity. EVERY WHERE means, with you, just so much of space as is filled up by objects which you can recognise. Or if, in the might of your mental conceptions, and the majesty of your intellectual march, you begin to talk about other worlds, and sys-

* Heb. i. 3.

tems of worlds, yet you carry the idea of *worlds* along with you. What can you say about mere vacuity? or what idea have you of space? You have no knowledge of God but as you recognise him in his works.

Try the same process with a human, or any other spirit? What do you know of a human being but by his works? What intercourse can you have with him but by *personal* acts? Or how much can you tell of angels, either good or bad?

Idolatry has existed in the world. Mankind have talked about "many gods," and "many lords," or PERSONS. But how was idolatry introduced? Was it by attempting to conceive of that which had no subsistence, or by undertaking to multiply that which really did subsist? And how would inspired writers correct idolatry? By telling us that there was no divine PERSON? Or by declaring that there was but *one* divine PERSON? If then theologians tell us that there are three Persons, and if they are really in error in such an affirmation, shall we correct their error by asserting that there is no divine Person at all? Or how do I lead you into idolatry, by declaring that there is but *ONE* divine Person, when the very essence of idolatry is that there are *MANY* divine Persons? By the declaration of Moses, Jehovah as *Elohim* is one Jehovah. By the declaration of Paul, there is *one God and one Lord*—*ONE PERSON*, of which the Son of God is the exact image.

The original term *HYPOSTASIS*, which in the text referred to has been translated person, is used several times in the new testament. It is however, never rendered person in our version, except in that single instance. The translators have preferred, or rather from the nature of the case they were obliged to use, other words:—*confidence and substance*. It may well be asked, what common idea can belong to these three english words—*person, substance, confidence*—that they should all be employed to translate the single term hypostasis? I know no better answer to this.

question, than that which is necessarily implied in the philosophical principle so often urged in these lectures. We obtain our ideas by means of our senses. A mere abstraction we cannot apprehend. The subjects of human knowledge must be identified with something material or external. Any quality, such as goodness, wisdom, or power, can be understood only by becoming the attribute of something which falls within the range of our perceptions. That something may be what we would very properly denominate SUBSTANCE. But if an intelligent being, who in his essence is simple spirit, should intend to afford us intercourse with himself, and for that purpose should assume external form, then, though that form would be *substance*, yet this term would give place, and the term PERSON would be more proper. Without such provisions, so exactly suited to our nature, or to our present mode of existence, we might conjecture or form an hypothesis, but we could go no farther. With such helps we may arrive at the most perfect CONFIDENCE.

Beings or things naturally elevated above or thrown beyond the sphere of our perceptions, when brought within that sphere by the assumption of form, or an identification with some external symbol, are said to *subsist*, or to have a SUBSISTENCE. Hencé the latin word PERSONA, from which our english word person is derived, in its primary sense was employed to express or signify a *mask*, worn by actors on the stage. An apparent or visible form was thus given to a character, which otherwise might have been purely ideal. If we ascribe to an inanimate thing the sentiments or language, or actions of a rational being, we are said to PERSONIFY. Thus we might at any time create a Salathiel or a Washington, and thereby personify the SPIRIT of the Jewish community or that of the American nation. In fact some of the modern Jews supposed Isaiah to have done this when he wrote the fifty third chapter of his prophecies:—"The person then spoken of was not, they say,

any particular person, but only the description of the people of the Jews in the *name* of a person; and of their present dispersion through all nations, with the contempt and misery which they suffer." Nothing is more common than this figurative mode of illustration, nor better suited to the character of our intellectual exercises. If then Jehovah should have assumed form, for the purpose of manifesting himself to beings who could otherwise have no perceptions of, or intercourse with him, any of the terms—HYPOSTASIS in greek, PERSONA in latin, PERSON in english, would be very readily and very properly applied to him. Even if there was no actual assumption of form, and the whole subject was a mere personification or figure, as some do actually suppose and argue, yet the details must be consistent with the laws of a PERSON; i. e. with the laws of form, the laws of spirit, and the laws of soul. If the laws of spirit as a pure abstraction were known and understood, they could not be applied in such a case, without violating the figure, and destroying the credibility of the system which should be defaced by so gross an inconsistency. The point of argument therefore, as has been already remarked, really ought to be, not whether there is any resemblance between the divine and human actions personally considered, but whether the history of the divine movements be a mere personification, adopted with a view to an apparent similitude? Or whether Jehovah did actually assume personal form? If that be the simple question, I presume it may be considered to have been fairly settled by the preceding discussion.

Nemesius, a christian philosopher of the fourth century, who is supposed to have been bishop of Emesa in Phœnicia, had abundant opportunities of measuring the controversy on the subject of trinity in its incipient amalgamation with philosophic systems. He is said to have written a treatise on the nature of man, which is considered to have been more than ordinarily interesting, and chiefly on ac-

count of its accurate physiology. We may safely, I suppose, introduce him here as a verbal critic, if nothing more, and allow him to have understood the force of the greek term hypostasis. He calls man a *trimeros hypostasis*—i. e. a person or hypostasis of three different parts; but he would not describe him as *three* hypostases or *three* persons. If such be the force of the greek word, as employed by one who well understood its signification, and who lived in the age when the subjects to which it belonged were so variously discussed; and if he has thus used it in a dissertation concerning man who was made in the image of God, then surely that term, when applied to Jehovah, must refer to ONE hypostasis or person; and of that one person or hypostasis, the Son of God is the image, as Paul declares. Theologians therefore violate all the rules of philology as well as all the principles of philosophy, when they talk of THREE persons in the Godhead. They have no scriptural argument to advance in favor of such an hypothesis; nor is it any matter of wonder that their various creeds and ecclesiastical measures should have perplexed the whole christian world, and prepared the way for all the absurdities which, to this hour, papal infallibility covers over as wise and sacred. Conscience was stupified by the despotism of an irresistible hierarchy, and “ignorance became the mother of devotion.”

Upon the whole—If we have rightly apprehended this interesting matter, it will follow, that when “in the beginning” Jehovah assumed the form, which has been denominated “the form of God,” and so assumed it that he speaks not only of his Spirit, but of his SOUL, he presented to his creatures a distinct divine subsistence—a divine hypostasis—a divine Person. This view cannot be given of Jehovah as a mere SPIRIT. It cannot be true of him in any sense but as being “in the form of God”—not in *any* form, but that of which SOUL can be properly and consistently predicated, which is “the form of God” of which

Paul speaks, or of Jehovah-ELOHIM, spoken of in view of creation; or of "the name of Jehovah" of which mention was made when Moses was inaugurated as the Jewish apostle; or of "the face of the Father" which the angels in heaven behold; or of "the Majesty on high" to whose right hand the Son has been exalted. When our spirits shall be separated from our bodies, we cannot speak of our hypostases in describing our disembodied state—for the human hypostasis is *trimeros*, or of three different parts. Our identity will not be destroyed, but our appropriate bodies will be in the dust awaiting the resurrection. Though then Jehovah assumes "the form of God," and a distinct personal subsistence denominated Jehovah-Elohim or the WORD, or the LORD, is presented to us, yet still it is Jehovah HIMSELF who is that Word, or Lord, or Elohim. There are not two Gods, a greater and a lesser; nor are there three persons; but it is precisely as the apostle John declares, and it can be no other way—"In the beginning the Word WAS, and the Word was WITH God, and the Word was GOD:" and this WORD was afterwards made FLESH, and dwelt among us. Or, while an HYPOSTASIS or divine PERSON did thus subsist distinctly in the beginning, the Spirit of that Person or Word, which was God HIMSELF, did, in the fulness of time, on analogous principles, and for analogous purposes, assume the form of man. The identity of the Word in the two manifestations is thus evinced; though fully to ascertain the relations subsisting between the two, a second view of man as made in the image of God must first be stated, and then carried forward to the subsequent discussion of the mediatorial Personage.

Our argument thus far has been conducted on the principle that man was made *personally* in the image of God. A SECOND train of illustrations may now be derived from another but a similar view of the divine image, which the scriptures very frequently delineate; and which embraces both men and angels. This second view is purely OFFICIAL,

and belongs to the constitution of social life, under which mankind have necessarily been placed. In the morning when Adam was created, his maker remarked—"It is not good that man should be ALONE."

When a companionship or social relation is formed, a new branch of divine legislation becomes necessary; but any statute which should be introduced in this connexion, must be based, like all other statutes, on the characteristic principle of our nature—i. e. as we acquire our ideas by means of our senses, or as we derive our knowledge through the medium of external images or representations, this new ordinance must, in its own place, enact an appropriate series of symbols. One human being will thus become a pattern or model for imitation to another. Accordingly the apostle Paul declares civil government to be an ordinance of God, and the civil magistrate to be his minister for good. And Moses tells us that Jehovah informed Eve that "her desire should be to her husband, and that he should rule over her;" and afterwards informed Cain that Abel's "desire should be to him, and that he should rule over his brother." In neither case, however, was this authority original; it was only ministerial. So that, Paul argues consistently when, carrying the principle down, he views all who bear rule as being "ministers of God;" and as deriving their authority from a divine ordinance.

Here arises the general doctrine of representation, as also the use of the official scriptural term ELOHIM. Civil government is founded in the nature of society. The agent who occupies the official place is the representative of Jehovah, or is the image of God. Hence Moses was ELOHIM (God or for God) to Pharaoh.—You will readily understand and estimate the principle of this doctrine, if you will simply recollect the common custom of princes stamping their image, or that which is supposed to be their likeness, on the current coin of their country. "Whose image and superscription is this?" said Jesus to the Jews. They

answered—"Cæsar's." He replied to them—"Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's," or give to the government of Cæsar whatever is due to it, and respectfully recognise the symbols of its authority; and when God's image is presented before you with its own appropriate superscription—"This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased, hear him"—return to the divine government whatever is due to it.

The economic arrangements of the mediatorial institute are stated in the scriptures with great precision, and in most accurate coincidence with the principle just advanced. "I would have you know," said Paul to the Corinthians,* "that the head of every man is Christ; and the head of the woman is the man; and the head of Christ is God." The correlatives which he employs, are image and glory. So God is the head of Christ—Christ is the image and glory of God—"the brightness of his glory, and the exact image of his person." Christ is the head of every man—"the man is the image and glory of God"—"if our brethren be inquired of, they are the messengers of the churches and the glory of Christ." The man is the Head of the woman—the woman is the glory of the man. These are the political relations of Jehovah's rectoral system. There is no mistake—there is nothing obscure—there is nothing out of place, in the statement thus made by the apostle. Starting with the very elements of social life, as they are first thrown into form by the matrimonial institution, or commencing where the divine ordinances and the scriptural records begin, his doctrine covers the whole ground occupied by our official relations. Even in the midst of those extraordinary occurrences which took place in his own day, he was very careful to correct the abuses that had followed; and to restore order by asserting the supremacy of original principles. A woman was for this reason pointedly prohibited from "teaching." She might "prophesy or pray;" but even in that

* 1 Cor. xi. 3.

case, she might not forget her subordinate position, nor prophesy nor pray with "her head uncovered." Miraculous gifts did not set aside ordinary laws. Revelation, using that term as it is commonly received, is not opposed to nature. These gifts might serve a valuable purpose; but that purpose answered, they were withdrawn. They were intended to subserve, not to contradict, nature. "Man is the image and glory of God"—his official agent, minister, or angel; and though a woman might have extraordinary gifts conferred on her, as Joel had foretold, yet the official place and superiority of the angels, or of man as the *image* and *glory* of God, must be recognised; and therefore, a woman must have power on her head, or a veil in token of her subjection.

As man is the image and glory of God, or Jehovah's official agent, acting in his place, by his authority, and as his representative, the title ELOHIM, whose use we must now proceed to show, goes along with the office. This circumstance has of itself created a good deal of perplexity in theological science, and particularly in view of the divinity of Christ. But the inspired writers always use terms safely and consistently. In the present case their phraseology is very strong, and to fastidious sectarians exceedingly startling. Look at the following instances:—Moses was the great jewish apostle—Aaron was a prophet. In view of their relations to each other, Jehovah remarks to Moses—"He (Aaron) shall be thy spokesman unto the people; and he shall be, even he shall be to thee instead of a MOUTH; and thou shalt be to him instead of God (Elohim).^{*} Again. "See I have made thee *Elohim* to Pharaoh, and Aaron thy brother shall be *thy prophet*."[†] The official term Elohim, which is employed as a fixed and technical epithet in view of the divine administration as sustained by God himself, is thus appropriated to Moses in his official character. He stood, both to Aaron and Pharaoh as Elohim, the image or

^{*} Exod. iv. 16.

[†] Ex. vii. 1.

glory, or representative of God himself. And that too, it may farther be observed, in an age, and in a series of official communications, in which a mighty effort was made to eradicate idolatry. If the term *Elohim* implies that there are three persons in the godhead, which explanation so many have pointedly accused as asserting that there are *three gods*, must it not have been an unhappy title to employ? Or rather, is not this secondary use of it, in applying it to official men, an irresistible demonstration that the title can imply no such forbidding dogma. "For, is there any sense in which "three persons" can be predicated of Moses, or any other official man.

This official principle is never presented more frequently, nor in a greater variety of form, nor sustained by more distinct and magnificent attributes, than in view of the person and action of the Mediator. How could it be otherwise, seeing that he is declared to be "the exact image of the divine PERSON;" and is described as having "the fulness of the godhead dwelling in him bodily?" Indeed no one has spoken more ~~unhesitatingly~~ nor unreservedly than himself, in reference to his own official relations. These frequently called forth the inquiry—who and what he was? whence and why he came? what was the measure of his authority, and how it could be that he manifested both so much wisdom and power? On a certain occasion the Jews accused him of making himself God, notwithstanding the palpable fact that he was a man. In reply to their charge, or in justification of his own pretensions, he says—"Is it not written in the scriptures, I said ye are gods? If he called them gods, to whom the word of God came, and the scriptures cannot be broken, say ye of him whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world, thou blasphemest, because I said I am THE SON OF GOD?"* Here is his own answer on the question of his divinity. Does he affirm, or deny his divinity? Or is his answer altogether

* John x. 34—36.

equivocal—one in which timorously he neither affirms nor denies any thing? Does he merely create a mist, through which he artfully escapes from threatening danger? And would he do this, after having so highly commended the scriptures for their uncompromising integrity?

In this reply he offers a *quotation* to his captious accusers. Of course, if there be any ambiguity about it, the best method to remove the ambiguity and ascertain the precise meaning, is to refer to the original text and context. You will find the entire passage in the book of Psalms.* The whole verse reads thus—"I have said ye are gods and all of you are sons of the Most High." On it I remark,

1. That the hebrew word, here rendered gods, is *elohim*—"I said ye are ELOHIM."

2. The official terms, ELOHIM, and SONS of the most High are here used in a poetical couplet as equivalent to each other, and as designed to express the same idea.

The latter of these terms is often employed as an official title. Adam was "the son of God." The official men in the line of Seth were called "sons of God." The angels, who are called *elohim*, are also denominated "sons of God." These things being so, let us apply them in illustration; and suppose that the Redeemer had said—"He called them ELOHIM, to whom the word of God came; and do ye charge him, whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world, with blasphemy, because I said I AM ELOHIM?" There is no ambiguity in his argument when thus arranged. Or again, as the Jews were as much displeased with him, "because he said God was his Father," and charged him with making himself equal with God, in using such language, suppose he had said—"He called them to whom the word of God came the SONS of the Most High; and do ye charge him, whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world, with blasphemy, because I said I am the son of the Most High?" By this second arrange-

* Psalm lxxxii. 6.

ment all ambiguity again disappears. And has he done any more than make use of one term for another, both of which terms, in their official acceptation, bear precisely the same import? Then Jesus of Nazareth is ELOHIM. The whole argument of the evangelists, which is professedly intended to prove that he was "the Son of God," is, in other words, professedly intended to prove that he was Elohim. And, as introductory to all the glory of the new creation, these evangelists may be considered as declaring that Elohim is the Saviour of the world, as Moses declares Elohim to be the Creator of the world. Paul as positively affirms him to be the Lord from heaven, as he does affirm him to be the Son of God.

3. The Redeemer explains in this passage the principle on which these official titles are employed. Those individuals who were called Elohim, or sons of the Most High, were the ministerial organs to and by "*whom the word of God came.*" And is not this the scriptural view afforded both of the Creator and the Redeemer? Jehovah-Elohim, or the Word, made the world. The Word became flesh. "God, who spake unto our fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son." When therefore Jehovah assumed form at first, or subsisted as Jehovah-Elohim, "the form of God" thus assumed, and afterwards emptied, was not the essence of God; for it could not, in that case, have been laid aside. But it was the ministerial organ, the MOUTH, by which Jehovah communicated his will, and which seemingly, for this very reason, has been denominated the "Word." It was this "Word" which afterwards became flesh: or the Spirit of that divine Person assumed the form of man as his ministerial organ, or MOUTH, for the purpose of communicating his will.

The same official principle runs down through the whole history of society, and embraces every case by which God communicated his will. They were all called Elohim "to whom the word of God came;" and in the same way

in which the english term God has been applied to them all. But while the principle of official life is the same, yet "the Word" was the original Elohim or the Creator himself, who afterwards became flesh, and is revealed as "the Lord from heaven." The similitude is very striking; but yet the Lord is no more confounded with his servants, than the High Priest of our profession is confounded with Melchisedec, who was made *like* unto him: or than the Son of the virgin, by being found "in the likeness of sinful flesh," is confounded with sinful flesh.

The similitude is carried still farther by the scriptural writers. They explain how the word of God came to these *Elohim*, and thus introduce and exemplify the doctrine of *Spirit* to which we have been attending. On the one hand these holy men, they say spake, as they were *moved by the Holy Spirit*; and they report the Master as telling his disciples, that they should be similarly employed, and that after he should ascend on high he would send upon them the promise of the Father. "When," said he, "they shall lead you, and deliver you up, take no thought beforehand what ye shall speak, neither do ye premeditate, but whatsoever shall be given you in that hour, that speak ye; for it is not ye that speak, but the Holy Spirit." The agency of the Spirit was the same in principle under both testaments; David was *in the Spirit* when he spake of the coming Messiah as his Lord; and John was *in the Spirit* on the Lord's day, when he unveiled the future history of the church.

On the other hand, the Redeemer applies to himself the prophecy—"The *Spirit of the Lord is upon me*, for he hath anointed me to preach good tidings to the meek." And the evangelists have fully detailed the divine transaction, in which the Holy Spirit is represented to have descended upon him in bodily shape. He himself also declares that he performed all his works by *the Spirit of God*; of himself, he expressly avers he could do nothing.

The glory which was spread over him consisted in this—The Father dwelt in him—the divine Spirit acted by him.

The similitude is apparent in another particular. When these official men, “to whom the word of God came,” had communicated their message, or when the ministerial organs thus temporarily employed had answered their purpose, they were retired from farther responsibilities. All results were left to God, to his agency in his holy providence, or to those superintending operations which the scriptures every where refer to the HOLY SPIRIT; i. e. as has been most distinctly and unreservedly affirmed—God himself, invisibly and not in personal form, yet really, watches over his own institutions. In like manner, “the Lord from heaven” is removed out of our sight, or, having finished his work, he has entered his REST, *as God did when he finished the heavens and the earth*;* so that “after the flesh we know him no more.” And now, when he has thus been removed, or has entered his rest, the SPIRIT has come to convince the world of sin, of righteousness and of judgment; and the gospel which is so freely and graciously proclaimed to all, is emphatically declared to be the wisdom of God, and the power of God, and the ministration of the SPIRIT.

Perhaps it may be objected to these explanations, that still they somehow reduce the Master to a level with his servants. For such a conclusion I am altogether irresponsible—because, in the first place, the argument is entirely composed of scriptural facts; and, in the second place, I do not think that any such conclusion will follow. No moral reasoner is responsible for every nonsequitur which a prejudiced opponent may choose to force upon him.

But to explain—the scriptural doctrine is, that man is made in the image and after the likeness of God. Does it

* It is in this connexion that the LORD’S DAY was established, and of which David spoke, when he prophesied of another day. See Heb. iv.

follow that man is verily God? Assuredly not. Under the new economy we are all "predestinated to be conformed to the image" of the Son of God. Are we therefore equal to the Son of God? Assuredly not. In drawing out our details it has been stated, that God, who is a *Spirit*, assumed form; and man is a *spirit* residing in an external form or body—is man therefore God? Assuredly not. In tracing out the official principle, these elohim as they are denominated, are not only like the Mediator, but they are like Jehovah-Elohim—the great Creator. Have we then reduced the Creator to a level with his servants? Assuredly not. But if the conclusion, thus forced upon us, shall follow at all, it will make the Creator a mere creature, as well as the Mediator. The principle of argument involves the whole; and the conclusion which legitimately applies to one, as legitimately applies to all. If indeed the likeness can be traced in every particular, and no difference can at all be discerned, then all are gods. We have not reduced the Creator, but have elevated the creature. Nay there is no creature at all, if we carry the likeness out; for we would thereby merge the existence of every being now supposed to exist in God himself. No candid logician would thus treat our argument.

Try the question in another way. Moses, the great Jewish apostle, had the Spirit of God; so had Aaron the Jewish high priest. Was Moses not superior to Aaron? The matter was once in debate, and Jehovah himself was the umpire. The case may be quoted, for its particulars are few. Miriam and Aaron undertook to condemn Moses—"Hath the Lord," said they, "indeed only spoken by Moses? hath he not also spoken by us? And the Lord heard it. And the Lord spake suddenly unto Moses, and unto Aaron, and unto Miriam, come out ye three unto the tabernacle of the congregation. And the Lord said, "Hear now my words: If there be a prophet among you, I the Lord will make myself known unto him in a vision, and

will speak unto him in a dream. My servant Moses is not so, who is FAITHFUL IN ALL MINE HOUSE. With him will I speak mouth to mouth, even apparently, and not in dark speeches; and the similitude of the Lord shall he behold: wherefore then were ye not afraid to speak against my servant Moses?" Judgment was executed, the controversy was closed, and Aaron confessed his folly, and acknowledged Moses as his LORD.*—The angels were elohim, and so also was Moses; were the angels on a level with Moses?—The Mediator was Elohim; but in comparison Moses was a "servant" in God's house, Christ was, "a Son over his own house." The angels were ministering spirits, the Son was the Lord whom all the angels must worship.

Again. Had not these various classes of servants, one and all, but a short period of official action? Rather, were there not only occasionally recurring periods when they were under the official influence? At all other times are they not seen to be acting under the ordinary laws of personal responsibility? Limited in view of the sphere, as well as the time of their official employment, even the angels were active under the LAW, which was "the word spoken" by them; but they had not "the world to come put into subjection" to them. The prophets sat down carefully to study events which should occur long after they should be gathered to their fathers; and which they, by the Spirit of Christ dwelling in them, had foretold. But what will you say of the personal responsibility of him who "was made under the law" for official purposes? Will you apply to him personally, who had "done no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth," the cleansing virtue of the mediatorial sacrifice? Can you discern no superiority in the only begotten? no magnificence divine in the Heir of all things? no glory divine, when the WORD himself, who was in the beginning with God, and who was God, becomes flesh? nothing to command your adoration, when the LORD from

*Num. xii.

heaven, laying aside "the form of God," takes the form of man? no claim to your cheerful and unreserved allegiance, when his kingdom is proclaimed to be an *everlasting* kingdom, and to absorb all within itself until the END shall come, and God shall be ALL IN ALL? Or what is it, which at any time, or in any part of this discussion, I have said inconsistent with these glorious truths, which could deserve the imputation of degrading Immanuel?

A third illustration of our general subject is afforded by the scriptural fact that angels are denominated ELOHIM. For example—In the book of psalms Jehovah is represented as saying—"Let all the ELOHIM worship him;"* or in our translation—"Worship him all ye GODS." Again—David says—"Thou hast made him for a little while lower than the ELOHIM."† In both these instances the apostle Paul translates the word elohim, ANGELS; and it is to be presumed that he understood both the language, and that which was intended to be expressed.

The equivalent official title, "sons of God," is also applied to angels. For example.—"There was a day when *the sons of God* came to present themselves before the Lord, and Satan came also among them."‡ "The morning stars sang together and all the sons of God shouted for joy," when the foundations of the earth were laid.§

On what principle are these titles applied to angels? The inquiry is important and may lead to a very interesting illustration of our general subject. Paul, when writing to the hebrews, and undertaking to explain the principle of the Redeemer's humiliation, remarks that—"Nowhere did HE, the Messiah, lay hold of *angels*, but he laid hold of the

* Ps. xcvi. † Ps. viii. 5.

‡ Job i. 6—ii. 1 compared with 1 Kings xxii. 19—22.

§ Job xxxviii. 4—7, compare the whole with Is. vi. 1—8. Mat. xviii. 10. Remember also, that Satan, in his conversation with Eve, seems to be perfectly familiar with the use of the term ELOHIM.

seed of Abraham.”* The apostle is speaking of the present relations of the Messiah, as they had been set forth by “the Spirit of prophecy,” when affording his preliminary “testimony.” The design is to prove the fact, that Christ should be made for a little while *lower than the angels*. And the amount of Paul’s declaration is, that the Spirit of prophecy never did point out the *Messiah*, when he should come to put away sin, as laying hold of angels; but every where predicted that he should come in the form of a *man*—that he should be “a partaker of flesh and blood”—that he should be our brother—that “he who sanctifieth, and they who are sanctified,” should be “*all of one*.” The remark is singular, and was made because the Jews considered the superiority of their own dispensation to be demonstrated by the circumstance, that it was graced by the ministry of angels. The apostle admits the plea, but reminds them that they had no right thence to infer that the Messiah should not be humbled; for their own prophets had every where testified beforehand of his suffering; and never had given them any right to expect that he should assume any other form, than that which should be perfectly consistent with suffering.

It appears however to me, that the observation implies something more, and that it is intended to meet another jewish idea, viz.—That under their economy the Messiah had laid hold of angels. For certainly it is not asserted that, irrespective of this appearance in the latter days, the Redeemer did not lay hold of angels. Evidently the Lord might have done this before, and in a variety of ways, without ever coming into collision with the Spirit of prophecy. He would thereby no more interfere with his coming in the flesh, than he did when he appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, or to Jacob in the form of a MAN. And if he has, at other times, and in other connexions, employed the agency of angels, the facts in the case would remove every difficulty

* Heb. ii. 16.

resulting from the use of the official titles under consideration.—Has he done so?

The facts to which we may refer on this subject are numerous and splendid. The whole Mosaic law was delivered by the instrumentality of angels.* Nor only so. But we are told of “the angel of the Lord” who talked to Abraham—who appeared to Moses—and who went up before the hosts of Israel, designated as that one in whom was THE NAME of God—as the angel of the divine presence—as the angel of the covenant, in whom the saints of old delighted, even the LORD whom they sought. Moses, you may well remember, was distinctly informed by the ANGEL of the Lord, who appeared to him “in a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush, that it was God who addressed him”—“I am the God of thy father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.” And indeed many ancient writers seem to have had this same idea. For example—Athanasius says, “he who appeared was an ANGEL, but GOD SPAKE IN HIM. Clemens Alexandrinus says—The Son of God who led Moses was an ANGEL, bringing with him the EVANGELICAL and principal power of the WORD: a little after he adds—The Logos or Word was an ANGEL, and he calls the Son of God the MYSTICAL ANGEL. Austin says—‘I ask who appeared to Moses in the fire? The scripture itself declares it was an ANGEL that appeared, but that GOD WAS IN THAT ANGEL who can doubt?’ Gregory, in his preface to Job, says—“The angel who appeared to Moses is sometimes called an ANGEL, and sometimes GOD; when he that speaks outwardly is governed by him that is within, he is called an angel to signify his obedience, and the Lord to denote inspiration.”† All these facts have the same bearing, and hold up to our view the same divine phenomenon. The terms or titles therefore,

* Ps. lxxviii. 17. Acts vii. 53. Gal. iii. 19. Heb. ii. 2.

† Watts' Glory of Christ. Dis. i. Sec. 1.

which we are considering, are applied to angels with strict accuracy and beautiful propriety.

The Redeemer, you recollect, has explained the import of the word Elohim, when he said that *they* were so denominated to whom the word of God came. On this official service the angels, according to the preceding statement, were sent; for the whole Mosaic law was “the word spoken by angels”—was “ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator”—“and was received by the disposition of angels.” On the trinitarian scheme, as it comes graced by the hallucinations of the grecian philosophy, and offers to the human mind the wild and sabellian idea of three persons or three parts in the godhead, or on the common idea of a secondary use of the term God or Elohim, there is no visible propriety in the facts adduced. On the principle set forth in these lectures, the whole subject is plain and consistent. So that in explaining the official term by tracing its applications, the official character of God himself is most visibly displayed.

It may, however, be necessary here to observe, that some may be inclined to interpret the term *Angel*, as used by Paul in the epistle to which we have referred, in its general acceptance of *messenger*. But what fearful contradiction would be thus introduced? For if by angels *official men* are there to be understood, it would follow that the Redeemer had not laid hold of the seed of Abraham, while it is expressly declared that he did. Please to look at the text. The angels delivered the law; but the official *men* who were then employed, were the seed of Abraham. The angels were *Elohim* under the former dispensation, but so were the seed of Abraham. The Son was made a little lower than the angels, but he made common cause with the seed of Abraham, and was not ashamed to call them brethren. On the principle of interpretation, thus arbitrarily introduced, the contrast is destroyed, and the apostolic argument is nullified, while the jewish objection is

entirely disregarded. Our conclusion, therefore, stands firm. The Lord, who was suddenly to come into his temple when he should lay hold of "the seed of Abraham," had previously "laid hold of angels." In the angel of the covenant he had put his NAME, and in this way became the great delight of the saints of old. Official titles were thus conferred on angels, because they were engaged in a ministry in view of the grand objects which were involved in "the mystery of the divine will;" i. e. the term Elohim was applied to them in perfect consistency with its own principle, for "by them the word of God came."

But why should any difficulty be attributed to this branch of Jehovah's providential administration? Has he not grouped together, in a system of official symbols and vicarious agencies, all other creatures belonging to his empire, as far as they are connected with our existence and action? And why should not other classes of intelligent beings be employed for like purposes, and in fulfilment of the divine will? provided the series of services to which they are called, shall not be inconsistent with their own nature, or with ours. May not the Spirit of God employ, in any enterprise which he may determine to undertake, the agency of angels as well as that of men? May there be no connecting ties in the intellectual or moral world, analogous to those which exist in the material world? Does it follow that such agencies do not, and cannot, exist, because that in our present mode of being they cannot be recognised by our *senses*? or that in our progress no change can occur which shall introduce us to the most perfect familiarity with them? Is it certain that such agents may not be covered with appropriate garments, or that our vision cannot be strengthened, so that they may be recognised? Are all the probabilities which nature affords, and all the experience of mankind as it may be gathered from the records of the church and the world, directly against such official analogies? I see not why men, even those who are most fond of

philosophical speculation, should be so exceedingly fastidious on the subject of angelic agency. They might as well deny the divine agency, or throw off from their consideration every view of secondary means, of which creation exhibits a series most splendid, and almost interminable.

A fourth illustration of the official principle is derived from the fact, that Jehovah-Elohim or the Word which was in the beginning, and the Word manifested afterwards in the flesh, are uniformly denominated LORD. David in *Spirit*, as quoted by the Redeemer, used very important phraseology when he said—"The Lord said unto my Lord." LORD signifies ruler or governor. As David was the first officer of the Jewish commonwealth, no one could be his LORD save Jehovah. This simple truth every one would admit. But when the term is used twice, and Israel's king wrote, *the Lord*—Jehovah, as will be conceded—said unto MY LORD, to whom could he refer? You remember that Jesus called on the pharisees for an explanation of David's language. In like manner Paul declares—"To us there is one GOD and one LORD:" and Peter avers that Jesus was constituted both LORD and Christ. The constitution of a LORDSHIP, or the manifestation of one who shall be recognised as LORD, or as the chief magistrate to whom every knee shall bow, is then the political operation, which has given rise to this mysterious thing which theologians have called TRINITY. Thus again we are thrown upon the principles of political philosophy, or the attributes of official life, for illustration.

In the allusions which I am now about to make, let it be remembered that it is simply *similitude* which is presented. Man is the image of God. The whole argument is merely a development of the doctrine of IMAGES. Farther, let it be recollected that it is no part of our present concern, how far the maxims of political philosophy may be abstractedly correct? The science is every where under review, and the investigator finds it as much encumbered by traditions

as theology itself can be. Antiquity and the wisdom ascribed to the FATHERS form as huge barriers against political as against moral reform. Leaving politicians to struggle with traditions and ordinances and dogmas as they can, and to conduct their reformation in their own line as they may, while for ourselves we believe that Jesus is HEIR of all things—the LORD of the whole earth—and that his SPIRIT, as such, shall every where preside, let us use the science as we find it.

The example which is offered for illustration, we shall take from our own institutions. The people of the United States have elected a “chief magistrate.” He becomes an official PERSON, HYPOSTASIS, or SUBSISTENCE, in whom, as such, they dwell. He is not in his official character to be considered as his individual SELF, but as *the people of the United States*, as far as his official character extends. He is viewed in this light both at home and abroad. He is the PEOPLE, and yet he is WITH the people. No false political philosophy will be charged against such a statement. Yet this officer is not elected by any *one* of the people: A strong minority respectable in view of wealth and intelligence might have preferred another. But, as a *whole*, he is the choice of the PEOPLE, and must be sustained by them in his official actions. Perhaps the political relation cannot be better expressed than by this simple proposition—The SPIRIT of the community dwells in their chief magistrate, or has manifested itself in him, by the assumption of PERSONAL FORM.

There is no difficulty in apprehending the general idea involved in the foregoing proposition. You all speak with perfect familiarity of the difference between the *spirit* and the *letter* of any instrument of writing—of the *spirit* of a will—of a book—of this, or any other age. The scriptures thus describe the two dispensations—the one is the *letter* which killeth, and the other the *spirit* which giveth life—the one was a *letter* engraven on tables of stone, and the

Other is "the fellowship of the *spirit*. They speak of the spirit of the world. No idea is more common. In its political application it runs through the whole of society, ascending from the lowest to the highest, or descending from the highest to the lowest officer. In every instance, and under every form of government, the principle is the same—SPIRIT is clothed with *form* for certain practical purposes which are contemplated.

Perhaps you may ask—What is the SPIRIT of the community? But in so doing, you carry me out into the region of abstractions. SPIRIT is brought to my knowledge by being embodied in the political officer. That officer thus inaugurated brings to my view the political *hypostasis* or *person*. You dismiss the officer, and then ask me what that thing is which has no hypostasis or person? The object which is sought lies beyond the range of the human senses, and of course beyond our power of perception. You have assigned me a task above human nature, and until some new or different method of acquiring ideas is conferred upon us, it would be folly to attempt explanation.

In like manner, if you ask what is SPIRIT in view of the divine nature, I answer—No one can tell. The subject is beyond our range. There must be a divine hypostasis or person before we can have any ideas on the subject. Jehovah must be revealed or manifested. This done, the form which he has assumed, if it be appropriate to our faculties of perception, will enable us to perceive and understand something about him. This is precisely what he has done, and the personal manifestation which he thus made, appropriate to man's powers of perception as they originally were, and as again they shall be when the redeemed shall see God as HE IS, is denominated, by Moses JEHOVAH-ELOHIM—by David THE LORD—by John THE WORD and GOD AS HE IS—and is referred to as the hypostasis or person of Jehovah of which the Son is the *image*, which no man can now see and live; but which shall be seen when the Son

shall surrender the kingdom to the Father, and Jehovah-ELOHIM SHALL BE ALL, AND IN ALL.

This manifestation, whose principle we have been contemplating in such various forms, having been mistaken by theologians in their pursuit after abstract philosophy, has given rise to the doctrine of TRINITY; which so many reprobate as untrue, which no one pretends to explain, and which is so often represented as a sublime mystery, necessarily and naturally incomprehensible. But if our subject has been explained up to that point where SPIRIT becomes to us a mere abstraction, if the false constructions in theology, which prevented you from coming up intelligibly to that point, have been removed out of your way, and if you may thus understand what a hypostatical or personal manifestation is, you can ask no more. A second manifestation, in which an *image* of the first is presented, may indeed have some peculiarity. But the principle by which even that peculiarity may be explained, as we shall see hereafter, is fairly secured, and this is all we could desire. A LORD—the chief magistrate of the universe—is thus constituted in a manner we can understand, and from the very beginning. And as “the form of God” then assumed was not the ESSENCE of God, neither did it affect that ESSENCE, though a distinct individual hypostasis or PERSON, which did not subsist without that form, is brought before us. And as the chief magistrate of the United States, who did not subsist until the SPIRIT of the community selected and assumed its own form, is *the people*, and yet *with* the people, so John represents that—“In the beginning the WORD WAS; and the Word was WITH God, and the Word was GOD.”

I cannot accuse myself of offering any ideas derogatory to Jehovah, or prejudicial to the views we should entertain of him, in tracing out such a simile. He has employed it himself. The official titles which he appropriates correspond with it. He is LORD—KING—Lord of LORDS—King of KINGS—FATHER—LAWGIVER—JUDGE; and his church is

his KINGDOM, his NATION, his PEOPLE, a COMMONWEALTH, a CITY, &c. As has already been remarked, I am not responsible for the accuracy of the political theory which has been quoted, nor concerned with the question—whether the spirit of the community be an entity or a mere figment? That question, I apprehend, is likely to become as interesting as *trinity* itself; and, if the apostle Paul has taken the true ground when he asserts that the ruler is a minister of God, it is likely to be settled on corresponding principles. The man of sin may possibly be revealed as of more gigantic stature, and as the head of a more extensive empire, than is generally suspected. The spirit of the community, and the spirit of the magisterial office, may then be discovered to be the Spirit of God, bringing liberty wherever he shall rule. This last view will make the illustration still better than it at present is, and entirely scriptural. But in either way the *principle* is the same. Spirit, assuming form, is the secret, and spring, and life of all visible action, human or divine. And in the multitude of examples which are to be found in society, in which men are said to *personify*, or to clothe a mere abstraction with personal attributes, the result is the same. Idolatry itself originates here; and, by carrying a genuine principle of intellectual philosophy into improper associations, it has illustrated the general laws of humanity by a host of fearful and desolating analogies; so that an inspired apostle, when he would describe “the true God and eternal life,” felt it necessary to exhort the disciples,—“LITTLE CHILDREN KEEP YOURSELVES FROM IDOLS.” Civil and ecclesiastical despotism arise from the same source. The one is a perversion of the doctrine of SPIRIT in its political connexions; and the other is a perversion of the same doctrine in its ecclesiastical connexions. Hence in both relations, physical power has taken the place of moral influence—intellectual operations, divine and human, have all been metaphysically misrepresented, and practically misapplied.

Here for the present this particular illustration must be left. The mediatorial manifestation will call it up again, and lead us to look at it in minuter details. I only remark in conclusion, that to object to an effort to explain the character and operations of Jehovah to the whole extent of the *images* which he himself has selected, to reject the lineaments of the one when we would ascertain the lineaments of the other, and then to perplex and distract ourselves by a vain effort to grasp a mere abstraction, is the greatest of all intellectual mistakes. How, I pray you, can wise men—above all, how can ministers of Jesus Christ—call such an intellectual process, either science or revelation? The Stagyrite might know no better, or a Platonic sophist might offer such subtleties for philosophic refinement; but the inspiration of the saint ought to have brought him nearer the throne of God. Even the politician who, falling in with “the march of mind,” has talked so much and so long, and so loud about power, and sovereignty, and majesty, and liberty, might have promulged a system of vastly greater verisimilitude.

LECTURE VI.

Of Creation—Appropriate manifestation of Jehovah—Plural terms—Character of the creature—Man—Image of the Elohim—His body—His spirit—Original responsibility—Its relations—Spirit's operations—Human ability.

HAVING spoken of the *two* different manifestations which God has made of HIMSELF, in view of the character and powers of mankind; the first, with its appropriate associations, now comes up before us. Agreeably to the classifi-

cation stated in the last lecture, the arrangement of our subjects, as they must be considered in order, is as follows:—Jehovah, Jehovah-Elohim, or Word, and Spirit—Creation—Man as he was originally made—and Man under Law.

Our first question, of course, is—How did God create the world?

If, instead of this question, I should ask you how does God *reconcile* the world unto HIMSELF, you would readily reply in scriptural language—“God is IN CHRIST, reconciling the world unto himself.” In explanation you might go on and say, that in order to reconcile man, he assumed a *human form*, and appeared in *the likeness of men*; by which means he became qualified, so to speak, to act for our benefit, in a manner consistent with the laws of our being, and the necessities of our condition. Or again, to use biblical language, you would say—“FORASMUCH as the children were partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise took part of the same, that through death he might destroy him that had the power of death.”

In like manner I would say, that in the beginning, God IN THE WORD, or as Jehovah-ELOHIM, created the heavens and earth: and going on to explain, I would further remark that HE, having purposed to call into being this system, and to place an intelligent creature in a presidency over it, did assume an appropriate FORM; and that, acting in this form, the whole work was done while he HIMSELF, stood, as manifested, Jehovah-ELOHIM, or LORD of the whole.

Certainly the scriptures do entertain—do clearly set forth—this simple view of the whole matter. Moses announces to us that—“In the beginning” ELOHIM made the heavens and the earth:” and again, that Adam and Eve “heard the voice of *Jehovah-Elohim* walking in the garden.” John tells us that *in the beginning* the WORD WAS, or subsisted; all things were made *by him*; and *without him* was not any thing made that was made. HE was

in the world, and the world was made *by him*, and the world knew him not." Paul, quoting from the book of psalms, testifies to the same fact—"THOU LORD, *in the beginning*, hast laid the foundation of the earth; and the heavens are the works of thine hands." The original word in the psalms, which the apostle renders LORD, is the singular of *Elohim*; and is the same used by Jehovah, when he informs Moses that he had appeared to Abraham as Almighty God; and used by Jacob, when he remarks—"I have seen God face to face," and denominates the spot where the sacred interview was enjoyed, Peni-EL. Both these appearances, you remember, were in the form of MAN.—LORD is the emphatic or distinguishing title of Jehovah *as manifested* in a personal similitude.—The apostle, speaking for himself, would say concerning his Master—"BY HIM were all things created that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible."

GOD then, or Jehovah in *personal form*, came down to create the heavens and the earth, as he came down to give the law to Moses from Mount Sinai; or as he appeared to Isaiah, when in a vision he saw the LORD upon a throne, high and lifted up. He came down in human form to *reconcile* man, when he appeared as the babe of Bethlehem, and angels sang—"Unto you is born this day in the city of David, a Saviour who is CHRIST THE LORD." So also he came down, in the form of God, to *create* the heavens and the earth; when, as he himself informs Job, "the morning stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy."

Having assumed external form, in which he would personally act, God impresses upon this system, which is summarily denominated *the heavens and the earth and all their host*, a corresponding character. I mean to be understood as intimating, that his intelligent creature MAN, whom he designed to create, was to be an intellectual spirit, inhabiting a *bodily form*; and that a material structure was now framed, to subserve the various purposes which such a state

of being, as has been predicated of man, would involve. By this series of outward agencies God manifested his own character, together with the principles of his actions, in a manner correspondent with the constitution of the human being; inasmuch as it is evident that man, being destitute of what have been called "innate ideas," must acquire his information by his corporeal senses, and from exterior sources. At the same time, while this external system affords to him the range of his observation, it also prescribes the sphere, and furnishes the means of his individual and responsible actions.

Hence it is said—"the heavens declare the glory of God, and the earth sheweth forth his handy works:"—"The invisible things of him are clearly seen, being understood by the things which are made, even his eternal power and godhead. That which may be known of God is "thus" manifested among men; for God hath thereby showed it unto them." So that the whole material fabric is intended to subserve a principle of *symbolic*, or *scenic* representation, suited to the present mode of man's existence. And our future concern will necessarily be, to watch and describe the development of this principle.

Jehovah pronounces his work to be very *good*. He intended to exhibit *himself* to mankind as GOOD. Just as he has done in the gospel, or in the work of reconciliation, so he did at the beginning:—he sought to leave the best impression of his own character upon his creatures. God is LOVE. He has no pleasure nor satisfaction in any injury which his creatures can sustain. He does whatever the nature of the case will permit him to do, to promote their welfare; or he multiplies his blessings, employs his restraints, and exerts his influences for their benefit, and as far as is consistent with their free-agency. To go farther, and interfere with, or take away from them their free-agency, is no part of his law or of his providence. To do this, would be to despoil man of his glory; and to inflict upon

him the sorest evil which he can possibly suffer. God's government is, and always has been, a government of LOVE. Such is the view which he designed and desires to give of himself; and our first parents were placed in the happiest circumstances, from which such an impression of the divine character could be derived.

All the different parts of creation were most wisely adjusted and carefully adapted to each other. A series of causes originated a corresponding series of effects; a system of reciprocal relations, exceedingly multiform and diversified, was instituted; and the whole was so accurately framed, so well proportioned, and so bountifully supplied, that the entire combination could be sustained in unbroken order, and undisturbed harmony. God always acts RIGHT. The most laborious research, the most scrutinizing analysis, the most minute experiment, can detect nothing wrong in any of his works. The farther our investigation is carried, the more our admiration is excited, and our confidence secured. All men, even *now* that *evil* has been introduced by the fall, live by faith in the divine providence, and grow wise by studying his stately and consistent movements. If the laws of nature were erroneous, if nothing could command our eulogy by its wisdom, or instruct us by its rectitude, *goodness* could not have been displayed; we could have had no motive to act, no incentive to hope, no subject for praise. The divine character could not have been an object of contemplation to an intelligent being, nor a pattern for imitation to a creature of moral obligation. Place these two views together; or consider the finished work of creation as both RIGHT and GOOD, and we shall have the very matter exhibited which has been specified in the divine law; which every intelligent being must approve; and which the Redeemer has set before us in the gospel; and that is—righteousness produces happiness. This is the elemental principle of all government, and is the philoso-

phy of life. Accordingly, the great Creator has most magnificently and gloriously displayed it in his own work.

But in reviewing this original work of the Creator, we are bound to contemplate more than the exhibited character of the Creator himself. The distinguishing features of the creature also, and the principles which belong to its individual *being* or *action*, require our most deliberate attention. Here the question of *power* and *responsibility* arises—a question, the debates on which occupy so much space in theological controversies; and a misapprehension of which may lead to the most fearful mistakes. Now it must be evident, on the face of the Mosaic account, as well as from the nature of the case, that each creature was formed in view of a particular design, which it was made competent to execute; that the laws of its being were impressed upon, or incorporated with, its own nature; or that the material body which is presented to the eye, is the mere visible organization under, or within, which certain principles or laws were put into operation; and that no creature could be expected to act above, or contrary to the laws which belonged to its own constitution. Hence Moses represents every living creature as made *after its kind*; and speaks of the herb yielding seed, whose seed is *in itself*; and the fruit tree yielding fruit, whose seed is *in itself*. He states facts in their own simplicity, and as though he were altogether unconscious of the difficulties which more modern writers have discovered in relation to ability and inability. He looked upon the whole scene before him with an unprejudiced eye; and his observations are made with all the familiarity of the first and simple impression he had received. Jesus uses the same style of remark, when he compares the kingdom of heaven to a man casting seed into the ground—"the earth," says he, "bringeth forth fruit of itself."

Each individual creature, it is evident, must act, or operate, according to the laws of its being. Beyond these laws

it cannot go. Whatever *power* might be predicated of it, must exist within the range of those laws. Destroy those laws, and its power is destroyed: interrupt their operation, and the exercise of its power is interrupted. A fig tree cannot produce grapes; neither can figs be gathered from the vine. No intelligent or consistent moralist would carry his ideas of power any farther; would attempt to tax the providence of God beyond the laws which divine legislation has established; or, depending on omnipotence, would defend the wisdom of a prayer that besought the Eternal to cover the fig tree with grapes, or the vine with figs. Neither should any wisdom be manifested in a hypothetical exposition of *power*, which should destroy the fig tree or the vine, and then piously refer to Jehovah for the figs or the grapes.

If we may conceive of a case, in which the action of the laws belonging to the constitution of any creature, should be suspended or impaired, so that the effect contemplated by the existence of that creature did not and could not follow, and then inquire what the *remedy* must be—the answer is at hand. Every one can see that the remedy would consist in restoring the suspended action of those laws. Can any good reason be assigned why, in such a case, we should prefer to confide in the mere omnipotence of God, working without means; when the universal characteristic of the material system is, that he works by means? Can any one tell us, why the fruits of the summer should be produced by the *immediate* power of God, rather than by the intervention of secondary causes, which the season itself affords?—But this is a very plain matter; yet the principle of divine operation, or the view of a creature's *power* of operation, so simple in this connexion, becomes a puissant affair in the metaphysical theology of learned sectarians.

To proceed. Moses next introduces MAN to our notice, and apprises us of some very peculiar circumstances connected with his creation.

1. The *Elohim* are again presented under that plurality of view, which has already been the subject of protracted discussion in the preceding lectures. The *Elohim* said, "let us make *man* in OUR image, and after OUR likeness." How shall we understand this language?

You are all aware, that this is not the only instance in which this kind of phraseology is employed. You remember, that after the fall, the historian represents *Jehovah-Elohim* as remarking,—“Behold the man is become as ONE OF us.” And again, when he descended to the plains of Shinar to confound the language of men, he said—“Go to, let us go down and there confound their language.”—Other instances might be adduced: but the foregoing are sufficient. The question is, where is their propriety? In reply, I remark,

(1.) That as we have had exhibited to us *two* distinct manifestations of God, with only *one* of which it is possible for us to have any familiarity in our present lapsed condition; we must obtain our principles of explanation from the one, and apply them to the other, so far as our minds can carry them. Now when the Redeemer said—“If a man love me, he will keep my words; and my Father will love him, and WE will come unto him and make OUR abode with him,”—who feels any difficulty? But here the doctrine of a divine manifestation in an *outward form*—while *Jehovah*, considered in himself as a *Spirit*, is no object of our vision—or the scriptural exhibition of *one God* and *one Lord*, is so palpable and distinct, that no inconsistency is suspected; or it readily vanishes. The original manifestation constructed on the same principle, and holding out to human observation *one God* and *one Lord*, may well be conceded to have been as clear when it was afforded; and would be so to us now, were it as possible for us to SEE as it was for Adam. If that concession be made—and I cannot conjecture why it should be withheld—all the difficulty arising from the use of such language is removed.

(2.) The *noun*, by which God is designated to us, is in the plural number: so that, on grammatical principles, other words which would be grammatically connected with it must be modified so as to correspond. And as the manifestation is *personal*, the personal pronouns readily fall under the same philological rule.

(3.) Other scriptural expressions, and applied to *man*, require the same indulgence in interpretation—if indulgence it may be called. Such are the following:—"Return unto thy rest, *O my soul*, for the Lord hath dealt bountifully with thee." "Bless the Lord, *O my soul*," again and again repeated by David.—"For that which *I* do, *I* allow not: for what *I* would, that do *I* not; but what *I* hate, that do *I*. Now if *I* do that *I* would not, it is no more *I* that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. *I* know that in *me*, i. e. in *my flesh*, dwelleth no good thing." Such is Paul's language. And it becomes if possible more striking, when speaking of himself, as having been caught up into paradise, he says—"Of such an one will I glory; yet of *myself* I will not glory, but in my infirmities." All these different modes of expression are, as applied to the same person, under the same personal view, highly improper; but they are both correct and beautiful, interesting and necessary, when applied to the same person under different personal views.

(4.) While these expressions may be illustrated on the distinction which has been stated, we are forbidden to carry that distinction so far as to overthrow the doctrine of the divine *unity*. Not only are we explicitly informed that there is but ONE God, but in the very passage from which these plural pronouns have been taken, singular pronouns are used with equal familiarity: for it is said—"So *Elohim* created man in *his* own image: in the image of *Elohim* created HE him; male and female created HE them." And afterwards *Elohim* said—"Behold *I* have given you every herb." "Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof *I* commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat?" While then the distinction

stated is, on the one hand, necessary to explain the phraseology; on the other, the phraseology itself restricts us from going beyond the distinction.

(5.) On the supposition that our physiology in explaining *Spirit, Soul, and Body* as belonging to the human *hypostasis* or Person, has not been a mistake which mere fancy has substituted for science, and supposing that Spirit, Soul and Body are ascribed to God, these expressions, both as singular and plural, are easily defended. For if, when SOUL exists, a distinct subsistence is presented, or an *hypostasis* or *person* is formed; and if SOUL is not to be predicated of God, considered as he is in himself a pure SPIRIT, any more than it can be predicated of our spirits after they shall have left our bodies; and if, in this view it is a proper declaration—"In the beginning the Word WAS, and the Word was WITH God, and the Word was GOD," then these expressions are strictly accurate in either grammatical construction. The SPIRIT of the people resides in our chief magistrate as its visible or personal form. He is the people, and yet is *with* the people. Is he guilty of any impropriety in incorporating either singular or plural verbs, nouns, adjectives, or pronouns in his official communications? What politician would criticise the phraseology of his prince, as theologians have criticised that of their Lord? or affect, as they have done, not to perceive the propriety of terms belonging to official documents? In what language would our hypercritical theologues wish an official agent, who must necessarily be considered both as a *person* and a *representative*, to express himself so as to offend neither their physiology nor their philology? A common author feels himself to move among official men, and unhesitatingly uses singular or plural epithets as he may find most convenient, or suppose himself to be uttering the sentiments of his readers.

I am fully aware that others have considered the language, on which we are remarking, as official. But then it is supposed to be the invention of earthly princes; and the

inspired writers are said to *borrow* it, that God may seem to speak with appropriate condescension. And did these princes borrow the official *title* also, and out of mere condescension designate Jehovah as ELOHIM? Is the political doctrine of representation, and of official images a like loan? or is not civil government an ordinance of God? Has he not established the political as well as the natural relations of mankind? and is not man, viewed *officially*, made in the image of, or like unto, God? Here then a licentious criticism has not only overreached, but reversed the *fact*.—Is it any matter of wonder that the world is full of theological strife and sectarian animosities, when such modes of interpretation become popular, and the human mind is so readily fascinated by any hasty comment that is seemingly ingenious.

2. The *Elohim* are said to make man in their own IMAGE, and after their own LIKENESS.

This image is supposed to consist in “knowledge, righteousness and true holiness.”* Now that God is characterized by knowledge, righteousness and true holiness, there can be no doubt; and when man possesses these attributes, there is as little doubt that he is *like* God. But that they cannot be included in the record, at present under consideration, is evident: because,

(1.) Knowledge, righteousness and true holiness, suppose intellectual and moral exercises, in which man could not have been engaged until he was created and put on his probation. He obtains his *knowledge* from the sphere of observation that is opened to him. Not having any “innate ideas,” he must depend upon his external resources; and, until as an intellectual being he was put on those resources, he could not possess the ideas which were to be derived from them. *Righteousness*, in like manner, is conformity to law; and he could not, therefore, have righteousness until he had conformed to law.—How is the fact, or how should have

* The idea is taken from Eph. iv. 23, 24.—Col. iii. 10.

been the fact, with regard to infants? Do they know any thing before or when they are born? or are their actions either righteous or sinful?

(2.) The *image* of God has not always the same meaning in the scriptures.—“A man indeed,” says Paul, “ought not to cover his head, for as much as HE is the *image* and glory of God; but the woman is the glory of the MAN.” Was not the *woman* made in the *image* of God? See the record.

It has also been asserted, that by the fall of Adam, all mankind have lost the *image* of God. Neither can this assertion be sustained by the scriptures. For when God renewed the mediatorial constitution with Noah, as “the heir of the righteousness of faith,” he assigned as the reason of a statute in relation to murder, then promulgated—“For in the *image* of God made he man;” which reason is still good, or the statute cannot be sustained. In the text just quoted from the pen of the apostle Paul, it is expressly asserted that the MAN is the *image* and glory of God. - And James, speaking of the tongue, observes—“Therewith bless we God, even the Father; and therewith curse we MEN, which are *made after the similitude of God.*”

All these things are readily explained by the fact, that as *Elohim* means Jehovah, who is a spirit, as manifested in personal form, and acting independently of that form in his continual providence; so man, being made in their image or after their likeness, was similarly constituted: i. e. man has an intellectual spirit, dwelling in an external form or body; which spirit may exist and exert an influence independently of his bodily presence.—The allusion which the apostle makes, in describing the man as *the image of God*, and the woman as *the glory of the man*, is not to this *primary* view, but to official standing and authority. Adam was our social head. Eve was not.

The first circumstance which we are required to notice concerning man—the general matters being settled—is

that he has a *BODY*. God has created him with an animal nature. And this body, like every other creature, has its own laws impressed upon, or incorporated within itself: all of which laws are necessary to its well being. It is a beautiful piece of divine mechanism, “fearfully and wonderfully made;” displaying the divine wisdom in one of its loveliest efforts; and putting to the blush the absurdity of atheistical speculation. It must act according to its own laws—not contrary to them—not above them. Nothing else, nothing more, can be expected from it: nor can we imagine that the divine power will be exerted to sustain it in a train of operations, for which it is not constitutionally fitted.

The *body* of man, it is necessary further to remark, was produced from the dust of the ground. It originates in, and from, this material system, or is a component part of it. This fact in relation to the origin of the *body*, as traced to the laws of the material system, is never lost sight of in the scriptural representations concerning it: in proof of which assertion, let the following texts be submitted.—“In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return to the ground; for out of it wast thou taken: for *dust* thou art, and unto *dust* shalt thou return.” “Remember, I beseech thee, that thou hast made me as the *clay*; and wilt thou bring me into *dust* again?” “All *flesh* shall perish together, and man shall turn again to *dust*.” “He knoweth our *frame*, he remembereth that we are *dust*.” “Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was.” “We have had fathers of our *flesh*, who corrected us, and we gave them reverence.”

The next circumstance that is observed concerning *man* is, that he has an intellectual *SPIRIT*. Without this he could not resemble *Elohim*. This *spirit* is the immediate gift of God, and did not spring from the dust, nor is it the offspring of the material system. God breathed into man’s nostrils, when his body was brought forth from the ground,

the breath of LIVES; i. e. both animal and intellectual life. The same idea is preserved throughout the scriptures.—“The spirit shall *return to God who gave it.*” “We have had *fathers of our flesh*—shall we not much rather be in subjection to the *Father of spirits* and live.” “O God, the God of the *spirits* of all flesh.” “None of them can by any means redeem his brother, nor give to God a ransom for him, for the redemption of their soul is precious.” “There is no man that hath power over the *spirit*, to retain the spirit.” “The burthen of the word of the Lord, which stretched forth the heavens, and layeth the foundation of the earth, and *formeth the spirit of man within him.*” “Fear not them that kill the *body*, but are not able to destroy the *soul*; but rather fear him, which is able to destroy both *soul* and *body* in hell.” To God, then, immediately and directly, are we indebted for our *spirits*. They have no *earthly father*.

I am aware of the argument that has been employed, and by no secondary men, to disprove the origin of the human *spirit*, as it has just been declared. But I must be permitted to leave their argument on this subject unnoticed; as it is advanced principally to sustain a doctrine, which we shall hereafter have opportunities enough to demonstrate to be unscriptural.

It may, however, be remarked, that the question itself is old; and gave rise to much litigation in those ages which moulded theology into the stately forms that sectarians so much admire. Tertullian and Origen and Jerome and Augustine and Pelagius were alike interested in it. But the doctrine of the trinity, which so fully discloses the ignorance of the physiologists of those times, evinces that the real difference between SOUL and SPIRIT entered not into their ratiocinations. Had it, the fact that man is made LIKE God, coupled with the assumption of human nature by the divine Spirit, would have settled the question. In the constitution of a divine PERSON, SPIRIT and FORM are

not the same. Then it appears that *spirit* may exist independent of *form*, and that the two belong to different orders of being. So in man, *spirit* may exist independently of his *body*—the one being mortal and the other immortal, they are thus evinced to belong to different orders, because governed by different laws. Augustine pleaded *ignorance*, i. e. he could not establish the very plea which was the turning point of his system. If any one can prove that we derive our *spirits*, as well as our *bodies*, from those who are styled “the fathers of our flesh,” or that God, to whom it *returns*, did not *give* the *spirit*, the doctrine of temporal and spiritual and eternal death, as the legal and necessary consequence of Adam’s sin, would be irrefutable. It may have been very pious and candid in Augustine to have remarked—“When the bible gives no decisive testimony, human presumption must beware of determining either for one view or another. Had the knowledge of such things been essential to salvation, the scriptures would have contained more respecting them.”* But the knowledge of “these things” was essential to his doctrines. To have been able to affirm the human origin of the human spirit, would have incontrovertibly settled his system; or had he demonstrated his dogmas, that demonstration would have proved the human origin of the human spirit. But he hesitated, and charitably warned us against the *presumption* of inquiry. Is it not equally *presumptuous* to affirm doctrines, whose evidence we dare not touch? There is “a polemical,” as well as “a purely scientific, interest,” in the exhibition of ecclesiastical tenets, which needs to be sustained by the influence of great names. In this connexion Augustine is quoted, and it is well to know what such quotations are worth.

The *spirit* of man, like every other creature, has its own laws impressed upon, or incorporated within itself. Paul has expressed my idea thus:—“The gentiles do BY NA-

* Bib. Reper. 1833, p. 108. Neander trans. by Woods.

TURE the things contained in the law—which show the work of the *law written in their hearts*.” Like every other creature then, the *spirit* of man is under a necessary obligation to act according to the laws of its own nature:—not contrary to, nor above, but in perfect correspondence with them. Nor is the power of God to be expected either to legislate for, or to act by the human *spirit*, in any manner that is not consistent with its nature, nor proportioned to its faculties. Neither is it to be supposed, while these faculties are suffered to lie dormant, or are not called out into action to the whole extent of their force, that God will gratuitously supply the deficiencies by an effort of his own omnipotence.

Here, therefore, or in the *constitution* of each individual human being, is laid the basis of his *personal responsibility*. Whatever may be his social relations, or however his earthly condition may be modified, he yet has an *individuality*, which must be his essential characteristic while his *spirit* exists. His *body* may be enthralled, but his *mind* must be free; and he must give account for himself to his Creator. No one man can eat or drink for any other man; but the organs of each animal system must possess their own vitality, and sustain their own functional operations; in like manner, no one man can *think* for any other man; but each individual *spirit* has its own characteristic faculties, and these must sustain their own personal operations. It is this individuality of being, with all its appended rights and primordial privileges, that mankind are now waking up to consider; and which, with such spasmodic effort, they are pleading against both political and ecclesiastical misrule. Nor will the controversy terminate until the victory is achieved; and the aristocracy of the dark ages falls disfranchised, before the banner of intellectual freedom. The assumed principles of political and ecclesiastical despotism are contrary to both *nature* and *revelation*.

The Son of God himself, while upon earth, could not *think* for his hearers. Hence he asked them with so much point, "Why do ye not *understand* my speech;" and replied with so much plainness—"because ye cannot *hear* my word." Their prejudices—their sluggishness—their deeply seated errors—their familiar, but inaccurate, technicalities—their sectarian dogmatism—their crude, but stereotyped maxims, derived from the traditions of the elders, and sustained by the commandments of men, prevented them from hearing either candidly or correctly. Hence they misrepresented his doctrines, traduced his character, reviled his ministrations, and upbraided him under the harshest epithets. "This people's heart," said he, "is waxed *gross*, and their ears are *dull of hearing*, and their eyes they have *closed*; lest at any time they should see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and should understand with their hearts, and should be converted, and I should heal them." And again, in his last hours and in full view of his cross, contrasting his own benevolent feeling towards them with all their unkindness to him, he said, "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them that are sent unto thee, how often *would* I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not." Let the human *spirit* then be either holy or sinful, it must, from *its own nature*, think for itself:—no other being can think for it.

It is unquestionably true, that one man may express his thoughts to other men; and that they, taking up those thoughts, may professedly and habitually act upon them.—There is a great deal of this species of intellectual operation in the world; and there necessarily must be. It is one of the finest and best views of the social character of man; but when abused, it leads to the most direful and disastrous consequences. It affords ample room for the two extremes attendant on human concerns—*good* and *evil*. On the one

hand, it is the very soul of the creed-making system ; is the only support of political or ecclesiastical despotism, when it connects an approval of the dogmas of past ages with civil or religious privileges ; and can alone account for that idolatrous reverence for the FATHERS, which eulogizes so highly their talents, their learning and their piety, and smiles so sarcastically at the pigmy pretensions of their children ; while, I fear, it has actually made pigmies of us all. It always has been, and it would seem that it always must be so, that men who are too timid, or too indolent to think for themselves, should perpetually detail the thoughts of others. And then again, many who pretend to think for themselves, are all the time meditating upon the ideas of those who have been long numbered with “ the pale nations of the dead.” How important is the question now-a-days, what Calvin, or Luther, or Owen, or Edwards, and a host of others, meant in their writings ? Can any one conceive a more humiliating intellectual spectacle, than when whole denominations of religious men—the old in their dogmatism, and the young in their intemperate zeal—are biting and devouring one another, while professedly arguing out such an unprofitable question ? But look abroad—hear, see, read, and decide for yourselves.

On the other hand, this principle of intellectual operation, by which the human spirit takes cognizance of surrounding objects that are presented to its contemplation, is incorporated in the divine government over man. When Jehovah created the world, he made an exhibition of himself, with the view of arranging subjects of thought for his intelligent creatures. The fact is abundantly evident. The divine works furnish to us the matters of our varied investigation. But the knowledge which they are intended to impart cannot be acquired without effort or reflection. The Redeemer did not ask the credence of his hearers to mere assertion, but appealed to every variety of evidence of which the subject was susceptible—to creation—to provi-

dence—to the scriptures—to reason—to his own miraculous works. The Holy Spirit is not given to control or subdue us by repeated emanations of resistless power, nor to preclude the necessity for personal inquiry; but he is sent to *convince* the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment. Jehovah no more deals with the *spirit* of man irrespective of its own high faculties, than he sustains our *animal life* by a providence that gratuitously dispenses with daily labor. The very principle of intellectual improvement is to be found in our intellectual effort. A debased mind must be regenerated; a corrupt life must be reformed; the *being* who has gone astray must be brought back; and personally to attend to and achieve this momentous change, is the matter of moral obligation which the scriptures prescribe. *Personal responsibility* is therefore the necessary result of our *personal existence*; and no institution or operation of God is intended to set it aside. Every man must give an account of, and for, himself to his Creator.

This intellectual spirit, which Elohim breathed into man, is made for the time being a tenant of the *body* that had been formed from the ground. The *body* then is the instrument by which the *spirit* acts. This acquires its ideas by means of the bodily senses; and applies the ideas thus obtained to the various purposes of life, or, in the discharge of its responsibilities, according to the measure of ability which belongs to the body. Weaken the powers of the body, and the spirit's ability to act is necessarily diminished. A man cannot act in sickness as he can in health. A blind man can have no idea of colors, and a deaf man can have no idea of sound. A child has no maturity of thought, and in old age "the silver cord is loosened and the golden bowl is broken." And hence Paul complains, that when he would do good, evil was present with him—that the law in his *members* warred against the law of his mind.—Nay, how easily might he, or any other man be disturbed! "Marvel not," says Pascal, "that this profound statesman is just

now incapable of reasoning justly ; for behold a fly is buzzing round his head. If you wish to restore to him the power of correct thinking, and of distinguishing truth from falsehood, you must first chase away the insect, holding in thralldom that exalted reason and that gigantic intellect which governs empires and decides the destinies of mankind."

I apprehend that the *animal part* of man is but little considered in discussions on moral science ; and that, as some one remarked on contemplating the splendid anatomical museum at Florence,—“ Philosophy has been in the wrong, not to descend more deeply into the physical man. There it is that the moral man lies concealed.” The theologian appears promptly to despatch any reference which might be made to it ; and, thinking that the question—*can matter sin?*—shuts out all necessity for illustration, he hastens away to speculate about *abstract spirit*. In like manner he had reasoned about God ; and now merely pursues his own mode of reasoning, in thus treating man. Having contemplated the Creator, enthroned in his own inscrutable perfections *outside* of the world himself had made, it was natural and necessary to carry his intellectual creature in search of him ; and, if possible, to ascertain some points of communion in which the two could meet. Here, as a matter of course, the theologian fails ; and hence the very virtues of the christian, like the attributes of Godhead, have become profound and inexplicable mysteries. For example :—Who can tell us what FAITH is ? No one. To be sure, definition upon definition has been afforded by systematic divines. **But** they only throw the difficulty one step forward : and when pursued, the answer is—Faith is the *gift* of God. Still, it may be asked, what is the *thing* which is given ? and in what sense is it a *gift* ? Does God bestow faith upon us, as he gives us our daily bread ? Or are these as different in the manner of their acquisition, as in their nature ? Must we believe what we do not see, do not hear, do not

understand? Or is it as John says—"That which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the word of life, declare we unto you?" If it be, then we receive our ideas through our corporeal senses, acting upon material objects of which our spirits take cognizance, and judge, understand, are convinced, and believe. But in that case there is no difficulty or mystery about the matter. For in this view, faith is the *gift* of God, as our daily bread is the *gift* of God: i. e. we secure our daily bread by a divine blessing upon our daily labor; and so we obtain faith by a divine blessing upon our honest and patient investigation after truth. And can it be otherwise? How can we believe in him of whom we have not heard? and how can we hear without a preacher?

In other words:—By throwing out the animal part of man from any interest in the great matter before us, and considering *spirit* as a pure abstraction, theologians seem to have forgotten all the peculiarities of SOUL. In fact the subject of *soul* they have altogether mistaken; or so far mistaken, that in attempting to explain the scriptural phrase—"Spirit, Soul and Body," they have very gravely told us that man has TWO SOULS; and then have endeavored to govern him as though he had none. Both their metaphysics and their politics have been but the relics of the admired age which gave birth to CREEDS, and inaugurated Constantine as the best umpire that philosophical theologians could find. It is here where the doctrine of "original sin" has been perverted; and which, notwithstanding the varied profile with which it has been pencilled, has never yet reconciled the common sense of mankind; and never will, until controvertists learn to state the difference between, and accurately to define the separate interests of, SOUL and SPIRIT.

In the same manner many reason when they reject all typical ordinances. All is *spirit* with them. Others run

to the opposite extreme, and are ever busy in formalities beyond what is written. All is *body* with them. Sermons, prayer-meetings, and consecrated days, seem to command their entire confidence; and they justify themselves to their own consciences by calling the excitement, which is thus produced or revived, heart-religion; as though the heart was intrinsically different from mind, or as though christianity did not require, but was unfavorable to, intellectual cultivation. How absurd that system necessarily is, which does not enact and sanctify outward institutions, as the means of mental illumination?

Out of this peculiarity of our present mode of existence, viz: that our intellectual spirit dwells in an animal body, arise all our *natural* relations. Take away that fact—let the spirit return to God, while the dust returns to the dust—and these natural relations cease; for, says the Redeemer—“in the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage.” How much more evident it must be, that all the *political* relations of life, from the paradisiacal constitution down, are limited in the same way, and confined in their action to the same material organization. Through this material organization, and by means of its senses, any objects connected with the political, as well as those belonging to the natural relations, may be presented to the human spirit, and form the matters of its careful revision, or its deliberate judgment. It is the nature and province of *mind* so to act; nor is the case altered by the character of the objects so presented. Whether they shall be good or evil, the mental exercise remains the same in principle. The spirit, sustaining its own *free agency*, and deciding by its own power of *conscience*, chooses between good and evil, and must meet the consequences of its own determinations. All that can be required in order to originate, and carry through to its issue, such an intellectual process, is *information*; afforded or acquired according to the established laws of human nature. And the various rela-

tions of life, whether considered to be natural or political, are intended to aid and facilitate, not to nullify nor impede, such a train of mental action. "He that is called in the Lord, being a *servant*, is the Lord's *freeman*." Personal responsibility is the high and distinguishing characteristic of our personal existence.

Having now traced up personal responsibility to its constitutional and necessary connexions, let us next inquire after the law to which the *spirit* was made amenable. From the whole view of creation, it must be very evident that, while every other creature served definite objects suited to its own capacities, the *spirit* of man was made to contemplate, to obey, and to enjoy God. RIGHTEOUSNESS, as productive of GOOD, is the high object it was formed to gain. In obtaining that object, it would act according to its own *nature*, and meet its own responsibility; but discarding that object, responsibility is violated, and condemnation unavoidable. In other words, it is as much *the nature of mind* to contemplate, obey, and enjoy God, as it is the nature of the fig tree to bring forth figs; or the moral results prescribed to the human spirit, as naturally follow from *its constituent principles*, as it belongs to the earth to bring forth fruit of *herself*. Hence the law is said to be written on our *hearts*; and the gentiles are described as "doing *by nature* the things contained in the law." And indeed, would it not be strange that the *mind* should be called to obey a law which is not coincident with *its own nature*, or which it had no capacities to obey? As well might it be expected that men should gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles.

The law itself, as it has been summarily expressed in the scriptures, requires of the human mind simply to DO and LIVE. That which must be DONE, is the thing which, as either enacted by a written code or inscribed on nature, is both *right* and *good*, and is perfectly within the reach of the human mind. A man cannot believe in him of whom he has not heard; neither can he fulfil a duty which he has no opportunity of knowing. This DOING was as much

within the range of Adam's abilities, as *believing* is now within the reach of our capacity; and he was *personally* as accountable under *law* which required him to DO, as we are under gospel which requires us to BELIEVE.—Let it here be distinctly understood that I am not speaking of the paradisiacal constitution; but of the law impressed upon, or incorporated with, the nature of every human being:—the law of SPIRIT as SPIRIT, viewed in its own individuality, and as existing for a brief period in this world.

It may be both seasonable and instructive to call up to recollection, that God himself, the great pattern of imitation, had been DOING also. He had created the heavens and the earth and all their host. This work which he wrought, is both RIGHT and GOOD. So clearly was this the fact, that Adam could distinctly perceive it, and make his observations in the most intelligible and unequivocal manner. In other words—God did, in his work of creation, exemplify the connexion between RIGHTEOUSNESS and LIFE; or show that the thing which is RIGHT is the thing that is GOOD. But this *righteousness* of God did not in any way interfere with the personal responsibility of man, so as to cover any deficiencies belonging to his *nature*, or any improprieties of which he might be *guilty*. It was an example to illustrate the divine character, and explain the divine designs; from which man might learn his personal duties, and derive the necessary inducements to perform them. But it was no part of Jehovah's intention to IMPUTE this righteousness, thus exhibited in his works, to Adam or to any of his posterity: it was not a robe which his hand had wrought as a garment of justification—it served not as a final plea in judgment. The law to man was, DO and LIVE: and his obedience to this law would present him as justified by his own WORKS. Wherever, therefore, a doctrine of IMPUTATION may be scripturally or rationally argued, it cannot be sustained in any respect, as a substitute for *personal responsibility*.

There is, and necessarily must be, a limit to personal responsibility. Man is not *infinite*, and the law of his nature could not be *infinite*. The law could not transcend the powers of his nature, nor be stretched beyond the sphere of action in which he was placed. Accordingly, on the one hand, I cannot accede to the lofty, yet undefined, notions which have been entertained of Adam's superiority, as though he were something more than human; nor, on the other, can I believe, that the paradisiacal institute was either the *only* law under which he was placed, or an arbitrary statute, enacted as a solitary test of his obedience. For, as we have seen, the law of his personal being was written on his *heart*, or incorporated in his *nature*; and must be obeyed throughout the entire extent of his agency, and in reference to all the relations belonging to the system with which he was connected. Whatever was the nature or the intention of the paradisiacal law, that institute could not set aside the law written on his heart; nor supersede its obligation in those circumstances to which it would naturally and necessarily apply. And those circumstances were neither few nor unimportant. For observe—The marriage institution was established, from which the various natural relations would unavoidably follow:—The sabbath day was sanctified, which would seem, as being a positive institution, to prelude a series of religious ceremonies as belonging to the service due to God;—The dominion over the creatures was entrusted to Adam's judgment, and they were afterwards named and classed according to his judgment:—He was put into the garden "to dress and to keep it," and was thus engaged in all the operations of an active life;—gold and precious stones, &c. are also enumerated, along with whatever was pleasant to the sight, or good for food, or contributive to the comforts and conveniencies of life, as items in the bountiful provision his Creator had made. A scene of operation and a condition of existence, entirely like that which the world now presents, with the exception that EVIL

had not been introduced, is thus minutely described by the inspired penman. Here then, we have the sphere of man's *personal* responsibility, when he was originally created—the parts as well arranged, and the boundaries as extensive as those of the corresponding system are at this day, or have been since the fall. It is moreover abundantly evident that this state of things, thus set up at the beginning, was to have been perpetuated until the Creator's intention of framing it should be answered; while at the same time some ulterior purposes were distinctly held up to view.

It may perhaps be objected, that the preceding view involves the *possibility* of the commission of sin by Adam or any of his children, irrespective of the paradisiacal constitution; and at any point in the whole range of their personal responsibilities. Reminding you, in the first place, that the preceding argument has been drawn from *the nature of the case*, and that the detail which has been presented is the historian's account of *the facts in the case*, I readily admit the accuracy of the objection, and concede its implication. What then? Is there any incongruity in the concession? Is any scriptural principle overlooked, or put at defiance? Did not Adam *sin* when he ate of the forbidden fruit? Did not Eve *sin*? and, as she was not our social head, did she not sin in violation of *personal* responsibility? Was she not "*first*" in the transgression? Did her sin become impossible before the *social head* had eaten? Have not angels sinned? Does not God himself speak of good and evil in other parts of his dominions?—Any difficulty which may arise here, proceeds from the assumption, that the existence of sin argues a *previous corrupt nature*. I say *assumption*—because neither Adam, nor Eve, nor the angels, had a previously corrupt nature.

That such a concession may be safely made, is farther evident from the nature of *personal* responsibility itself. This could not be absorbed in any social institute. The mediatorial righteousness of the Son of God himself has not

absorbed it: but he commands every man to believe; and on a compliance or non-compliance depends the issue. By his own *nature*, every man is in a state of personal *probation*. Good and evil are placed before him. And every where throughout the scriptures, his final destiny is connected with his own responsibility. Spiritual and eternal life, on the one hand, and spiritual and eternal death on the other, are respectively attached to the facts given in answer to the judicial inquiry, whether he has done good or evil? Who ever heard of any man's being condemned at the bar of God for Adam's sin? or of any other judicial inquiry, than that which embraces *the deeds done in the body*, and binds one to answer for HIMSELF? Ah! much do I fear, that multitudes are slumbering on an awful precipice, in relation to this momentous matter. Rouse up, I beseech you, and search the scriptures, that you may ascertain whether you must not be judged in the great day of retribution—each for YOURSELF?

It may now be very fairly asked, what would have been the consequence, if Adam or any of his posterity had sinned in violation of personal responsibility? Should such a transgressor have died? To answer this question, it must first be settled, what kind of death it means? If it be *temporal* death, to which the question refers, I unhesitatingly answer, that thus the transgressor would *not* have died: because temporal death is uniformly connected with Adam's sin. *In Adam all die*. It is very true that death may be inflicted as the penalty of a municipal statute:—but that occurs only because death has been brought into the world, as the consequence of Adam's sin. And it is also true, that death was inflicted as the penalty of the Mosaic law; but that resulted from its typical purposes and character. Neither fact disturbs our general argument, but rather confirms it; because the provisions established in both cases were purely *political*. However righteous any man may become, he cannot escape death:—"It is appointed unto *all men* once"

to die." In such a case, therefore, as the inquiry contemplates, personal responsibility would have left a sinner to the divine favor for pardon on the principle of repentance; or to the decisions of the day of judgment, when every man must give account of himself to God.

Again it may be asked, what would have been the final issue under such circumstances, if the transgressor had not died? In what way should he have been brought into judgment? These questions are entitled to a distinct answer, whether the case of transgression shall be admitted or denied. It could not have been intended that man should live here forever, if the paradisiacal law had not been violated: and personal probation must necessarily lead to a judicial investigation. There were evidently two sides to the constitution under which mankind were placed; and if sin were followed by penalty, obedience must secure reward. How then shall we decide this interesting matter? Are there any scriptural principles, unequivocally set forth, whose truth is indisputable, and on which we may confidently rely? I think there are such principles very distinctly stated; and that they fully meet the whole case.

The apostle Paul, in his argument on the resurrection, addressed to the Corinthians, very explicitly assures us, that "*flesh and blood* cannot inherit the kingdom of God." Now Adam had this very flesh and blood which cannot inherit the kingdom of God: so that he could not inherit the kingdom of God; or he must, some how or other, part with *flesh and blood*.—Again the apostle observes, "there is a *natural* body, and there is a *spiritual* body. "And also," he adds, it is written, "the first man Adam was made a living soul; the last Adam was made a quickening spirit." The doctrine of these two kinds of bodies, he does himself apply to the primordial, as well as to the remedial, state of man; and observes, that their order was—"that was not *first* which is spiritual, but that which is natural; and *afterward* that which is spiritual." The doctrine of the resurrection, as

connected with the christian system, he argues on these original principles. A *natural* body is not the mere offspring of a *fallen nature*, but is all that was produced from the ground, or that belonged to Adam before he fell; and is strictly analogous with the material system, of which it forms a part. On the other hand, a *spiritual* body is not a mere appendage of christianity, presented as analogous with the resurrection, but was contemplated from the beginning; for which reason it is incorporated with christianity.

Again, the apostle says, "we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be *changed*; in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet: for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be *changed*." Temporal death is therefore not indispensably necessary to our putting off the natural, and putting on the spiritual, body: a *change* may be accomplished in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye; of which the facts that occurred in the history of Enoch and Elijah are bright and interesting examples. Any supposed difficulty in the case before us is thus readily and entirely removed. So that death itself is neither so unique nor monstrous a matter as it is generally represented to be; but it is, according to the representations the apostle has made, analogous to an event which should have occurred, if Adam had not eaten the forbidden fruit; and which should have pressed home the personal responsibility of every human mind with equal force. Thus, by a change which would have taken place, not so painful nor dishonorable as temporal death, yet still by a change from a natural into a spiritual body, should mankind, whether they had personally done good or evil, have been introduced to the judgment seat.

We have now reached the paradisiacal institute. But wishing to consider that matter by itself, I shall postpone it to the next lecture; and in the mean time anticipate our discussion, only so far as to take up the following question:—Was Adam left to fulfil his various duties *in his own strength*?

This question, in an age when there is so much contradictory and unsatisfying argument on the subjects of divine power, and human ability and inability, may perhaps serve to throw these litigated matters into a novel shape, or one which has not been defaced by scholastic technicalities. Let us see what reply may be obtained from the facts, as they are detailed in the scriptures.

Moses instructs us that on the seventh day God RESTED from all his work. And what did he mean by God's *resting*? Paul, illustrating the mediatorial system as an ecclesiastical constitution, compares it with this early frame of moral government which Moses describes; and remarks—"He that is entered into his REST, he also hath ceased from his own works, as God did from his." An analogy is evidently intended to be asserted. In the latter case, we learn that Christ, as to his bodily presence, is now removed from our view, and that in place thereof the SPIRIT has come. The analogy then would be, that God, having finished the work of creation, entered into his REST; or, that in *personal form* he was removed out of Adam's sight, and the SPIRIT came.

It may perhaps be considered as a breach upon this analogy, that Jehovah-ELOHIM, or God in *personal form*, did afterwards appear in the garden. But so also the Redeemer appeared to Paul, when he commissioned him to go to the gentiles. So he appeared to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, when he would make or renew his covenant with them. So he appeared when he came down to the plains of Shinar, and to Sodom, to execute his judgment. A *like* occasion had now occurred; something out of the course of ordinary rule was to be adjudicated; and, viewed as the facts alluded to are to be estimated, the seeming discrepancy is done away.

Then the SPIRIT came, as he comes now. We are wont to refer every issue to the single agency of the *Spirit*; and many feel warranted to wait, when they are called to be-

lieve the gospel, until the *Spirit* shall renew their hearts. Others, who have tasted that the Lord is gracious, are continually representing the Spirit's influence in such a light, that a sort of irresponsible state is supposed to exist, and an inability on the part of man is inferred; with all which the doctrine of a personal election and reprobation most exactly fits. They plead for the use of *means*, it is true;—but then any one may see that their doctrine of divine power and human inability renders the *means* utterly useless. Multitudes of sinners thus excuse themselves from believing; and multitudes feel themselves to be in a most fearful predicament, while the penalty hangs over them—"he that believeth not shall be damned;" and while the scriptures unequivocally declare that the sinner perishes by his own fault. Theologians cannot reconcile these contradictory views, and the cry of mystery will no longer avail.

How stood the matter at *first*? Can we speak of Adam's inability, because divine providence was then the "ministration of the Spirit?" Do the scriptures report him as indolently waiting for the Spirit of God? Or do they refer his fall to any other urgency than that exerted by the sinful emotions of his own bosom? None of these incongruities can be affirmed with confidence in relation to him. And why should they be affirmed of man *now*? Man, it may be replied, is now encompassed with infirmities. True. But the divine government has proportioned its operations to his infirmities. He is not now under *law*, but under *grace*. And where is the difference in principle? There is none. It is now as much within the compass of our ability to *believe*, as it was within the compass of Adam's ability to *obey*. Not that there is no divine power now, or was no divine power then. For in both instances the Spirit's operations belong to the divine government. The simple fact is that, in its present relations the subject has been obscured and misrepresented by scholastic subtlety: while, in

view of its original connexions, it has been habitually overlooked; and by referring yourselves to the display of undiluted truth as at first afforded, you may more quickly and more accurately understand the interest which you yourselves, and all men, have in the influence of the Spirit of God. Here, beneath the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, the ministry might lay down their fetters, and go forth, untrammelled and unabashed, to preach salvation by "the Seed of the woman," to ALL THE WORLD.

LECTURE VII.

The Paradisiacal constitution—An external and political dispensation—Not inconsistent with personal responsibility—Tree of life—Popular view of Adam's sin and its consequences—Law given to Adam compared with law given by Moses—Analogies—Theologians reason against themselves—Force of the phrase FOR THY SAKE.

IF the argument elaborated in the preceding lecture be accurate and conclusive, and if the historical details have been neither misrepresented nor exaggerated, then the paradisiacal statute must not be so interpreted as to destroy *personal responsibility*. In other words—It has been shown that personal responsibility belongs to the very nature of man, or is the necessary accompaniment of his personal existence:—that each man is accountable for *himself*, and for himself *alone*, at the bar of God:—that no one man, not Daniel, nor Noah, nor Job—and may I not add—nor *Adam*—can be a substitute for any other man, or deliver either son or daughter by his righteousness; and that wherever a doctrine of *imputation* may be maintained, or of

whatever political compact it may constitute a part, it cannot contravene this great law of our personal being.

It has also been shown, that the *spirit* of man proceeds immediately from God himself, while the *body* is referred to a secondary agency, belonging to the material system. No man can have power over the *spirit*; but each one, according to the instructions delivered by the Redeemer to his disciples, has it in charge to live above the fear of his fellows; and to direct his movements, under the solemn consideration that GOD ALONE is the arbiter of the immortal *spirit*. Of course the paradisiacal institute must direct its agency to that which it can reach: and cannot terminate in the destruction of *spirit*.

To this view may be added the fact, that the mediatorial system itself does not destroy, nor set aside, personal responsibility. On the contrary, that system has been introduced, because "the one offence" of Adam, limited in the devastation it brought about, left in personal responsibility the opportunity for a remedial operation. Permit me to illustrate my meaning by an analogy.—You have entrusted your funds to an agent, in whom you thought you had just cause to confide. He has been unfaithful, and squandered your means. You are involved in consequent suffering; but you have contracted no guilt. *Personally*, you have not sinned. This is a social transaction which every one understands. No one complains of its injustice, objects to its philosophy, or emblazons it as awful or unapproachable, on account of its mystery. Every one perceives, that while *personal* responsibility results from *personal* existence, so *social* responsibility results from *social* existence. Each is necessary, justifiable, and philosophical in its own connexions.

But in the case contemplated, another question arises. The infidelity of your agent and the consequent suffering in which you are involved, lead to the inquiry, whether you can meet your own *personal* obligations? Your *charac-*

ter is unhurt, but what are your *means*? If your *means* are wasted, your creditors must then look to your *personal* character; and their future conduct must be regulated, not by pressing the principle of social responsibility, with a sort of *Shylock* pertinacity and cruelty; but as one system has been brought to its extremity, the remedy must be sought for in a higher system; and all future operations must be framed in coincidence with the remedial principle thus derived. Such a course would be as wise as it is humane. So in the case before us. The one offence of Adam has pushed the system of *social* responsibility to its extremity: the remedial principle must be sought for in the higher system of *personal* responsibility. Evidently we are involved by Adam's sin in suffering; and as evidently we have no *means* of meeting our personal obligations or of obeying LAW; but as clearly our personal *character* has not been forfeited. The fact that we were not then born, renders the idea of the forfeiture of personal character perfectly unreasonable and absurd. And when a philosophic theologian undertakes to maintain that idea, it is no wonder that he is lost in *mystery*, and is unable to defend his system by scripture, by analogy, or otherwise, to the common sense of mankind.

I have said, that the limited effect of the paradisiacal institute afforded the opportunity for the introduction of the mediatorial system. The preceding analogy was intended to illustrate that position, by evincing that, in personal responsibility while unviolated, the remedial principle must necessarily be sought. If a remedial principle could not be thence derived, it could come from no other source—as appears from the two following scriptural considerations.

1. Speaking on the subject of the resurrection, the Redeemer informs us, that “in the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage.” Of course all the other natural relations will be done away; and our social existence, whatever may be the form under which it shall

be maintained, shall not be regulated by those principles which are essentially characteristic of it here. But further the Redeemer adds, that they who rise shall be "like the angels of God." The angels are not bound together by social ties, analogous to those which subsist among men upon earth. Their condition in their own sphere of action, and our condition in the flesh differ—in what? Certainly in this, that *social responsibility* is not found among them, as it has been established among Adam's race. When, therefore, angels sinned, they sinned on their *personal responsibility*. Amid the varieties of creation, and while this difference has been stated, it would appear that the history of these intelligences has been given to us, on purpose to show the results of *personal responsibility*.

If Adam had not sinned, that purpose would have been highly important. His fidelity would have afforded an exhibition of the connexion between righteousness and life; and his posterity would have been thrown on their personal responsibility, in view of their ultimate destiny. The history of fallen angels would, in that case, have afforded an appropriate exhibition of the connexion between personal sin and spiritual death. I say an *appropriate* exhibition, because, while it would illustrate the issues of personal responsibility, the human being, free from the infirmities that now encompass him, would have been fully able to have estimated it. If *now* our intellectual vision does not reach so far as distinctly to embrace so lofty and so luminous a demonstration, the reason is—we are fallen. Our indistinctness of view on the general subject is a *proof* of our fall; but argues no more against angelic agency, than death proves that it was not originally intended that we should be immortal. Our infirmity in the flesh no more militates against the existence and agency of these spiritual intelligences, than the fact, that we cannot see God and live, proves that there is no God; or that he did not originally

manifest himself in "the form of God," which is too glorious for us now to behold.

On the other hand, as our *political* relations are different, the Adamic constitution developes the issue of *social responsibility*. No Mediator has been provided for the one; while for the other a Mediator has appeared. Why is this? It is a *sovereign* act, it may be said. But why refer an act to sovereignty, when a reason good and sufficient is at hand? And is not that reason at hand in the present case, when the fact is so plain and distinct, that there is a whole race of intelligent beings who had not *personally* sinned, but who were involved in disaster and sorrow by the fault of another? Does not the justice of the case, does not the *goodness* of God, point to the reason? But

2. Adam's children, in consequence of the righteousness of the Mediator, are now so far extricated from the embarrassment in which they were involved by Adam's sin, as to be fairly and consistently put on their *personal* responsibility. As by the offence of Adam they became *sinner*s, so by the righteousness of Christ they have become *righteous*; and as by the offence of Adam they have been brought into *condemnation*, so by the righteousness of Christ they are now in a state of *justification*. If now they despise the rule of faith, under obligation to which, and on their personal responsibility, they are placed, "there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins; but a certain fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries." The issue of personal responsibility is the same in both cases. So that in the limited effect which I have ascribed to the Adamic institute, arises the opportunity for a remedial dispensation. If personal responsibility had been violated, and the sentence of the law in this connexion had been passed, the above scriptural facts evince that a Mediator could not have been provided. If any then have been apprehensive, that the present argument is likely to issue, either in a "socinianised" corruption, or

infidel rejection, of the mediatorial *principle*, they may perhaps be satisfied by the preceding observations, that this principle is introduced by the very door which our argument throws open: and furthermore, they may, peradventure, perceive, that the popular representation on this subject shuts out that principle. Hence it is, that theologians so often resort to *sovereignty* in their various lucubrations; for they can have no other reason, when personal responsibility is so unceremoniously, yet inconsiderately, foreclosed.

I consider the paradisiacal constitution to have been nothing more than a *political* or *external* dispensation, like the *Mosaic law*, by which in fact it was afterwards illustrated. Its sanctions were *temporal* in their character. It promised *temporal* reward; it threatened temporal penalty. It grew out of the social relations which had been created, and could not go beyond them, as they formed a part of the general system which God had set up. And the object was to display, under a visible or symbolic form, the connexion between righteousness and life: just as God had displayed the same general principle in creation itself; as every man must do in all his actions, and in every relation in which he stands; and as in fact is done, by contrast, in the various consequences of Adam's offence. The connexion between sin and death is now, not only written in the bible, but it is inscribed on the material system and incorporated in the animal nature of man himself. Such is the doctrine which I would advance on this subject; which results, as I think, from the very nature of the case; and which, as I believe, the scriptures will most plainly and lucidly exhibit.

Before, however, I proceed directly to the argument, by which I expect to establish the doctrine advanced, there is one circumstance belonging to the general subject which requires particular attention. It is generally supposed—and no wonder, for our translators so represent the fact—

that there was a symbolic *tree of life*, placed in the midst of the garden; and for a purpose analogous to that for which the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was similarly situated;—a kind of *sacramental* pledge of *life*, as the other was a *sacramental* pledge of *death*. If so, then the tree of life must have been an appendage to the paradisiacal constitution; and must necessarily be found there, in connexion with its sacramental companion. But how does the document read?—"And the Lord God" it is written "commanded the man, saying, of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat: but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." Here you perceive is a distinct reference to *the one tree*, while its character is carefully discriminated; and yet not one word about a particular *tree of life*. Nay more—Adam receives express and unrestrained permission to eat of *every other tree* of the garden, and nothing still is said about a particular tree of life. Still farther.—Eve gives to Satan a distinct and minute account of the circumstances under which God had placed her partner and herself, and speaks of the tree *in the midst of the garden* as the very one of which they were not permitted to eat; but says nothing of a tree of life. Now if there was any distinct *tree of life* planted in the midst of the garden, and made symbolic of life, these omissions are wholly unaccountable. And thus, it would seem that one of the most prominent and favorite points of allusion, which they might and do make, who suppose that *eternal* life was promised in the covenant, is rendered very equivocal in the outset.

There are but one or two considerations, which can at all be urged in favor of the prevalent notion, that there was a particular tree of life. The first is derived from the second chapter, and from the account which Moses gives of the planting of the garden. He says—"and out of the ground made the Lord God to grow every tree that is plea-

sant to the sight, and good for food; *the tree of life also in the midst of the garden*, and the tree of knowledge of good and evil.”* This seems to be as strong proof as could be desired in support of any proposition; for it is nothing short of direct and positive assertion. Yet our surprise, instead of being abated, must only be increased, when we recollect that there is not one word about such a tree in the paradisiacal constitution itself. And any hebraist will tell you, that the language, in which the historian wrote, has but few adjectives: and that in a case where an adjective is not at hand to complete a description like that under consideration, the noun would be repeated. Calling in this philological peculiarity to our aid, and translating the passage accordingly, Moses would then make the following statement:—“And out of the ground made the Lord God to grow every tree that is pleasant to the sight, and good for food, and *a tree of life*; and also, in the midst of the garden the tree of knowledge of good and evil.” The phrase *tree of life* would be equivalent to—*tending*, or *conducive to life*:—every tree pleasant to the sight, good for food, and conducive to life, the Lord God made to grow out of the ground. The same form of speech is used in the first chapter—“*the tree of fruit* bearing fruit after his kind.” Such a translation removes all discrepancy, and corresponds with the actual fact; for all the trees which were given for food, were really *trees of life*.

Another plea may be set up in favor of the popular notion, and which would be derived from the third chapter; where God assigns the reason why man was put out of the garden:—“Lest,” said he, “he put forth his hand and take also of the *tree of life*, and eat, and *live forever*.” But all the trees were *trees of life*; and the word may be, and ought to be, so rendered here; unless it can be shown that there was one particular tree, specially denominated the tree of life. That the term is in the singular number, ar-

* Verse 9.

gues nothing against our position; because the fact is the same in the second and eighth verses of the same chapter, where our translators themselves have rendered the word as plural.—Neither can any thing be obtained in favor of the common notion on this subject, from the circumstance, that it would seem from the phraseology, that if Adam, after his sin, had eaten of the trees of life, he would have lived *forever*; because the term rendered *forever*, is applied to any period whose termination is concealed from view. For this reason it is applied to express eternity: for the same reason it is used in reference to the period of a man's natural life; as also when a prospective view was taken of the Jewish dispensation, by Moses himself.* And to make it apply to eternity here, without assigning sufficient reasons for so doing, is to beg the question.

In truth there was no necessity for such a symbolic tree, inasmuch as all the trees were *trees of life*; nor can the shadow of a reason be offered, as furnished by the constitution itself, why any such symbol should have been set apart. This will further appear when we come to consider the precise use of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.

But let us turn to the *constitution itself*. And, that no mistake may be committed, I shall state the doctrine, as it has been held on this subject, in the language of another, whose ability and accuracy, in such a case, will not be doubted.—“The death,” says Dr. Edwards, “which was to come on Adam, as the *punishment* of his *disobedience*, was opposed to that *life*, which he would have had as the *reward* of his *obedience* in case he had not sinned. *Obedience* and *disobedience* are contraries: and the *threatenings* and *promises*, that are sanctions of a law, are set in direct opposition; and the *promised rewards* and *threatened punishments*, are what are most properly taken as each other's opposites. *But none will deny*, that the LIFE which would have been Adam's reward, if he had persisted in obedience, was ETER-

* See Exod. xii. 14; xxi. 6.—1 Sam. i. 22. See Kennicott's dissertation on the tree of life.

NAL LIFE. And therefore we argue justly, that the DEATH *which stands opposed to that LIFE is manifestly ETERNAL DEATH, a death widely different from the death we now die.*" "If Adam, for his persevering obedience, was to have had *everlasting life and happiness*, in PERFECT HOLINESS, UNION with his maker, and *enjoyment of his favor*, and this was THE LIFE which was to be confirmed by *the tree of life*; then doubtless THE DEATH threatened in case of *disobedience*, which stands in direct opposition to this, was a being given over to EVERLASTING WICKEDNESS *and misery*, in *separation from God*, and in *enduring his wrath.*"*

This venerable and highly esteemed author, whom many seem disposed to place along side of Calvin and Augustin, indubitably asserts in the foregoing paragraph, that on the one hand, LIFE, *temporal, spiritual, and eternal*, would have been the reward of Adam's obedience to the paradisiacal statute; and on the other, that DEATH, *temporal, spiritual and eternal*, has been the *punishment* of his *disobedience* to that statute. This doctrine, I understand to have been generally received, as a true exposition of these early transactions. That it has been denied at times, I will readily admit; but then the denial appears to have been, for the most part, if not uniformly, connected with the rejection of some other matters of vital importance. I suppose that the doctrine in view has been strenuously maintained, because it has been conceived that those other important matters necessarily depend upon it. Yet it appears to me, that while many hold those other matters as demonstrably true, this doctrine they *feel* to be contrary to their own common sense. They therefore would not controvert it, equivocal as they may think it, being afraid of the consequences which they imagine must necessarily result. I am sure that such has been the condition of my own mind; but now, not fearing the supposed consequences, because I do not think that they would occur, I unhesitatingly deny the doctrine which our author has advanced.

* Edwards on Original Sin.—Part. II. ch. i. sec. 2.

Yet if we grant unto this writer his premises, his conclusion must irrefragably follow : i. e. if LIFE, temporal, spiritual and eternal, was the *reward* of obedience to the Adamic law, DEATH, temporal, spiritual and eternal, must have been the punishment of its transgression. How does he prove his premises ? His remark is, “ *none will deny* that the reward was *eternal life*.” But suppose that some one should deny that the reward was *eternal life*—what then ? Very possibly he might be set down as insane : so universally have theologians and sceptics taken this exposition of the brief record for granted. It is, however, no new thing that one half of the world should think the other half to be crazy : or that, in the religious controversies which men conduct with so much confidence, and while they have forgotten the scriptural injunction to “ speak the TRUTH in LOVE,” they should resort to the use of such epithets. The Redeemer was thought to be beside himself, and Paul was reproached with madness.—But suppose that some one should deny our author’s position. You see he *assumes* it : and from mere *assumption* draws his conclusion. His assumption, though it may seem to be adventurous, I deny. Then it will follow, by his own argument that, if LIFE, temporal, spiritual and eternal, was not the reward of obedience ; DEATH, temporal, spiritual and eternal, cannot be the punishment of disobedience.

It has already been abundantly evinced, that there was no one particular tree symbolical of life ; and that all the trees of the garden were conducive to life. It deserves now to be further remarked, that even LIFE itself is not mentioned in the constitution. And if so important a result as *eternal* life, involving the destiny of the immortal spirit, should be depending, is it not singular that not one word should be said about it in the institute, in execution of which it should occur ? How can this be ? Is there not room to suspect some mistake, or to demand an explanation ?

But perhaps it might be answered, that the promise of life

was *implied*. How can this be made to appear? On the supposition that Adam had obeyed the law, and did not *die*, the terms employed would be fully complied with; for the threatening should be neither incurred nor executed. Any thing farther must be expressed. If nothing farther is expressed, we have reached the limitation of the statute. But it may perhaps be rejoined, that if man did not *die*, he must live *forever*. The paradisiacal constitution does not say so. How can it be otherwise you may ask? Why, when we have reached the extremity of one rectoral principle, we must refer to another. So here: when *social* responsibility runs out, we must refer to *personal* responsibility, and ascertain its issues; or we shall be involved in a difficulty from which there is no avenue of escape. Now we have seen that if Adam had obeyed the law, each human being would have been put on his own *personal* obligations: and a change from a natural into a spiritual body being contemplated in the general system, each one should have rendered an account for himself—and in this connexion alone is eternal life to be obtained. From the nature of the case, therefore, eternal life could not have been the reward of Adam's obedience to the law he received in the garden: and an assurance, that he should not *die temporally*, is all that could be implied. If eternal life was not, and could not be, the reward of his obedience; why, agreeably to the argument which has been quoted, eternal death could not be the penalty due to his disobedience.

On the supposition that LIFE had been promised in the covenant, as it has been called, and that a symbolical *tree of life* had been planted in the garden, yet the argument we are considering would fare no better. For while *personal* responsibility remained behind, eternal life and eternal death would still be associated with *it*; and the political dispensation which clothed Adam with his official character, could not have appropriated the sanctions which belonged to another system. The term LIFE then, had it been ex-

pressed, could have imported nothing more than *temporal* life, and the tree could have symbolized nothing else. Nay, if the hebrew word, rendered in the next chapter, FOREVER, had been appended, nothing further could have been designed; because that term, signifying any period whose termination is concealed, may be, and often is, applied to a man's natural life, as well as to eternity. In no way can the doctrine under consideration be inferred from the terms of the constitution itself;—either as to their direct or implied assertions. On the contrary, that doctrine cuts up by the roots every interest that belongs to the subject of *personal* accountability; and presents to view a judicial policy which is in every way, and in the highest degree, repugnant to JUSTICE. It is no matter of wonder that the veil of *mystery* has been thrown over the whole affair; and that men, professing christianity, walk in darkness, and live in doubts all their days.

The argument in favor of this doctrine cannot be derived from God's interpretation of his own institute, when he comes to execute its sentence. He utters not one word about spiritual or eternal death, in his address to Adam. The whole process terminates on man's animal body, and the material system of which that body forms a part. I know it may be, and has been said, that the sentence executed was not of "equal extent" with the evil threatened; and that that apparent inconsistency is to be accounted for by "the intimations of mercy" which had just been given. Nothing is more easy than to make assertions. Where is the proof of such a strange commentary? The tree planted in the garden was symbolical of the knowledge of good and evil, as the original terms describing its objects distinctly specify. Did the execution of the sentence fail in this respect? The threatening was, "in the day thou eatest thereof, dying, thou shalt die;" and the execution of that threatening was—"dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return." Where is the difference? There is none.

No eye can see, no mind can perceive any. But it is very apparent that spiritual and eternal death cannot be predicated of the last ; and therefore it is said not to be of equal extent with the first, in which spiritual and eternal death is *supposed* to be *implied*. And what is still more strange, while the sentence executed is asserted not to be equal in extent with the evil threatened, yet, theologians will have it that all mankind are *spiritually* dead in Adam. The evil then has actually come on mankind, far beyond the limits of the sentence, as declared to be *executed* ; and that, notwithstanding the “intimations of mercy” which had just been given. In other words—All that God *professedly* visits upon man for this one offence is, in so many words, declared to be *temporal* death ; and yet theologians have solemnly and unreservedly proclaimed it to be *spiritual* death.—“Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return”—what intelligent or candid mind can, or would, by any tortuous course of reasoning, turn such language into a description of *spiritual* death ?

If then, from the very fact itself, as it is told in language so plain and simple, *spiritual* death, even though it had been intended in the original sentence, is not executed upon man, is it not abundantly evident, that amid the wreck which Adam’s sin produced, the SPIRIT is unhurt ? and that *personal* responsibility is the very resource to which the mediatorial system refers ? So we have again reached this same conclusion, by simply exhibiting scriptural facts.

The deficiency of argument thus drawn from the original facts, is variously supplied by quotations of scriptural texts, that are derived from the old testament, and belong to the Mosaic economy, which was itself the administration of LAW ; or from the new testament, which exhibits the finished work of the Redeemer, and by which all are made *righteous*, and are brought into a justification of life ; so that this latter class of texts is connected with the results of personal responsibility. For example—I should be far from

death reigned from Adam to Moses." These points are here stated:—There was a period when there was no *law*:—during that period *SIN* could not be imputed; because, where *law is not* there is no transgression: but notwithstanding this, all the way down from Adam to Moses, *death*, which comes by *SIN*, reigned, even over them who had not *SINNED* after the *similitude* of Adam's transgression. Adam's transgression was committed against *law*; *SIN like* his transgression must be *SIN* against *law*; so that *death* reigned over them to whom *SIN* could not be imputed, because it reigned over them who were not under law. If there was a period when *law* was not, then they who lived during that period could not *SIN* like Adam. Accordingly Paul had said, *SIN is not imputed* where there is no *law*; and yet adds, *until the law SIN* was in the world: and again, that *death* reigned from Adam down to Moses, even over them that had not, *like Adam*, transgressed *law*. The plain meaning of all this is—that wherever you find *death*, it is the consequence of *SIN*: now from Adam to Moses you do find *death*; but during all that period you do not find *law*, and therefore cannot find *SIN*: how then is *death* thus reigning to be accounted for? Why plainly by a reference to ADAM'S *SIN*—all men are *SINNERS* by Adam's one offence:—by *him SIN* entered into the world, and *death by SIN*, and so *death* passed upon all men, because that *in him* they have all *SINNED*. It follows, that they, on whom *death* has come by his offence and not by their own, are the very ones who did not *SIN like Adam*; had they *SINNED* like Adam, *death* would have come by their own offence.

Again. The reason why *death* did not come by their own offence was simply this, that they were not under *law*. Now though there is a sense in which such a state may be predicated of infants and idiots—to whom the passage has been applied—yet no reason can be assigned why the apostle should single out the infants and idiots who lived between the time of Adam and Moses. And moreover, if

during that period there were any others who were not *under law*, the reference must necessarily include them. Now in the very outset of his argument, the apostle had declared that the gentiles were not under *law*; but that the jews were. It follows that the gentiles did not *SIN like Adam*;—yet death did reign over them. Moreover, the jews themselves were not under *law* till Moses came; and yet death reigned over them. Hence the apparently singular remark which Paul, judging from the difficulties of commentators, so indistinctly makes—“I was alive without the law once, but, when the commandment came, sin revived and I died.” The doctrine of the apostle is the same taught by the prophets, viz.—that the jews under the Mosaic law did *SIN like Adam*. Then the two dispensations, the law under which the jews were placed, and the paradisiacal statute, were the same in character:—both of them had *temporal sanctions*.

But farther, the apostle in this very argument informs us that there were “*many offences*,” or that the *offence* had *abounded*: i. e. while there were some who, not being under *law*, did not, and could not, *SIN like Adam*; there were others, who, being under *law*, did *SIN like him*. Hence he remarks—“THE LAW entered, so that the *offence* hath *abounded*”—“the commandment came and sin revived.” This is merely the opposite side of his argument. The facts are, that the *law* entered, or was given by Moses. If *law* was introduced, *SIN* might be imputed, or the offence might *abound*. Accordingly such has been the fact; and the Mosaic law proved itself to be the ministration of death and condemnation. So then the jews did *SIN like Adam*, and like him were brought into death. Accordingly there was a necessity that the righteousness of the Redeemer should go beyond the “one offence,” and cover these “many offences” of the jews. This was done, and HE is, by means of death, the Mediator for *the redemption of transgressions*

denying, or even doubting, that “the wages of sin is *death*, and that the gift of God is *eternal life* through Jesus Christ our Lord.” But any one can see, that all these judicial results meet a man on his own personal accountability :— For “he that believeth on the Son of God hath everlasting life ; and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him.” Such disjointed extracts taken, not only out of the local connexions in which they are found, but, from the system to which they belong, are poor adjuvants of the cause they are employed to uphold. They all work in the opposite direction ; and serve to evince that, under the mediatorial system, God is dealing with man as an intelligent and responsible being, put on his personal obligations, and called to answer for himself.

I have had frequent occasion to refer to the Mosaic institute as being an administration of LAW. God introduced it as the LAWGIVER. Moses, you recollect, could not see his face and live. Accordingly, Ezekiel describes the whole house of Israel under it, as an assemblage of dead and dry bones. The sons of Jacob were thus set forth, not as existing in this state in consequence of Adam’s sin, but as sinners against LAW which had been given to themselves by Moses. It was ordained, it is true, in the hand of a *Mediator* ; being designed to subserve a general mediatorial purpose, but still it was LAW. Hence Paul describes it as “the ministration of death and condemnation :” and, in his general reasonings on the relative position of works and faith, it furnishes him with the means of demonstrating the insufficiency of works. Its sanctions were purely of a *temporal* character ; as I presume any one may know, without having any great amount of biblical scholarship.

It is a singular fact, much as it may have been overlooked, that the transgression of Adam and the transgressions of the Jews are said in the scriptures to be *alike*. The psalmist says—“Ye shall die like ADAM, and fall like one

of the princes.”* The idea intended to be conveyed, as is very common in the old testament, is expressed in the form of a couplet. To die *like* Adam, and to die *like* one of the princes, is much the same thing. The whole psalm relates to official character. The fall of Adam was the fall of a PRINCE, and is to be interpreted on official principles: but not as the execution of a fell sentence, which sweeps all nature to destruction, without pausing to consider, whether no remedial agent is at hand. And as all the Jews constituted a nation of official men, were God’s *kings* and *priests*, this kind of death might be predicated of them all. Hence

Hosea, speaking of Ephraim, says—“They, LIKE ADAM, have transgressed the COVENANT, or dispensation.”† Here the sins or the offences of the Jews are declared to be like Adam’s offence; and not only so, but the dispensations under which they respectively sinned are compared together. If so, Adam’s offence was committed against a *law* whose sanctions were of a *temporal* character.

The apostle Paul furnishes, in his elaborate argument on justification, the same general idea.”‡ In that argument he refers to some who “had not sinned *after the similitude* of Adam’s transgression.” The prophets, as has just been evinced, speak of the Jews as sinning *like* Adam: but Paul speaks of those who did *not* sin *like* Adam, leaving the impression that there were some who *did* sin *like* him. Let us look at the different parts of his argument. But let it be remembered that, when SIN is denied of any of those who lived between Adam and Moses, the meaning is not that they had no *personal* unholiness, or were chargeable with no *personal* transgression; but that their SIN was not committed against LAW. Please to bear this in mind when you attend to the following exposition:

“Until the LAW,” he says, “SIN was in the world: but SIN is not imputed where there is no *law*. Nevertheless,

* Ps. lxxxii. 7.

† Ch. vi. 7.

‡ Rom. v. 12—20.

*that were under the first testament.** It must be very clear that the dispensation under which Adam was placed, and the economy afforded to the jews by Moses, were the same in character; and that if spiritual and eternal death cannot be referred to the one, neither can it be referred to the other.

This context, however, furnishes us with an illustration of a different kind, in view of our general subject. The apostle lays down the doctrine, that Adam is a figure of Christ: and, in correspondence with it, remarks, that as by one man's offence *the many*, i. e. ALL MEN were made, or *constituted, sinners*, so by one man's righteousness *the many*, i. e. ALL MEN shall be made, or *constituted, righteous*: And again—as by the offence of one, judgment came upon ALL MEN to *condemnation*; even so the free gift came upon ALL MEN unto *justification of life*. I know full well, that some would make the words ALL MEN refer to the ELECT. Whenever they shall be able to make this out, they will be fairly entitled to their system. But why should they attempt it when the plain fact is before them, that *all men* go down to the dust, in consequence of Adam's sin? and that *all men* shall be raised from the dead, in consequence of Christ's righteousness? This simple fact explains and justifies all the apostle's terms, and gives them a very beautiful and important signification. The difficulty of those theorists lies here:—It is very evident, that by Christ's righteousness *all men* are not made *personally* holy: but somehow or other, in their estimation, *all men* are made by Adam's offence *personally* sinful. And as the two results do not correspond, theologians must invent a mode of explanation which will preserve the *assumption* with which they start.

Now it is very evident that the same terms may be, and in the scriptures often are, applied both to the symbol and to the object which the symbol represents. When the jew brought his victim to the altar, and when Christ offered up

* Heb. ix. 15.

his own life, the term *sacrifice* was unhesitatingly applied to either oblation—Aaron was a *priest*, and Christ was a *priest*.—The term *saint*, or holy one, may be very properly applied to an *individual*, in view of his personal holiness; but it is equally applied to the *nation* of the jews, or to christian *nations*, in view of their being God's peculiar people.—In like manner the term *unclean* may be applied to an *individual*, in view of his personal defilement; but it is equally applied to the gentiles as not being God's peculiar people.—You remember that Peter was prepared by a *vision* to receive the messengers of Cornelius; in which vision a great sheet was let down before him, containing all manner of beasts, *clean* and *unclean*. When commanded to kill and eat, he answered, "Not so, Lord; for I have never eaten any thing that is *common* or *unclean*." The answer he received was—"What God hath *cleansed* that call not thou *common*." All this he himself explains in the following manner:—"Ye know that it is an *unlawful* thing for a man that is a *jew* to keep company, or come unto one of another *nation*; but God hath showed me that I should not call *any man common* or *unclean*; therefore came I unto you without gainsaying, as soon as I was sent for." The terms *saint* and *unclean*, are not here applied, excepting in a symbolic sense.

You also remember that Paul, speaking on the subject of divorce, in his first epistle to the Corinthians, has the following observations:—"The unbelieving husband is *sanctified* by the wife, and the unbelieving wife is *sanctified* by the husband; else were your children *UNCLEAN*; but now are they *HOLY*." Personal *sanctification*, personal *cleanness*, or personal *holiness*, is not meant by the apostle; for in the first place it is an *unbelieving* husband or wife that is sanctified, while the children might not have known the right hand from the left, nor have done either good or evil: and in the second place, he is giving directions to a church in view of constitutional or political principles.

In like manner he represents the jewish economy as a ministration of *law*—of *condemnation*—of *death*. Of course they who were under it were *SINNERS*. On the other hand he describes the new testament as the ministration of the *spirit*—of *righteousness*—and of *life*. By parity of reason, they who are under it are in a state of justification, or are *RIGHTEOUS*. Not that all the jews were personally sinful and condemned; nor yet that all who live under the new testament are personally righteous.—Hence he also says to Peter—“We are jews by nature, and not *sinner*s of the gentiles.” So then there is a double sense in which the terms *righteous* and *sinner* must be viewed. If primarily they refer to *personal* qualifications, secondarily they are merely *official*. Take this second, *official* sense, and the apostle’s argument stands out clear and satisfactory.

But as the Redeemer’s work has been thus brought up before us, let me ask, whether he was not *made* under the *LAW*? Was he rationally under the law, or was he not put there for an *official* purpose? Did he not bear our sins in his own body; but did he thereby become *personally* a sinner? Did he not *die* for our *sins*; but did he *die* because he was *personally* a sinner? Did he not redeem us from under the curse of the law, by being made a *curse* for us; yet did he die either *spiritually* or *eternally*? If spiritual and eternal death is the curse which the law denounced on us, and he did not die spiritually and eternally, then did he die in our room, or as our *substitute*? or did he endure the curse of the law? Do not the scriptures say that he was put to death in the *FLESH*? In fine, can any one assign the reason, why, when Paul declares—“Christ has redeemed us, being made a curse for us”—he should prove it by a quotation from the *Mosaic law*, saying—“For it is written, cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree?”

Understand me. These questions are asked, not with any intention to throw any doubt over the mediatorial character of our Redeemer, as though he had not been made

a curse on our account; but merely to show, that as he did not die spiritually and eternally, spiritual and eternal death could not have been included in the penalty of the Adamic statute. And as his being a curse—not for the jews alone, but as prefigured by *Adam*—has been proved by the Mosaic law, the Mosaic law and the paradisiacal constitution must be the same in principle, in their reference to LIFE and DEATH. As Christ died *in the flesh*, Adam by his SIN, brought death *in the flesh*: and as the Mosaic law pronounced *temporal death*, the Adamic institute could do no more.

In this connexion it may be also asked, what does the baptist mean, when he says—"Behold the Lamb of God that taketh away the SIN of the world!" His view appears to be precisely the same taken by Paul, when he speaks of the *one offence*, by which *all men* are made, or constituted, SINNERS, and are brought into condemnation. The SIN of the world is this ONE OFFENCE; and Christ comes to take it away. Should this SIN lead to temporal, spiritual and eternal death, then Christ, by his righteousness, must take away temporal, spiritual and eternal death from all the world; which, it will be admitted by all, is not the fact. For while the baptist speaks about the WORLD, the apostle speaks of THE MANY, OR ALL, on whom Adam's offence has entailed its disastrous consequences. To all men therefore the baptist refers, when he says that Christ takes away the SIN of the WORLD; and there is no room left for any interpretation, but that which would be established by the fact of the resurrection of the dead; in which all men are shown to be brought into a justification of life, by the righteousness of Christ.

There are some analogies, afforded in the scriptural history, which cannot be explained, excepting on the principle by which I have now interpreted the original law; analogies to which no one would ever think of ascribing any other than a secular or external agency. In consequence

of the FLOOD, the life of man has been very much shortened; and by the same physical instrumentality employed after the fall—a curse upon the *ground*. Yet no one would ever suppose that spiritual or eternal death was thereby introduced. An effect is produced on the whole material system, and on the animal powers of man; the common use of animal food became necessary; the universal depravity, as it had been betrayed in the preceding ages, is referred to with grief; and God places his bow in the clouds, as a testimony that he would *no farther curse the ground for man's sake*. But notwithstanding these facts, no one would ever think of referring spiritual and eternal death to the *curse*, then pronounced on the ground. Such an effect, therefore, as has been contemplated in our exposition of the Adamic dispensation, involving simply the animal nature of man and his secular associations, has been actually produced in our world, and by a divine judgment. In supposing then the effects of Adam's transgression, when God cursed the *ground for his sake*, to be similar in their character, the principle of exposition, thus adopted, has nothing objectionable or derogatory in *itself*. For as it is sustained by scriptural fact, and admitted to be on an equally extensive scale, the very course of judicial policy adopted by Jehovah in a subsequent case, unless there can be something indubitably and demonstrably clear, to show that the divine judgment was of a different kind in Adam's case, the interpretation now given is unassailable. Moreover, the *ground*, having been *cursed for Adam's sake*, this very course of policy, developed as succeeding the *flood*, whether there was any farther action included or not, was pursued in the event of the *fall*. If there be any other proceedings involved in the execution of the threatened calamities, they who advocate them have the burden of *proof* upon themselves; while the explanation now given, and so far as it goes, cannot be rejected without impeaching the wisdom and providence of God.

And that such a mode of divine administration might be conducted in common with the *remedial scheme*, is also illustrated by *analogy*. For, when the ground was cursed for Adam's sake, God yet gave to him the promise of "the Seed of the woman." So, when further temporal calamities overtook the human family by means of an additional curse on the ground, God entered into covenant with Noah; who appears, as Paul explains his official character, as "the Heir of the righteousness of faith." This covenant includes *all mankind*, as its own particulars abundantly evince. Yet a mere *external* condition is described, and spiritual and eternal life is left in its own original connexions—a matter belonging to personal responsibility. In like manner, God made a covenant with Abraham, in which the patriarch sustains the official character of HEIR OF THE WORLD; yet nothing more than external advantages or privileges were secured. Spiritual references abounded—the scenic display was appropriate and beautiful—the righteousness of faith was brilliantly set forth—the Spirit of the Lord wrought out, in his providence, a most magnificent "allegory"—but each individual under it has his own eternal life reserved as the object of his personal responsibility, to be sought, secured, and enjoyed, by intercourse between God and his own spirit.

Nor has the analogy yet run out.—The actual transgressions of mankind have been very much modified, in consequence of the external position created by these symbolic systems respectively. After the *fall*, men became *infidels*; after the *flood*, they became *idolaters*; under the jewish economy, the children of Abraham became *formalists*; under the christian dispensation—what are we, but the advocates of jewish dogmas, intermixed with gentile philosophism? And yet shall we sternly reject our external associations, in which good and evil are so variously and uniformly intermingled, as accounting for the depravity of mankind, who derive their ideas from external spec-

tacle, and by their external senses?—But this subject will present itself hereafter.

Having these analogies, we may speak with some confidence as to the accuracy of our principle of exposition. And the more so when, descending to the details afforded by the new testament, we hear Paul declare—"In ME, i. e. in my FLESH, there dwelleth *no good thing*.—I see ANOTHER LAW IN MY MEMBERS, warring against *the law of MY MIND*, and bringing me into captivity to the law of SIN which is in MY MEMBERS.—With my MIND I MYSELF serve the law of God; but with the FLESH the law of sin. O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from *the body of this death*?—But I keep my BODY *under*, and bring it into *subjection*, lest that by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself should be a cast away.—What the law could not do, in that it was weak through the FLESH, God sent his Son in the likeness of SINFUL FLESH to do.—Mortify therefore your MEMBERS, which are upon the earth." A thousand other like expressions might be quoted; and they would all be sustained, as philosophically accurate, in the view now given. But this matter also must be reserved.

Unless I am greatly mistaken, the doctrine which I have advanced is necessarily, but covertly, admitted by theologians against themselves. For not only do their comments upon regeneration imply the principle for which I contend, and put the *christian* into the very state I have described; but they strenuously maintain the necessity for the Spirit's operations, to accomplish such a change in the human constitution, that man's spirit may be able to understand the gospel. And when the change is effected, so that with the MIND the believer really does serve the law of God, yet they cannot get *sin* and *death* out of the believer's FLESH. What then is the real difference between us? I have announced that the offence of Adam did not *produce* that, which they say the Spirit of God must *remove*. And what

advantage do they really gain? Can more glory redound to God by saying, that *one* divine constitution removed a difficulty, than by saying, that *another* divine constitution did not produce that difficulty? What benefit do they secure, by supposing that God does away by *supernatural* means, that which he had done by *natural* means? There must necessarily be a sophism in their speculations. And it arises, I imagine, from some conceit they have entertained of the superior value of that which is *supernatural*—a conceit derived from mistaking the precise use of *miracles*. The mere *display* of divinity would appear to be all and in all with them; and the *object* of that display nothing.

But there is another way by which they covertly employ the principle here set forth. In preaching the gospel to men, do they not address the conscience? All men have conscience. Paul tells us that among the gentiles, “their *consciences* are continually accusing or else excusing one another.” And what is CONSCIENCE? Is it matter? Is it mind? Is it neither?—It is very common to represent it as the *vice-gerent* of God in the bosom of man; an idea borrowed, I presume, from the book of proverbs, in which the philosophic moralist says—“The *spirit* of man is the candle of the Lord.” But if conscience be the spirit, or a property of the spirit of man, is conscience *dead*? Or if the spirit of man be the candle of the Lord, is the spirit *dead*? Do any appeal to conscience, as though it were bereft of all animation or power—a mere cold fragment of death? Or in those appeals, does not every one try to bring forward views, of whose truth the mind is, or may be, *conscious*? And is it not in this very connexion where conscience is found, being in itself, that very measure of spiritual illumination and life, which any individual may possess?—May not conscience be defiled—seared as with a hot iron—loaded with dead works? And when such is the case, is that its natural state? or is it the result of a

course of actual transgression, in consequence of which God gives a man up to "a reprobate mind?" Either then it is folly to talk about mankind having *conscience*, or inconsistent to maintain that they are spiritually dead by Adam's sin? In a state of spiritual death, as that phrase is figuratively used, men may be, when degraded by the long established habits of loathsome vice, or malignant hostility to truth; but then *conscience* goes too—defiled—seared—shrouded in death.

But now it may be asked—Even admitting that the paradisiacal constitution has been correctly set forth, what was its USE? Did not God unnecessarily expose his creature to the fetches of temptation, by an arbitrary institute endanger his standing, and so sport with his constitutional weakness? By no means. You might as well ask, what is the use of civil government, of the parental relation, or of the divine righteousness exhibited in the works of creation and providence? We are informed that it was not *good* that man should be *alone*. A companion was accordingly created, and an enlarged condition of social existence was thus contemplated. Social responsibility then arose, and its results would be of the most diversified and extended character. The young must learn from the old, and the inferior from the superior. Parental influence, derived from parental example, would be most decisive; and a moral impression would be left, which would be good or bad, according to the character of the influence. This is human nature; which, in no view, could sustain an operation more important, nor lead to issues, either more diversified or extended. Here then the paradisiacal constitution comes in: The head of the race held an official connexion, by the results of which, the relation between righteousness and life on the one hand, and between sin and death on the other, is put into the most splendid form, and made to subserve most decisively its intended purpose. Nor could Adam's.

official character be regulated by any other law ; or, being as it was, terminate in any other consequences. And if mankind would calmly reflect on the origin of temporal death, or duly estimate the moral influence of the varied afflictions of life, they would neither so severely censure the providence of God, so listlessly refer to the effect of Adam's sin, nor talk so ignorantly and spasmodically about dying.

At the same time, when Adam was put under this particular institute, it deserves to be specially noticed, that he was taken from the place where he had been created, and put into the garden, which must have been planted with some special design. What was that design ? Whatever it may have been, it is evident that such a change of position would introduce its own peculiarities ; and would throw Adam under an economy which must have its own limitation. Unquestionably some advantages were conferred, some privileges were to be enjoyed, and some new obligations were imposed. But no explanation, it seems to me, can be given for this movement, unless it be that in this new location we must look for the circumstances of Adam's *official* action. Nor is there any thing equivocal or derogatory in that explanation ; for official character always confers honor, and enlarges the sphere of useful and dignified services, in reference to him on whom it is bestowed ; as well as promotes the welfare of those who are subjected to its control. It is no degradation to a child that he should be subject to his parents, nor to a nation that it should be subject to its prince. On the contrary, the intellectual faculties of children are most happily evolved under a proper parental superintendence ; while a nation enjoys peace, and gains renown, under the discreet legislation and benignant providence of a wise prince. So, if Adam had obeyed the law under which, in his official character, and in his new position, he was placed, all his offspring would have

been deeply indebted to, and highly benefitted by, his fidelity. And even as the fact has turned out, the connexion between sin and death is so fully and undeniably established by the official consequences of his SIN, that infidelity, which affects to laugh at the inspiration of the bible, must cower to the analogous demonstration of nature.—The politician too may remember, that many an empire has faded away, like the garden of Eden, under the withering and blasting influence of official sins.

Such is the most philosophical view which can be taken of the results of official character. They may be seen exemplified in every department of social life. And is it not the scriptural view in the case before us? “Cursed is the ground,” said God to Adam, “FOR THY SAKE.” Did he curse any thing else for Adam’s sake? Or would a curse on the ground, transcending all its affinities, produce, not only temporal, but spiritual and eternal death?

What is the meaning of this phrase, *for thy sake*? Have we any analogous cases in which this language is used, from which its meaning may be ascertained? The following examples are offered—If, said God, I find in Sodom, fifty—forty and five—thirty—twenty—ten righteous men, I will spare all the place *for their sakes*.—I will multiply thy seed for Abraham’s *sake*.—In thy days I will not do it, for David thy father’s *sake*.—I will give one tribe to thy son for David, my servant’s *sake*, and for Jerusalem’s *sake*, which I have chosen.—For my name’s *sake* will I defer mine anger. Expressions of this kind abound in the scriptures. What is their meaning? What kind of legislative, or providential operation, are they intended to intimate?

It is here where theologians begin to talk to us about MERIT and DEMERIT, and finally run off into a sort of commercial account; until they affect to strike an accurate balance, when they make the ELECT depend on Christ’s righteousness; and at the same time suffer Adam’s sin to come in by wholesale, as though a correct arithmetical calcu-

lation were entirely unnecessary. But the terms MERIT and DEMERIT are not scriptural. They sustain a sectarian dogma, or a piece of false philosophy; but distort, while they profess to advance, moral science. The object of the inspired penmen evidently is, to refer to the *practical influence* of the agent, to which they ascribe the effects contemplated. Ten righteous men might have exerted an influence powerful enough to have regenerated the city of Sodom;—even as the preaching of Jonah brought the city of Nineveh into sackcloth and ashes. They might not, it is true. But our God acts not from omniscience abstractedly considered. His judgment is according to facts; and his long suffering waits on the development. And so the argument might be made out, in view of the other cases quoted.

Such would have been the effect of Adam's righteousness. Such ought to be the effect of Adam's sin. That is—Each individual would have been instructed by Adam's obedience and its consequences, that eternal life depended on obedience to the law inscribed on his own nature; or was indissolubly connected with personal holiness: as by Adam's disobedience and its consequences, it is now demonstrated to every one, that eternal death will be the result; if, as *personal* transgressors against the law of our own nature, we are not regenerated and sanctified. The law written on the heart requires us to DO and LIVE; and the Adamic constitution was intended to afford a symbol, by which that law, and its operations should be visibly illustrated.

Sceptics have been not a little sardonic in their witty objections on this subject; but they have forgotten their philosophy in their love of pleasantry. Would God, say they, have brought upon mankind their present amount of suffering, because Adam ate an APPLE? But then the question is, can official sin detail a general calamity? Or, going back

to the original state of our being, could a different or a more appropriate test have been provided? If by the nature of LAW, the least offence incurs penalty, so that "he who offends in one point is guilty of all," the smallness of the transgression in question made the symbol so much the more perfect; and the effects of sin entering the mind, were the more happily set forth. "A little leaven leaveneth the whole lump." The type is transparent—the objection is puerile.—"It is not all gold that glitters."

Presuming that our subject has been sufficiently elucidated, I might pause for the present. I only delay to remark, that the popular doctrine on the Adamic constitution is not now assailed for the first time. You may go back, discovering many similar attempts at different times, until you would find the early fathers contending about the matter, and Chrysostom and Augustin taking different sides. They have passed away to the generations of the dead; and others have again and again occupied their places. Now our turn has come. We have the bible in our hands, and must decide for ourselves. What did they say? It is imbecility to ask. Read, judge, decide for yourselves. Their talents, like their rights, were no better than your own. And if you will only examine, you may decide, even with superior accuracy. I leave the merits of the argument with you:—and may God Almighty bless your prayerful deliberations.

LECTURE VIII.

Symbols—Fall—Its circumstances—Its effects—Use of the Tree of knowledge of good and evil—Physical agent by which death was introduced—Nature of death—Condition of all men—Law and Gospel—Human depravity.

IN the last lecture I described the paradisiacal constitution as a *political* institute; and as intended by its results to serve a *symbolical* purpose. This principle of hieroglyphical display, carried out with a view to intellectual or spiritual benefit, belongs to the whole material system; and explains the relation between matter and mind. The heavens and earth, in this way, declare the glory of God; or by visible representation manifest the invisible things of his nature. Legal ordinances typified moral privileges. The natural relations were artificial means of accomplishing spiritual objects. Hieroglyphics were mere representatives of something else.—While language was circumscribed, and possessed few words, its terms were taken out of their natural, and applied in a tropical, sense.—Prophecy is the language of signs and figures, and speaks more by pictures than by sounds.—In fact, all language is full of figure, and is so from absolute necessity:—not that this circumstance, as might be supposed, is a mere peculiarity of the orientals; but it belongs to the primitive state of society, and attends it, even when advanced to the greatest degree of refinement.

To exemplify more minutely:—A tiger would represent *fierceness*;—a lion, *courage*;—an ox, *strength*;—a serpent, *wisdom*;—a mountain, *firmness*;—a palm-tree, the *righteous* man;—a green bay tree, the *wicked* man. In the chapters

before us, a tree in the midst of the garden, was the symbol of the knowledge of good and evil ;—the garden itself typified a condition of great external blessedness, under a righteous political administration—the bruised head of the serpent signified the broken power of the god of the world—the sacrifice pointed to the offering of life, which Immanuel should make ; and illustrated the mortification of the lusts of the flesh, which is an important and imperative duty binding on all men—the cherubim, at the east end of the garden of Eden, manifested God as dwelling among men—Adam himself, as having the dominion, was the *image* of Jehovah as Lord of all.

In later times, the prophet, priest and king, with their respective services—Melchizedec and Moses, distinguished as they were in the peculiarities of their own official relations, and the carnal ordinances with which they were respectively concerned, were only vivid emblems of the Son of God, in view of his mediatorial character and action. Abraham, as a covenant head, was constituted a pattern of the righteousness of faith ; while in his family history, we are furnished with a series of most beautiful allegories. The Sinai covenant was “the ministration of death and condemnation,” showing that it is impossible to be saved by LAW ; and the new testament is “the ministration of righteousness and life,” evincing that the sinner may attain to everlasting life by faith in a Mediator. Christ is the *image* of the invisible God, the brightness of his glory, to which we are predestinated to be conformed. A husband is an image to his wife—a parent is an image to his child—a ruler is an image to his subject—a superior is an image to his inferior. The principle which I am thus pressing on your consideration, ramifies itself through all society ; follows human life in all its sinuosities, and leaves no social relation, natural, political nor religious, free of its control. The paradisiacal institute, in the view which has been given of its nature and objects, is only conformed by our argument to the whole course of

divine legislation among men. He, who would plead for the exception of that original statute, or hesitate to admit that where Christ is an image Adam must also be, must show the reason why.

In the primitive state of society, when mankind would slowly imitate the hieroglyphical system, by which God offers through our corporeal senses, the subjects of our intellectual perception, their first efforts would necessarily be very defective. But as population enlarged, as the objects of thought became varied, and social interests grew multi-form, as society advanced in refinement, and intellectual men devoted their leisure to educate the general mind, oral tradition would give place to historical record, and hieroglyphics to the more extended system of alphabetical language. If then God, who had originally taught men according to the principles of their own nature, and had carried these principles as far as their circumstances required, should make any further communication, would he not adopt their later modes of imparting instruction? Is there any irrationality or impropriety in the idea, that in the advance of society, when the accumulation of labor should call for division of that labor, and other classes of official men should be needed, that God should make known his communications by official men, *specially* appointed? Or is the notion offensive and unphilosophical, that such official men should *speak*, or *write*, as the nature of the case or the circumstances of society might demand? Where then is this tax on human credulity, which the doctrine of the preaching of the cross, or the inspiration of the holy scriptures is declared to impose?—But you admit those doctrines; and see you not that external means are thus multiplied? that ministerial men are examples, whose moral influence must necessarily be extended and powerful? and that the scriptures themselves, are but a transcript of the divine character?

It deserves farther consideration, that even when the official men, who were employed at any particular time, were permitted to use the written language of their country, yet the ancient symbolical method of communicating truth was not abandoned. Moses *wrote* his roll of the judaic history and constitution, and God himself wrote the law on two tables of stone. But the history which Moses wrote, while it gathered all the *ancient* symbols into a good and safe keeping, recorded also the circumstances under which originated a whole series of *new* symbols; or a whole range of *carnal* ordinances, made up of the *elements* of the world. The prophets wrote; but they incorporated an extensive system of hieroglyphics and symbols in the communications they made. The apostles and the evangelists wrote; but the Master, by the institutions he set up, *the Lord's day, preaching, baptism, and the supper*, secured, by symbolically representing, the great points of his mediatorial enterprise. The reason of all this is evident. The condition of society might call for writing; but the meaning of symbols is more fixed and uniform, while an alphabetical language is both local and changeable. And under this view, it is not a little strange, that multitudes, who profess to regard divine truth, so carelessly consider, or so habitually neglect divine ordinances.

It would seem then, that the principle adopted in exposition of the Adamic dispensation, betrays no hasty nor immature speculation; but runs through all nature, and gives character to all God's institutions. In fact, if the paradisaical law be not interpreted on that principle, it will stand ALONE; as contradictory to the whole course of divine legislation, as it is destructive of personal responsibility, and therefore contrary to the nature of MAN.—But waving any farther general remarks, let us proceed with our analysis.

How did the fall occur? Is it to be accounted for by natural means? or must we refer it to a supernatural agency, which Adam was unable to resist? Was there any secret

influence exerted by Jehovah, in pursuance of his own eternal and irreversible *decree*? Did he *permit* an intelligent being to exert a superior power, which Adam had no capacity to oppose? Or did man commit transgression when he might have avoided it? These questions are of paramount importance; and it is presumed they may be very fairly and distinctly answered. Certainly the historian professes to give us an account of the whole catastrophe: and there is as certainly a wide difference between a crime that is committed from compulsion, and that which results from the exercise of a man's own free agency.

I must here call up to your recollection the fact, which has been the basis of the whole of the preceding argument, and of every theoretic view that has been developed: viz. that man has no *innate ideas*. I am aware that this fact has been, in various ages, a matter of harsh and protracted controversy. A field of conflict has been marked out in which have appeared such men as Aristotle, Plato, Descartes, Hume, Reid, Locke, and I know not how many more, as combatants. But my impression is, that this subject has been finally and satisfactorily elucidated by Locke; and that, notwithstanding the opposition he met with, every one who is at all acquainted with the philosophy of mind, would freely concede the doctrine I have stated. And certainly, any man who is governed by candor and a love of truth, or who is not infatuated by the conceits of false philosophy, or the prejudices of an illiberal sectarianism, has only to observe the peculiarities of his own constitution, and the daily operations of his own mind, to be fully satisfied in relation to the point in question.

But if the general fact thus averred cannot be disputed, its truth cannot be affected by the *character* of the ideas which a man may have. Whether those ideas shall be good or bad, they cannot be *innate*. He may have an innate capacity to make a choice; or he may labor under outward difficulties in making a choice; but his choice is neither

holy nor sinful, until it is made. If his ideas are not innate, but are derived from exterior sources, they can be neither good nor bad, until so derived; because they do not exist. Knowing the character of external objects, or the difficulties in which he may be involved, you may anticipate what the character of his ideas will be. But if those objects be of a mixed character, and good and evil are thereby presented to an intelligent and free agent, with the intention that he should make a wise and deliberate choice, you can readily see what *ought* to be the character of his ideas. And if you can perceive this, you have apprehended the principle of *personal responsibility*, and can be at no loss to explain its philosophy.

There is a very common notion, that our actual transgressions cannot be explained, but by admitting that our intellectual nature is previously corrupted. If by this, it is intended merely to assert, that a man commits transgression, because he has cherished erroneous impressions derived from sensual objects; or that, when good and evil are presented before him as an intelligent and a free agent, he has chosen evil, this view is scripturally correct. For—"As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he. Out of the heart proceed all evil thoughts. Every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of *his own lust*, and enticed. Then when lust hath *conceived*, it bringeth forth *sin*." But if, transcending these limits, it is intended to advance the doctrine, that the intellectual nature of man is sinful before it has derived any ideas from surrounding objects, or before lust has *conceived*, then I demur, not being able to understand how this can be. For, if lust has not conceived, there can be no *ideas*: and if lust has conceived, independent of sensible objects, there must be *innate* ideas—which, from the principles already elucidated, there cannot be.

But that such an exhibition of the human mind, as that which I reprobate, cannot be true, if there be no innate ideas, and if the spirit comes from God, is still farther evi-

dent from the facts in the historical sketch before us. Sin may be explained without maintaining such an unscriptural and unphilosophical view of the human mind. Adam and Eve had no corrupt nature when God formed them, or before lust had conceived. Neither mind nor body was previously corrupted in their case. The fact was the same with regard to fallen angels. They had no previously corrupt nature, unless it can be supposed that God *created* them *sinners*—which no man in his senses can suppose.

Nor is this all. Moses goes on circumstantially to relate how it happened that our first parents did sin; and instead of referring the fact to their *innate* depravity, he ascribes it to ideas which they derived from local circumstances. The serpent *beguiled* Eve. She *saw* that the tree was *good* for food, and that it was *pleasant* to the eyes, and a tree to be *desired* to make one *wise*. Having eaten, she *gave* of the fruit to her husband; and he *hearkened to the voice of his wife*. This is the whole account; and it is not unlike a thousand other occurrences which take place in every age, and which we may see every day. Evidently, as the apostle James explains the whole subject of sin, in relation to every human being, and when considered as *personal* transgression, *lust had conceived*, and then sin was brought forth. If there had been a corrupt nature, previous to the entertainment of the ideas acquired, it would seem that sin could scarcely have been committed more promptly.

It farther deserves your consideration, that we have a general subject illustrated here, by more than a single or insulated fact:—there is a great variety of circumstances. The fallen angels had been very differently situated, and fell under the operation of *personal* responsibility, exhibiting a range of intellectual aberrations as varied and extensive as their number or their individual characters, unless theologians can carry out and establish their system of a dull and impracticable *uniformity* in the invisible world. Adam was a social head, Eve was not. The one fell un-

der *social*, the other under *personal* responsibility. The one was male, the other female. The one was tempted by the serpent, the other by his wife. The one brought death into the world and all our woes; the other entailed consequences peculiar to her own condition. A greater variety of circumstances cannot be presented in the whole extent of human existence: for all human life is to this day developed in the issues of social and personal responsibility; in the influence of male and female character; and in the mingled operations of different beings of diversified talents. Yet a previously corrupt intellectual nature is not at all necessary to account for the multiform results.

In stating the facts of the case, Moses informs us that a SERPENT talked with and beguiled Eve: and this apparently strange matter requires our attention. Concerning it I remark,

1. That Moses means to inform us that a *literal* serpent was employed as the agent in this transaction. Because—(1) he compares it with the *beasts* of the field; with which he would not have compared an intellectual spirit (2) God says to the serpent—"Thou art cursed above all *cattle*, and above every *beast* of the field; upon thy *belly* shalt thou go, and *dust* shalt thou *eat* all the *days* of thy *life*," which could not be predicated of an intellectual being. (3) God farther said to the serpent—"I will put enmity between thee and the woman, between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel"—which is a universal fact in the history of the serpent. (4) The subtlety of the serpent is proverbial; hence Jesus says to his disciples, "be ye wise as *serpents*." (5) Paul tells us that the *serpent* beguiled Eve. (6) "No part of ancient mythology is more curious, though, in some respects, more intricate and perplexed than the worship of the *serpent*. Nearly allied to that of the cherubic symbols, it rivals it in point of *universality*, and closely resembles it in

point of application.”* (7) The curse pronounced on the serpent constituted a visible and suitable *emblem*—on the same principle on which every other subject is represented to man, i. e. external symbol—in illustration of the promise that the Redeemer should break up the dominion of the god of the world, or “destroy the works of the devil.” And this curse it appears to me, would be accomplished without changing the serpent’s form. His *eating dust* is enough.

2. That Moses intends to inform us, that the serpent was the mere agent of an intellectual spirit, is also evident: because—(1) There is very superior intelligence discovered. The address was made to Eve, rather than to Adam. Adam was “the image and glory of God,” and on him rested the official *responsibility*. “Eve was the glory of the MAN;” and therefore might be the more easily assailed, not feeling the full force of that responsibility. The speaker talks of the *Elohim*, a term which expresses the whole mode of the divine manifestation to us; and at the same time remarks, concerning the knowledge of good and evil, in a manner which shows him to be acquainted with the peculiar circumstances of the, to us, invisible world.—And the very choice of his agent was as deep laid an artifice as the nature of the case would admit of. (2) Satan in the new testament is described as “that OLD SERPENT, called the Devil, and Satan, which *deceiveth* the whole world.” (3) One part of the Mediator’s work was to condemn, judge, or cast out the prince of the world. “For this purpose was he manifested, even to destroy the works of the devil:”—to “destroy him that had the power of death, that is the devil.”

* Faber’s Orig. of Pag. Idol. vol. I. p. 439. It is also said that “in the orgies of Bacchus Maenoles, (or the mad) his worshippers were crowned with serpents, and yelled out *Eve, Eve*, even her by whom the transgression came.” Parkhurst’s Heb. Lex.

I am aware, as I have before remarked, that this whole subject of Satanic influence, and that of the *fall*, or even the *existence* of angels, has been disputed; and that an attempt has been made to resolve all the scriptural allusions to such matters into mere metaphors. But why, or what advantage is to be gained, either in scriptural exposition or philosophical speculation, I cannot see. If, in addition to what has been said, intellectual beings here can influence each other, or modify the forms of matter, is it unphilosophical that intellectual beings, though of another and a *higher* order, should modify matter, and thereby influence us? Does not God affect us by such means, both in communicating good and inflicting evil; and do we not thereby affect each other? If there be such a race of intellectual beings, as our argument contemplates, how else could they affect us than through the instrumentality of matter? Admitting the fact of their existence, and remembering the peculiarity of our being, as obtaining our ideas through the medium of our corporeal senses, is not every other circumstance in perfect good keeping with the whole subject?

Conceding the doctrine of spiritual agency, still there does not seem to have been any very unmanageable difficulty in the temptation stated. For whatever may be the supposed intellectual superiority of the deceiver, yet the sphere of his action, in that case, as well as in all other temptations to which we may be subject, was circumscribed by the laws of the material system. There is no evidence, that the literal serpent actually spoke. Such might have been the appearance; but as the scriptures unequivocally ascribe the power of death to the devil, and as it is his kingdom which the Redeemer came to overthrow, the power of speech, manifested on the occasion, was only farther proof of the presence of an intellectual agent. Eve was *deceived*. The appearance was false. On the other hand, Adam was tempted by his *wife*, and was not deceived.*

* 1 Tim. ii. 14.

Many a lying wonder and sign, and much deceivableness of unrighteousness after the power of Satan, has the world seen since that day ; in view of which aberrations we can now discern nothing but a scene of human guilt, followed by its natural and merited consequences.

Take a glance at the other side. The Creator had placed our first parents in the midst of the happiest circumstances. Blessed in each other's society—surrounded by every thing good and excellent, redolent and lovely—the countenance of their Lord radiant with smiles and beaming with love—their access to him free and unrestrained—their selves distinctly warned against the evil which overtook them, and solemnly forbidden to do that which they did do—what more could an intelligent being desire? An intelligent being asks for information:—information they had. A dependent creature seeks for happiness:—they possessed all the various blessings that could make them happy. The providence of Jehovah presided over the whole scene;—his Spirit dwelt with them. God had done for them whatever their nature required, or the peculiarity of their situation demanded. He could not have gone farther without destroying their free agency. He could not have thrown farther restraint upon the subtle adversary, than that under which the temptation itself shows him to have been placed: for there was no appeal made to them but through sensible circumstances; nor could they else have been overcome. What more would they have had? Or can any one imagine, that a righteous Lord made them responsible for an amount of power which they never possessed?

Theologians, however, have put this whole affair in such a light, that every one must feel that there is a sophism lurking in some part of their exposition. From their premises, the conclusion, that God is the author of sin, to many a mind appears unavoidable; and perhaps some would admit the conclusion, rather than abandon the premises. Here theological science and the common sense of man-

kind are at utter variance. The argument, whose conclusion appears so offensive to some, and which I apprehend all would gladly explain away, is derived from the abstract perfections of Godhead, about which we can know nothing. God has *manifested* himself, and beyond that manifestation our inquiries cannot be carried, without becoming involved in perplexing conjecture.

The argument would run thus:—Nothing can be foreknown as certain, which is not fixed as certain; therefore, according to the order of nature, predestination is the basis of foreknowledge. Or thus;—whatever is foreknown must *certainly* come to pass; therefore—what? Foreknowledge is as sure a basis on which to rest the doctrine of *fate*, as predestination itself can be. Then Adam fell because it was foreknown or predestinated that he should fall. If this conclusion be admitted, is not God the author of sin?—If it be denied, how came Adam to fall? He fell as a free agent, it may be replied. But how could he fall as a free agent, when it was certain and necessary that he should fall, and all contingency is shut out from consideration? Here is a *mystery*. For how can these two statements be reconciled?—Perhaps it might be offered as an alleviating circumstance, that God intended to do mankind a greater good by introducing the gospel. But then we may answer that, independent of God's being thus represented to do evil that good may come—a course of action which he forbids to his creatures—this notion does not relieve the original argument; because it still makes the fall to be *necessary*, in pursuance of a divine determination.

But is it not evident that we have in the present case a constitution with *two sides*? Was not *obedience* contemplated, as well as *disobedience*? Was not *penalty* opposed by *reward*? And did not Jehovah *foreknow* what would occur in one view, as well as in the other? If then foreknowledge necessarily implies predestination, it must have been predestinated that Adam should fall, and that he should

not fall. As this cannot be, it follows that foreknowledge does not necessarily imply foreordination; and that God might foreknow a train of circumstances which he did not ordain, but which are to be traced simply to the responsibility and agency of the creature. This conclusion is not derogatory to the character of Jehovah, nor can it in the least degree detract from the wisdom or righteousness of his lordship over our world; and yet the free agency of the creature is thereby entirely relieved, and stands forth sustained in all its individuality of operation.

Certainly the scriptures do so exhibit the divine character. God takes no pleasure in the death of his creatures; he does for them whatever, consistently with their nature, he can do; he *would* gather them, as a hen gathereth her brood under her wings, but they *will not*.—"Let no man say, when he is tempted, *I am tempted of God*; for God cannot be tempted with evil, *neither tempteth he any man*: but *every man* is tempted when he is *drawn away of his own lust*, and is enticed." Language cannot be plainer, nor more to the point; it seems to have been framed on purpose to meet the speculations of the day, which either directly or indirectly charged God with being the author of sin.

Cleaving to a false mode of reasoning, some may say—still it is evident that Adam fell by divine *permission*? But then the question comes up, what is permission? Does it imply, that any extraneous and irresistible force was allowed, under which Adam could not avoid sinning? If this is meant, the fatalism thus asserted, is no better than the fatalism resulting from *predestination*. Is it not evident, from the fact of the temptation, as well as from the divine declaration in reference to the fall—"Behold, the man is become as one of us *to know good and evil*"—that good and evil are intermingled elsewhere than in our immediate world; and consequently, that it is over such a condition of things that Jehovah presides? Does the existence of evil in our world imply, that when one human being tempts

another, he who is so tempted, is by a divine agency led into sin? Or would you infer any injustice in the divine administration which does not paralyze the arm of every wicked man? and house the righteous, so that they should neither see nor hear the evil that is around them? Would you have the great Governor of the world to break up all the relations of life, reverse the law of probation, and make you holy by force? If not, then extend the same rectoral principle to the relations of mind, and to the circumstances attendant on those relations, and where is your difficulty? Under such a view, permission does not imply force; the divine government appears to be regulated according to the intellectual character of his creatures; and the free agency of man is preserved in its own distinctness, and occupies its own appropriate place.

Take an example. Satan was permitted to tempt Job; and, as you all know, sore and heavy were the patriarch's calamities. Far more severely dealt with, it would seem, than Adam had been—for Job was bereaved of all his outward comforts, which Adam was not—and well nigh reduced to that solitude which Adam, it would appear, apprehended; yet Job held fast to his integrity. Nay, he seems among the other subjects of his glorying, to glory over Adam. "Did I cover my transgressions as Adam, by *hiding* mine iniquity in my bosom? Did I *fear* a great multitude, or did the contempt of families terrify me, that I kept silence, and went not out at the door?" True, God found reason to condemn Job, but did not find fault with all he had said. On the contrary, his criticising and carping friends were censured, while he was consecrated as a priest to minister in sacrifice for their sins; and was most abundantly blessed in the end.—This divine *permission* then, which may be supposed to have been granted when Satan found his way to the garden of Eden, does by no means imply that any necessity to sin was imposed on Adam; but refers to a course of administration necessarily belonging to

a train of circumstances in which good and evil are intermingled.

I have been the more particular in an effort to elucidate Adam's transgression, because it is an epitome of all that follows in the varied and melancholy history of mankind. If the argument pursued does not shake the harsh prejudices of some determined sectarian, it may perhaps rescue some ingenuous youth, who, dissatisfied with the metaphysical subtleties he cannot unravel, is hovering on the verge of dreary infidelity. And many a young man, in this day of free and unrestrained inquiry, like the youth in the garden of Gethsemane, is wistfully looking to the end of all these distractions, in hope that the clouds will be scattered, his own mind relieved, and his way to eternal glory made bright and clear.—To the prayerful and candid attention of such an one, I offer my exposition of this momentous subject: while, at the same time, I do seriously and earnestly wish, that ministers and christians, forgetting the past or learning from its misdeeds, would look more to the intellectual and independent character of the coming generations.

We must now turn to consider the effects which eating of the forbidden fruit produced upon our first parents. These effects have been represented as of the most fearful character:—nothing less than that this guilty pair became “*dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body.*” How wise men, with their bibles in their hands, could make so broad and unreserved a statement as this, it is very difficult to explain; unless that they carelessly, and without investigation, copied the errors of preceding ages. There are many dogmas which have been derived from the *fathers* instead of the bible; dogmas which have formed a chaplet of immortality around the brows of Augustin and his compeers, but which have nothing to do with the testimony of the prophets and apostles. The *facts* as the scriptures report them, afford a very different case. Look at them—

1. Jehovah says—"Behold the man is become *AS* one of us to know *good and evil*!" Can the doctrine which is taught so confidently concerning man, be at all advanced in reference to God, either in view of Adam's fall, or of any like, but prior, event? Yet a similarity of condition is asserted. Man knows good and evil, *AS* GOD knows good and evil. You would not, you cannot, predicate a *corrupt nature* of the great Creator. Why then deduce a *corrupt nature* as characteristic of man, when this divine comment is so plain and distinct? You will not reply, that God is a *Spirit*; for—while man is also an intellectual being, and it is of spiritual corruption we are speaking—you would deny the recorded fact that there is a similitude. I cannot see any way in which the likeness can be discovered, unless it be, that God as *Lord* of all, and man as having this world put under his dominion, respectively preside where good and evil are intermingled. So far as personal *NATURE* is concerned, you may not even breathe a suspicion concerning Jehovah, unless it be that "the *FORM OF GOD* has become by the fall inappropriate to the present condition of mankind; and a necessity has consequently occurred for a second manifestation, and that in the *FLESH*. If you suppose the address we have quoted to have proceeded from the lips of the Mediator, and to be prophetic of his future sorrows, still it was *in the flesh* he was put to death. In no way can the doctrine so strenuously maintained, be made to correspond with the divine comment; while each, and all of the suppositions, whether you refer to dominion or personal form, would sustain the principle of exposition I am advocating:—Our doctrine, remember, is, that the *animal nature* of man is made subject to *CHANGE* by death, and that *the whole material system*, as it is connected with our present mode of existence, is exposed to the same deleterious influence.

2. Adam's sin was *conventional*. He fell as an *official* man. And certainly it is not the *fact* now, that the trans-

gression of an official man forthwith desolates all his private character. Many men do in their places as members of a corporate body, what they would shrink from doing as individuals. They may understand a duty in their own little circle, while general principles which may embrace society at large they do not comprehend. In the one case they may be righteous according to their knowledge; in the other they may sin through ignorance:—like Paul, blameless as to the institutions under which he lived, but ignorant of the revolution which was to bring in “the new covenant.” An officer may, in such a case, ruin his personal reputation forever; but it does not necessarily follow that he should. In his personal responsibility the remedial principle must be sought; and it may be—for it often is—found there.

3. Even if Adam’s sin had not been official, but, like Eve’s, had been merely *personal*, such a fearful disaster as we are considering would not necessarily follow. For though the scriptures have said, that “whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all;” and though the principle of law may be—“the soul that sinneth shall die”—so that there can be no recovery by *law*; yet it does not follow that a remedial operation may be utterly impracticable under another system of government. The mediatorial principle of the gospel, viz.—“if any man confess his sin, God is faithful and just to forgive him his sin, and to cleanse him from all unrighteousness,” might very naturally and readily be introduced. The very fact of his confession may indicate a fragment of moral character yet remaining; like as in Sodom, when ten righteous men should have saved the city, or like “a little leaven that will leaven the whole lump;” or it may be, that that fact might evince a general state of good feeling. On such a fact, a government that is both wise and gracious, may very safely extend pardon, and thus save a transgressor who would otherwise, according to the *progressive* course of sin,

become utterly base.—And if one sin could not, or did not, so desolate the moral character of Adam, how should it so utterly desecrate all the moral energies of his children?

4. The history charges him with but *one* sin. God arraigns him for but *one* sin. Paul traces the consequences which have come down on all mankind to *one* offence. What ingenuity is required, and wasted, in an attempt to show that Adam violated each command of the decalogue, and that death has come on all the world because that he became spiritually dead and *wholly* defiled!

What is the proof by which such a fearful indictment is established?

1. Adam was so stupid, it will be said, as to think of hiding himself from an *omnipresent* God. But such is not the historical fact. For he heard the voice of Jehovah-Elohim walking in the garden, and he hid himself from the manifested or personal presence of Jehovah. In connexion it may be asked, was Moses spiritually dead and wholly defiled when he exceedingly feared and quaked?

2. It is said that Eve “laid the blame upon the serpent;” and Adam “laid the blame upon his wife, and even on Jehovah-Elohim himself.” But did they not relate the circumstances as they had transpired? Did they not tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? Did they not with great simplicity, frankness, and candor, *confess* their sin? And is it not consistent with the most enlightened and liberal views of human nature, to interpret that confession as *repentance*?—But Adam said to God—“The woman whom THOU gavest to be with me.” And is this any thing more than a pleonastic mode of speech, in which more words are used than may seem to us to be absolutely necessary? and which may well be employed when a language could have but few words?

Can the proof adduced sustain the charge which has been so confidently tabled? Or does any more appear on the face of the record, than an act, by which *evil* was

brought into the world?—evil which the unhappy pair had begun to experience in their own persons, but which had not destroyed the refinement or delicacy of their feelings?—and an act, which was perfectly consistent with their love of truth—with candor—with confession—with repentance—and which, in reference to Adam, is ever recognised in the scriptures in its own insulated character? Jehovah interpreted the case very differently from the popular notion, which scholastic theology has so injudiciously and harshly promulgated. He pitied the condition of his fallen children; averred that they were now brought to know, not evil alone, but *good* and *evil*; and that all their earthly relations were entirely changed. So far from being *spiritually* dead, they were not even *temporally* dead; nor does it appear that the tree of whose fruit they had eaten, was capable of producing death in either sense. Nay more. They were not condemned, their sentence was not passed, until their kind Lord, retreating into that personal responsibility which belonged to their nature, and availing himself of their moral character as it was displayed at the time before him, proclaimed the mediatorial constitution—adapting it to their actual circumstances. God is LOVE—his gospel is, “if any man will confess his sins, God is faithful and just to forgive him his sins;” and one of the most beautiful and luminous proofs of both is afforded by these very transactions.

I have just remarked, that it does not appear that the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was the cause of *death* in any sense. This intimation may, perhaps, startle you as contrary to all your impressions. My reasons for the remark follow:—

1. It is not said that this tree was a *tree of death*. It is said that, in the day when Adam should eat of its fruit, dying he should die; but it is not said that the fruit should be the agent by which death should be executed. Its agency was much more confined in its physical action, and might have been temporary. The terms by which its effect was

described at *first* were—the *knowledge* of good and evil ; and those employed in stating the fact, after the covenant was violated, were—their *eyes were opened*, and they *knew* that they were naked. Nothing farther is asserted concerning it.

2. While the *principle* of any constitution is preserved entire, any case which may occur under it must be provided for ; either by special statute, or by the law of another constitution to which such a case may more properly belong. According to the paradisiacal institute, *Adam* was our social head ; and to *his* offence the introduction of death is referred. But *Eve* was *first* in transgression. If *Adam* had not sinned—and the case might have occurred—then, either the tree was not the physical agent of executing death ; or, contrary to the principle of the constitution, death would not have come by *Adam's* offence ; or, *Eve* would not have died. *Eve* violated her personal responsibility, and her sin was considered and punished irrespective of *Adam's* offence. Or if the fact, that her daughters have shared with her in her penalty, should seem to make her sin official like *Adam's*, its official character must be altogether *secondary*. Or rather, I should say, that the fact in her case evinces, that the principle of social responsibility belongs to the *nature* of society, and is identified with all our social institutions. Consequently the *Adamic* constitution is not an *arbitrary* institute, unkindly engrafted on nature, but was a mere regulation of the *political* relation in which *Adam* stood to his posterity ; and therefore could only result in political, or external advantages or disadvantages.—In the subsequent parts of the scriptural history, instances are not wanting, in which the peculiar character and deportment of children are traced to maternal, as well as to paternal influence.

3. If the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was the physical agent by which *death* was introduced, how did death, so introduced, pass upon the lower orders of creation. Evidently some other cause, more gene-

ral and more efficient, is necessary to explain the extent to which death has been executed.

4. We have seen in a previous lecture, that Moses, when on mount Sinai, could not see the face of God, and *live*. No such difficulty is even hinted at in Adam's case. He seems to have been capable of the most perfect familiarity, and of the most free intercourse with God. Moses was under the sentence as passed, and the force of the physical agency by which the sentence was executed. Adam was not yet under that sentence, nor had he felt the power of the deleterious agent, which was pointed out to him afterwards.

5. Death is *appointed* unto all men.—“I create peace, and I create *evil*,” saith the Lord. The execution of the penalty was not put out of his own hands, but is left as a matter of his own *just* administration.

Then it may be asked, what was the precise use of the tree of knowledge of good and evil? To which I answer, that its use is disclosed by the transactions themselves. Its effect on the animal constitution of our first parents was the proof of their guilt. There was no equivocation possible in the case.

But can it be supposed, it may further be asked, that, under such circumstances, Adam would have dared to equivocate? To which again I answer, that while others have represented him as *dead* in sin, and *wholly* defiled, they can hardly censure a conjecture, which merely supposes that a sinner would *hide* his transgression if he could. Nor can they justly condemn an interpretation, which is founded on a common judicial principle, that every man is to be held innocent until he is proved to be guilty. In their lofty speculations on the abstract perfections of Godhead, they may indeed scout such a simple idea. But they would forget such facts as the following.—When the cry of Sodom's iniquities came up before the Lord, he descended to inquire after the *proof* in the case. When Cain replied

to the Lord—am I my brother's keeper? the Lord answered, thy brother's blood crieth to me from the ground. When Saul pretended that he had fulfilled the commandment of the Lord, and made his strong asseveration before the prophet, Samuel asked him, "what then meaneth the bleating of the sheep in mine ears, and the lowing of the oxen which I hear?" When Abraham took the knife to slay his son, the angel of the Lord said unto him—"Lay not thine hand upon the lad, neither do thou any thing unto him: for now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son, from me." On the day of judgment, the wicked are represented as pleading their cause thus—"When saw we thee an hungered, and did not feed thee?" The answer returned is—"inasmuch as ye did it not unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye did it not to me."—The objector to our interpretation would forget, that we must appear before a JUDGE; that the judge is the SON OF MAN; that every one must give account of *himself* in the day of judgment, when he shall be either justified or condemned by *his words*. Judgment, like every other political transaction, is not the mere sovereign act of a supreme Lord, acting independently of the feelings or views of the intelligent creatures he has made; but every eye shall see, and every ear hear, and every tongue confess, that the judge of all the earth doth right.

And now we may distinctly perceive, that if the foregoing view of the judicial object of the tree of knowledge of good and evil be correct, there was no use for any particular *tree of life*, to serve an analogous purpose. Of course there was no particular tree of life, for God makes nothing in vain.

But if the tree of knowledge of good and evil was not the physical agent by which *death* was introduced, by what means was the sentence executed? This question too is fairly and fully answered by Moses. For he tells us, that

the Lord God *cursed* the GROUND; and that he did this for Adam's sake; or because that he had violated the statute which had been given to him. A similar fact occurs in the history of the flood; which visitation produced still farther temporal calamities. Any medical philosopher, even though he has made but slender attainments in his science, will underwrite this scriptural explanation. You may be fully satisfied on the subject by very little inquiry or observation.

This physical agency will not only explain the cause of death, but it will, at the same time, account for its universality, and will demonstrate the interest which *all mankind* had in Adam's official character. But it cannot prove that Adam or any of his posterity did become, by his one offence, *dead* in sin, and *wholly* defiled in all the faculties and parts of both soul and body. How could any noxious miasm, or poisonous vapor, thus exhaled, morally pollute the mind? Nay more—how could spiritual death be instantaneously spread out over the powers of the intellectual spirit, by an act whose penalty was so slowly executed, that the powers of the body itself were brought only into a *dying* condition? And farther still—how could death, temporal, spiritual and eternal, be implied in the sentence originally pronounced, when the only physical agent referred to at the time, did not produce death at all? Or is it not evident that the original sentence, instead, as has been asserted, of going beyond the sentence which was actually executed, fell far short of it? For if the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was the physical agent by which the original sentence would have been executed, then death could not go beyond Adam's own race. Whereas, when the ground is desecrated and becomes the physical agent, the various classes of animals, as well as the whole material system, are immediately involved, and cannot escape from its destructive influence. Their sufferings—which speculative theologians have not been able to account for—

necessarily follow ; though in no sense can it be said that they had committed Adam's sin. How much theologians have taken for granted ! Well might a candid reformer charge his successors to recollect, that Calvin and his noble companions had not discovered all that is in the bible.

This matter, however, cannot be dismissed yet. For, admitting the correctness of the preceding argument, and supposing that the death of the body, with the various temporal calamities that attend it, constituted the penalty of the broken law ; even then would not death be *eternal*, seeing that the doctrine of a resurrection belongs to the mediatorial system ? Still all my labor would thus appear to be in vain.—Perhaps not. The objection may be more specious than solid. Let us try.

1. If Adam had not broken the law, but had secured its reward for himself and his posterity, they should not, according to the general principle which Paul advances in his argument on the resurrection, have remained here forever. As there is a natural body and a spiritual body, our parents and their offspring should have been *changed*. How would this change have been accomplished ? Unquestionably by the power of God. As manifestly death itself comes not as the simple effect of any physical agency, but as a matter of divine administration ; and it is not to be viewed as a mere physical necessity, but as a decision of the divine judge. Man at first was made no more than “ a living soul,” and could have no power to change himself. His inability to raise himself from the dead, would no more argue the eternity of death, than his inability to change himself from a natural into a spiritual body, would argue the eternity of his existence in this world.—The resurrection therefore involves more questions than the mere issues of law may present.

To illustrate my meaning by an analogy. If you have entrusted your funds to an agent, and he has squandered them away, assuredly the next question which arises is,

whether you are able to meet your *personal* obligation?—In the case before us, we have the two systems of social and personal responsibility. Under the first, death has been introduced. Then the question is, whether, under the second, a man can recover himself? If he can, there is nothing in the sentence of the law to prevent him. But man cannot raise himself from the dead, because in his own nature he is nothing more than a living soul.

Call back the analogy. If you are unable to meet your personal engagements when your agent has wasted your means, and as your personal character has not been lost, another question arises :—what will—what ought—your creditor to do? Your personal character is the very remedial resource which will attract his attention, and in view of which he will seek for relief. So in the case before us. Adam had committed one offence, but still his personal character invited confidence; and the personal character of his children is, by his sin, unhurt. What then will God do? According to the nature of the creature he has made, according to the system of personal responsibility which he established, and at the very point where an exertion of his *own power* would be indispensable even if sin had not been committed, what may we look to him to do?—Is it contrary to philosophy or scripture, that when one system is exhausted, we should draw on the resources of another? When state objects, so to speak, or political purposes, or the general interests of social life, are preserved, is the divine government so defective as to leave individual integrity unconsidered? Would an administration so narrow and improvident, be either wise or good? Did not Jehovah pardon David's sin, while, yet for *public* reasons, or because he had given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme, the crime itself was formally punished? Or must all such considerations be thrown aside as fugitive and irrelevant, and system be jumbled up with system, merely to give way to the antiquated conjectures of a speculative the-

ology, whose distempered fancies are more sacred, than its arguments are conclusive ?

2. Not only have we two systems whose respective interests must be considered, but the actual circumstances, as these are stated, were arranged to meet those interests. There is nothing in the whole paradisiacal law, to prevent the full development of *personal* responsibility, not even in view of transgression. The tree placed in the midst of the garden contemplated, by its own terms, a state of society in which *good* and *evil* should be intermingled. It was not all EVIL—all DEATH, that was to be introduced. All that was GOOD was not to be destroyed. Evil should come, but that which was *good* might remain with it. The extent of the threatened *evil* must be interpreted by the fact. The *death* threatened was not perdition—instantaneous and entire. The penalty was expressed in very different language. Dying, thou shalt die, said the Creator; thus intimating a prolonged state of being, though suffering under a mortal infirmity. The fruit of the tree was not the physical agent in executing the penalty ; but the *ground*, whose deleterious effects would be gradual in their operation. Though Adam forfeited the privileges of the *garden*, yet he might be returned to the spot whence he was taken. The very nature of the animal system, in that it *might* become mortal and corruptible, while the existence of the spirit is eternal, together with the limited effect produced on the moral nature of our first parents—all these things abundantly evince the political character, and consequently the external influence, of the Adamic institute. No case can be more clear. Every view which it presents looks to a remedial agency as both natural and just ; both wise and good. And when the remedial expedient is so visibly exhibited, at every point and on every turn, it would be very strange, if the dogma, unrelentingly wrapping up the whole system in the gloom of eternal death, should still be obstinately defended.

We must now look at the effects of the fall, as they were visited upon ALL MEN. That *all men* were involved in Adam's official proceedings, must be evident from the nature of the case, as well as from the character of the physical agent employed. The deleterious influence which the *ground*, as having been cursed, exhales, is universal. There is no escaping from it. How men can dispute the *fact*, I do not see. But that they should quarrel with the *philosophy* of the fact, *as it has been taught*, is no matter of wonder. Our nature instinctively revolts from any political doctrines which impute a vindictive character to the Eternal, or which would build up despotic institutions on earth. The Spirit of God affords no such instructions to the human mind. And the moral philosopher, in attempting to establish such notions, fails in his argument from a deficiency of testimony, and runs counter to nature. Take away the bayonet and the sword, the gibbet and the stake, the star-chamber and the inquisition, and human beings naturally revert to original principles. Hence the controversies of the present age. Church courts will fail in their conflicts with nature.

Death has come upon *all men*. The body, as the scriptures describe it, has become—this *mortal*, this *corruptible*. A *weakness of the flesh* has supervened. Man is not able to *do*, what he could do, if his animal nature did not labor under this mortal infirmity. Hence he is unable to obey LAW, which was the rule of his being in its original vigor. Accordingly the Son of God is sent in the likeness of *sinful flesh*, to do that which the *law* could not do, in that it was weak, through the FLESH. Or, in other words, the gospel is framed to meet this very weakness, under which our corruptible bodies suffer and groan. Hear Paul. “In me, i. e. in my *flesh* dwelleth no good thing. I keep my *body* under, lest, after having preached the gospel to others, I should be a castaway myself. There is a law *in my members*, warring against the law of my *mind*. The *flesh* lusteth

against the *spirit*, and the *spirit* against the *flesh*: and these are contrary the one to the other." Hear the Redeemer:—"The *spirit* truly is willing, but the *flesh* is weak."

We have already seen that the body, and its appropriate senses, constitute the means by which the spirit acquires its ideas, and the instruments by which it acts. Injure the body or weaken its senses, and the range of the spirit's ideas, as well as the sphere of its action, necessarily becomes limited. Under such circumstances, we *cannot* do, even what we *would* do. The power to *will* may exist where the power to *perform* is not possessed; though we are sometimes told that human inability lies in the *will*. A multitude of objects are now spread out before me. I see them all. Let me be deprived of my animal organs of vision, and I can see them no more; but my intellectual power, considered as an attribute of spirit, is not diminished. Restore by medical means my animal organs, and I see again; but a surgical operation has not restored a lost intellectual attribute. While blind, I *would* see, if I had the *bodily* power. When my body dies, my spirit still lives. So when Adam brought death into the world, the *body*, or our animal nature, became corruptible in consequence of his sin. Beyond this every thing is *personal*. I would have seen better, and would have acted more powerfully, if my body had been unimpaired in its various faculties; but still I see and act according to the bodily power left, and for that I am *personally* responsible. Deny this view, and there is no escape from sheer materialism.

There is no subject which theologians have tortured into more shapes, or have pencilled out under a greater variety of profile, than that of *human ability and inability*. It is really mournful to observe how deeply and awfully mysterious they have made a very plain point. Certainly it is a very plain statement that, in consequence of Adam's sin superinducing a weakness of the flesh, men *cannot* obey *LAW*; and it is just as plain that they *can* obey *gospel*, be-

cause it is intended to meet and help their infirmities. The whole doctrine of the scriptures is, that man *cannot* be saved *without* a Mediator, but that he *can* be saved *with* one. And it is certainly very evident that neither under law nor gospel, neither before nor since the fall, can man be viewed as independent of the providence of God, or as living in the *moral and intellectual* world, any more than he does in the *physical world*, without the co-operating agency of the Holy Spirit. What can be more evident?

It is true that this matter has been argued in the scriptures:—but why? The two systems—law and gospel—belong to the history of man. Under the one, evil has been introduced; under the other, a remedy has been proposed. They are, therefore, the legitimate subjects of human thought. Accordingly, in all ages mankind have been reasoning on their respective claims. Nay, so far have they carried their controversial expositions, and so great have been the mistakes into which they have reasoned themselves, that Jehovah found it necessary to represent the inefficiency of the one, and the remedial agency of the other, under two distinct dispensations—the Mosaic and the Christian. The argument, therefore, which serves to elucidate the original subjects, involves the two dispensations; and the arguments intended to explain the two dispensations, involves the original subjects. The Jews mistook the nature of their external position, and of the purpose of *election* by which they occupied that position. Necessarily they stumbled on a great deal of metaphysical speculation about human ability and inability. Paul had to meet and refute their errors. Since their days christians have mistaken their external position, and the purpose of *election* by which they have been so peculiarly distinguished. They have, in fact, revived judaic notions; and are consequently involved in all the metaphysical subtleties of the age in which Paul wrote. But more of this hereafter.

You perceive that I have not denied the fact of mankind deriving a corrupt *nature* from Adam. But then that corrupt *nature* consists in this—that man has now a mortal and corruptible body. As he originally acquired his ideas by means of his corporeal senses, so he acquires his ideas now. Those senses have become impaired, but the intellectual power is not in *itself* injured or corrupt. It can have no ideas farther than it has the outward means of acquiring them. But so far as those means go, it not only *can* but *does* acquire them. It is here, where personal responsibility, from the very nature of the case, arises; where ability must be supposed, and beyond which, in reference to our personal nature, the influence of Adam's sin does not and cannot go. There is, indeed, an indispensable necessity that a Mediator should be provided; and that his institutions should correspond with the measure of our ability, as the law corresponded with the original ability of Adam. But that Mediator being provided, and his institutions being established, we become *personally* accountable, and perish by our own fault, if we perish at all. Hence the scriptures write so freely of *the lusts of the flesh*, and inform us that whenever a man commits sin, he is drawn away of *his own lust*, and is enticed; while they also describe the gentiles as doing by *nature* the things contained in the *law*, and showing the work of the *law written* on their heart.

Man having this corrupt nature, i. e. *a corruptible and mortal body*,—carrying about him “this body of sin and of death,”—having “*a law in his members* warring against *the law of his mind*,”—goes out into the world to associate with beings of his own kind, and corrupted like himself. At the same time the whole material system is, to him, like his own constitution, an intermixture of good and evil: interesting all his sympathies, and forming the resources on which he draws, in seeking the supply of his wants and the gratification of his desires. Thus constituted, and thus

circumstanced in consequence of sin committed by his social head—having no innate ideas, either good or bad—acquiring all his ideas by his bodily senses and through the medium of surrounding objects—and yet living and acting under *personal* responsibilities with which his everlasting destiny is connected, he appears in the midst of a troubled scene of action, to fulfil the duties and meet the trials that await him. Let us follow his course.

As a new born babe, “born to *trouble* as the sparks fly upwards,” he suffers and complains. In his early life, and while *mind* is yet unfurnished with intelligence, by which he can discriminate between good and evil, he betrays the propensities of his *corrupt animal* nature:—propensities which seem to characterize the lower orders of creatures themselves, who have not been endowed with intellectual and immortal spirits. These propensities, varying in character and degree as widely as the animal temperament can be diversified, the excitement he feels and the restraints under which he acts, are derived from the sensible circumstances in which he is placed.

I am aware that the case of children is often very differently represented. They are supposed to betray in all their apparent aberrations an intellectual depravity, or a state of spiritual death, as the direct, the necessary, and the invariable consequence of Adam’s transgression. The scriptures appear to give a very different account of this interesting matter. Take the following passages:—“Your little ones, which you said should be a prey, and your *children, which in that day had no knowledge between good and evil.*” “Before the child shall *know to refuse the evil and choose the good.*” “Brethren be not children in understanding; howbeit in *malice* be ye *children*, but in understanding be men.” “*Should I not spare Nineveh, that great city, wherein are more than six score thousand persons that cannot discern between their right hand and their left hand, and also much cattle?*” The unbelieving hus-

band is sanctified by the wife; and the unbelieving wife is sanctified by the husband; else were *your children unclean, but now they are holy.*" "Verily I say unto you, except ye be *converted, and become as little children*, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." Suffer *little children*, and forbid them not, to come unto me, *for of such is the kingdom of heaven.* And he laid his hands on them, and departed thence." "The promise is to you and to your children." "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved, and *thy house.*" These and such like passages of the scriptures, evince children to be the special objects of the divine affection and care; to present the best view of moral character, when a simile is sought for in illustration of *conversion*, or when intellectual life is, as it were, to be commenced anew; and to belong to that number over whom the mediatorial administration is peculiarly extended.

But, to resume the account of a human being as he is passing through the world.—He is first committed to parental care. And surely no one can be so dull an observer as not to have perceived the innumerable deficiencies of domestic life—the collisions of feeling—the contrarieties of opinion—the opposite habits of discipline—a course of government which, either by its severity palsies the moral sense and crushes all independence, or by its excessive mildness and imprudent indulgence nurtures the passions, and leaves the mind dormant—a premature attempt to call out intellect, while the feelings are untutored—the disregard of *moral* influence inducing a constant appeal to corporal chastisement—false systems of religious education, which substitute the abstract propositions of an antiquated catechism, for the spiritual exercises of the parental mind, and for the co-operating agency of the Spirit of God, presiding over the social action of heart upon heart—the unphilosophical attempt to engraft upon the infantile spirit the notions of other men, which parents themselves do not

understand—the great solicitude to appear fair and stand well with the particular class of society to which a family may belong—the endless calculations which terminate on business or pleasure, on wealth or honor, on fashion or amusement, while conscience is coerced into silence, or is modified according to the standard of morality which that class of society may have adopted—what, I pray you, can be expected from such a tissue of parental delinquencies, but the general depravity of morals we are called upon to explain?

It must also be apparent to every observer of human life, that all children do not grow up to indulge the same vices, nor to commit sin in the very same form. The children of the heathen exhibit, under parental tuition, a very different set of habits from those which characterize the children of the Jews, while the children of christians vary from both. In the very same community, one family will grow up entirely dissimilar to another family. The artificial distinctions of society—the form of political government—the despotism to which men may pusillanimously submit, or the liberal and independent principles they may enthusiastically maintain—the ecclesiastical parties which may grow out of a period of excitement, and whose dogmas may and will be transmitted by a religious entail, until that excitement is worn out—these and such like varieties of social life are carefully and sacredly regarded by parents in training their children, giving form to their manners, tone to their feelings, and vigor to their prejudices. All these varieties will occur too with as much *uniformity*, as can possibly be asserted in an argument which traces up the general depravity to a corrupt *spiritual* nature derived from Adam. How many hundreds and thousands in our own day and country are episcopalians, or presbyterians, or baptists, or methodists, or friends, or unitarians, or infidels, merely because their fathers were such before them! How many sects and congregations are sustained

in this very way! How adventurous, how preposterous, how heretical, it is conceived to be for any man to break away from the dominion of this social law! Such an adventurer has lost his CAST in christendom as certainly as though he had lived in Hindostan; and his compeers seem to think that they owe him no christian reciprocities, but that they may sport with his feelings, cripple his influence, ruin his reputation, warn their friends against a pernicious contagion, and condemn him both for time and eternity. I know that it is a very popular doctrine, that every man should think for himself, and a very popular boast that in our beloved country any man may do so. But then let any one venture to take the public at their word, and begin to dispute the infallibility of the fathers; and even they who would rejoice in his success, stand aloof from the enterprise in which, for conscience sake, and it may be for the public's sake, he risks, so to speak, his all. And yet multitudes affect to wonder at human depravity, when parents bring up their children under such fearful auspices, and, in this way, often reduce the finest intellect to *spiritual death*, by their own thoughtless but criminal mismanagement.

But if the parental course should have been elevated above these sectarian movements and this hereditary imbecility, yet how quickly the youthful mind becomes vitiated by its early associations! A thousand adventitious circumstances attend on the gradual development of juvenile character. The young begin to calculate on their own individuality, the strength of their own opinions, and the rationality of their own choice; and a new scene is opened which, in its incipency, gives a fair prognostic of its riper pretensions. Under the force of early predilections long vibrating, it may be, amidst doubts and fears, but at length settled on objects entirely sublunary, if not entirely sensual, the rising generation become capable of abusing their personal responsibilities; and listlessly sink into the same routine, in which their fathers descended to the grave.

When referred to the church, in hopes of inducing other and better resolves, they find themselves met by mysteries become sacred by age, and which leave their inquisitive minds baffled at every step, while sectarian prejudices, ministerial conflicts, and ecclesiastical despotism forbid any investigation into matters they do not understand; and thus, embarrassed and perplexed, they abandon the hopes in which their fathers gloried. The multitude stand startled at the general depravity, and can discern no explanation, excepting that Adam's sin brought all mankind into temporal, spiritual and eternal death, by "defiling all the parts and faculties of both soul and body!" You may go into the pagan world, and changing terms, you meet the same result.

A modern writer has well expressed my ideas, in the following paragraph:—"The thread of every life is entangled with other threads, beyond all reach of calculation. The weal and woe of each depend, by innumerable correspondences, upon the will, and caprices, and fortunes, not merely of the individuals of his immediate circle, but upon those of myriads of whom he knows nothing. Or, strictly speaking, the tie of mutual influence passes without a break, from hand to hand, throughout the human family: there is no independence, no insulation, in the lot of man; and, therefore, there can be no absolute calculation of future fortunes; for he, whose will or caprice is to govern the lot, stands perhaps, at the distance of a thousand removes from the subject of it; and the alternated influence winds its way, in ten thousand meanders, before it reaches the point of its destination."* In such a state of society, who does not wish to see those overturnings; by which our mediatorial prince shall revolutionize the human family, and construct our social operations on better principles than those which are now embraced? The promise of the millennium or some such happy condition is, or ought to be, as great a relief to the mere philanthropist as it can be to the most re-

* Nat. His. of Euthusiasm, p. 138.

fined moralist—who, fascinated by the beauty and brilliancy of the promised re-organization, is wistfully watching for the Master's coming, amid the distractions which now threaten to drive our ecclesiastical principalities into delirious and blasting misrule.

I may be asked whether any revolution, which can make matters better, is practicable, or may intelligently be looked for in this dying world? To this I would briefly answer, that if you reverse the causes, you may reverse the effects; that the scriptures have said—"Train up a child in the way in which he should go, and when he is old he will not depart therefrom;" that if the iniquities of the fathers are visited upon the children, the mercy of the Lord is extended unto children's children; and that we have a promised scene of millenary righteousness and blessedness, in the description of whose peculiar mercies, the taking away a corrupt spiritual nature, as having been derived from Adam, is nowhere even hinted at.

But finally, it results from Adam's sin, that Satan has acquired power in this world, and that we are all exposed to his temptations. "We wrestle," says Paul, "not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places."—"If our gospel be hid, it is hid to them that are lost; in whom, the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them that believe not, lest the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine unto them."—"Be sober, be vigilant," says Peter, "because your adversary, the devil, as a roaring lion, walketh about, seeking whom he may devour." To many a timid christian, nothing is more appalling than this very view of his earthly course. How many have fallen under the prowess and malignity of this mighty Apollyon! And how often do multitudes ascribe their sins to his artifices, and make a natural imbecility of their moral nature derived from Adam their apology, rather than confess their

heedlessness, and their unbelief; and rather than equip themselves for the conflict, or put on the panoply which the great captain of their salvation has provided!

To these three causes—the FLESH, the WORLD, and the DEVIL, do the scriptures uniformly ascribe the personal depravity of mankind. Whenever they speak of the corrupt spiritual nature of an individual, or of a community of individuals, they intend to describe the powerful control of the influences which have been thus enumerated. They may speak of the character of human beings, in viewing LAW separate from mediatorial provisions; as I would fain hope theologians themselves make the same reference, in the estimate of mankind they so often express. Thus judged, all mankind must necessarily perish. Yet still their perdition would be connected with their *personal* responsibility, as none of them can obey LAW. But under the influences stated, nothing else can be inferred than a *carnal mind*, or the habit of *minding* the things of the flesh, which is *enmity* against God.

If any should not be convinced by the preceding argument, or do not perceive that their own responsibilities call on them to *mortify the flesh*—to *overcome the world*—and to *resist temptation*, as covering the whole sphere of their action in relation to SIN; then let me ask them to explain to themselves, how, or whence, that GOOD originates, which they call MORALITY in contradistinction to religion? If mankind be *wholly defiled in all the parts and faculties* of body and soul, and be *dead in sin*, how can this *morality* exist? It will not do to account for it by mere *restraint*; because as *all* is *evil*, when a restraint is imposed, that which remains unrestrained, must still be *evil*. But the *morality*, of which we speak, is not *evil*, but GOOD. Will any one undertake to say that conjugal love and fidelity, the parental storge, and the whole train of social virtues are *evil*, and expect to be believed? When Jesus *loved* the young ruler, who had kept the commandments from his youth up, and

was *near* to the kingdom of heaven, were the virtues of this young man *evil*? and did the Redeemer *love* that which is *evil*? When the gentiles do *by nature*, the things contained in the *law*, and show the work of the law written on their hearts, is all this *evil*? When Paul, comparing, in this respect, jews and gentiles together, remarks, that they who have done *good*, whether they be jews or gentiles, shall inherit eternal life, must their *good*, and that which is written on their hearts, and is in them by nature, be still spoken of as *evil*? And all this too, as the consequence of Adam's sin; when the consequence of that sin is explicitly declared to be, the knowledge of *good* and *evil*? On the contrary, when the scriptures speak of any being *dead in sin*, do they not thereby describe a course of *personal* transgressions which have entirely desolated the social virtues:—"Trespases and sins, wherein in time past ye walked, according to the course of this world—according to the prince of the power of the air—in the lusts of the flesh?" Look at Paul's description of a community characterized by a *reprobate mind*, in the first chapter of his epistle to the Romans, and see whether it be Adam's sin or their personal transgressions to which he ascribes their dreadful and loathsome apostacy, or whether the very *good* we have spoken of, as constituting *morality*, is not absent?—In fine, is not the phrase—*dead in trespases* and *sin*, mere figurative language, describing those who have abused their privileges, dishonored the institutions of divine love, and turned traitors to the general weal?—If this argument fail to convince, it is useless to protract the discussion.

But after all what has been gained by our argument?—TRUTH, if no other peculiar advantage, I answer; and by TRUTH we are "begotten again," are sanctified and saved. Yet I trust, we have also gained *personal responsibility*, unembarrassed by the subtleties and sophistry of the schools; we have disclosed to those who are "ever learning and never coming to the knowledge of the truth," the reason of

their unbroken disappointment; we have made appear to those who are professedly waiting for God, and who have never experienced the regenerating efficacy of his grace, the reason why they have not realized what they seem to desire; and we have thrown the mere sceptic, confident in his unbelief, proud of his superiority to fanatical delusion, and bitter in his satirical strictures, upon his own personal obligation, as he demanded. The object was worth achieving. And having achieved it, as we believe, we will hold it fast with becoming confidence, as though it cheered and sustained us in our way to the heavenly inheritance. "Go ye," said Jesus, when he commissioned his disciples on their errand of mercy, and ascended to the throne of his glory—"Go ye *into all the world*, and preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned." Would to God, beloved brethren, ye did BELIEVE, and that ye understood the truth, that ye might BELIEVE. There is a form of divine doctrines, in which they come home to the heart "in demonstration of the Spirit and with power."

LECTURE IX.

Mediatorial constitution—Its origin—Mediator—God manifested in the flesh—Seed of the woman.

I HAVE represented the paradisiacal institute as a political dispensation. The mediatorial constitution, which we now proceed to consider, must be explained on a corresponding principle. Under the one, a great and sore evil has occurred; and under the other a remedy for that evil is provided. Of course the two constitutions must be viewed

as assimilated to each other : or, as, on the one hand, the broken *law* is the ministration of sin and death ; so, on the other, the *gospel* must be the ministration of righteousness and life. The law having been constructed to meet the peculiar attributes of human nature, the gospel must be similarly framed ; or it would be inappropriate to the case it was intended to relieve. Under both forms of the divine administration, man must be governed as an intelligent and accountable agent ; and they must be suited to him as having no *innate* ideas, but as acquiring his ideas by his corporeal senses, and through the medium of objects which those senses can recognise.

God himself made man thus ; and there is nothing derogatory to the divine character in supposing, that the divine legislation will precisely correspond with human nature. The mediatorial system cannot be *original* in its principles, because it is intended, and proclaimed, to be *remedial* only ; and any available matter that may yet belong to the original system, which is to be relieved, will not be rejected. Man is not taken out of his corruptible body, and placed in another body, which shall be more congenial to the benevolent purposes of his Creator. Neither are the natural relations to be broken up, nor is the principle of social responsibility to be discarded. But a new SOCIAL HEAD is to be consecrated ; each individual must “work out *his own* salvation ;” and provision, ample and free, must be made ; so that, notwithstanding the infirmities man inherits and the trials that await him, he may be enabled to obtain eternal life. The two systems must, therefore, be perfectly analogous, and the distinct attributes of man must be as fully and as prominently displayed in the last as they were in the first. Nor does the grace, or the wisdom, or the power of Jehovah appear less conspicuous, when an intellectual agency is thus predicated of man, than when he is described as perfectly passive, or mechanical, under the influence of a regenerating Spirit. A mere

word, a sovereign act of power, would accomplish the one, while a series of means, most diversified and minute, and equally appropriate to the endless variety of character and situation which human society presents, would be required by the other. Where shall we search for the philosophy of the natural world, if it be not in the relation between cause and effect; in the mutual dependencies, and in the action and reaction, which meet us at every step; while each creature preserves its own individual character, and carries out its own distinct operations? In like manner where shall we search for the philosophy of intellectual life, or moral obligation, if all the actions of man's individual faculties are to be merged in one omnipotent mandate? which mandate is uttered according to no known law, but proceeds from mere sovereign good pleasure. I infer then, from the nature of the case, that there is more room to display grace, wisdom and power, in a regal administration over intelligent and free agents, than there can be in a sovereign superintendence over mechanical agents.

In fact, our preceding lectures have evinced, that the mediatorial institute *arises* directly out of the original system; and is, in view of the divine character, a natural and necessary result from the violation of that system. Call up to your recollection the following particulars, which have been distinctly noticed in the progress of the general argument.

1. Angels fell on *personal* responsibility. In their condition there is nothing analogous to the natural relations among men. No Mediator has been provided for *them*. How should there be? Where would a mediatorial standard be reared? On what circumstance in their history, on what attribute of their being, could a remedial institute exert its influence? The case with mankind is entirely different. Behind social responsibility remains another system yet unimpaired. A Redeemer might turn with confidence to man's personal character. Under such circumstances,

why should not a Mediator be provided?—The door is opened *HERE*, and a Saviour enters.

2. If Adam had not eaten the forbidden fruit, then, after a period of personal probation, each of his posterity should have experienced a change from a natural into a spiritual body, and thus have been introduced to a final judgment. This change could not have been accomplished by the power of the human being, inasmuch as Adam was made merely a “living soul.” *HERE* too, in the contemplated operations of the system, the exercise of divine power is necessarily called for. Consequently, when we are reduced, by Adam’s transgression, to look at the other side of the statute, or to follow out the penalty in its deleterious action, we arrive, by a different route, at the very same *spot*. For death is now the outlet to introduce each individual to his personal account; as the change from a natural into a spiritual body would have been, if Adam had not sinned. The divine power is therefore referred to, from the nature of the system; and whenever Jehovah steps forth to act, he will display the intrinsic excellence of his own character.

3. The posterity of Adam have been brought into their various embarrassments, by a sin not *their own*. A judicial case is thus referred to the divine arbitrament. If the accused be not guilty, shall they be condemned? If there be any alleviating circumstance, shall it not be considered—will not *justice* speak? If there be any hope of reform, will not *mercy* speak? Is there no dispensing, no pardoning power, belonging to the supreme Governor? Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?—How simple, how easy, the whole case is!

4. By the fall of Adam, his children suffer under the malignant prowess of a powerful adversary; by which means the judicial investigation is extended to embrace a wide range of circumstances. A spectacle is presented to the universe, and other hosts of intellectual beings become deeply interested in the decision. Again we are thrown

on the divine character; and our case creates universal interest and sympathy.

The *system itself* then opens up a door for mediatorial relief; and the *character of God* becomes the turning point, where an inquiry is to be instituted as to subsequent proceedings. I know very well that theologians have taken a very different view of this whole matter. Fond of abstractions, and imagining that the more degraded the creature is represented to be, the more glorious God will appear, they can see nothing but an inscrutable sovereignty presiding over the melancholy scene; and deepen the gloom, by teaching that God should have been JUST, had he condemned Adam and all his posterity to everlasting perdition, for the "one offence." I cannot so speak of Jehovah. The scriptures afford no such representations of his character or conduct. And much do I marvel, that even those who have been taught from their earliest years to estimate their Creator under such dark and suspicious shadings of character, should not, when they see that he *has filled the earth with his goodness*, promptly embrace the first opportunity of forming lovelier views. Such thoughts of God must cripple all their efforts in his service; rebuke any approach to intimate or filial fellowship with him; limit their spiritual experience; fill up their pilgrimage with misgivings and distraction; and consign them to the grave amid doubts and fears. Hence confidence has been withdrawn from the Redeemer himself; and saints and angels, as secondary mediators, with a surplusage of supererogated works, and liturgies for the dead, have been called in as adjuvants. Hence so much blame has been thrown on Adam at one time, and on Satan at another; for some mode of explanation is indispensable to meet such a dark statement. Hence the chilling maxim, by which many justify their own tremulous hopes—"he who never doubted, never believed." The character which such moral philosophers or melancholy theologians delineate, when they undertake to describe the Governor

over all, excites no confidence and wins no love. Fortunately, however, for many, their inward exercises do not always correspond with their *published creed*. They derive loftier moral views, and more heavenly sensations, while meditating on the divine promises. In these promises, which are exceedingly great and precious, they glean some vivid ideas of divine love; and under the pleasing and enchanting, but often transitory, excitement, they for the moment forget their petrifying views of God, as riding on the whirlwind and crushing them under the denunciations of unsatisfied law.—But let us appeal to the law and to the testimony. Our beloved Lord speaks for himself.

God is LOVE. All his works—creation and providence—proclaim his goodness. “I am,” said he, “the Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long suffering and abundant in goodness and in truth—slow to anger and of great kindness.” He meets all who are distrustful and timorous with a solemn oath—“As I live, saith the Lord Jehovah, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked; but that the wicked turn from his way and live; turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways; for why will ye die, O house of Israel?”—Such is his character, and when did he ever falsify it? Whom did he ever disappoint? Who ever called and were not heard, or turned and were rejected? Who ever perished at the foot of the cross, or were thrown from the everlasting arms into the gulph of perdition? Whom has he not commanded, warned, entreated, and besought? Come, plead against him if thou canst. Recount his unkindnesses, tell of thine unanswered prayers, make mention of thy righteous deeds, and publish abroad the sorrows of a heart he has broken by his unrelenting severity—if it be in thy power to fling one single reproach against his merciful administration. Reproach him? No, thou canst not. All thy life long, his people, his ministers, his bible, his Spirit, have sounded in thine ear—“God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever

believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life:" and at this hour, conscience, in thine own bosom, responds to the truth of the fact. At his bar, and in the day of his burning glory, thy spirit shall meet the unanswerable argument—to sink, it may be unredeemed, and under a load of *personal* guilt into wailing and woe.

This is with me, as it ought to be with all, a favorite topic. Permit me to recite some of the appeals, which the Saviour himself makes to the good sense of mankind.—

"What MAN is there of you, whom if his *son* ask bread, will he give him a stone? Or if he ask a fish, will he give him a serpent? No *man* would be so inhuman or unfeeling. If ye then, being EVIL, know how to give good gifts unto *your children*, how MUCH MORE shall YOUR FATHER which is in heaven give good things to them that ask him?" He has nothing *evil* about him. He is your FATHER, and you are his CHILDREN. Can you then for a moment suppose, that he is destitute of the feelings of a *father*?

"You ask me, why I receive sinners and eat with them? What MAN of you, having an hundred sheep, if he lose one of them, doth not leave the ninety and nine in the wilderness, and go after that which is lost, until he find it? And when he hath found it, he layeth it on his shoulders, rejoicing. And when he cometh home, he calleth together his friends and neighbors, saying unto them, rejoice with me; for I have found my sheep which was lost. In like manner, when I go out as the great shepherd: there is *joy in heaven* over one sinner that repented, more than over ninety and nine just persons that need no repentance.

"Either what woman having ten pieces of silver, if she lose one, doth not light a candle, and sweep the house, and seek diligently till she find it? and when she hath found it, she calleth her friends and her neighbors together, saying, rejoice with me; for I have found the piece which I had lost. Likewise, I say unto you there is joy in the

presence of the angels of God over one sinner that repenteth.

“A prodigal son, having spent all his property in riotous living, returns to his father’s house, degraded, mortified and ruined! Shall he be rejected? Or will not a glad father, and a sympathising household, clothe him with the best robe, kill for him the fatted calf, and rejoice that he who was lost is found? Would any object to such a display of the paternal heart, unless it might be a jealous, ill natured, self righteous brother? And do you find fault because I seek to turn sinners from destruction? Have you no humanity to stimulate, no good sense to direct your feelings? Shall your heavenly Father manifest less kindness than his own creatures, or in moral sensibilities, sink below a mortal man? Be it known unto you, that it is not the will of your Father, which is in heaven, that one of these little ones should perish.

“The kingdom of heaven is like unto a certain king, who, in taking account of his servants, freely forgave a defaulter ten thousand talents. He had been brought under the condemnation of law; and himself, wife and children, and all that he had, were liable to be sold. But he humbly sought his lord, and was freely forgiven. Such is the nature of the kingdom of heaven, and the import of the gospel of grace—But that same servant went out and found one of his fellow-servants, who owed him an hundred pence. Disregarding the high example which had been set before him, and abusing the grace of which he had been so large and welcome a recipient, he violently proceeded to the extremity of the law. Prayer, entreaty, promises, appeals to his compassion, produced no impression on his hard heart; but he cast his unfortunate companion into prison, and left him to his sufferings, until the debt should be paid. But the lord was wroth, and said—‘O thou *wicked* servant, I forgave thee all that debt, because thou desiredst me. Shouldest not thou also have had compassion on thy fellow-

servant, even as I had pity on thee? And the lord delivered him to the tormentors, till he should pay all that was due to him.' Such is the kingdom of heaven; such is my Father's administration: so shall he do also unto you, if ye from your hearts forgive not every one his trespasses." Thus would, and did, our Saviour reason, evincing the greatest clemency, and the tenderest compassion, as characteristic of his mediatorial commission.

The idea, therefore, that God would have been *just* in condemning all Adam's posterity to eternal perdition, and for Adam's "one offence," falsifies every view of the divine character which has been given in the scriptures; belongs to a system of morals which would degrade even a sinful man; and is reprobated by the Master as sheer WICKEDNESS. On the other hand, free forgiveness, a gracious response to a prayer for mercy, and a kind regard to every good moral feeling which can exist in a human heart—when a debtor has saved his moral character by honorably doing all that he had ability and opportunity to do—constitute the very mode of divine operation which is embodied in the gospel, and which invites human confidence. There are "terrors of the Lord" unquestionably. Dishonored law and despised grace will remit a man to "the tormentors." But how ministers of the gospel can so far have forgotten the benevolence of their high calling, and the grace of the gospel they preach; how they can consent to merge what is so good and lovely, so condescending and kind, in continually uttering denunciations, and throwing human beings into such fearful paroxysms of alarmed feeling; or how they can interpret animal convulsions as spiritual exercises, worthy of an intelligent being and grateful to Jehovah, I do not, and cannot perceive. Assuredly such proceedings are not sanctioned by the commission they have received; by the nature of the message they are required to utter; by any intelligent views of human na-

ture they can embrace; or by any example, either of the Master or of his apostles, they have ever read.

As a mediatorial scheme may then naturally be looked for, as all its provisions must be suited to the case which is to be relieved, and as those provisions must be most heavenly and godlike in benevolence, let us proceed with the historian, and investigate the attributes of the remedial system, which was promptly introduced. It is expressed by God himself in the following manner:—"I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed: it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel." The peculiar phraseology was derived from the transactions themselves, as they had just transpired; and imported to Adam and Eve as much as any promise can announce to us; although such a promise may appear to be more lucid and expressive now that we are placed under different circumstances. A better view could not have been given to our first parents, nor a happier emblem have been selected than that which the history of the literal serpent should transmit from age to age.

"The Seed of the woman" is declared to be the mediatorial PRINCE, who should arise to achieve the redemption of our race. From the very first he is described as the *Son of God*, and "the desire of women." Adam had been known as the Son of God, but he was *made* of the dust of the ground, and was not "the Seed of the woman." Christ was not *made* of the dust, but was "*the only begotten* Son of God." This peculiarity in regard of his human nature, is very distinctly asserted in both the old and new testaments; and its design was, that he might wear "*the likeness* of sinful flesh," without having *sinful* flesh: or that he might have *the nature* into which sin had introduced its baneful influence, without having the *sin*. If he had been a son of a mortal father, both physiologically and legally his flesh would have been *sinful*. Like Adam he would have been merely "a living soul," instead of a

quickening spirit. But as God himself was his Father, both physiologically and legally, his animal or human nature became qualified for the instrumentality it was intended to subserve. “A *body*,” said he, “hast thou *prepared* me,” suitable in its constitution and temperament for the great work it was intended to perform. This was necessary, according to the views we have advanced in relation to the nature of the paradisiacal institute, and the effects of the fall. And Paul says:—“It *behooved him* in all things *to be made like unto his brethren*, that he might be a merciful and faithful high priest in all things pertaining to God.—It *became him*, for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory, to *make the Captain of their salvation perfect through sufferings*.—Such an high priest *became us*, who was holy, harmless, undefiled, SEPARATE FROM SINNERS, and made higher than the heavens.—We have not an high priest which cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities, but was in all points tempted like as we are, yet *without sin*.” It was indispensably necessary that our Saviour should wear our nature; but it was equally necessary that he should be without *sin*. This was the great point to be gained. His being “the Seed of the woman,” while yet he had no mortal father, accomplished the important end; and in a way to which no one who understands the doctrines of correct legal jurisprudence, or can state an accurate and consistent view of the physiology belonging to the case, could offer one rational or philosophical objection.

As the constitution of the mediatorial person is not an arbitrary matter, whose attributes are to be considered independently of the nature of the system which is calling for relief; the first point which claims our attention is the application of an original principle to the case in hand. Man has no *innate* ideas, but acquires his ideas by means of his corporeal senses. Inferring the existence of a supreme intelligence from the works around him, and which

are intended to afford, through those senses, the evidence of Jehovah's eternal power and Godhead, he *naturally* seeks after *personal* intercourse with Jehovah. To meet that desire and view, Jehovah had previously assumed external form; and under this *manifestation* he is denominated Jehovah-ELOHIM, or the WORD. Man is now fallen. According to our argument, his *bodily senses are impaired*. Can he then enjoy that *personal* intercourse which his nature demands, and if not, what shall be done? I answer, that agreeably to the fact recorded in the biography of Moses, man could not, in his lapsed state, *see the FACE of GOD and live*. Either then the whole doctrine of *personal* intercourse must be abandoned, or another *manifestation*, suited to man's present condition, must be afforded. Here, therefore, in the *nature* of man, and in the *nature* of his circumstances, arises the necessity for Christ's DIVINITY. And if this view be correct, the doctrine of Christ's *divinity*—which, as you know, I never for a moment denied—is put to rest. No man who admits that our argument is scriptural and conclusive, can ever have even a lingering doubt upon that controverted point;—in relation to which philosophy and philology, reason and revelation, history and authority, reproach and invective, have all been summoned and forced to respond to the appeals of angry disputants: and about which, after all the controversy, the common mind has not obtained one clear or well defined idea in reference to its heavenly principle. The spirit of Arius and of the council of Nice, which at an early day acted out a very gloomy tragedy in the name of the Head of the church, seems still to superintend the angry conflict. Whether any thing can be offered to reconcile the combatants, prejudiced and committed as they are, is a very doubtful matter; or rather men are too sectarian, and too full of the philosophy of other times, calmly or patiently to judge of any argument which is not expressed in their own technicalities.

The necessity for a second *personal* manifestation of Jehovah, or for an *exact image* of his PERSON, having occurred, he has been pleased, so far as man is concerned, to divest himself of the form of God, and to take the form of a servant; or instead of exhibiting himself as JEHOVAH-
ELOHIM—whom no man can see and live—to reveal HIMSELF IN CHRIST, or as THE WORD MADE FLESH. Accordingly the Mediator has been represented as a divine personage, by the old and new testament writers, as well as by his own assertions, before he appeared and while he was upon earth. The details on this subject are highly interesting, and the progress of our discussion requires us to pursue them.

When Cain was born, Eve remarked,—“I have gotten the man, Jehovah his very self.” She does not appear to have noticed or understood the peculiarity of the promise, as it was afterwards explained; yet seems fully to have understood the fact that the deliverer should be *divine*—should be Jehovah HIMSELF. What was her train of reflection, or wherein the fallacy of her calculation consisted, we are not informed. But she appears to have cherished her mistake; and to have incorporated it in the early habits of thinking, which she produced in the mind of her first-born. Her observation is the only hint given, from which we can ascertain any reason for his dereliction. His character betrays mortified pride, and disappointed ambition, together with excited envy on account of his brother’s higher promise.—The case of Rebecca furnishes an analagous fact in the history of maternal mistakes.

At the close of the scene when *Abraham* was required to offer his son in sacrifice, he called the name of the spot—*Jehovah-jireh*—saying, in this mountain JEHOVAH shall be seen. The deportment of the patriarch, including the confession of the divine NAME which he thus made, has been celebrated in the scriptures, as a brilliant specimen of the

righteousness of faith. The situation in which Isaac was placed, when bound on the sacrificial pile, and under the uplifted knife of a beloved father, who was reposing all his confidence in the ability of "Almighty God" to raise his son from the dead; the relief which was granted when another victim was provided;—the whole matter, with all its references, forms a beautiful *figure* of the mediatorial system, the patriarchal faith in which is so highly commended. As Abraham was constituted a covenant head, and *the heir of the world*; as he did become an official head, under whose auspices two subsequent dispensations were erected; and, as in his SEED all the families of the earth should be blessed, there can be no mistake in the comment he makes; while the facts must be considered as a typical pledge of some future and more glorious transaction. Somewhere in the development of God's purposes of love, events must transpire, in which this singular pledge should be redeemed, and to which this scenic exhibition most distinctly and happily alluded. Accordingly the reference points to the sacrifice of the Son of God, when, on mount Moriah or Calvary, he appeared to take away sin by the sacrifice of *himself*. He with whom Abraham conversed, and to whom he offered sacrifice, was the ANGEL, or messenger of Jehovah, of whom mention is frequently made; and who is described as the LORD, that was afterwards to come into his temple. On the present occasion he said to Abraham—"Thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son, from ME."

But other facts occurred in the history of this princely patriarch, as well as in that of his immediate successors, Isaac and Jacob. When he was "ninety years old and nine, JEHOVAH *appeared* unto him, and said unto him, I am the ALMIGHTY GOD, walk before me and be thou perfect."—Again "JEHOVAH *appeared* unto him in the plains of Mamre: and he sat in the tent door in the heat of day. And he lifted up his eyes and looked, and lo! THREE MEN stood by him." After this he held a long and familiar conversation

with *one* of these, who is represented to have been JEHOVAH. Moses was explicitly told by JEHOVAH—“*I appeared* unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob *as*, or by the name, or form, of ALMIGHTY GOD; but by my NAME, or personal form of JEHOVAH, was I not known unto them. All these *appearances* in the biography of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, were in the form of MAN; and the *facts* no presumptuousness can deny, nor ingenuity fritter away.

David utters a remarkable declaration, which is afterwards quoted by the Redeemer in elucidation of his own official pretensions;—“The *Lord* said unto MY LORD, sit thou at my right hand.” The term *Lord*, as it was originally used, ever imported inferiority on the part of him who used it. David, in using it, then referred to the superiority of him of whom he spake. Hence the difficulty which the pharisees felt in answering the question—“If David IN SPIRIT call him LORD how is he his SON?” David, as the king of Israel had no superior, but the God of Israel.

Isaiah describes a vision which he enjoyed, when the royal magnificence of the heavenly court was spread out before his view. That which the prophet beheld, an apostle tells us, was THE GLORY OF CHRIST.

The prophet Malachi closes the old testament with the divine promise—“Behold, I will send my messenger, and he shall prepare the way before ME: and the LORD, whom ye seek, shall suddenly come to his temple, *even the messenger* (angel) *of the covenant*, whom ye delight in: behold, he shall come, saith JEHOVAH of hosts.” Jehovah here proclaims—my messenger shall prepare the way before ME—the LORD is to *come* into his *temple*—and the ANGEL of the covenant is the LORD, who was to come. This passage the Redeemer interprets as referring to John the baptist, who came to prepare the way of THE HIGHEST; and whose official employment, for which he had been specifically designated, was to bear testimony to the Messiah.

There is something peculiarly striking, and particularly

interesting, in this denomination which the prophet uses in reference to the LORD; and which has already occurred to our notice in the history of Abraham. He is called the ANGEL of the covenant; which appellation might at first view detract from the divinity of his person. But the Mosaic dispensation was the administration of LAW, and was introduced by God under the character of *lawgiver*:—or in the FORM or NAME of JEHOVAH. Was there then, under the Levitical dispensation, no exhibition of Jehovah HIMSELF in a mediatorial point of view? Having appeared in the form of MAN to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and the jews living, not merely under the Sinaic, but also under the Abrahamic covenant, was this peculiar and important *manifestation* of God entirely withdrawn? Observe, the expression of Malachi identifies the LORD with this ANGEL, and calls him the angel of the COVENANT. And this fact can scarcely fail to call up to the recollection of the biblical reader, a declaration that God made to his people, which is remarkable in itself, and at the same time clearly explains the matter in hand. “Behold,” said he, I send an ANGEL before thee, to keep thee in the way, and to bring thee into the place which I have prepared: beware of him, and obey his voice, provoke him not; for he will not pardon your transgressions: for MY NAME IS IN HIM.” Again, the reader of the scriptures will as readily call up to his recollection, a fact which occurred in the history of Joshua. On some occasion, while he “was by Jericho, he lifted up his eyes and looked, and behold, there stood a MAN over against him, with his sword drawn in his hand; and Joshua went unto him, and said unto him—Art thou for us, or for our adversaries? And he said, nay, but as CAPTAIN of the host of Jehovah am I now come. And Joshua fell on his face to the earth, and did worship, and said unto him, What saith my Lord unto his servant? And the CAPTAIN of Jehovah’s host said unto Joshua—Loose thy shoe from off thy foot for the place whereon thou standest is holy.” Here the angel—

whose official character is that of CAPTAIN—a term which, you know, is appropriated to the Lord Jesus—appears not only as a MAN, but acts as JEHOVAH, in reminding Joshua that the spot on which he stood was HOLY, being consecrated by the divine presence. The ANGEL, or messenger of the covenant, who went up before the people, who consequently was CAPTAIN, requiring all obedience to his orders, and in whom Jehovah's NAME dwelt, was then that same ALMIGHTY GOD, who had *appeared* to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, their patriarchal fathers. It was he, of whom the prophet Isaiah predicates that same “fellow-feeling,” which the apostle Paul ascribes to our great high-priest, saying—“In all their affliction he was afflicted, and the angel of his presence saved them: in his love and in his pity he redeemed them; and he bare them and carried them all the days of old.” Malachi has stated this subject, or penned his prophecy, in appropriate terms, when he says—“The LORD whom ye seek, shall suddenly come into HIS temple, EVEN THE MESSENGER OF THE COVENANT whom ye *delight in*.”

If I have not sufficiently identified the *angel* as being the LORD, and well known as such, I will refer you to the account which Moses gives of his own induction into the apostolic office. “The ANGEL of the Lord appeared unto him in a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush. And when JEHOVAH saw that he turned aside to see, the ELOHIM called unto him out of the midst of the bush, and said—I am the *Elohim* of thy father, the *Elohim* of Abraham, the *Elohim* of Isaac, and the *Elohim* of Jacob.”—The ANGEL and the ELOHIM are the same.*

The simple fact, however, that Jehovah says concerning this angel, “MY NAME IS IN HIM,” ought to satisfy any one who will give due attention to the use of terms. But perhaps, it may not be amiss to observe again, that the original words translated NAME, in hebrew and greek, are used

* See Lec. V. for fuller explanation.

for the *person* himself, whom they may be intended to represent. The *name* of Jehovah is accordingly employed in the old testament, as a title belonging to either manifestation. In the new testament the Redeemer prays—"Glorify thy NAME," and commands his disciples to baptize "in the NAME of Father, Son and Holy Spirit." The term is thus used also for human *persons*; as for example:—"The number of the NAMES (persons) together were about an hundred and twenty." "Thou hast a few NAMES (persons) even in Sardis, who have not defiled their garments." "And in the earthquake were slain of men (NAMES) seven thousand, and the remnant (of *names*, or persons) were affrighted, and gave glory to God."* The very fact, therefore, that Jehovah remarks concerning the *angel*, whose official character we are considering,—*My name* is in him—is irrefragable proof that the *mediatorial manifestation* is designed to be expressed by the term.

To proceed. Matthew takes up the subject, where Malachi left it, and tells us, both of the Messenger who should prepare the way of the LORD; and of the virgin-born child, who should be called *Immanuel*, i. e. GOD WITH US: and whom Isaiah had declared should be designated by the name—Wonderful, Counsellor, THE MIGHTY GOD, THE EVER-LASTING FATHER, the Prince of Peace. John fulfils his office in pointing to Jesus of Nazareth as the HIGHEST, whose way he came to prepare; who should baptize men with the HOLY SPIRIT; and who would thoroughly purge HIS floor, and gather his wheat into the garner, while he would burn up the chaff with unquenchable fire.

John, the apostle, says of him—"In the beginning the WORD WAS, and the Word was with Jehovah, and the WORD WAS GOD. The WORD was made FLESH, and dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the ONLY

* See Parkhurst's Lex. either Heb. or Gr. He refers to Longinus as using the greek terms, which would be literally rendered—one name for one person.

BEGOTTEN of the Father, full of grace and truth." In short, all the evangelists lay themselves out to demonstrate, by the details of his own ministry, that he was THE SON OF GOD, in whom the FATHER DWELT.

Jesus declared that the FATHER dwelt in him. He said,—"The *Father* himself, which hath sent me, hath borne witness of me. Ye have neither heard his voice at any time, nor seen his shape. I am in the *Father*, and the Father in me; he that hath seen *me*, hath seen the *Father*; and how sayest thou then, show us the *Father*?

After he had gone to his kingdom, his disciples testified concerning him, and proclaimed his glory:—"We were eye-witnesses of his *Majesty*.—In him dwelleth *all the fulness of the Godhead bodily*.—He divested himself of *the form of God, and took the form of a servant*.—God is in Christ reconciling the world unto HIMSELF, not imputing unto men their trespasses.—All things were made by him.—Moses was faithful in God's house as a SERVANT; but Christ, as a SON, presided over HIS OWN house.—As God entered into rest, when he finished the heavens and the earth, even so Jesus, having finished his work, entered into his rest.—These, and a thousand other like glorious declarations are found in the sacred scriptures, describing THE LORD FROM HEAVEN, who came down to act as the second Adam in the form of MAN, and to whom the Spirit was not given *by measure*, but on whom that Spirit descended in *bodily shape*.

While these views are spread out at large over the bible, and belong to the *whole* history of God's proceedings with men since the fall, it is curious to observe what an abundance of like views may be gathered from the heathen world. I will give you a few of them.

"The ancient account seems to be very true, and of the primeval philosophy, that, at certain fixed times, pure and divine powers, for the good of men, walk on the earth, descending from heaven; not clothed in air, as Hesiod speaks, but having *assumed* bodies similar to our own, and having

taken upon themselves a life inferior to their nature, for the sake of fellowship with us.”*

“The followers of Buddha unanimously declare, that his incarnation in the womb of a virgin was foretold several thousand years, though some say only one thousand, before it came to pass.

“It is declared, in the Vicrama-Charitra, that the birth of a divine child, from a virgin, had been foretold one thousand years before it happened; nay, some say two thousand. The time of his birth is thus ascertained from the Lumarica-Chanda, a portion of the Scanda-Purana. When three thousand and one hundred years of the Cali-Yuga are elapsed; then SACA will appear and remove wretchedness and misery from the world. SACA is a title of the virgin-born Buddha.

“Whenever the deity condescends to be born of woman, *the person is one, but there are two natures.* To this distinction we must carefully attend, in order to reconcile many seeming contradictions in the Puranas; and more particularly so with respect to Vaivaswata and Satyavrata, who are acknowledged to be but *one person*. The divine nature is an emanation of Vishnou in his character of the Sun; and Satyavrata is the human nature. These two natures often act independently of each other, and may exist at the same time in different places.”†

“Virgil, in his *Pollio*, announces the approaching birth of an extraordinary child, whom he decorates with all the attributes of the Messiah of the Hebrews. This child was to be the high offspring of the gods, the great seed of Jupiter. When Julius Cæsar wished to crown his greatness by assuming the title of a king, one of his creatures adduced a prediction from the books of the Sibyl; in which it was

* Faber's Dispensations, vol. 1. p. 305.

† Faber's Dispensations, vol. i. pp. 311—12, who refers to Asiatic Researches, vol. x. pp. 27—46, 47, and vol. vi. pp. 479.

foretold that a prince was to arise about that time, whose monarchy should be universal, and whose government would be essential to the happiness of the world. Cicero freely admits that the prophecy in question was actually to be found in the sybilline oracles."*

Much more might be readily advanced, and of the same general character, from the mythology of the heathen. The simple fact, however, when it is thus proved, answers my purpose. And the whole view shows, that it was GOD HIMSELF who assumed a human form, and descended to bless mankind, as their Saviour. And if there has been no evidence that the *second person of the trinity*, as he has been termed, thus descended, there has been none to evince that the Saviour, in his divine character, was any other than GOD HIMSELF. Nor can any one, who has given himself time to understand the theory I have advanced, find the least room to charge it with a tendency, either to *tritheism*, or to any of the popular forms in which *unitarianism* has in vain solicited the credence of mankind.

But the necessities of human nature, under the deteriorating consequences of Adam's sin, called for more than a manifestation, or an "exact image" of Jehovah's PERSON. Adam had not only introduced sin and death into the world, but he had forfeited his official character as their *social head*; and had defrauded his children of that "ministration of righteousness" which, in his official character, and for their benefit, he should have wrought out. It was intended that his *righteousness*, by securing *temporal life* and all its accompanying blessings, should exhibit to his children the connexion between righteousness and life, in view of their personal responsibility to the law "written on their hearts." Such an exhibition was indispensably necessary, considering the peculiarity of the human constitution; or that the

* See Faber's *Horæ Mosaicæ*, vol. i. pp. 78—80. Horsely's *Diss. on Heathen Prophecies*, pp. 15—20. Leslie's *short method with the jews*. Work. Fol. vol. 1 p. 47—50.

spirit of man acquires its ideas through the medium of the bodily senses. Of the influence of such official character and action, we have ample and melancholy proof in the general depravity of mankind. A remedial scheme must take up this great law of human nature, and the Mediator must furnish this "ministration of righteousness." Accordingly Jehovah-ELOHIM, or the WORD, assumed the form of a *servant*, was found in the fashion of a *man*; and this official personage, being made under the *law*, became obedient unto death, that he might "bring in everlasting righteousness."

For this general object, he became "the Seed of the woman," thus wearing the *likeness* of sinful flesh: but as he had no earthly father, a body being prepared for him by Jehovah, who is hence called his heavenly Father, he had not *sinful* flesh. The end designed to be accomplished by all this careful preparation of his exterior form was, that he might be an *official* agent, or a *social head*, such as the law had made Adam. For this reason he was, as Adam was, emphatically the SON OF GOD; though different from Adam in this, that *he* (the man Christ) was the *only begotten Son* of God. Hence he was called the SECOND ADAM, and is declared superior to Adam, in that he was a *quickening spirit*; having all life in himself as given to him by his Father. Thus Adam is declared to be the FIGURE of Christ: and the principle of official action is distinctly defined to be, that—as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive; or that—"as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life." Adam had forfeited his official dignity; a chasm was accordingly created, which, under a remedial system developed on the same principle with the original institute, must be filled up, either by restoring that lost dignity to Adam, or by conferring it on another. It was conferred on another, Adam having become utterly incompetent, as the formation

of Christ's human body abundantly manifests; and therefore Christ is introduced as the **SECOND ADAM**.

It is worthy of our attention, that the first Adam was formed immediately by Jehovah-Elohim. The strict analogy, it would therefore seem, requires that Christ, as the second Adam, should have a similar descent. To reprobate the birth of Christ, is about as philosophical as it would be to deny the origin of the first-man.

The political analogy equally demands, that the fact of Christ's birth should be as the scriptures have described it. Who should be "the **HEIR** of all things" but Jehovah's **SON**? If then Christ is indeed "Lord over all," and if the political relation between the **FATHER** and the **SON** includes the idea of **INHERITANCE**, both of which the bible unequivocally affirms; then, if you deny the peculiarity of the Redeemer's birth, you are bereaved of an appropriate—of the **ONLY**—external **SYMBOL** of the great political transaction by which the Redeemer is constituted **LORD**. And yet, by such symbols, which the nature of man makes imperiously necessary, God has represented every other great truth to the human mind.

I know not whether any of you may have adopted the Swedenborgian idea, that God had assumed simply a human body, without having a human spirit; or whether you might not suppose that the argument, as far as it has been pursued, involves that idea. It forms, however, no part of my speculations. Christ is most unequivocally declared to be a **MAN**, and is, in so many words, called the **MAN** Christ Jesus. —"There is one God, and one Mediator between God and men, *the man Christ Jesus*. He hath appointed a day, in the which he will judge the world in righteousness, by **THAT MAN** whom he hath ordained:" He could not be a **MAN**, if he had not a human spirit; he could not speak of *himself* separate from the Father, as he does, if he had no human spirit; his historians could not portray the extending operations of his *mind*, growing in wisdom as he ad-

vanced to manhood, as they do; nor could he refer to his own distinct intellectual operations, as he does, when he says—"As I hear I judge"—or when he says, "Of that day and hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, *neither the Son,*" if he had no human spirit; nor could he be the second Adam, a social head to the human family, if he had no human spirit.

But on the supposition that our spirits are derived from our earthly parent, how could Christ be a MAN at all? Following up the subject physiologically, from its beginnings in other parts of the material world, we have nothing more called for than a philosophical view of a more intricate or complex material organization; and theologically, nothing else is required, but to show how he could have human *flesh*, without having *sinful* flesh. If there should exist in the material world any thing analogous to that which is displayed in the intellectual world, and which constitutes the *man* the legal, or official, HEAD; then this whole matter is fairly and fully met by the declaration, that Christ was "the Seed of the woman." Hence it is that, in speaking of his human descent, his *spirit* is not referred to at all; but as his spirit, like all other human spirits, was derived directly from God, the peculiarity of his body turns upon the fact that it was not *sinful flesh*:—"That *holy thing* which shall be born of thee, shall be called the Son of God." The question in this connexion, never involves his *spirit*; and simply because unholiness of *spirit* is a matter belonging to individual action and personal responsibility. The singular manner in which the subject is represented in the scriptures, together with an analogy between the material and intellectual world, to which I have already alluded, is the basis of my idea. I know not how physiologists in general may estimate it; but they must pardon me, if I think of my bible more highly than I do of their conjectures; and refer them to its pages, rather than to their *systems*.

The theology of the world is never very widely different

from its philosophy. How should it be, when ecclesiastical men occupy the chairs of science, and literary men *alone* are considered competent to occupy our pulpits? Multitudes may affect to laugh at philosophy; but in spite of them their philosophy will control their theology, or their theology will control their philosophy. It must be so. For both are concerned with God's works. Creation and the bible are like to each other. The heavens and the earth conspire with the scriptures to declare the glory of God. A revolution occurring in the one, will bring necessarily a revolution in the other; or, if philosophy should advance while moral science still doles out the prejudices and dogmas of past ages, it is no wonder that an uproar should be heard, and that theologians should tremble under their own prognostics of growing infidelity.—But my object was, as to the subject before us, to refer physiologists to the *bible*: for the BIBLE is strictly philosophical, whatever the systems of its admirers may be.

Thus qualified, or his mediatorial *person* being thus constituted, the Redeemer enters on his benevolent enterprise. His *apostolic* character had been prefigured by that of Moses, who “was faithful in ALL God's house:” or, who was not merely a prophet, but concentrated *all authority* in his own commission; and whose influence was felt in every part of the ecclesiastical establishment that he was employed to erect. Hence it is said, when Jehovah would illustrate his official importance—“With him I will speak mouth to mouth, even *apparently*, and not in dark speeches; and *the similitude of the Lord shall he behold.*” So Christ. Of him it is said, “No man hath seen God: the only begotten Son, which is *in the bosom of the Father*, he hath declared him;” and he was faithful to him that appointed him, as also Moses was.” But then Christ Jesus “was counted worthy of *more glory* than Moses, inasmuch as *he who hath builded the house* hath more honor than *the house.*” The *Creator* hath more glory than the *creature*: “For

every house is builded by some man ; but he that built *all things* is GOD. And Moses verily was faithful in all his house as a SERVANT ;—but Christ as A SON OVER HIS OWN HOUSE.” Hence Jehovah says to him—“ Thy throne, O GOD, is for ever and ever :—Thou, LORD, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the works of thy hand.” As the “ appointed HEIR of all things, by whom the worlds were made,” he enters on his remedial embassy—the brightness of glory, and the exact image of God’s PERSON—the CHARACTER—the IMAGE—the VISIBLE REPRESENTATION of Jehovah IN THE FORM OF GOD.

In this official character, which is so general, *all* authority, which in a system of *types* has been parcelled out among many individuals, devolves upon the SON *alone*. Hence, in the discharge of his mediatorial work, he is *Prophet, Priest, and King*. Summing up all as a social head of the RACE, he was more gloriously prefigured by ADAM :—He declares his FATHER to the human family ; on his *righteousness* the whole divine administration is conducted ; and he exercises dominion over the whole system. Rising superior to Adam, and carrying out a remedial principle commensurate with the whole exigency which had occurred, he is “ the image of the invisible God ”—a manifestation of Jehovah HIMSELF, LIKE that which had been originally afforded when man was created—the divine LORD, the LORD FROM HEAVEN. And all is sustained in his person and work, with the most perfect consistency, and in a manner precisely suited to our present character and condition. Hence he speaks of himself in the following language :—“ The SON can do nothing of himself, but what he seeth the FATHER do : for what things soever he doeth, these also doeth the SON likewise. For the FATHER loveth the SON, and showeth him *all things* that HIMSELF doth. For as the FATHER raiseth up the dead, and quickeneth them, even so the SON quickeneth whom HE will. For the FA-

THESE judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the SON: that all men should HONOR THE SON, EVEN AS THEY HONOR THE FATHER. He that honoreth NOT the SON, honoreth NOT the FATHER which hath sent HIM."

I know not how to speak of the beloved Saviour, with more heavenly conceptions, in distincter terms, or in loftier phrase. The ideas and language have alike been taken from the scriptures, and are utterly inadmissible in a description of a mere creature, or of any one less than GOD HIMSELF. At the same time, I cannot imagine how a remedial system, intended to relieve the described and the visible condition of mankind, so far as the official character of the Mediator is concerned, should be presented in more suitable form.

LECTURE X.

Difficulties stated—Redeemer's prayers—The delivering of the kingdom to the Father, when the END shall come—Official analogies—Redeemer's prayers—SPIRIT and its varied operations, in application of the views developed in Lecture V.

THE subject of the mediatorial character and relations, as they are spread out over the inspired pages, and which cannot fail to interest, at least, every philosophical moralist, is entitled to farther elucidation. There are various difficulties which have not yet been removed, and which will readily occur to every reader of the scriptures. They are no doubt, even now, pressing with great weight on your minds; and you see not how they can be removed on any hypothesis. But let us pursue our investigations. We

have been sustained thus far, and may venture, with a good share of confidence, to proceed farther.

CHRIST, it is said, PRAYS to his Father; and this may be supposed to be utterly inconsistent with the idea of his DIVINITY.

But why should he *not* pray to his Father? May not the MAN Christ Jesus pray to his FATHER? Even in view of the mediatorial *personage*, of which both natures are affirmed; where is the alleged impropriety? When David calls upon *his own soul* to bless the Lord, does he not use a phrase of which similar impropriety might be, and yet is not, asserted?—But above all, does it not belong to Christ's official work to fulfil all *righteousness*? and may I not explain his *prayer*, as he explained his *baptism* to his forerunner? Might you not as well ask me, why he did any thing in *human nature*, or why he was made *like unto his brethren in all things*, and why he *learned obedience* by the things which he suffered? Or rather, may I not ask any one who objects to his *divinity*, why he should *not* pray, when all round his *humanity* is unhesitatingly admitted?

But, it will be replied, his prayer was so *peculiar*: for he said, "Father, glorify thou me, with *thine own self*, with the glory which I had with thee, before the world was."—Well what was this glory? Was it not that which belonged to him as the LORD, seated on the THRONE, having *all power*, and governing *all things*? Was it not God, as manifested in *the form of God*, or Jehovah-Elohim, who was recognised as LORD; because that *man*, from his constitution, could not perceive pure SPIRIT? And did HE not, as thus manifested, the LORD, *lay aside*, so far as sinful man is concerned, *the form of God*, and *take the form of MAN*? Does he not pray then, that his FATHER would clothe him with *that glory*, confer upon him *that power*, and demonstrate him to be entrusted with *that lordship*, which men were thus originally called to recognise? And is not this identity *every where* asserted? Was it not the WORD, which

was in the beginning WITH GOD, and which WAS GOD, that was afterwards made FLESH?

Again. We have had frequent opportunities of noticing the peculiar force of the scriptural term NAME, as applied to God:—the *name* Jehovah—the *name* Almighty God—the *name* Father, Son and Holy Spirit—my *name* is in him. Accordingly, in connexion with the prayer under consideration, Jesus remarks—“I have manifested THY NAME unto the men which thou gavest me.” And elsewhere he prays—“Father glorify thy *name*.” The prayer corresponds with the subsequent fact, which Peter expressed with so much point and beauty, when he said—“Let all the house of Israel know assuredly, that God hath made that same Jesus, whom ye have crucified, both LORD AND CHRIST.” And as such he is set forth, according to his prayer, when in his church, and at his altars, men are baptized “in the *name* of Father, Son and Holy Spirit.—You might then as well ask me, why he prayed at all?

In what way, it will be farther demanded, does Christ sit at THE RIGHT HAND of Jehovah, on the throne of heaven?—In reply to this question, I would ask you to remember, that when God was originally manifested *in the form of God*, he was so manifested both to ANGELS and men. This view of our subject, you recollect, was distinctly stated in the argument on the ELOHIM; and it may now be fully impressed on your mind by quoting the declaration of our Redeemer, concerning *angels*:—“They do always,” said he, “*behold* the *face* of my FATHER which IS IN HEAVEN.” All the language on the subject deserves particular attention. “THE LORD said unto MY LORD, sit THOU on MY right hand, until I make THINE enemies THY footstool.”—“The SON having by himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the MAJESTY on high.”—He said himself—“ye shall see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of POWER:”—“It is *manifest* that HE is accepted, who did put all things under him.”—At first there

was a single *personal* manifestation of God, to occupy the throne as LORD. But a second *personal* manifestation, or that which should be an IMAGE, appropriate and exact enough to answer the same purpose, has become necessary, and HE, who thus appears, is made both LORD and Christ. As Lord and Christ this second manifestation, this "EXACT IMAGE" of Jehovah's PERSON, or of JEHOVAH-ELOHIM, is now exhibited on the throne, and on the right hand of the original manifestation. Hence David's language—The LORD said unto my LORD; and hence the position occupied is described as the right hand of MAJESTY, or the *personal* dignity and glorious display of God as *manifested* to his creatures. Or, Jehovah having, for certain purposes, taken *the form of man*, in THAT FORM he has gone to the throne; which throne he had from the beginning occupied *in the form of God*—having assumed FORM in both cases, for the government of his creatures. As LORD in the *mediatorial* form, he sits down on the right hand of the previous exhibition he had made of himself, as LORD in the form of *God*. And can any reason be assigned, why he should not occupy the throne, or be manifested in both forms at the same time? Is there any incongruity, or was David inaccurate, when he observed—"The Lord said unto my Lord."

This double exhibition, each having its own distinct official relations, and sustaining those relations with the most exact consistency, shall continue the luminous, but varied, manifestations of GODHEAD, while the necessity in which they originated shall remain. But a change is contemplated; for our mediatorial LORD is invited to the throne UNTIL—until all his enemies are put under his feet; thus long, says Paul—please turn to the first epistle to the Corinthians—thus long "he must REIGN. Then cometh the END, when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power." The purposes of the mediatorial manifestation, for which the WORD divested himself of the

form of *God*, and took the form of *man*, shall be all accomplished :—which being done, THE END has come. What shall occur then, when, the object of this mediatorial manifestation being secured, its necessity shall cease ; and we shall be qualified to do that which by the fall we are incompetent to do—i. e. to see God AS HE IS ? The apostle informs us that Christ shall then *deliver up the kingdom* to God, even the Father. Of course the Mediator shall reign no longer, or shall be no longer LORD. The WORD, who had assumed the form of MAN while we were unable to see GOD, will reappear to MAN in the form of GOD. Then we shall be made competent to see GOD ; and instead of a manifestation in the form of *man*, God manifested “in the form of GOD,” or, as it was in the beginning, the WORD which was with God, and which was GOD, SHALL BE ALL AND IN ALL.—The Father dwelleth in the Word. And, if we were at liberty to suppose, that a time might arrive when all God’s intelligent creatures should be annihilated, it would in that case be consistent to aver, that Jehovah would lay aside the form of God, as no longer necessary. Jehovah would no longer subsist in PERSON, or as Jehovah-Elohim. But such an END is not contemplated—angels and men are immortal.

What then becomes of the MAN Christ Jesus ? Why adds the apostle—Then shall the SON—then shall the SON ALSO—then shall the Son also HIMSELF, be SUBJECT to HIM who put all things under him, and who *manifestly* was *excepted*, when all things were thus put under him. The consequence of this SUBJECTION of the Son is, that GOD SHALL BE ALL AND IN ALL.—The Son is here spoken of as that one who says of himself—“I can of *mine own self* do nothing :”—“the words that I speak unto you, I speak *not of myself* ; but the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works.” The distinction between the FATHER and the SON is thus most unequivocally asserted ; and when the END cometh, that distinction shall be *visibly* displayed as it

is not *now*. The Son is at present on the throne ; but then the distinction shall be visible ; for God, even the Father, shall be *all and in all*, while the Son himself shall be *subject*.

But still it may be inquired, what shall be the future relations of the SON ?—All things shall be brought back to their original condition of government, when the mediatorial kingdom shall be at an end ; or they shall be consummated as they would have been if ADAM had not eaten the forbidden fruit. The human family as they shall then appear in heaven—the righteous who shall go away into everlasting life—shall be recognised in their own peculiar association. But where is their HEAD ? ADAM had forfeited that dignity by transgression. And on whom should it devolve, but on the SECOND Adam, who had been their Redeemer ? Hence Paul says, when speaking of our family organization—“I would have you know, that the HEAD of every *man* is CHRIST ; and the *head* of the *woman* is the *man* ; and the HEAD OF CHRIST is GOD.”

If my remarks be somewhat more bold than those which you have been accustomed to hear ; and if they seem to convert that which you have been wont to consider as an inscrutable mystery, into a very plain matter ; perhaps you may feel your mind perfectly reconciled, by recollecting that he, who laid aside *the form of God* so far as man is concerned ; while yet in *that form* he retained other relations, may also lay aside *the form of man*, while the relations of that form of man, or of the man Christ Jesus, and *as such*, are in no way affected. If you are not perfectly reconciled to this view, it may not be amiss for you to turn to the commentators,* and observe their ideas and their perplexity. They will tell you, that Christ AS MAN, like the saints and angels, will be subject to the Father ; and immediately enter into collision with “the *Arians*, who affirm, that if this had been the apostle’s meaning, he would

* Scott, Henry, Whitby, McKnight, Locke, Guyse.

have said, *then shall even Jesus himself be subjected.*" But they think the whole argument of the apostle to be exceedingly obscure. And no wonder; for they go on to say, that—the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, shall *in union* govern all things: and, that notwithstanding the apostle says, that *the Son* shall be *subject*. Their error lies in their idea, that the distinction of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, is in GOD-HEAD ITSELF; which idea, from the very nature of the case, cannot be correct. The distinction exists in the MANIFESTATION which God makes, of HIMSELF. Their doctrine is unquestionably maintained from the best motives, and with the view of elucidating the DIVINITY and PERSONALITY, which they suppose to be indubitably predicated in the scriptures, of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. But those points can be better explained without their doctrine; as may appear very intelligibly to any mind that has candor enough, and will take time enough, to consider the scriptural statements.

But this whole subject may be presented in another and perhaps better light. The illustrations offered in the fifth lecture afford us a fair opportunity of varying the argument. Man is described in the scriptures as having "spirit, and soul, and body;" and these were considered by ancient physiologists as constituting the human HYPOSTASIS or PERSON. God ascribes all these to himself, and frequently speaks of his SOUL, in his addresses to the people of Israel; while Paul speaks of the divine hypostasis or PERSON, of which he declares the Son to be "the exact image." Now whether you consider that there was a divine person, or that all such expressions must be interpreted as mere figures of speech, as being used out of mere condescension and without any reference to substantial symbols, still some meaning must be intended. If, on the Socinian principle of explaining plural nouns and pronouns, verbs and adjectives, when applied to Jehovah, you consider the term SOUL to be merely "borrowed" from the physiology of the human person for illustration, yet it must be borrowed on ac-

count of some valuable idea it would convey; and must be interpreted consistently with that physiology. If so, let me ask whether a father can give his *SOUL* to his son? or, if that can be supposed, would not then the *individuality* of the father be entirely lost, or his personal *subsistence* be merged in that of the Son? Such an hypothesis, you perceive, is utterly inadmissible. It will therefore follow, that if the term *SOUL* be applied to Jehovah consistently with its own meaning, God cannot give his *soul* to his "only begotten Son," without destroying that individuality of subsistence which has been denominated the *Logos* or *WORD*. And if this cannot be, the exaltation of the Mediator can in no way imply an impropriety, in that the original *PERSON*—Jehovah-Elohim—occupies the throne. How can it be otherwise than that he should? The *individuality* is distinctly preserved.

The fact in the case is, that *SOUL*, viewed as the Soul of *God*, never is predicated of the Mediator. You always hear of the *SPIRIT* of God dwelling in Christ Jesus, and you hear abundantly of his divine qualifications in that respect. Whenever *soul* is spoken of in relation to "the man Christ Jesus," it is always a human soul. If he had not been a *MAN*, as the scriptures have described him to be, or if he did not possess a human soul, then the Spirit of Jehovah dwelling in him would or might have been his *Soul*; and he should thereby have become a *SECOND DIVINE HYPOSTASIS* or *PERSON*. Either then the original Person, which was in the beginning, would have ceased to subsist, or we should have two Gods: i. e. we should have two distinct individual subsistences or *PERSONS*. But while the inspired writers describe the Father and the Son, they never speak of more than one divine hypostasis or *PERSON*. Their language goes as far as the subject will allow them to go, and the provisions they proclaim are extended as far as the nature of the case will admit; but they never do call the Mediator a divine *HYPOSTASIS* or *PERSON*. They say

the Mediator is "God manifested in the flesh," and that "in him dwelleth all the fulness of the godhead bodily;" but they also say that he is "the exact image" of Jehovah's hypostasis or Person. Other images or representatives have been proclaimed, for the Spirit of God dwelt in the prophets; but he is "the EXACT image." His *body* was a human body, and was tenanted by a human spirit; if it had not been so, it would have been, as in the original manifestation, "the form of God." But it is precisely here where the scriptures state the contrast to be—"Being *in the form of God*, he made himself of no reputation; and took upon him the form of a *servant*, and was made in the likeness of *men*; and being found in fashion as a *man*, he humbled himself and became obedient unto death."

You will perhaps reply that, agreeably to such a view, Christ cannot be divine, or cannot be GOD. You will, however, please to remember, that I believe as much in the divinity of the LORD as any man can do; and am not accountable for the conclusions which other men may deduce from scriptural facts. But I cannot see that your conclusion will follow. SOUL is not predicated of simple *spirit*, but of *embodied spirit*. Jehovah is not less divine, or less Jehovah, when considered irrespective of the form he may assume, or as he is in himself PURE SPIRIT. A spirit entering a body, though denominated *soul*, does not cease to be spirit. When death shall have dissolved our bodies, our spirits shall not therefore cease to exist. If, as Paul seems to intimate, our spirits shall be clothed with heavenly forms for a time,* and thus shall await the resurrection of their own appropriate bodies; and if, though *soul* may not be predicated of such a mode of existence, our identity is not destroyed, such a conclusion may not be forced upon us in view of the case in hand. Or if, when the Lord and his angels appeared in the form of men, and did eat and drink with Abraham, while yet no distinct and permanent per-

* 2 Cor. v. 1—4.

sonal subsistence can be supposed; and if, in that or a similar case the Lord could say to Abraham—"I am Almighty God;" it surely cannot follow, that, when the Spirit of God dwells in the man Christ Jesus, he may not say, "I am Almighty God." Nothing can be more distinct than his own declarations—"The Father dwelleth in me"—"I cast out devils by the Spirit of God"—"All shall honor the SON, even as they honor the FATHER. He that honoreth not the Son, honoreth not the Father which hath sent him."

None will deny the humanity of Christ Jesus. I mean to say, that no one, with whom it can be our object to moot the questions before us, will deny that the scriptures have exhibited to us "the man Christ Jesus." By a man, the controvertist will concede, is to be understood, a being who has a human body and a reasonable soul. Or if any conscientious inquirers should think that the question, whether he had a human soul or not, is not easily answered, our present argument might relieve them. For as SOUL is predicated of him, as the SOUL OF GOD is predicated of no PERSON but of that one which no man hath seen, nor can see, and which we have already shown was Jehovah-Elohim, or Jehovah in "the form of God," it follows that the soul which was predicated of Christ was human; and that, constituted as other men are, with the exception that he had no earthly father, but was "the only begotten Son of God"—he was the ministerial organ by which Jehovah manifested HIMSELF. As Jehovah always acts consistently with his own purposes, and consistently with the attributes of the ministerial organ he employs, the whole case stands out before us invested with its own peculiarities—peculiarities which identify the divine manifestation with human interests in a manner of its own; yet resembling—THE IMAGE OF—the first manifestation.

Look at the object in view. Man, who, by the necessities of his nature, must have a personal manifestation of

Jehovah made unto him, has gone into rebellion against this LORD. The object is to restore him to his allegiance by a system of moral or political means consistent with his nature. He cannot see God and live: i. e. in his lapsed state the original manifestation of Jehovah is altogether inappropriate to him; and yet by the necessities of his nature he must have a manifestation of Jehovah. The object then, is to constitute a mediatorial PRINCE—an IMAGE of Jehovah-Elohim, suited to the present condition of mankind. Another will not answer; for it is a manifestation of Jehovah HIMSELF that is needed. No prophet, nor any officer as a mere man, will meet the case, because all men belong to the ordinary organization, and are involved in the rebellion. Yet the best manifestation which the *nature* of the case will admit, and on which, as its base, can be constructed a system of efficient moral means, where a common cause can be made, and sympathies have their full play, must be afforded. This has been done. Accordingly Christ is not revealed before us as one of the fallen; but “a body was prepared for him,” and he was “without sin.” In him Jehovah makes the manifestation of HIMSELF which was indispensably necessary: and thus, by the very nature of the transaction, Christ appears before us as the LORD, and yet the IMAGE of the divine PERSON. It is impossible, from the whole philosophy of the general subject, whether you consider either the divine object, or the human exigency, that he should be any thing less. Hence David’s language—“The LORD said unto MY LORD;” and Paul’s—“The second man is the LORD from heaven;” and Peter’s—“God hath made that same Jesus whom ye have crucified both LORD and Christ.”

We are now compelled to resort, for farther explanation of this “mystery of godliness,” to the principles of official life. In this direction we have gone so far in our statements as to exhibit the philosophy of the chief magistracy of our

country.* We have now to suppose a case. A particular province or state may be considered as having violated her allegiance and gone into rebellion. What remedy would the political philosopher suggest in such a case? It is inexpedient that the chief magistrate should go in his own proper person, though the entire power and authority with which he is invested should be required. It might, perhaps, be said, as David's men said to him—"Thou shalt go no more with us to battle, that thou quench not the light of Israel."† None of the ordinary officers, though the spirit of the community might be resting on them, could meet the emergency; because their commission is too limited, and their locality would destroy confidence in their integrity. The only expedient, in such circumstances, which has yet been devised, has been to send a viceroy or plenipotentiary; or one in whom ALL POWER, or all the FULNESS of the sovereign power, should reside. Under such an arrangement none would be exempt from subjection to this mediatorial officer, save the chief magistrate himself.

I offer you in these remarks, be it remembered, merely a SIMILE. Do not the scriptures thus describe our Mediatorial Prince, our glorious CAPTAIN? In him dwelleth all the FULNESS of the GODHEAD bodily—"He is the HEIR of all things—ALL-POWER in heaven and earth is given unto him—He is HEAD over all things—the HEAD of all PRINCIPALITY and POWER—Unto him every knee must bow and every tongue shall swear—"None is excepted save he who did put all things under him."

This viceroy or plenipotentiary alluded to, is the IMAGE of the chief magistrate. The SPIRIT of the chief magistrate, as such, rests on his representative, and yet it is the SPIRIT of the community which rests upon him. If you take away from the chief magistrate the spirit of the community, he has no right to send the plenipotentiary. Of course the spirit of the community is the guaranty for the

* See Lec. V.

† 2 Sam. iii. 2—4. xxi. 17.

commission. This double operation any one acquainted with the philosophy of politics would readily understand. If then any such double view is given in the scriptures, in respect to the Mediator, i. e. if at one time the Spirit of the Word as the original Lord is said to rest on the Redeemer, and at another God, as a Spirit simply considered, is said to dwell in him, or if there be a "procession of the Spirit from the Father to the Son," as theologians speak, it must be some such official matter as that which has been described in the political transactions alluded to.

The deputy, clothed with such extraordinary powers, may solicit from the chief magistrate the means of executing his commission. He may ask even the community, or appeal to the spirit of the community simply considered, to sustain his plenary power, or to uphold him in the exercise of the magistracy, as they do uphold the chief magistrate himself: and he may confidently expect that the spirit of the community will respond to his prayer. No one discerns any absurdity in all this, nor argues, either that the magistrate is praying to himself, or that the viceroy has not been entrusted with full power. On the contrary, his extraordinary commission is the reason why he offers the prayer; take away the commission and he may not offer the prayer at all. Now there is not one single prayer which the Redeemer offers, that this principle of political philosophy does not cover. That "the fulness of the Godhead dwells in him bodily," is no reason why he should not pray as he does; but is the very reason why he should. Hence the Redeemer explains one prayer by another, and furnishes us with the true principle of exposition when he prays—"Father, glorify THY NAME"—for God's NAME is that visible representation of himself in which he dwells.

The general object being accomplished, or the enterprise on which the viceroy was sent being finished, will he not return his commission, and take his own place as a *subject*, while the spirit of the commonwealth will retire into its ap-

propriate form. The rebellion being staid, the breach being healed, the disobedient being reconciled, the empire being made whole, and the office of viceroy being no longer necessary, will not the chief magistrate be ALL AND IN ALL? And is not this the very thing which Paul describes, when he speaks of the END coming? of the Son surrendering the *kingdom* to the Father, and taking his place as *subject*? and of God becoming *all and in all*?*

According to such a view of political remedies, founded, as you distinctly perceive, on the *multiform* manifestation of SPIRIT; which—the chief magistrate in his own proper person, or the viceroy—would be the *greatest*? Both have *all power*. The spirit of the community resides in both, and for a strictly analogous purpose. Yet *manifestly*, as Paul would say, the chief magistrate in his own proper person is the *greatest*; and the viceroy may say of him, and without introducing any confusion into political science—"He is *greater* than I." Now, says the Redeemer, "God is a SPIRIT." The remedial operation in the divine government, on which we are meditating, must therefore depend upon the multiform manifestation of SPIRIT. There is no higher simile afforded to us in intellectual philosophy. And accordingly the facts in the case are—Jehovah, who is a Spirit, originally manifested himself in "the form of God," or as Jehovah-Elohim, the Lord of the universe. In consequence of the fall of man, and for remedial purposes, as we cannot now SEE this original manifestation and live; a second manifestation of *the same Spirit*, and for analogous purposes, has become necessary. When that manifestation is made, he who appears before us is God Almighty—has all power given to him—has all things put under his feet—is the same Spirit—is Lord over all. Yet "manifestly," says Paul,—there is no mystery, nor difficulty, nor confusion about it—"manifestly he is excepted, who did put all things under him." *Manifestly*, on the fair princi-

* 1 Cor. xv. 24—27.

ples of political science, Jesus would say—"My Father is greater than I." The manifestation of Jehovah in "the form of God," or as Jehovah-Elohim, was suited to the character and powers of man, before he fell; and shall be again suited to him, when, delivered from sin, he shall be "like God" hereafter. The manifestation of God "in the flesh" is suited to man in his present fallen state, when encompassed by the infirmities of the flesh. Both are manifestations of the same Spirit—of the supreme God, without contradiction or confusion. Yet is not the first evidently the GREATER manifestation? Is it not so much GREATER, that our lost powers must be restored before we can see or enjoy it? And can it follow, that because we have a second manifestation of Jehovah, suited to our condition of imbecility, that the avowed inferiority converts the LORD into a mere creature? Or must we range through creation in quest of some superangelic creature, whose official relations might relieve a plain problem in political philosophy, when the simple details of the subject itself bring all the relief that can be required?

You may perhaps still feel a difficulty, because it is evidently the same BEING described in the scriptures. The Word which was in the beginning becomes flesh; but in the simile advanced for illustration, you say, there are two distinct beings—the chief magistrate and the viceroy. This is true; and in the Redeemer's case, or under the mediatorial administration, the head of which is anthropomorphic, or *like man*, you hear of "the MAN Christ Jesus," who, as such, had body, soul and spirit of his own. The Spirit of God dwelling in him, is like the spirit of the community dwelling in an individual. Not so at first. Then God had his own appropriate form; not the form of man, but "the form of God;" by the assumption of which form the divine PERSON or hypostasis *subsisted*. "In the beginning, the Word—Jehovah-Elohim—was." And the object then was, that man, who was made in the image of

God, might, in discharging his personal responsibilities, be LIKE GOD.

Then again. Under all the varieties of political manifestations among men, there is but one spirit of the community. The identity is to be found in *Spirit*. In the scriptural case before us there are TWO FORMS—the form of God, and the form of man; yet there is one SPIRIT. Paul himself adopts this very mode of explanation when tracing the subject out into its subsequent ramifications. “There are,” he says, “diversities of gifts, but the SAME SPIRIT. And there are differences of ADMINISTRATIONS, but the SAME LORD. And there are diversities of operations, but it is the SAME GOD, which worketh ALL IN ALL.” There is a great variety of spiritual gifts, and these are bestowed on different men for official purposes; but “all these worketh that ONE AND THE SELF-SAME SPIRIT.”* So there is in the frame of political government an endless variety of influences or vicarious agencies, but the same *spirit* of the community runs through them all.

You will recognise the idea, which I am offering as a similitude, when reminded that *corporations*; which are made up of many individual members, form one political PERSON. Paul would compare these political expedients to the human body; which, though composed of many members, forms but ONE WHOLE. On this very principle he declares the church to be constructed. His language is—“So also is Christ.”† Hence, acts which may be done in successive ages are performed by the *same political person*, though great changes have occurred as to the individual man. The king of Israel built the temple at Jerusalem. Saul was king of Israel. But Saul did not build the temple. Again. Solomon built the temple. But Solomon is the name of a mere man, who, considered simply as such, did not build the temple; for it was erected by the king. Yet for the sake of distinction, and where a suc-

* 1 Cor. xi. 4—11.

† 1 Cor. xi. 12—31.

cession occurs, the name of the particular individual is oftentimes necessary in speaking of the acts of the political person. The Lord from heaven is our Saviour. Not the Lord in the form of God, for in that view he is our Creator. It is in the form of man that he is our Saviour. Jesus Christ did many mighty works, and yet he says—"The Father who dwelleth in me, he doeth the works"—"I can of mine own self do nothing." But to say Jesus did these works is proper, because in the man Christ Jesus the Father dwelt; and these terms all belong to the Lord, who was in the form of God, who made the world, and who has been manifested in this second form of man. If terms could not thus be interchanged, there could be no changes in the divine manifestations; and corporate bodies could not outlive the individual members of which they are composed at any given time. Is it not in this political sense that you may very justly remark—Isaiah, or Jeremiah, or Daniel, or some one of the prophets, said so and so, when in fact it was the Lord who said so by them?

To carry our simile then as far as the illustration of our subject may require, and as far as just exposition will admit, it may in continuation be observed, that every ministerial organ which the spirit of the community may employ, preserves its own distinctive attributes. David and Solomon were both the king of Israel; but David was a man of war, and Solomon was a man of peace. Each one acted out his own character, and impressed his own image on his own age. A similar fact is every where visible in the government of God. There were many prophets, and there have been many apostles. Isaiah, and Jeremiah, Peter and Paul, though servants of God, and anointed by the Holy Spirit, yet never lose their individuality. One wrote and spoke, and acted as another could not have done. "There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit. To one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom; to another the word of knowledge by the same Spirit." Suppose then

that we carry the principle a little higher up. When God, who is specially declared to be a SPIRIT, manifests HIMSELF in "the form of God"—in which form he is called JEHOVAH-ELOHIM—there are operations peculiar to him in that form. Thus he created the world—thus he sustains the world—thus he says to the Son, "sit on *my* right hand, until *I* make thine enemies thy footstool—thus he is too glorious for man in his lapsed condition to *see*. But he manifests himself "in the flesh;" and now certain other things are said, which are true of "the form of man," and which cannot be predicated of "the form of God." Hence we hear of the holy child Jesus—of his growing in wisdom and stature—of "the man Christ Jesus"—of his learning obedience by the things that he suffered—of his not knowing the time of the judgment—of his not being able to do any thing of himself. On the principles of political philosophy, which, while it discourses of a spirit of the community, yet ascribes to every ministerial organ that may be employed its own distinctive attributes—on the principles of political philosophy all the expressions referred to are readily and consistently explained. Many of those expressions have been thought to be exceedingly strange, and have been most pertinaciously urged as full proof against "the divinity of Christ." But if man, as an official agent, wears THE IMAGE of God, these expressions are necessarily accurate, as long as the manifestation of Jehovah in "the form of God," and the manifestation of God "in the flesh," be the subjects offered to the consideration of the human mind.

Another remark here may be necessary. The official relation subsisting between Jehovah and the Saviour is generally expressed by the terms, FATHER AND SON: from which fact, on the supposition that the distinction exists in the divine ESSENCE, we have had not a little learned discussion about FILIATION. And, in explanation of the doctrine of ETERNAL GENERATION, many, who would contemptuously smile at the official analogies now presented,

and reply in that common and significant phrase—"those are different things"—would tell us, there cannot be a father where there is no offspring; or the sun and his rays are co-existent—as though *these too* were not different things. It has however been sufficiently noticed, that the scriptures have unequivocally asserted that Jesus was born of the virgin by the power of the Holy Spirit, and is therefore denominated *the only begotten Son of God*. When then Jehovah manifests himself in his *only begotten Son*, who is thereby distinguished from all other men, the term SON will be familiarly used in reference to the Lord from heaven; as familiarly as the term DAVID would be applied to the king of Israel, while the son of Jesse, who was particularly distinguished by the term, should occupy the throne.

But these titles—FATHER AND SON, have an official reciprocity; and there is a special reason, if I mistake not, why they should be used, in the present case, in preference to all others. When civil government was first established, official honor was naturally and necessarily hereditary. The oldest son was not only HEIR to the paternal estate; but became such, in so far as the exigencies of society required it, because he had to sustain the dignity, and meet the expenses of the magistracy which devolved upon him. In the subsequent arrangements which belonged to the jewish constitution, official honors, originally appropriated to the first-born, were distributed to different individuals. The priesthood was conferred on the tribe of Levi, and on the family of Aaron. The princely prerogative was not lodged with the hierophant, but might be bestowed on any individual, of any family, of any of the tribes. The state of society after "the earth was divided," and national relations were constituted, required this modification of the original ordinance. Society has not yet recovered herself; nor will she, until "the mystery of the divine will is finished. The jewish constitution is considered as a divine

precedent, justifying this "diversity of gifts" and this "difference of administrations." And so far has this matter been carried, that many, affecting to be wiser than all the rest of their race, can see nothing but king-craft in political, and priestcraft in moral, science. What may be the occurrences and changes and institutions of a future age, when "the knowledge of the Lord shall cover the earth as the waters cover the channel of the sea," when the new organization, after which so many are wistfully looking, may be accomplished by the breaking up of old institutions, and by a return to original simplicity, no politician nor moralist can now distinctly foresee. The prejudices of political parties and of religious sects are too strong, to suffer men to conceive of a pure theocracy, in which Prince Messiah shall govern by his SPIRIT.

However this may be, it is evident that the terms belonging to the different offices lost their general import, and became secondary titles. FATHER AND SON were then the only general terms left, by which the inspired writers could describe the official relations which we are considering. King was not enough, for the prince was no longer priest. Priest was not enough, for the priest was no longer prince. Hence the apostle, in illustrating the official relations of the Son of God, was obliged to leave the family of Aaron, and resort to the apparent anomaly afforded by the priesthood of Melchisedec, in order to exhibit Jesus as A PRIEST UPON HIS THRONE? Going back then to the simplicity of civil government, as it was instituted in the beginning, and deriving from the natural relations the best analogy by which to illustrate the regal prerogative, these terms—FATHER AND SON—seem to be peculiarly expressive in elucidating the relations of the mediatorial kingdom. Hence it is that you often find the term FATHER used in an official sense. Every prince should be a FATHER to his people. Micah consecrated a young Levite, whom he cherished as his son, to be unto him a FATHER and a priest. The prophet, tes-

tifying beforehand concerning Christ, calls him THE EVER-LASTING FATHER, because he should bear the *government* and the glory, and should reign FOREVER. And hence Adam is said to have begotten a SON in his own likeness and after his image, who was to occupy the official position, which was vacated by the murder of Abel and the apostacy of Cain.

In a government which recognised the hereditary principle, a case might readily occur, when the king being retired by death, and the SON being in a state of *minority*, some temporary provision must be made. A REGENT must be appointed; who, though he would not be considered as the HEIR, but as a SERVANT, should be invested with the supreme power. In this way Moses and Christ have been actually compared by the apostle Paul—Moses, he says, “was faithful in ALL GOD’S HOUSE as a SERVANT, but Christ as a SON over HIS OWN HOUSE.” By a like illustration does the Redeemer himself exhibit his own claims, when, in one of his parables, which was designed to explain the nature and institutions of the KINGDOM of heaven, he described a householder as having first and often sent his SERVANTS to obtain the fruits of his vineyard; and finally sending his SON. The separate pretensions of those officers were well understood; for the husbandman, on seeing the SON, observed, “this is the HEIR.” In the political administration sustained by the Lord of the universe, all those prophets who were trusted with a temporary regency before “the fulness of time” had come, and who were called GODS, (Elohim) were merely SERVANTS. But when “the fulness of time” had arrived, and the great Prophet appeared, he was the SON AND HEIR—the SON in HIS OWN HOUSE—the Heir of ALL THINGS. Every reader of the bible knows, that these are scriptural ideas; and yet they strictly belong to political philosophy, or the science of government; nor do they detract any thing from the glory of the Saviour, as God over all, blessed for evermore. It is on general *political* principles that Paul speaks of the church

under Moses as a MINOR.* The biblical writers never hesitate to employ, for the purposes of illustration, the maxims of political philosophy.

These terms—Father and Son—do not appear to me to imply more than I have stated in the double explication now given; an explication founded on a common idea, that one divine system is analogous to another divine system. Nature corresponds with revelation—the mediatorial institute corresponds with the law—the two covenant HEADS, Adam and Christ, resemble each other, as Paul has taught us. The divinity of the Redeemer, or the fact that he was “God manifested in the flesh”—“the Word made flesh”—is far clearer on the principles of exposition now set forth, than on any fine-spun theory of filiation, which the most learned or ingenious theologue could advance; and that simply because we have been contemplating nature and grace as correlate. Prince Messiah—the Word made flesh—is as much ALMIGHTY GOD, as he was, who appeared as a MAN to Abraham, and declared himself to be ALMIGHTY GOD, who entered into covenant with the patriarch, and said to him—“Walk before me, and be thou perfect: if you object to the divinity of the SAVIOUR, you must equally object to the divinity of the CREATOR.

This analogy, which we have pursued so closely, and which may appear to many to be so novel, enables us to go one step farther. The Spirit of the community which we have observed to rest on the chief magistrate, on his plenipotentiary, and on all the subordinate officers—in which detail there is a diversity of gifts, a difference of ministries, a diversity of operations, but the self-same God, the self-same SPIRIT, as Paul would say, in reference to divine things—this self-same spirit of the community rests *on the people themselves*. Every patriot carries with him—in his bosom—wherever he goes, the SPIRIT of his country. Each is a partaker of the general diffusion, and feels an attractive,

* Gal. iii.

subduing, transforming influence, which moulds his character, controls his feelings, and regulates his habits. He never interprets that influence to be physical power, and yet freely talks of its omnipotence and versatility, as pervading every relation and assimilating all to itself.—Wherever he goes he is recognised and known—the SPIRIT of his country has left its impression, has put its “SEAL” upon him. He thinks, feels, suffers, enjoys, speaks, acts—does every thing under the influence of that SPIRIT. No violence is done to his feelings. He experiences no interference with his liberty, but is perfectly conscious of his own individuality, and acts under the full force of his personal obligations. He talks most enthusiastically about his liberty, and yet is most devoted to his country’s interests. He needs neither bayonets nor swords to compel his obedience. He acts from an inward sense—from CONSCIENCE; and the more intelligence he has, and the less physical power he feels, the truer, the more devoted, the more uniform, the more persevering, is his patriotism. On the other hand, reduce intelligence, bring in physical power, talk blindly about sovereignty, and display the majesty of an autocrat, under whose despotic sway he lives, and the patriot becomes either a rebel or a slave, or a hypocrite. Can any one, who knows either the nature or the history of man, deny or refute this statement?

In the preceding remarks, has any thing else been presented than a simple analogy of the operations which the scriptures ascribe to the Holy Spirit? The saints who are all FELLOW-CITIZENS have all received the same spirit, by whom they are sanctified, transformed, “SEALED.”—Wherever they go, they are recognised as belonging to the FAMILY of God, or as members of the COMMONWEALTH of Israel. Their thoughts, their feelings, their habits, are alike; their speech betrays them; and even when, like Peter, they would not be known. The action of the principle is always true—its political influence is always certain, to what-

ever dispensation it may be applied. A jew or a christian may be as readily recognised as a mahomedan or a pagan, as an American or an European. And the scriptures themselves employ epithets in application to the Holy Spirit, according to the dispensation or political constitution under which he operates. He is a Spirit of *fear* at one time, and a Spirit of *love*, of *power*, and of a *sound mind* at another. A Spirit of *bondage* while the law subjected the jews to the elements of the world; and a Spirit of *adoption* when the believer is introduced into the liberty of God's children. On this subject scriptural proof is abundant; while the philosophy of the moral influence, whether general in its character and extended as the empire of mind, or limited in its application and modified by local circumstances, is apparent and lucid. The whole subject, as detailed in the scriptures, is perfectly consistent with the laws of SPIRIT; and refers nothing to the attributes of SOUL, excepting where Jehovah appears as the Creator, or acting as such—as in the morning of the creation, or on mount Sinai. The mediatorial institute is based on the principle of personal responsibility, and therefore describes the divine agency as a mere development of the laws of SPIRIT. The doctrine of physical power so largely incorporated in sectarian dogmatizings, which so pertinaciously demands the submission of intelligent and thinking man, and a resistance to which has been the ostensible reason for papal councils and protestant synods, is an exotic in the garden of the Lord; and is poisonous as the deadly night shade. Look to both hemispheres. Compare monarchicál and papal pretensions together. Let the mitred priest stand by the crowned prince, and see what mischief physical power has entailed on mankind. SPIRIT seems to have departed from them all; and a bloated aristocracy has monopolized glory and honor and immortality. These things can no longer be tolerated by either God or man, and revolution will be but the harbinger to revolution, as the SPIRIT of the Lord goes forth from pole

to pole, and from the rivers to the ends of the earth—the Spirit of liberty, of truth, of glory, and of an everlasting kingdom.

Looking back to the analogy afforded by official life, you would not say that there are THREE SPIRITS of the community; nor can you predicate of the spirit of the community, in its diffused operations over the members of that community, any PERSONAL OR VISIBLE MANIFESTATION.—The personal manifestation of that spirit you must refer to the chief magistracy, or to his viceroy as his immediate representative; yet it is not the less the spirit of the community in its general influence. So in view of the great subject before us. The scriptures predicate PERSONAL MANIFESTATION of God HIMSELF, who is a SPIRIT, in speaking of the WORD in the beginning, or “the form of God.” In like manner they predicate PERSONAL MANIFESTATION of God HIMSELF, or rather that which is as near to it as the case will admit, in speaking of Christ Jesus as his “exact image.” But they do not suppose a third PERSONAL MANIFESTATION, when they describe the general operations of “the Holy Spirit.” Yet the Holy Spirit is not therefore the less God HIMSELF. In all the political cases referred to, spirit is not a first part, nor a second part, nor a third part, of the spirit of the community; as though, according to the notion of Sabellius, there could be in spirit a “separation or efflux of parts.” But it is the spirit of the community ITSELF. So in these divine matters; we have not a first person or part, a second person or part, a third person or part, of God, as though there could be “a separation or efflux” in the divine essence, but God HIMSELF. But enough.


I have now stated what I believe to be the scriptural exhibition of this momentous subject. If I have departed from the popular creed, as it has been transmitted to us from the third and fourth centuries, my remarks are equally remote from any alliance with those heretical speculations, by which that creed has been assailed. I conceive, as to

their relative importance, that the CREED on the one hand has rendered a plain and glorious subject altogether unintelligible. Its authors and advocates have declared that they are unable to explain the mystery they assert, and which yet they hold too sacred for any but the impious to question. The reputed heresies, on the other hand, rob the subject of all its glory; and dip deeper into mystery than the systems which they censure as irrational and illiberal.

Most solemnly do I call upon you to ponder what I have said. If the views I have offered to your consideration be correct, it is worth your while to ascertain the fact. I have appealed to scriptural texts, which you may all read for yourselves. I have advanced doctrines concerning the necessities and operations of human nature, of which you are all competent judges. I have summoned you into the Holiest of all, whither you may all come through the rent veil of the Redeemer's flesh, and on bended knee ask God for his Spirit to teach you. I have waked up your excitement on a subject which brought down the heavenly host to the plains of Bethlehem, and inspired them to sing—"Glory to God in the highest, peace on earth, and good will towards men:—"For unto you is born this day, in the city of David, a SAVIOUR, which is Christ THE LORD."—And now may GOD ALMIGHTY, FATHER, SON AND HOLY SPIRIT, abundantly bless you; and bring you, in that day of glory when the SON shall deliver up the kingdom to the FATHER, to shout with his redeemed,

DEATH IS SWALLOWED UP IN VICTORY.

END OF VOL. I..



LECTURES
ON THE
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF
MORAL GOVERNMENT,
AS THEY ARE EXHIBITED
IN THE FIRST THREE CHAPTERS
OF
GENESIS.

✓
BY JOHN M. DUNCAN,
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In the BEGINNING the WORD WAS, and the Word was WITH God, and the Word was God.—*John i. 1.*

The WORD was made FLESH, and DWELT AMONG US; and we beheld his GLORY, the glory as of THE ONLY BEGOTTEN OF THE FATHER, FULL OF GRACE AND TRUTH.—*John i. 14.*

EVERY ONE OF US SHALL GIVE ACCOUNT OF HIMSELF TO GOD.—*Rom. xiv. 12.*

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LECTURES

ON

MORAL GOVERNMENT.

LECTURE XI.

Mediatorial work—Manifestation of God—Righteousness of the Law, fulfilled by the second Adam—The Consequences—Rom. v. 12—20, explained—Symbolical character of the mediatorial work—Reasons for the death of Christ—Principles of the divine administration—The reconciled man—Pardon of personal transgressions—Term Atonement.

IN proceeding to consider the WORK of our mediatorial Prince whom we have been contemplating as surrounded by all the glory of his official relations, two or three things must be called up to our recollection. The work of creation and that of reconciliation are presented in the scriptures as parallel to each other. Jesus has finished “and ceased from his own works, as God did from his;” and has entered into his REST. While such is the principle on which Jehovah acts in both cases, each *work* will correspond with the character of the human mind, or with the constitution of the human being. That is—as men acquire their ideas by means of their corporeal senses, the divine operations intended for their instruction must be an exterior display suited to such powers of perception. To meet these pow-

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ers of perception, God at *first* assumed personal form, and exhibited himself by means of the material system which he had created. And now when the outward manifestation originally made has become insufficient or inappropriate, in consequence of the baneful and wide spreading influence of Adam's sin, a *second* manifestation is afforded, of the same general character, and precisely suited to the present condition of infirmity in which mankind are found. Compare the following biblical statements:—

As to the first—"That which may be known of God is manifest among them; for God hath showed it unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things which are made, even his eternal power and Godhead."—"The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handy work. Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night sheweth knowledge," &c. &c.

As to the second—"The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us."—"He is the image of the invisible God."—"Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God. How shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard; and how shall they hear without a preacher; and how shall they preach, except they be sent?"

In both cases it must be evident, to every one who has patience enough to look at a system which differs from his early impressions, that an exhibition is afforded to the outward senses of men; and that an appeal, with a view to instruction, conviction and intellectual action, is made under every variety of suitable and appropriate form. Then, both from the nature of man, and from the uniform mode of the divine operation, as well as from the exposition offered of the mediatorial institute itself, the Redeemer's *work* must be an exterior display. "God hath *set his Son forth* to be a propitiation." "Before our eyes Jesus Christ hath been evidently set forth, crucified among us." The Spirit takes of the things which are Christ's, and *shows* them un-

to us. He comes *to convince* the world of sin, of righteousness and of judgment. *God is in Christ* reconciling the world unto himself. He took the *form* of a servant, and became obedient unto death. In all things he was made *like* unto his brethren.

Adopting the principle thus announced, and indeed having no alternative, we must apply that principle to a two-fold view of the mediatorial work.

Jehovah makes an exhibition of HIMSELF. The glory of God is shining in the face of Jesus Christ. He is the brightness of glory, and the exact image of his person. No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him. These, and a multitude of such like phrases, meet the biblical reader every where in the sacred volume. And as he ponders them his spirit is charmed, his feelings are interested, his mind is elevated, the attributes of the most High become familiar—beholding and reflecting the glory of the Lord, he catches the living likeness and is changed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord. Thus he is found at last RECONCILED.

The display which Jehovah intends to make of *himself* is—that he is LOVE. “God so *loved* the world, that he gave his only begotten Son.—In this God commendeth his *love*, that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. Herein is *love*, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins.” Every where, and in every transaction—in the gospel itself, in the institutions of the gospel, and in the mediatorial administration under which we live—he is seeking to attract us by his LOVE. How charming are the overtures, the invitations, the offers, the promises, which by his grace continually strike upon our ears! How untiring and attractive his forbearance! How excellent and lovely his commands! How mild and well intentioned his fatherly chastisements! What a cloud of witnesses—patriarchs, prophets and apos-

ties, holy and inspired, parental and fraternal, domestic and ecclesiastical, secular and spiritual—has he gathered around us! With what profound solicitude he expostulates, entreats or forewarns! How kindly he condescends to send his Spirit, that he may be the guardian of our steps, the companion of our walks, and the inmate of our bosoms? The very angels of his presence become our ministers, encamp around our dwellings, and give praise for our redemption!

There is, however, no view in which his goodness appears more conspicuous or surprising, than in his becoming *like ourselves*, and learning obedience by the things which he suffered; that, being tempted in all points like as we are, he might be able to succor them that are tempted. Nothing is left undone that could serve to constitute him a merciful and faithful high-priest. His sympathy finishes the display, and leaves no blessing to be desired—no deficiency to be regretted. Nothing comes near it, save the bright glories that illuminated the morning of the creation, that called forth the sons of God to hymn his praise, and left on the human being the image of Jehovah-Elohim.

He farther designs to manifest his WISDOM. How may a sinner be reconciled to God, is a question which none but the great Creator can answer. That such a reconciliation might be effected; that the child of transgression and sorrow might call for relief on the God of love who had been so freely expending the treasures of his goodness, is an idea which any intelligent being might readily conceive. But in what way such a magnificent enterprise should be achieved—an enterprise in which the divine glory should not be tarnished, in which human nature should not be violated, and which should be commensurate with the intermingling systems of matter and mind, of personal and social responsibilities, of human and angelic agencies—is a question on which philosophers have uttered their magniloquous pretensions, and infidel men have affected to be most profoundly wise. But who among them has ever answered the

troubled spirit, or relieved the burdened conscience? So widely have they strayed, that the gospel has been foolishness to some, and a stumbling block to others; and their most deadly hostility has been provoked, when the doctrine of the cross has unfolded itself with all its heavenly principles; or has drawn out its lines as a perfect parallel to those which the sentence of condemnation had inscribed on the nature of *man*, and on the earthly habitation which had been given him. The adaptation of this moral mean to the end designed, is the display of divine *wisdom*, which it unfolds. Like the exhibition of wisdom, every where breaking upon our view when we contemplate the moral or intellectual world, where cause and effect are so nicely balanced, and where the mightiest intellect of which man can boast may expend all its power, so the cross of the Son of God develops the wisdom of Jehovah. And wherever it comes, and is appreciated according to its own intrinsic worth, it never fails to elevate human character, to soothe human sorrow, to mitigate human evils, and to call forth, in their greatest luxuriance, the charities of human life.

But the last remark, by asserting the efficiency of the mediatorial scheme, suggests it to our consideration as an equal manifestation of divine POWER. That is, the cross of Christ is the *power* of God, just as any other system which he may have set up, and which evolves itself in a series of operative causes adequate to certain effects, is the power of God: or as his providential co-operation, in sustaining his own works, is the power of God. His power, in this connexion, is not a single omnipotent cause, throwing away from itself all secondary agents, or becoming so isolated in action as to disregard the influence of motive on the human mind. When this power is most fully or vividly experienced, the deepest conviction is produced; the loftiest purposes are formed; the highest intellectual effort is made; and the greatest amount of intelligence is communicated. In this view the mind of a Paul, or the heart of a John, the obsti-

nacy of a jew, or the stupidity of a pagan, might as readily be enlightened and subdued. And thus thousands upon thousands have been brought to live in heavenly fellowship with their great Redeemer; have died in triumph, and joyfully broken away from the embrace of this mortal life, to inherit the fulness of joy, and possess the everlasting pleasures which are at God's right hand. This point, however, will call for more elaborate argument in a subsequent lecture.

But turning from these primary attributes of Jehovah,—goodness, wisdom, and power,—another question is started up, which involves his JUSTICE. This matter I am free to confess strikes me in a very different light from that in which you commonly hear it represented. When I listen to a minister of the God of love, making it the grand object of his official addresses, to throw mankind into convulsions by exaggerating the terrors of the Lord, and measuring his own success by the nervous excitement he produces, my heart is pained within me. Such a ministerial onset may rouse and alarm; and addresses thus violent and harsh may suit the age in which we live; but the end must be a deterioration of christian intelligence, in which moral imbecility and gross superstition, as they commonly do, shall go hand in hand. How often, in such a tissue of ecclesiastical aberrations, professed moralists, in the same breath, bless God, and curse men made in the 'similitude of God!

Certainly God is JUST. It would be insanity to question such a primary truth. He himself has set forth Jesus Christ to be a propitiation for the remission of sin, that he might be *just*, and the justifier of him who believeth in Jesus. But what is JUSTICE? Is God not *just*, unless he be clothed in palsyng terrors, and unless his administration shall be set off under every symbol that makes it forbidding and overwhelming? and that too when the cardinal fact in the history of his operations is, that he has so loved the world

as to give his only begotten Son, because he has no pleasure in the death of the sinner?

But what, I ask again, is *justice*? Is that which is RIGHT, not *just*? Is that which is according to long established LAW, not *just*? Is that which fairly considers all the points of EQUITY that may be presented, not *just*? Or is *justice* a sort of theological cherubim, surmounted by a flaming sword, which forbids a poor, trembling, dying sinner to approach the offers of life, until a sovereign word, whose principles of operation no mortal man can scan, removes the unmeaning but petrifying omen? If the Mediator shall act out a part equal to that which Adam acted; if he shall kindly or equitably regard those who have been brought into suffering by a fault not their own; if, when *law* is sustained, grace should seek, according to its excellent nature, to be plenary, and even exuberant, in its provisions, do men object, and call themselves philosophers?—But let us go out into this discussion. Adam, says Paul, was a *figure* of Christ. What does he mean?

It has been very explicitly declared in the scriptures, to be indispensably necessary that the Redeemer should resemble Adam. There can be no resurrection of the dead, if Christ be not risen: “for since by MAN came death, by MAN came the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive.” “Forasmuch as the children were partakers of flesh and blood, HE also HIMSELF likewise *took* part of the same, that *through death* he might destroy him that had the power of death.” The nature of the case required such a Saviour,—one that should be qualified for such transactions. Any plan to be executed by an official personage of different characteristics, would not be in good keeping with the system that had been previously established. The remedy in such a case should not have been proportioned to the evil; but should be either inefficient by falling below the evil, or destructive of man’s free agency by rising above the evil. “It BECAME

HIM, for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory, to make THE CAPTAIN of their salvation *perfect through sufferings*." And hence he himself asked his sorrowing disciples,—“OUGHT not Christ to have suffered these things?”

The *principle* of official operation is very apparent and distinct. The whole case presents the two sides of a legal instrument:—disobedience and penalty, obedience and reward; or,—sin and death, righteousness and life. The problem involved is neither difficult nor obscure; and the decision is both easy and safe. If, by the disobedience of our social head, death has been introduced into our world, surely by the obedience of another social head, life may be secured. The sin contemplated, being official in its relations, and personal responsibility having been preserved, there is nothing at all unnatural in the proposed remedy. No philosophic moralist can offer one fair objection; as no reason can be assigned why righteousness should not bring life, under the operations of a system by which sin brings death. The commentator who stammers or stumbles here, must be ignorant of the first elements of government; and could not safely be trusted with any legislative or judicial interests, in either church or state, however conscientious or well-intentioned he might be. Every institution that is wise and good, lovely and fair, would wither in his hands; the whole social fabric would tumble into ruins under his erratic and wilting policy; and a thousand human associations or ordinances might be substituted, which would be as degrading as they would be inappropriate. The difficulty of the case does not arise from the impossibility of ascertaining any competent *principle* of relief, but in the selection and qualification of the *agent*. Where shall he be found? Who can undertake the task with any promise of success? Answer this, and all the rest is plain enough. Provide the agent, and neither sceptic nor theologian has the least cause to demur as to the character of the com-

mission; or to perplex and puzzle himself about any new, recondite, or mysterious operation, to which such an agent is called. An official righteousness bringing in life, according to the very terms of LAW, is the moral highway, in which the way-faring man, though a fool, need not err.

Look at the law, and its results. Adam's sin has introduced into our world "the ministration of death" and condemnation. He sinned in violating law, and death followed to the whole extent of his representative character, as it was constituted by law. His children who *suffer* death on account of his sin, did not *commit* his sin. Yet they were constituted *sinner*s, according to the uniform operation of political government. On the mere principle of personal responsibility, which summons every man to give an account for himself, such an issue could not have occurred. Though by the issue, as it has transpired under social responsibility, he has received a very important and salutary lesson, which, in its application to himself, would teach him, that his personal sin would finally involve him in personal condemnation.—And now, even at this present day, when men affect to doubt the inspiration of the scriptures, and might fondly imagine that divine mercy is too great to condemn them on account of their personal sin, they may turn to the inspired volume of nature, on whose glories they descant with so much energy and excitement, and learn the same moral lesson, as it is taught under the great material emblem.

Take the other side. Adam might have obeyed the law and have brought in *life* as the reward of obedience; or have entailed on the world "a justification unto life," instead of a "condemnation" unto death. Then all his children should have been placed under a "ministration of righteousness," which, in view of their personal responsibility, should have been a salutary and important lesson, teaching them that their personal righteousness should secure their personal justification. Nature should in that case

also have become an inspired volume, so to speak, which all coming generations might easily read. And as, in the first view, SIN, by introducing death and evil into the world, has so far disqualified them to meet their personal responsibility, that a Mediator has become indispensably necessary; so, in the second, RIGHTEOUSNESS, by preserving life and retaining the good which had been originally created, should have fully qualified them to fulfil their personal responsibility.

Permit me then to suppose, that in forming a remedy the wise and beneficent Creator should resolve to bring in a second social head—a second Adam—who should do what the first Adam failed to do; or who should introduce a “ministration of righteousness,” attended by circumstances which should enable every man to meet his personal responsibilities; can any one object to such a remedial system? Exterior circumstances may be somewhat altered; but the principle, philosophically considered, is precisely the same. This certainly is the only plan which is consistent with personal responsibility.

You have all read enough of your bibles to know, that the Mosaic dispensation is uniformly denominated LAW; and that the Christian dispensation is as uniformly denominated GOSPEL. I then call up to your recollection a scriptural statement in reference to these dispensations, which you may have oftentimes remarked to be couched in very singular phraseology. The first is declared to be “the ministration of death and condemnation:” so much for LAW. The second is as unequivocally set forth to be “the ministration of righteousness and of the Spirit:” this is GOSPEL. And what shall we understand by these singular exhibitions? Has *law*, under the Mosaic dispensation—when the jews sinned as Adam did, when “the offence abounded,” and when Jehovah described to one of their own prophets, the whole house of Israel under the symbol of a valley full of dead and dry bones—any reference to *law as violated by Adam*? If so, then the phrase, “ministration of

death," is an apostolic technicality, descriptive of the condition of mankind, as they are constituted *sinner*s by Adam's transgression. But this being admitted, then, on the other hand, the phrase "ministration of righteousness," must also be an apostolic technicality, descriptive of the condition of mankind, as they are constituted *righteous* by Christ's righteousness. So far therefore as symbol can explain—symbol which has been in protracted and magnificent display—it follows that the finished work of the Mediator privileges *those* to whom its knowledge has already come, and will privilege *all mankind* when his kingdom shall be one and his NAME one throughout the earth, with the MINISTRATION OF RIGHTEOUSNESS; which ministration will serve as a rule of government in view of their personal responsibility. Of old he was praised, and from the rising to the setting sun shall he be praised, as *Jehovah our righteousness*.

Such is the ground professedly occupied by the apostle Paul, in a formal argument on the subject.* Thus he reasons:—"As by the offence of ONE, judgment came upon ALL MEN to condemnation, EVEN so by the righteousness of ONE the free gift came upon ALL MEN unto justification of life. As by *one man's disobedience* the many (ALL) were made (constituted) *sinner*s, so by the *obedience of one* shall the many (ALL) be made (constituted) *righteous*." The principle of operation, and the extent to which it is carried, are the same. ALL are constituted SINNERS, and ALL are brought into CONDEMNATION by *one man's OFFENCE* on the one hand; so ALL are constituted RIGHTEOUS, and are brought into JUSTIFICATION OF LIFE by *one man's RIGHTEOUSNESS* on the other.† Two parallel lines could not be more distinctly drawn—two institutes of a similar character could not be more circumstantially described. Indeed,

* To this argument I have had occasion to allude before, Lecture VI.

† Rom, v. 15—19.

that there might be no mistake on the subject, the apostle had prefaced his argument by unequivocally asserting, that Adam was the **FIGURE** of Christ. And in so doing he holds up to view two official characters—the one at the head of the first, or *legal* institute, and the other at the head of the second, or *evangelical* institute. Under the one *condemnation and death* have accrued—under the other *righteousness and life* have been presented. In the one **ALL** men *die*—in the other **ALL** men are made *alive*.

Some theologians, in interpreting this passage, as just quoted from the apostle's pen, feel no difficulty in applying the terms—*sinner and condemnation*—to **ALL MEN**; because their general doctrine of the original institute, and of the consequences of its breach, permit them to do so most unreservedly. They consider that all mankind are temporally, spiritually and eternally dead in Adam; and that God should have been perfectly just in sentencing all Adam's children to such a doleful fate for his sin. Human depravity, the lamentable characteristic of all ages and of all communities, offers them, as they suppose, facts enough for an impregnable defence in advancing such dogmas. But when they come to look at the correlate terms—*righteousness and justification unto life*, they are compelled to change their ground. And no wonder. For on the principle by which they interpret the forensic terms in the first instance, they could not interpret the corresponding terms in the second instance, without rushing into the doctrine of universal salvation. Facts would not sustain so sweeping a conclusion, as any intelligent man may see. But to give up their principle, in view of the consequences of the *fall*, would be to spoil their whole theory, and send them adrift on a boundless ocean, where no sun appears by day, nor stars by night. How fearful a predicament! Yet, that they cannot carry their principle through, is one of the best evidences that it is incorrect. Give to the terms all round an official application, leave out of sight the untenable idea,

that by the imputation of Adam's sin all men are made *personally* sinners, or by the imputation of Christ's righteousness all men are made *personally* righteous—let temporal death be contrasted with the resurrection from the dead—and all difficulties vanish. The argument becomes plain and consistent, and the apostle speaks unrestrainedly to every candid mind.

I do not say that there is no difference between the two social heads, or in the extent to which their official capabilities may be traced. The apostle himself emphatically declares that there is a difference; but then, instead of its being calculated to restrict the benefits flowing from Christ's righteousness, these are celebrated for their greater exuberance. "Not as it was by one that sinned," says the apostle, "so is the gift. For the judgment was by ONE (offence) to condemnation, but the free gift is of MANY offences unto justification." The fact which he had previously stated was, that death had reigned over some who had not sinned after the *similitude* of Adam's transgression—of course there were some who did sin *like* Adam. These who did sin *like* Adam were guilty of the "many offences." He explains himself afterwards, by saying, that in consequence of the LAW entering, "the offence ABOUNDED." The reference is most unequivocally to the JEWS, who alone were placed under LAW, and could sin *like* Adam. And he adds—"But where sin abounded, grace did much more abound; that, as *sin* hath reigned unto *death*, even so might grace reign through *righteousness* unto eternal *life*, by Jesus Christ our Lord." In this, the gift transcended the offence: for this righteousness of Christ covered the offences committed by the jews against LAW, which had been for certain purposes, privily brought in. Or, as the same apostle tells us in another of his epistles, and when discussing the subject of Christ's sacrifice:—"He is the Mediator of the new testament, that by means of *death*, for the redemption of the transgressions that were under the first testament, they

which are called might receive the promise of eternal inheritance." And again it is observed—"God hath set forth Christ to be a propitiation, through faith in his blood, to declare his *righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God.*"

Perhaps you may inquire, how it was that the righteousness of the Redeemer thus transcended the original or Adamic type; or on what principle it, the remedial righteousness, could be extended in its application, so as to cover the transgressions committed under a temporary revival of *law*? The answer is at hand. God had by his purpose of *election*—adopted, it is true, with a view to the general good, and therefore gracious in its ultimate design, yet *privily* introduced—God had, in erecting the Sinaic establishment, placed the Jews in a very novel and peculiar situation. The law ordained over them proved to be "a ministration of death"—a yoke, which neither they nor their fathers were able to bear. The reason for this interference with the regular operations of society, as they had been developed under the mediatorial administration, and from the day "the first promise" was given, will be assigned hereafter. In the mean time the fact of such interference, whose authority could not be established but by a train of splendid and awful miracles, deserves to be distinctly noticed. Was there not then an evident necessity, that God should protect the Jews from all harm that might attend on such an extra-judicial proceeding? As all mankind had been put under the remedial government of divine grace, and that by two, if not by three, distinct legislative proclamations—in Adam, Noah and Abraham—how could ALMIGHTY GOD consistently throw any part of them back again under LAW? In such a case, would he not, by a sovereign act, have made their condition worse than it was before? and have required of them that which they were not ABLE to render? And is this his method of dealing with men, whose sorrows excite the sympathies of the universe, and

over which his Son so freely, and so often wept? Let his design be what it may, necessarily he would protect and secure the rights of his chosen people. And accordingly he pledged himself to do so, in preaching the *gospel* to their fathers; in connecting the righteousness of faith along with all the institutions which he gave them; and by ordaining the law in the hand of a MEDIATOR. Nor only so. The Saviour himself “delighted in” as “the angel of the covenant,” was the CAPTAIN of their hosts, who went before them while they were in the wilderness, and finally brought them into the promised land.

Nor is this all. One great object, which was not lost sight of at any time, was to afford an antecedent course, which the force of circumstances had rendered necessary, by which to introduce the Messiah. The LAW, by its own terms, could hold its official relations, and authoritatively bind on the Jewish conscience, only until the Seed should come to whom the promise was made. It was a mere schoolmaster, instructing a pupil while yet a *minor*;—a preparatory measure to qualify an heir to receive, and to enjoy, his inheritance. Of course the inheritance, when he received it, would fully compensate him for any disciplinary severity of which he might have complained; and he might be soothed and thankful when the advantages of his training should become apparent even to himself. And if the benefits which have accrued from that singular dispensation—“glorious,” even though it was “a ministration of death”—were duly appreciated; or if we should estimate the vast amount of evidence which it offers in behalf of the pretensions of the Son of God, and the demonstration of the impossibility of being “justified by deeds of law,” which it furnishes; the whole world might praise God that he had so peculiarly distinguished the Jews.—In other words—The Mosaic law belonged to a series of means by which the mediatorial system was to be introduced; and that system must not only secure its primary object, but

guaranty the integrity of any intermediate measures which were, either originally or casually, necessary to its introduction. If the operation of the Mosaic ritual, as an intermediate measure, was attended by *the abounding of the offence*; then the mediatorial system, spreading itself out over the means of its own introduction, must display *the abounding of grace*. Hence the Redeemer, in being put under LAW, was put under it in its Mosaic form; and is set forth before us as having fulfilled *all righteousness*.

But I have another use to make of this seemingly strange matter.—Some theologians have sometimes found a difficulty in extending the phrases,—by the one righteousness THE MANY are made RIGHTEOUS, and by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon ALL MEN UNTO JUSTIFICATION OF LIFE,—some theologians, I say, have found great difficulty in extending these phrases to ALL MEN. They would rather, as has before been stated, introduce a restrictive principle, of which no notice is given in the context, but which is supposed to grow out of a covenant between the Father and the Son, to confine these terms to the ELECT. But were not the JEWS the *elect* of God? and was not the apostle reasoning with them at the time? Are they not put into contrast with others, who were not under law, and who did not sin after the similitude of Adam's transgression? And if such were the jewish circumstances, and distinct provision was made for them as the elect, to whom can the phrases in question refer but to ALL MEN? Are not THE MANY opposed to the ELECT? And does not the simple appellation—*the many*—rebuke all such prudish scruples? There is nothing left for us but to take the broad principle which the apostle has laid down. Adam was a *figure* of Christ. And as ALL MEN are constituted *sinners* by Adam's one offence, so ALL MEN are constituted *righteous* by Christ's one righteousness: AS ALL MEN are brought into *condemnation* by Adam's offence, so ALL MEN

are brought into a *justification unto life* by Christ's righteousness.

The mediatorial work, therefore, consists in this, that it was a *ministration of righteousness*. For this purpose Christ was made under LAW. Righteousness is conformity to law; and LIFE is the reward of that conformity. Christ having rendered this righteousness, as our social head, procures for us LIFE. Adam and himself acted under the same general instrument; and as the offence of the one brought all men into death, the righteousness of the other brings all men into life. Hence the Redeemer is so fully and unequivocally declared to be *the resurrection and the life*—the Lord of *life* and glory—whose voice shall be heard in the *grave*, waking up all the *dead*. Hence it is said, that ere he shall surrender the kingdom to the Father, DEATH, that is, temporal death as we term it, or the death of the body—though the last enemy, shall be destroyed. In the morning of the *resurrection*, when all men shall rise *to die no more*, DEATH shall be cast into the lake of fire.

Thus, agreeably to the nature of *law*, according to its own terms, and as it had been exemplified in Adam's case, LIFE is the result of *righteousness*. The facts most demonstrably sustain the theory advanced; and not only in reference to Christ's *work*, but in view of Adam's *sin*. For if the resurrection from the dead, as exhibited in Christ's coming back from the grave, and as it shall be exhibited at the last day when death shall be swallowed up in victory, be the contemplated and appropriate result of his obedience to *law*, then Adam's disobedience could only introduce that death from which men are delivered by the resurrection.—How important, in the remedial plan, is the Saviour's resurrection! Its "power" in relation to practical godliness is great, as Paul most aptly and beautifully describes it;* and its memorial, as it returns in each revolving week, cannot be otherwise than refreshing to the spiritual mind.—

*Phil. iii. 8—11.

Could any subject more interesting than the connexion between righteousness and life, thus luminously set forth, be offered to the consideration of an intellectual being? No wonder that the scriptures employ such glowing terms when they speak on this lofty theme:—"This corruptible," they say, "must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality. So when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written,—Death is swallowed up in victory. O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory. The sting of death is SIN, and the strength of sin is the LAW. But thanks be to God who giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ."—This is a justification unto life. He who forfeits its blessings, and rises to everlasting shame, does so by his personal unbelief, and sinks into death because he has despised the abundant overtures of grace divine.

Supposing that Adam had obeyed the LAW, and brought in "a ministration of *righteousness*" instead of "a ministration of *death*," what would have been its legal bearing? Certainly his posterity would not have died a "temporal death;" or that DEATH, which the Redeemer shall *destroy*, should not have entered the world. In other words,—his children, instead of having been involved in a *condemnation* to death, would have obtained a *justification* unto life. This happy constitutional result would have come upon ALL MEN. But the question which I have asked, must go farther. We must inquire how "a ministration of righteousness," brought about by the official obedience of our first social head, should have affected the *personal responsibility* of his children? Should that righteousness, by *imputation*, have conducted them to eternal glory, and thus have nullified the whole system of personal responsibility? Should there not have been an indispensable necessity, notwithstanding Adam's official act, that every human be-

ing should obey the law written on his own heart, and by *personal holiness* become meet for that kingdom, which flesh and blood cannot inherit? And if the contemplated operations did not rest on an *imputation* which absorbed all *personal responsibility*, could this ministration of righteousness have served any other purpose than as a splendid and magnificent emblem to induce to personal holiness? and in the same way that God's own display or manifestation of HIMSELF calls for our imitation, or as official excellence always demands attention? This would have corresponded with the nature of men, as obtaining their ideas through the medium of their senses, and have exhibited every man as he necessarily is, individually accountable. Certainly when Adam sinned we did not eat the forbidden fruit; and as certainly, if he had not eaten, we should have thereby displayed no personal virtue. In the same light is Christ's righteousness to be viewed. Its imputation to us, absorbing our personal responsibility, is a mere theological chimera, and in all juridical science, a downright absurdity. Every human being who shall ever reach heaven, will enter there on the principle of his personal holiness; and every one who shall be turned into hell, shall incur this fearful doom, not by any deficiency of the mediatorial righteousness, to be attributed, either to itself or to any purpose respecting its application, but by his own personal unholiness. From the nature of the case, then, and from the nature of man, the ministration of the mediatorial righteousness must be an appeal to man's outward senses; and be intended to call forth all his personal faculties, on the principle of personal responsibility, and for the purpose of personal sanctification;—without which sanctification he can never enjoy an entrance into the kingdom of glory.

Certainly the scriptures take this very method of illustrating the use which they intend us to make of the subjects they present to our consideration.—“Be ye holy, for I am

holy ;"—“be ye imitators of me, even as I am of Christ ;”—“let the same mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus ;”—“hereunto were ye called, for Christ has left us an *example* that we should follow his steps.” Similitude is in fact the secret, the sacred, the philosophical, operation of social life ; and gives to the divine manifestations on the one hand, and to social responsibility among men on the other, all their energy and importance. The characteristic of our being at the first was, that we were made in the image of God ; and the highest benefit which can be bestowed on a race of sinners, is to renew them in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, after the image of him that created them. The very end and design of the divine government is to preserve the likeness on the principle of personal responsibility ; and of course to make such an exhibition as shall, by the excitement and exercise of those powers for which man is accountable, further and secure that object. And when the whole is obtained, and the mediatorial kingdom is absorbed in the general administration, which proclaims God to be all and in all, the consummation supposes that we shall be *like* God. There is, therefore, no other principle on which the remedial transactions of Immanuel could be constructed. They form a ministration which, under the superintending agency of the Holy Spirit, wakes up the human mind to consider its interests and discharge its responsibilities. The view thus disclosed, as I think, unfolds the only principle of moral government consistent with personal responsibility, and exhibits the glorious import of the gospel. This is the channel in which divine favor flows, and in which the riches of divine grace discharge themselves in full stream—a river of life deep and broad, where all may slake their thirst, and suffer no more forever.

But in interpreting the work of the second Adam as “a ministration of righteousness,” and thus throwing it into a systematic arrangement which may be somewhat novel,

you may very fairly inquire, what is the place which the *death* of Christ occupies in such a view ? Was his death necessary, or had it any peculiar efficiency about it?—Not only is the inquiry fair, but if in any place my chain of reasoning is weak, we have now in our hands the link that will break. Nor have I any objection that the whole catenation should be dissolved, if at any point it will not bear a just amount of pressure. TRUTH, brethren, truth is the object the human mind is searching after. The Son of God came into the world to bear witness to the TRUTH.

1. The Redeemer came to “finish the transgression, to make an end of sins—the one offence and the many offences—to make reconciliation for iniquity, and to bring in everlasting righteousness.” In this variety of language do the scriptures describe his WORK. But they do not intend, by multiplying terms, to lead us away from its great characteristic. The Spirit, to whose agency is committed the application of evangelic truth to the human mind, convinces the world of *righteousness*: used in which connexion by the Master himself, the term RIGHTEOUSNESS covers the whole of his finished work. As has already been intimated, he was “made under LAW.” The *law* then is the measure of his operations; and prescribes, throughout, whatever was necessary for him to undertake. Of course he must *die* because the law had been broken.

But it may be said, that if Adam had obeyed the law, his obedience would not have included *death*. True, but his obedience would have been the *righteousness* of the law; because, as it had not been broken, it could demand no more. If more had been required than mere obedience to the precept of the law, then mere obedience to the precept, in his case, could not have been the *righteousness* required. But now, the law having been violated, and a case of transgression being called into judicial consideration, *righteousness* requires something more than mere obedience to precept. Christ was not only made under

the law, but was put under its *curse* ; for the law had said, in view of “ sin worthy of death ” having been committed— “ cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree.” The explanation of his death is then to be referred to the LAW, whose *righteousness* he came to fulfil. Hence it was said by one of the ancient prophets—“ The Lord is well pleased for his *righteousness*’ sake ; he will magnify the *law*, and make it honorable.”

I feel no concern whatever, to sustain the theological distinction between Christ’s *active* and *passive* obedience : but prefer, with the apostle, to exhibit an entire WHOLE. The apostle’s language is—“ Being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became *obedient unto death*, even the death of the cross.” In fact, when the scriptures speak of the righteousness of the Mediator, they uniformly include under that term, both his active and passive obedience, considering him as being “ made *perfect* through sufferings.” Thus in one epistle, “ the many offences ” committed by the jews are represented as covered by his *righteousness* ; and in another, their “ redemption ” is referred to his “ *death*.” So also reconciliation is sometimes referred to the whole of Christ’s work ; as in the passage quoted—“ God is *in Christ* reconciling the world unto himself.” And again—God “ hath reconciled us to himself by *Jesus Christ*, and hath given unto us *the ministry of reconciliation*.” At other times it is referred to his sufferings or death :—“ And that he might reconcile both unto God in one body, by his *cross*.”

The death of Christ forms the *distinguishing* part of his mediatorial work. Adam, in rendering the righteousness of the law, would not have died ; because the law had not been broken. But by Adam’s transgression we are *constituted* a race of *sinner*s. This is our peculiarity, and Christ is under the law as *broken*. Hence the sufferings and death of Christ appear so conspicuous in the scriptural details ; but they are not intended to supersede in our minds the idea of his *righteousness* as a WHOLE. A part, and

that which circumstances have rendered the most prominent, is put for the whole ; while, in its own individuality, it is always put in connexion with our *sin*, is always referred to the fact that the law was violated and its penalty incurred, and is always represented as indispensably necessary. Often, very often, do the inspired writers put this matter in the foreground, as the very *perfection* of our mediatorial prince, and make it emblematic of the whole of christian living. "The preaching of the *cross* is to them that perish, foolishness ; but unto us which are saved, it is *the power of God*." "We preach Christ crucified, unto the jews a stumbling block, and unto the greeks foolishness ; but unto them which are called, both jews and greeks, Christ the *power of God*, and the *wisdom of God*." "God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom the world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world." "I am crucified with Christ, nevertheless I live ; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me : and the life which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me." "We are always bearing about in our body, the dying of the Lord Jesus, that the life also of Jesus may be made manifest in our body."

2. But the scriptures, in explaining the death of Christ, not only fondly display its legal consistency : they also compare it with the great practical object which a "ministration of righteousness" was intended to subserve. God's grand design is to place before us a most perfect emblem of that which he would desire us to be. This design is apparent in the visible representations he has made, down from the manifestation of himself, personally and in his works, to the lowest form in which social life or official responsibility can appear. Such is the essential principle of government over a class of beings who are distinguished by personal intelligence, and who receive their ideas by means of their outward senses. Nor can a wider range, for the

operation of such a principle, be any where presented, than is afforded in our own world: where every virtue must be acquired and maintained in the midst of toils, temptations and sufferings. To “learn obedience *by the things which he suffered,*” as though it were necessary for him to acquire his ideas in the same way that ideas are acquired by ourselves, is no small nor uninteresting part of the Redeemer’s work, considered in view of its practical efficiency. How cheering and refreshing is *sympathy* to a sufferer! It is the only appropriate connexion in which the social affections of the human heart can be displayed, when suffering is to be endured. There is a philosophic coldness, there is a stoical apathy, sustained by whatever is chilling in abstract principle, which strong intellectual men often mistake for morality; and under which sensitive minds shrink and writhe. But our Master occupied a different position. “*It behooved* him in all things to be made *like unto his brethren,* that he might be a merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining to God.” It would not do for heaven itself to be too hard, or in any way too severely inquisitive; not that Jehovah does what is wrong, but a series of practical operations, consistent with the weakness of human nature must be sustained, and the human mind must be put into a situation where it might act freely and unreservedly. A finer view of social life could not be presented, than our Redeemer’s work presents; nor can any more be justly required, even by theologians themselves. But now, Christians, “forasmuch as Christ has suffered for us in the flesh, arm yourselves likewise with *the same mind*;—Christ also hath once suffered for us, *leaving us an example* that ye should follow in his footsteps.” His death was a death unto sin, and teaches us to “mortify the deeds of the body,” that we may live:—one of the most important items belonging to our personal responsibility.

You may remember that in a former lecture,* when speak-

* Lecture IV.

ing on the subject of the divine manifestations, I had occasion to call your attention to the peculiarity and the force of the following phrases—"Almighty God"—"the Spirit *searcheth* all things"—"the Father *judgeth* no man, but hath committed all judgment to the Son." This language serves to show that Jehovah, instead of leaving our little minds to struggle in vain attempts to arrange and express some adequate conceptions of his own immensity, has exhibited *himself* in a manner which is suitable to our apprehensions. A similar view is presented to us here. "It behooved Christ," says the apostle Paul, "to be made *like* unto his brethren, *that he might be a merciful and faithful high-priest.*" Doubtless our whole case is spread out in the light of his own countenance. He *knows* all, and can *do* all, if his own *omniscience and omnipotence* are alone to be respected. But something else is to be taken into consideration. He *could* have raised up children to Abraham of the stones of the street; but the scriptures must be fulfilled. So whatever he might be able to do, viewing simply his own perfections, yet the peculiarities of our nature must be regarded. His mediatorial administration must be conducted on principles which shall correspond with our intellectual capacities. *Sympathy*, like love, or wisdom, or power, or justice, must be *exhibited*; or his priestly services would not fall within the range of our perceptions. His sufferings and death, therefore, resulted from a *necessity*, which argues no deficiencies in Jehovah, but some peculiarity in our own constitution. It *became* God to make the captain of our salvation perfect through sufferings: it *behooved* Christ to be made *like* unto his brethren, *that he might be a merciful and faithful high-priest.* Such an high *priest* became us. In that he hath suffered, being tempted, he is **ABLE** to succor those that are tempted. The *necessity* for the *death* of Christ, is like the *necessity* for a divine manifestation in the *flesh*. The whole mediatorial system is constructed like the original system of creation; in which "the elements of the

world," with their varied relations and operations, are emblematic of spiritual realities. Like *books*, written by the finger of God, intellectual subjects are stated, discussed, and exemplified in them. And the age which best understands the value of *books*, should best understand the inspired volumes of nature, or should study them the most intensely.

3. It is here where, if I mistake not, the striking and glorious superiority of Christ, as the *second* Adam, is to be considered. The first Adam was made a "living soul"—capable of preserving the life he had; the second Adam was made "a quickening Spirit"—able to restore the life which had been lost. The nature of the case, and the peculiarity of the mediatorial person, alike called for this distinction. Mankind were to be raised from the dead; and Christ was GOD manifested in the FLESH. In view of the *law*, and of the nature of *grace*, which may employ any agency that is not inconsistent with *law*; and in view of a divine manifestation, in which all the features of the original institute must be preserved—of which a change from a natural into a spiritual body was the most glorious, because it was the consummation of that institute—any superadded privilege or influence which was called for, might be safely introduced:—*safely*, I mean in reference to ideas which the *human mind* can form. Now that Christ should be "a quickening Spirit," was called for by the fact that all men had been brought into *death* by Adam's sin. How could he then, as a quickening Spirit, raise man from the dead, and not violate the essential principles of the moral government which had been established among men? Through *death*, says the apostle, he destroyed him that had *the power of death*. The dominion of DEATH being thus broken up, GRACE comes in to act out her own character; and sets off our victorious prince with all the glory and beauty, all the strength and majesty, which our circumstances could call for; or which could win our affection and gain our confi-

dence. Not that any work of supererogation is performed, for the mere sake of *show*; but grace is exuberant, though it never acts inconsistently with law. The mediatorial system has no deficiencies.

Admitting that "a ministration of righteousness," perfect in all its parts, and furnishing a full display of its legal attributes, had been constructed by Christ's "obedience unto death," it may now be inquired, whether in this he met the whole object of his mediatorial mission? To answer the inquiry, we must revert again to the scriptural prototype, and ask what else Adam would have done, if he had obeyed the law? This retrospective view discloses a secondary fact of great interest. The most superficial observer would discern that, the knowledge of *EVIL* should not have been introduced into the world, if our first father had not sinned. In other words, his children would have been placed in the most happy circumstances, in regard of their personal responsibility; and should have enjoyed every facility by which they could be assisted in discharging their obligation. A corresponding result must attend on Christ's righteousness; so that believers in his name might become personally qualified to fulfil their duties, and secure everlasting life. Were it necessary, we have now an opportunity of descanting on the various means of grace, which are employed by the Spirit of the Lord, to affect the human mind, and to convince the world of *SIN*, of *RIGHTEOUSNESS*, and of *JUDGMENT*. The *EVIL*, which has been introduced by the original offence, it might be shown, is sanctified to the production of ultimate good. The tempter's power is broken, or his kingdom is destroyed, according to the terms of the original promise; so that the believer is brought off more than a conqueror through him that loved him and gave himself for him. And the Holy Spirit, in all the plenitude of grace, and in all the variety of the kindest offices, would attend each child of redeeming love through all the diversified scenes of his earthly pilgrimage.

But all these matters are perfectly familiar to every christian. He is already acquainted with their freeness and their fulness—they are the common topics to which he listens every sabbath, and on which he meditates every day.—A remark or two only I think to be necessary.

The original promise was expressed in this language—“I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her Seed; *it shall bruise thy head*, and thou shalt bruise his heel.” The principal idea here stated, and which is made to represent the whole mediatorial work, is that of the *judgment*, by which Satan, as the god of the world, is overthrown. The same idea is frequently advanced in the new testament, in explanation of the Redeemer’s work. Thus—“Forasmuch as the children were partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise took part of the same; that through death he might destroy him that had the power of death, that is the devil.”—For this purpose the Son of God was manifested, that he might destroy the works of the devil.”—“Now is the judgment of this world; now shall the prince of this world be cast out.”—“The prince of this world cometh, but hath nothing in me.” The Spirit “shall convince the world of judgment—because the prince of this world is judged.”—This event was achieved by the Redeemer’s *death*, or righteousness, because that was the fulfilment of the *law*. “Now as “the sting of death is sin, and the strength of sin is the *law*,” the power of Satan must be derived from the law as broken. Of course, when the law was fulfilled, his power was destroyed, his kingdom was overturned, his *head was bruised*. Any power which he may now exert, the believer is perfectly competent to resist: and thus the promise was fulfilled.

A remark or two in relation to the demoniacal possessions, which are reported as having occurred under the jewish dispensation, will not here be out of place. They must be referred to the peculiarity of the Mosaic economy, as being a government of *LAW*, or “the ministration of death

and condemnation." The Redeemer informs us that "the devil was a murderer from the beginning; and Paul tells us that the Captain of our salvation, "through death destroyed him that had the power of death, that is the devil." The power of this adversary would, therefore, be felt under a "ministration of DEATH;" or his influence would form a part of the symbolical exhibition, for which such an economy would be set up. The "works" of the Saviour, in which he designed to "take away the sin of the world, implied, according to the first promise, the bruising of the serpent's head; and consequently, that same "work," in taking away "the many offences" committed by the jews, who, in violating LAW, sinned like Adam, would destroy the power of Satan as expressed in connexion with those "many offences." These possessions being coincident with the nature of the jewish dispensation, the miracles which their occurrence afforded the Redeemer an opportunity of performing, would furnish the most appropriate evidence of his messiahship. And accordingly he promised that, the Holy Spirit should employ this evidence in that way—"He shall convince the world of *judgment*, because the prince of this world is *judged*."—From this argument it would follow that, these possessions cannot occur under the new dispensation, inasmuch as it is "the ministration of righteousness and life;" or it follows that, Satanic influence, as it was connected with the symbolic character and operation of the Mosaic economy, has been destroyed.

The gentiles officially reprobated, as the jews had been officially elected, were placed in analogous circumstances. Idolatry is often declared, by inspired writers, to be "darkness and *death*;" and Satan is denominated "the god of the world." When the gentiles, under the process of the second election, were called into the church, it was no small part of the blessedness of their new position, that they should be delivered from this debasing control; and hence Paul's commission was to be fulfilled by "opening their

eyes, turning them from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God." The second election, therefore, by contemplating the twofold object, or by introducing the gentiles along with "a remnant" of the jews into to the church, displays a double illustration of the remedial agency destroying "the works of the devil."

Here I cannot, though it may be considered to be an unlooked for digression, refrain from adverting to another scriptural matter, of which the preceding remarks most forcibly remind me. It is somewhat singular in itself; and the various opinions which commentators have advanced in relation to it, appear to me entirely unsatisfactory. I allude to the imprecations, which so frequently occur in the book of psalms. Perhaps a reference to the peculiarity of the dispensation under which the psalmist lived, and which we have been reviewing, may clear up the whole difficulty. The Redeemer himself explained a parallel case by such a reference, when, passing through Samaria, the inhabitants of a certain village refused to receive him, "because his face was as though he would go to Jerusalem." The disciples, hurt at the indignity offered to their Master, asked him to permit them to pray for fire from heaven, *even as Elias did*, to consume these Samaritans. Jesus instantly rebuked the unreasonable request:—"Ye know not what manner of SPIRIT ye are of; for the Son of Man is not come to destroy men's lives, but to save them." To save their lives—what is the force of his reason? or how does it bear on the official character and conduct of Elias? I would paraphrase the Redeemer's answer thus—"Ye know not the nature of the *dispensation* under which you are called to minister. Such a prayer might do for Elias, who officiated under a ministration of death; but ye are called to officiate under a ministration of life, whose HEAD is a quickening Spirit—the resurrection and the life—the Lord of life and glory.* If

* For such a view of the term SPIRIT, see Acts xix. 2—Rom. viii. 15—2. Tim. 1. 7.

then the dispensation under which Elias lived, justified his prayer, or if his high official character entitled him to inflict *death*, the penalty of the *law* whose integrity he sought to restore ; the same justification may relieve David's official character, when, viewed either as a prophet or a king, he appeals to the great head of the nation—to Jehovah, concerning whom Paul says, "our God is a consuming fire"—to sustain his own law by the infliction of its known and incurred penalties. I know not in what other way to explain, either the prayer of Elias, or the imprecations of David. And if this explanation be correct, it will unquestionably follow that, we have no more right to utter the imprecations of David, than the disciples had to offer the prayer of Elias. The nature of the new dispensation forbids both, or it forbids neither ; and affects *praise* as much as it can affect *prayer*.

But to return. Perhaps, in reference to the mission of the Spirit, it may be asked, how can HE be said to be SENT, according to the ideas of the divine manifestations which I have advanced ? Observe the terms in which the Redeemer speaks on this subject :—and when "he is come, he will guide you into all truth ; for he shall not speak of *himself*, but whatsoever he shall *hear*, that shall he speak ; he shall glorify me, for he shall receive of mine and shall show it unto you." Of course it is not *abstract deity* to which your attention is called, when the scriptures refer you to the Holy Spirit. The Spirit, Jesus said, shall not SPEAK of HIMSELF. All the phraseology which is employed, belongs to Jehovah as manifested in personal form ; and the coming of the Spirit is, like the ascension of Immanuel, a transaction which derives its propriety and its phrase from the nature of the case. On the principle of similitude, which is the professed object of the whole, and on which all the circumstances are made to turn, there is no more difficulty nor impropriety, than when Paul speaks of being present in

spirit, while absent in body. The Spirit of a manifested God, or of a visible and glorious personage, of whom spirit and form or body may be predicated, might be said to come or to be sent, without any far-fetched idea being presented to the mind. We can have no other ideas of God, than those which are attendant upon, and consistent with, such a manifestation; and any incongruity which we suppose ourselves to perceive from the fact of the Spirit being sent, arises from the labored and unsatisfactory attempt we have made to form a conception of abstract deity.—Jehovah, as manifested, says, MY Spirit, in the same way in which any of us speak, when we say—MY Spirit.—“The spirit of the prophets are subject to the prophets.” The language does not barely cover the idea of God’s sending *himself*. It is God *manifested*, who is represented to us as both *spirit* and *form*, who says MY spirit, contradistinguished from *form*—that form being removed from our view. We no longer know Christ after the *flesh*.

The object of the mediatorial work is to reconcile man to God. In this view, I presume, any one may distinctly recognise a remedial operation, which addresses itself to man as a free, intelligent, and responsible agent. The very term imports one of the highest intellectual efforts which a rational being can make; implies an action on his mind of a variety of considerations, both pleasing and active; and indicates a state of heart in which a thousand evil passions may have been repressed, or have given way to the liveliest exercise of the best affections. The result is one in which, kindness and love, argument and entreaty, expostulation and warning, are employed; and where mere force is the feeblest and worst of all means that can be used. Accordingly both “the word” and “the ministry of reconciliation,” are intellectual in their character and influence; and never have been indebted to the physical arm for any part of the moral achievement contemplated. “Now then,” says an apostle, “we are ambassadors for Christ, as though

God did beseech you by us, we pray you in Christ's stead, be ye reconciled to God." Hence it is that we are charged not to resist. Hence it is that we are required to believe. And hence it is that the fault is our own, if we are not saved. Having eyes, we see not; having ears, we hear not; and having hearts, we understand not. But submitting ourselves to other influences, and yielding to the lusts of the flesh, to the corruptions of the world, and to the temptations of Satan, and that in defiance of every suggestion which divine kindness has made, we bring everlasting ruin on ourselves.

The *reconciled* man exerts all his intellectual energies under the directing control of *truth*, whose evidence has been brought home demonstrably to his own mind, while all his feelings fully accord. He mortifies his flesh, "keeps his body under," watches against temptation, and lives above the world, that he may walk in communion with God. Christ is in his heart the hope of glory; and he lives by faith on redeeming love. He is distinguished by the fruits of the Spirit, who dwells in him. His *business* is to glorify God, to do good, and finally to attain to everlasting joy. His treasures, his conversation, his heart, are all in heaven, and he is patiently, but affectionately, waiting for the coming of the Lord. His path is like the shining light, which "shineth more and more unto the perfect day." "Drawn with the cords of a man, and with bands of love," he leaves the things which are behind, and reaches forward to the things that are before. And when at last he has finished his course, he cheerfully bids the world adieu, lays off the panoply in which he had maintained his successful conflict, "wipes from his brow the dust and heat of battle," and departs to dwell with his Lord forever. To produce such a change in human beings, who are found devoted to the sensualities of life, and alienated in their minds by wicked works, is the avowed object of the Mediator's righteousness, and of the

Spirit's operations. And the whole proceeds from setting up the kingdom of God in human hearts.

It may be very readily conceived how the righteousness of Christ, accomplished by his becoming *obedient unto death*, should effect this reconciliation. It illustrates and exemplifies the connexion between righteousness and life, which is the great moral lesson we have to learn ; and which constitutes the very element of our intellectual existence. It unfolds to us the principle of moral responsibility, on which our everlasting destinies depend. It manifests the divine perfections with all their attractive influence ; and exhibits the goodness and portrays the love of God, in the most inviting and gracious form. It is the visible and demonstrative interpretation of all those moral principles which are applicable to our condition as subjects of the divine government, and as living in a world of sin and sorrow. It affords a luminous and lovely portrait of the glory of the Lord, by *beholding* or *reflecting* which, we become changed into the same image, from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord. It consecrates a hallowed spot where the Lord reveals his *presence* ; that by communion with him, he may leave the full and vivid impression of his own pure and holy character upon our spirits. It creates, and bestows all those secondary agencies, through which, as his own appointed means, he holds a purifying fellowship with our inmost thoughts. These, and such like results, make up its characteristic operations in a sanctifying process, which the Spirit carries on within us. He who submits his heart and yields his affections, feels himself to be in the holiest of all, and in communion with his heavenly Father. He calls up to recollection the lusts he has indulged, the sins he has committed, the mercies he has abused ; and how freely and copiously he weeps, *repenting* of all that he has done ! He looks to his Saviour's virtues and sorrows, learns the nature of his own being, perceives the truth of the gospel brought home to him " in demonstration of the Spirit and with pow-

er," and deeply convinced, he *believes*. He listens to the promises of future glory, and withdrawing his eyes from the vanities of life, he, in the full swellings of hope, transfers his affections to heaven. He looks around upon a guilty, dying world, and—his heart bursting with the tenderest sympathies for his brethren—he tells them, in impassioned strains, what the Lord has done for his soul; seeks to convince them that there is a living, regenerating, sanctifying influence about the truth as it is in Jesus, when it is admitted into the heart; and beseeches them to be reconciled unto God.

Ought not such effects to follow, if the gospel be what it pretends to be; if man be an intellectual creature; and if Jehovah communes with his mind, or deals with him on the principle of personal responsibility? Must not such effects necessarily follow, unless the hearers of the gospel resist the moral influence, which the God of love thus brings to bear upon their own intellectual nature? Is not *power*—power to reconcile, to regenerate, to sanctify, to elevate, the human mind, and analogous with the operations of power in all other directions—here most abundantly disclosed? See you not that God is thus *working*—working *mightily*—*in you*, according to his good pleasure? and, by his Spirit, convincing you of *sin*, of *righteousness*, and of *judgment*? Feel you not, that the gospel is a competent instrument of spiritual action on your own hearts; that the cross of Christ is suited to your earthly condition; and that your sympathizing high-priest is able to succor you in your temptations—is able to save, even *to the uttermost*, all that come unto God by him? Have you ever heard a "joyful sound, like it? Has the proud philosopher ever displayed such *wisdom*? or the haughty formalist ever manifested such *power*? Behold, sinner, what a glorious foundation God hath laid in Zion! Lay down your weapons of rebellion? Quit your unbecoming and ruinous strife with your heavenly Father. Listen to his exhortations. Harden your hearts

no more against the yearnings of his Spirit. Calculate not, that after you shall have rejected his Son, there “remaineth a sacrifice for sin.” Think not, that mercy will plead your cause, and avert your impending doom, while your nature is unsanctified, and your soul unreconciled. Other foundation no man can lay, than that which is laid, even the Lord Jesus Christ. Reject him, and you are undone forever, because there is no other medium of reconciliation—no method, consistent with your own intellectual nature, by which you can be renewed in the spirit of your mind. An unholy being is prepared for nothing, either in his own bosom, or according to the established principles of all moral government, but perdition. You might as well suppose that a hurricane would contribute to vegetation, as imagine that an unsanctified man would be meet for heaven.

But in speaking of the righteousness of Christ, it may farther be inquired, what connexion it has with the “actual transgressions” of men? or those which are committed by them as living on their own responsibility?—In the text which has been so often quoted on these general subjects, this question is very explicitly answered:—“God is in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself, *not imputing unto men their trespasses.*” Can any other explanation be desired? But men are so full of their ideas of abstract *justice*, and reason so exclusively on principles of mere *law*, that they have substituted a series of theological enigmas for the riches of grace. Taking their own range of thought, they dwell in deepest sadness on the forbidding and chilling views of divine sovereignty which they have formed; and sit down wilted and writhing under the frowns of an angry JUDGE, as though they had committed the unpardonable sin; when they should have laid their heads upon a SAVIOUR’S bosom, and drank, yea, drank abundantly, from the fountain of his forgiving love. How often we have yearned over such troubled spirits! And that, when, perhaps, we have scarcely escaped from the toils ourselves!

Let us inquire after the principle. Theologians have reasoned from the *nature* of LAW. But are we under law? If we are not under *law*, their premises are inaccurate, and no wonder their conclusion is so troublesome;—for what can the human mind ever gain by false reasoning? The real fact is, that we are not under *law*, but are under *grace*. The *law* gives sin all its power; but being under *grace*, “sin shall not have dominion over us.” Christ having become the end of the law, by fulfilling its righteousness, we are placed under GOSPEL; and our inferences must now be drawn from the *nature* of GRACE. And what may we not expect from grace? What will not the God of grace do for us, seeing that he has no pleasure in the death of the sinner, and has loved us so much as to give his only begotten Son to die for us? He is our loving Father—what may his children not ask for? After all his professions and declarations of fatherly kindness, can ministers of his holy sanctuary still describe him as keeping up a judicial process on principles of inexorable law, urging it even to an extremity—and would you believe them? Would any of you, being a father, give to your son a stone, when he asks for a piece of bread? or a scorpion, when he asks for an egg? What then mean all these fine-spun theories, and petrifying denunciations, which drink up the spirit by the anguish they create; when prophets and apostles are singing and preaching grace divine, and when the providence of God, in “the riches of his goodness, forbearance, and long-suffering,” stands inviting, commanding, entreating, reasoning, expostulating—waiting for the sinner to return? Surely ministerial men have misunderstood their commission, and the christian church has not read aright the charter of her privileges and her hopes. And yet these very dogmas which distort our heavenly Father’s image, and pierce our own hearts with so many sorrows, are antique traditions, which official men are so laboriously and fiercely defending, and

which parents are so inconsiderately teaching to their children.

Perhaps my remarks may be charged with a tendency to licentiousness. Does such a tendency belong to the *nature* of GRACE? or does it acquire that tendency when it is put into contrast with LAW, and when it is exhibited as forming the characteristic of a remedial government in the hands of the Son of God? Is a reconciled man a creature of unbridled lusts and unhallowed propensities? Or, as Paul would express the idea, "can he who is dead to sin, live any longer therein?" Is there any immoral or anti-philosophic attribute belonging to an administration of LOVE?

But then are not our actual sins pardoned *for Christ's sake*? Most assuredly. The scriptures have explicitly declared the fact. We are all called upon to be "kind one to another, tender hearted, forgiving one another, even as God, for Christ's SAKE, hath forgiven us." Nor is it uncommon with the bible to represent us as pardoned for Jehovah's NAME SAKE. On what principle? The ground was *cursed*, and might have been *blessed*, for Adam's *sake*. Sodom and Gomorrah would have been saved for the *sake* of fifty, or even of ten, righteous men. And why? If the practical result of Christ's righteousness be to *reconcile* the world; and if, when the mediatorial kingdom has been accomplished, the redeemed are presented as personally holy, should pardon for their many transgressions be withheld? Is not this gracious result declared in the text,—*"God is, in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing unto men their trespasses?"* What would you do with a reconciled, a reformed, a holy man? What would an earthly father do with a returning prodigal? Under such circumstances is not forgiveness natural, wise, equitable, and right? Has not God explicitly declared, that—"If we confess our sins, He is FAITHFUL and JUST to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness?"

Could the issue of LAW itself go any further than to make holy men eternally happy? And would not all this, flowing from the practical efficiency of the Redeemer's righteousness, under a government of love, be the fruit of GRACE; which the redeemed may celebrate through eternity?—Christ's righteousness, as perfected by his death, thus becomes the PROPITIATION, or that official transaction, on whose principles, as intrinsically excellent, as most happily appropriate to the case, and as sustained by the *law* itself, God can be favorable to our world, and by which, or for whose SAKE, he may extend pardon freely and fully, without infringing on the nicest point of government.

It may be farther objected, that the doctrine advanced exhibits the sinner as justified by the *merit* of his own works. To this I reply, that MERIT is another theological term, whose technical obliquity has injured many a spiritual mind. Besides, it is a term which belongs, in the common use that is made of it, to the administration of LAW, under which we do not live. As to justification, its details, though much involved by theological sophistry, are very plain and simple on the scriptural page. No man ever can be "justified by deeds of LAW," or obedience to *law* abstractedly considered; because no man can obey the *law* ab- is what "the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh." Here arises the necessity for a Mediator. This Mediator having obeyed, or fulfilled the righteousness of the LAW, ALL MEN who had been previously brought into *condemnation* by Adam's sin, are brought into a *justification of life*. That righteousness being produced, ALL MEN are put under the mediatorial government, and are required to believe and obey the gospel, on their own personal responsibility, and under institutions of grace which are most favorable to the discharge of that responsibility. He that believeth is "justified by faith;" he that believeth not is condemned for his unbelief. And at the last-day, when "God shall judge the secrets of men by JESUS CHRIST,

according to the GOSPEL," every man shall stand justified or condemned, according to the facts belonging to his individual case.—"I say unto you," said the blessed Master,— "That every idle word that men shall speak, they shall give account thereof *in the day of judgment*. For by thy words thou shalt be *justified*, and by thy words thou shalt be *condemned*." And again I ask, what else would you do with a righteous man than *justify* him? or with an unrighteous man than *condemn* him? But theologians have confounded "deeds of laws," predicated of the government of LAW, and irrespective of a Mediator, so much with "works" performed under the mediatorial administration of the GOSPEL, that every plain reader of the bible is thrown into perpetual perplexities; and no one can tell the precise place or value of good works.—True they tell us, that good works are EVIDENCES; but are not deeds of law EVIDENCES too? The question is not fairly stated, and hence the difficulties which have arisen.

I may, perhaps, be censured, as having left out of view altogether THE ATONEMENT. But this certainly would be most careless and uncandid misapprehension. For I have been most distinctly portraying THE RECONCILIATION to your view. Go back again, and see if such be not the fact. I have not used *the word*—ATONEMENT, it is true. And are all your ideas to be thrown into confusion, your prejudices to be called up in all their vigor, and a scriptural argument to be scorned as unworthy of consideration, because a particular word has not been used? Do you not see what an unhappy strife has been gendered by *words*? Oh, but the word *atonement*, you will say, is too important to have been left out! Then I must assign my reasons for the omission. And,

1. After all the talk about it, the word occurs in our translation of the new testament but *once*;* and there, as every greek scholar knows, the original term so translated.

*Rom. v. 11.

ought to have been rendered *reconciliation*. What then is the meaning of all this difficulty, which is so constantly felt in relation to it? One would have supposed that the *word* occurred on every page of the new testament.—It will not do to reply that *the thing itself* is every where presented; for the *thing itself* I have endeavored most faithfully to describe.

2. The etymology of the word evinces it to be perfectly consistent with the argument stated. MENT is the common termination adopted to form a noun: as for example—punish-*ment*, blandish-*ment*, refresh-*ment*, accomplish-*ment*. So here, atone-*ment*. The termination *ment*, is merely added to the two words *at* and *one*, and makes AT-ONE-MENT, which means the being *at one*, or agreed, or reconciled.

3. The word has a technicality about it, which employs it to represent something in theological controversy, that is different from the official object which it is intended to designate.

I shall hereafter use the term in this particular sense, or as importing RECONCILIATION.

This mediatorial *work*, Christ as a *prophet* proclaims; as a *priest* he performs it; and as a *king* he has been exalted to administer, or reign on its principles. He is “a merciful and faithful high priest,” he is exalted to be a “Prince and a Saviour, to give or grant repentance unto Israel and remission of sins;”—and this is the mediatorial administration under which we all live; under which ALL have lived from the beginning, or since the first promise was given; and by which ALL shall be judged at last.—May GOD ALMIGHTY give us wisdom to appreciate the privileges of GRACE, that we may be found ready for JUDGMENT at last; and that it may not be our CONDEMNATION that we refused to believe in and obey him, who by his righteousness has brought us ALL into a JUSTIFICATION OF LIFE.

LECTURE XII.

Application of the mediatorial constitution—General views—Origin of ELECTION—Object of the covenant with Abraham—Nature and Reason of the two “covenants”—Condition of the gentiles—Light of Nature—Priesthood of Melchisedec—Priesthood in general—Design of election.

THE EXTENT of the mediatorial institute is a subject of very great interest. No theological point has called forth more argument, or excited more feeling. It has already been presented incidently in the preceding lecture. The nature of the institute could not have been discussed without stating its extent; because the terms of the apostolic argument, which I have been endeavoring to analyse, included both subjects. In fact, the *nature* of the Redeemer's work cannot else be ascertained. If Adam's transgression involved the whole race, so that all are *constituted sinners* and are brought into *condemnation*, and Christ's righteousness did not extend to the whole race, so that all are *constituted righteous*, and are brought into *justification* of life; then Adam could not have been a **FIGURE** of Christ. Much less could the *abounding* of grace over sin have been sustained. Such is the view afforded by the apostle;—a view which includes both the efficacy and the application of the remedial statute.

All the general principles on which I have been reasoning lead to the same result. *All mankind* have been brought into a state of sin and condemnation by *a fault not their own*; all the principles of *justice* and *equity*, from which the mediatorial constitution itself arises, are necessarily due to **ALL**, and necessarily applicable to **ALL**. The theolo-

gical restrictions which have been arbitrarily imposed, and ingeniously and variously defended, instead of conferring a favor on some, take away a *right from all*;—a *right* belonging to man's existence, and awarded by the very constitution of our being.

The divine attributes, of which the mediatorial constitution forms so beautiful a display, necessarily bring *all men* under the remedial operation which that constitution has introduced. Controvertists speak of the goodness, and wisdom, and power, and righteousness of Jehovah, in a system of government which does not respond to the *personal responsibility* of its subjects; which not only leaves them unpitied and unassisted in a train of sorrows and infirmities, that are not to be traced to their own sin; but which condemns them as *personally responsible* under its administration, and for favors and privileges that have not been bestowed. It is impossible that any argument should justify such proceedings; or that the scriptures should state any views of the divine character so inconsistent with its essential attributes.

The nature of *man*, as being qualified to acquire ideas by means of his corporeal senses, renders it as practicable to apply a remedial ordinance to *ALL* as to *one*. One man will be, on all accurate and consistent principles, as *responsible* as another man, for that which he *sees, hears, and has a "heart to understand."* And no reason can be assigned why any man should not be under the common moral responsibilities of the divine government, any more than that a reason can be assigned why any man shall not enjoy the common privileges of his existence.

The nature of the remedial institute, or the mediatorial righteousness of the Son of God, being, as has been shown, an exterior exhibition addressed to the human spirit through the bodily senses, brings one man within its range as well as another man. A doctrine of election cannot be sustained under those circumstances, which excludes any man

from *seeing, hearing or knowing*. And hence it is, that the condemnation of men does not consist in this, that there was no *light*, but that the light did shine, and they loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil. Their condemnation is this—"That which may be known of God, is manifest among them; for God hath showed it unto them."—But "they hold the truth in unrighteousness;—when they knew God, they glorified him not as God—they did not like to retain God in their knowledge." Such are the scriptural comments on the subject. God does not, by any sovereign legislation, render it impossible for men to know, love, and obey the truth. The mediatorial righteousness of the second Adam is, like the sun in the firmament, intended for ALL—and ALL may enjoy the light and heat if they will. Our ecclesiastical lords would limit divine grace, and curtail the blessings of *reconciliation* by arbitrary statute; but God spreads his tender mercies *over all his works*.

In the chapters before us it is certainly as plain, that the promise given after the fall, expresses the mode of administration to which Adam and his children were subjected; as that the law, promulged in paradise, included himself and children in its operations. They were ALL without any exception exposed to *death*, reduced to toil and sorrow, and involved alike in the same knowledge of good and evil. They ALL have the same attributes of character, the same mental and corporeal faculties, and are placed in the same circumstances of life.

It may be said that all these effects were the results of Adam's *sin*, and prove nothing in favor of our argument. Be patient for a moment.—Theologians do not mean to abandon their own ground, as that was formerly exhibited; viz. that the sentence *executed* was not equal to the sentence *threatened*.* If they do abandon their ground, then as mankind would not be *spiritually dead* in Adam, they

* Lecture VII.

would be under the mediatorial institute. If theologians do not abandon that ground, then, by their own showing, all mankind are under a penalty, whose operations are restricted by the mediatorial institute. They may take either side of this dilemma. But still farther, all those *other* circumstances, which attended on the early annunciation of the Saviour, and which were purely mediatorial in their references, are as universal in their application as the consequences of Adam's sin. The enmity between mankind and the serpent—the cherubim—the sacrificial institution—the idea of Jehovah manifested in *the form of man*, or of a virgin-born Elohim—all of which are purely *evangelical*, and are every where to be noticed among men, or go as far as death and the knowledge of good and evil have gone. Or if these distinct matters are lacking under any particular condition of society, the mediatorial *idea* is prominent in some peculiar and interesting form.—The universality of the mediatorial symbols, offers an irrefragable argument in behalf of the universality of the institute itself. While all these details are instructive and evident, there is not incorporated with them any—not even the most distant—hint of any *election* restricting the operation, or application of the mediatorial plan. ELECTION, as the term is used by the inspired writers, comes into view long afterwards; and for specific purposes, which shall be stated in their own place. The mediatorial institute is the present and the gracious legislation of divine wisdom, framed in coincidence with man's *personal responsibilities*; and you must either admit its universality, or deny those responsibilities.

The particular text which I have quoted as interchangeable with the first promise, and which I selected on account of the precision of its terms, ascribes the very same latitude to the mediatorial work.—“GOD was in Christ, reconciling THE WORLD unto HIMSELF.”—THE WORLD.—I am fully aware of the exception which may be taken to this term, inasmuch as it is sometimes to be understood in a limit-

ed sense. But it is not always to be so considered. The exception may be cheerfully conceded; and yet, notwithstanding, the most fastidious theologue must admit that *the world* may mean **THE WORLD**. And perhaps, when he shall carefully observe the use of the term in the new testament, he may find it utterly impossible to sustain its limited sense, in application to the Redeemer's kingdom, by any ingenuity which may be employed. This philological difficulty I shall now endeavor to bring distinctly to view: and for this purpose, shall arrange the texts I may quote in three distinct classes.

1. "The **WORD**, who was afterwards made **FLESH**, was in the beginning with God; and the Word was God. *All* things were made *by him*; and without him was not any thing made, that was made. He was in the **WORLD**, *and the world was made by him*, and the world knew him not." The idea here asserted is very frequently stated in the scriptures in other language: thus—"By him were **ALL THINGS** created that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible." He is "the heir of **ALL THINGS**"—the **SON** being the heir of the Father's *official prerogative*, which extended to **ALL THINGS**. Throughout the old testament too the **GOD OF ISRAEL** is continually represented as the Creator of heaven and earth.

To the Word also has been ascribed the whole work of a sustaining and overruling providence. "Who being the brightness of glory, and the express image of his person, and upholding **ALL THINGS** by the word of his power." "By him **ALL THINGS** consist."

The remark that I wish to make upon this class of texts, which every reader of the scriptures knows might have been much enlarged, is, that **THE WORLD**, meaning *all things*, was made by him who was "in the form of God." Of course, when "the Word was made flesh" and tabernacled among men, he came into his *own* world which he himself had framed, and which he continually upheld.

Hence the apostle John remarks—"He came unto *his own*, and his own received him not." What is there unseemly or incongruous in the idea that the Redeemer should come to save and bless *his own*? It may be replied, that the apostle refers in that phrase to the Jewish nation; or as Paul would say—"his own house." That may, or may not be so. It may not be so, because they who did not receive him, were those who did not *know him*; but they are not stated to have been the Jews; for in the preceding verse it is said—"He was in *the world* and *the world* was made by him, and *the world* knew him not." But let the terms, *his own*, be restricted to the Jews, yet still *his own* did not receive him, and nothing is made out for the "limited atonement," which is appropriated to the elect; because the elect, agreeably with the doctrine maintained concerning them, will receive him. And if, by any show of argument, the elect could here be introduced as the objects of his mediatorial kindness, yet they become so by virtue of his particular *property* in them, as being given to him by the Father. But this idea of *property* will destroy the argument it is intended to support; for the whole *world* is his property, inasmuch as he made it. So also Paul reasons in his epistle to the Hebrews. Nor can any fair reason be assigned why the Redeemer, as being God *manifested*, should not bless the world; seeing that the Creator, by whom the world was made, was God *manifested*.

2. The Redeemer is declared to be invested with *all power* in heaven and in earth; to have *all things* put under his feet; to be the head over *all things*, unto whom every knee shall bow, and every tongue shall swear. He is also said to be "the seed" of Abraham; and Abraham is designated as "the heir of THE WORLD," and that too by virtue of *the righteousness of faith*. Noah also, who, every one knows, was the heir of the world, is emphatically styled "the heir of the righteousness of faith;" then, THE WORLD, as such, has a deep interest in all that belongs to the right-

eousness of faith, which is the very peculiarity of the mediatorial institute ; so that Christ, as Mediator, has the whole world put into his hand, governs it by mediatorial law, and awards to it mediatorial privileges.

It is true, that various dispensations have been established, some of which have conferred their special favors on certain portions of mankind. The patriarchal dispensation, erected with Adam, and afterwards revived with Noah, was universal in its application. It was mediatorial, for its characteristic was the righteousness of faith ; and yet it was co-extensive with THE WORLD. The Mosaic dispensation was confined to the Jews. And the new testament dispensation has, thus far, been actually confined to a part of the gentiles. But these two latter dispensations were not designed to shut out the rest of the world from the benefits of the first, as though they had no interest in the righteousness of faith, which had been preached to them from the beginning. So far from such a denunciation being the object of the two subsequent " ministrations," they, in common with the first dispensation, were set up by the Redeemer himself, as Paul explicitly declares :—" God hath," he says, " in these last days spoken unto us by his Son, whom he hath appointed HEIR of ALL THINGS, by whom also he made THE WORLDS, or *dispensations*, or *ages*. The jewish ritual he enacted as " being in the form of God ;" and the gospel he has proclaimed as " the Word made flesh." Both of these, " the law" and " the gospel," he has established for special purposes, which I shall presently undertake to explain ; but neither of them was intended to set aside, or to revoke, mediatorial law, as given to *all men* immediately after the fall ; and therefore neither of them militates against the broad fact that he is the Saviour of THE WORLD.

3. If you will carry along with you the two previous classes of texts which I have quoted, you will be prepared to see the full force and beauty of those which follow. " He

that sowed the good seed is the Son of man ; the field is *the world*." " God so loved *the world*, that he gave his only begotten Son."—" God sent not his Son into *the world*, to condemn *the world*, but that *the world* through him might be saved."—" And this is the condemnation, that light is come into *the world*, and men loved darkness rather than light."—" The gospel—which is come to you, as it is in *all the world*."—" And we have seen and do testify, that the Father sent the Son to be the *Saviour of the world*."—" And he is the propitiation for our sins ; and *not for ours only*, but also for the sins of *the whole world*."—" Who will have *all men* to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth."—" We trust in the living God, who is the Saviour of *all men*, specially of those that believe."—" For the grace of God that bringeth salvation, hath appeared unto *all men*."

These texts seem to be sufficiently explicit, and have afforded ample scope to the textual expositor to display his ingenuity, in forcing them under sectarian restrictions. Nor is any thing more easy, nor injudicious, than to embarrass a momentous subject by verbal criticism, as the whole of moral science has abundantly demonstrated. Few reason on general principles ; and a little philological acumen enables a sectarian to carry his party feelings and views a great length. The present subject has been long abused by this technical refinement. But if you shall recollect and apply the general views which have been stated, you will find them adequate to disembarass your own mind ; and you will feel that a just interpretation of scriptural terms will throw no impediments in your way.

The real truth, however, is, that the doctrine of a " limited or definite atonement " is necessary to maintain the doctrine of " election," individually considered, which has been so zealously advocated. They are twin sisters. Our argument, therefore, necessarily requires, that we should endeavor to ascertain the biblical form of ELECTION. That

there is an *election* asserted in the scriptures, no one can deny. It appears there, plain and distinct, both in language and fact; to evade it is childish, and to oppose it is dishonest. But to explain it fairly belongs to the expositor; and on no class of expositors is the responsibility to explain more imperiously pressing, than on those who maintain that each individual is personally accountable.

To me it seems, that ELECTION, as stated in the scriptures, is purely *official*; or if there be any exception to this view, it shall be explained in its own place. I mean to say, that according to the scriptures, ELECTION is an appendage of "the two covenants" which have been introduced since the call of Abraham. Certain it is, that God did at one time *elect* the jews, and that at another time he did *elect* the gentiles, to be his particular people. In the one case, then, the jews, and in the other case the gentiles, would very properly be called God's ELECT. They severally stood in a peculiar relation to him, according to a "purpose of election." This statement is not to be controverted; for the scriptures have presented it in full delineation, both historically and doctrinally.

ELECTION, however, has been considered as a divine purpose, setting apart a certain number of mankind, which number can neither be increased nor diminished, to everlasting life; and reprobating, or passing by, the rest as heirs of eternal death. But supposing, as I do, that election is co-eval with "the two covenants," that view of it, which is dogmatically enough declared to be orthodox, seems to me to be a palpable abuse of its terms and design. Nor only so; but it also appears to me that God himself, foreseeing the misinterpretation of his own high and holy purposes, framed the Abrahamic covenant in order to preserve the integrity of the mediatorial constitution; and to prevent any collision between the two latter covenants and the gospel scheme itself. To explain. The Mosaic ritual was enacted under the covenant made with Abraham; and un-

der the Christian economy all believers are said to be the children of Abraham. Of course, the law given by Moses could not, as Paul argues in his epistle to the galatians, be contrary to the promise given to Abraham. His language is very explicit—"And this, I say," he observes, "that the covenant that was confirmed before of God in Christ, the law, which was *four hundred and thirty years after*, cannot *disannul*, that it should make the promise of none effect." Now the *promise* was given to Abraham as "the heir of *the world*," and did actually constitute him such. Thus it is expressed—"In thee shall *all nations* be blessed." That is, the promise given to Abraham included all nations; the law given by Moses, included only the nation of the jews, as God's elected people. If then there be any meaning in terms, the limited operation of the law given to the jews, as Jehovah's elect, according to Paul's doctrine, was not intended to countervail the universality of the gospel, which had been preached to Abraham as the heir of the world. Accordingly, when the apostle finds the jews reasoning on erroneous views in relation to their own peculiar privileges, and arguing the rejection, or reprobation, or passing by, of all the rest of the world, as though they had no interest in the gospel, he flies at once to the Abrahamic covenant, in order to demonstrate their error. Such in fact is the argument he maintains, in the very epistle and chapter from which our quotation has been made. Changing terms, we conceive that his argument is equally applicable to the ideas of God's purpose of election, which have since been so strenuously maintained.

The relative position of these different covenants appears to be as follows:—After the fall, when God gave the promise of the Seed of the woman, he made Adam a second time—a covenant head—or, if you please, a patriarchal chief, to his race. Through him he promulgated to *the world* the mediatorial institute, or, as Paul would express it, "the righteousness of faith." After the deluge, he in-

vested Noah with this official pre-eminence, and thus again proclaimed *to the world* the righteousness of faith. In process of time an emergency occurred, which required another divine interference, and a new act of legislation became necessary. Nor was it an easy matter to interfere ; because any measures which might be adopted would necessarily affect *the organization of society*. On a former occasion, and under a similar emergency, the process which the great governor of the world adopted, and which he promised never again to repeat while time should last, was summary and terrible—he brought in the flood, and the whole race, with a very small exception, perished beneath his awful rebuke. Now again he comes down in judgment ; yet under promise that he would not desolate the earth. But what should he do ? It is manifest, that however lenient his proceedings might be, a new organization must take place : and an organization which, whatever its provisions might be, must not make matters worse than it found them. The plan which infinite wisdom devised, and which has been styled the mystery of the divine will, eventually proved to be the division of mankind into NATIONS, and this very ELECTION, of which the scriptures so frequently speak. God intended thereby to relieve the new series of difficulties which had occurred. And accordingly Paul traces up the law of Moses to them, as their origin ; for he asserts that “the law was added because of CORRUPTIONS”^{*}—which had been introduced since the flood.

ELECTION?—But the whole world had become corrupted. Abraham himself and his fathers were idolaters. Thus the elected alone could enjoy divine favors, and the rest of mankind would be reprobated, or passed by. Jehovah would be the God of the jews, but not the God of the gentiles. Not at all, says the apostle. He is “the God of the gentiles also ; seeing it is one God who shall justify the circumcision by faith, and the uncircumcision through faith.”

^{*} Gal. iii. 19.

Not at all, says Moses; for "God LOVETH THE STRANGER:" and made Abraham the heir of the world that all nations might be blessed in him, as they had been in Noah, and Adam before him. He was exalted to the same official pre-eminence, and secured the same evangelical boon—even *the righteousness of faith*. And the purpose of *election*, which was carried out into execution four hundred and thirty years after, could not, and did not, interfere with the righteousness of faith, in which all mankind had a like interest. Manifestly then,

1. The gentiles were still under the patriarchal dispensation; which was mediatorial in all its attributes, and had conveyed to them all its ordinances. Wretchedly as they corrupted the revelation which had been made from the beginning, and repeated by Noah, yet the incarnation and sacrifice of the Son of God, as promised and typified, were the very sources of their exceedingly strange mythology. They were not removed from the influence of patriarchal privileges; but while they became more and more idolatrous, their very idolatry proclaims their evangelical origin. It is no uncommon thing for theologians to urge the *universality* of sacrifice in proof of its divine authenticity.

2. The whole series of transactions with which Jehovah filled up the Israelitish history, was done before, or in presence of, the gentiles. Egypt marvelled, and Canaan trembled. These things were not done in a corner. All men heard of them; all men saw them. "These statutes," said Moses to them, "are your wisdom and understanding *in the sight of the nations*, which shall *hear* all these statutes, and *say*—Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people." Considered, therefore, as having an official character, the Mosaic ritual was a luminous and instructive display to the gentiles themselves, which might have checked their idolatrous career, and taught them the most profitable lessons. So that the purpose of election, which consecrat-

ed the jews as a peculiar people, did not involve the utter reprobation of the gentiles.

The reprobation, or passing by, of the gentiles, or their being left in their former position, would not go beyond an official transaction; but would refer simply to an external dispensation, whose privileges were not conferred on them. Accordingly Moses was required to deliver the following message to the Israelites—"Ye have seen what I did unto the Egyptians, and how I bare you on eagle's wings, and brought you unto myself. Now therefore, if ye will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be to me a peculiar treasure above all people, **ALTHOUGH ALL THE EARTH IS MINE**: and ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation." And again, Moses said to them—"The Lord your God is God of gods, and Lord of lords, a great God, a mighty, and a terrible, which regardeth not persons, nor taketh reward. He doth execute the judgment of the fatherless and widow, and **LOVETH THE STRANGER** (one of another nation) in giving him food and raiment. Love ye therefore, the stranger; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt."

3. The gentiles having these avital privileges, and others which accrued to them from the **ELECTION** itself, the apostle Paul, in his great epistle to the Romans—where he is arguing on the grand principles of Jehovah's moral government, and that too in view of the purpose of election—declares that they are not condemned, saving for their own fault. His reasoning is very plain. "That which may be known of God," he observes, "is manifest in (among) them; for God hath showed it unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; *so that they are without excuse; because that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imagination, and their foolish heart was darkened. Even as they*

did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them up to a reprobate mind." Surely such a case is not to be resolved into an inscrutable sovereignty, whose proceedings are aside of any known judicial principles : neither does any difficulty occur, too great for our minds to reach, and the reasons of which belong to the awful secrets, that the last day shall disclose. The whole matter is very plain.

But the apostle goes further in his explanatory statements, and shows, that the gentiles not only have the outward manifestation of which he had spoken, but that they have personal qualifications of a corresponding character and extent. "For," he says, "when the gentiles, which have not the LAW, *do by nature* the things contained in the LAW, these, having not the LAW, are *a law* unto themselves ; which show the work of the LAW, *written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness*, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing, or else excusing, one another." Surely the gentiles are not destitute of moral attributes, for they "show the work of the LAW *written in their hearts* ;" neither are they incapable of exercising their moral powers, for *they do by nature* the things contained in the LAW, and their consciences are ever bearing witness. Moral questions and judicial principles are familiar to them, for they are ever debating such things with one another.

The apostle does not leave us yet, but states distinctly the relative condition of the gentiles. The jews, he says, have *the law of Moses* ; and the gentiles have not *the law of Moses*. The jews do under *the law of Moses*, what the gentiles do *by nature*. Of course, the jew shall be judged by the law of Moses, under which he has been placed ; but the gentile shall be judged without the law of Moses. Both shall be called into judgment, and shall be dealt with according to their circumstances. The gentile who has *sinned* without the law of Moses, shall *perish* without the law of Moses ; and the jew who has *sinned* in (under) the law

of Moses, shall be judged by the law of Moses. And this judgment, which shall call up the secrets of men, shall be conducted by Jesus Christ, and *according to the gospel*: so that the gentile, who cannot be judged by the law of Moses, because he is not under it, must be under the gospel, seeing that he shall be judged “according to the gospel.”

To draw out the case at full length, says the apostle,—“God will render unto EVERY MAN *according to his deeds*; to them who by patient continuance in well doing, seek for glory, and honor, and immortality, he will render eternal life: but unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, he will render indignation and wrath. He will render tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that DOETH EVIL: of the jew first, and also of the gentile; but he will render glory, honor, and peace, to every man that WORKETH GOOD; to the jew first, and also to the gentile. For there is no respect of PERSONS with God.” This statement, one would think, might satisfy the most fastidious theologian, and demonstrate to him that the gentile—that the whole world—is not under law, but under the mediatorial institute.

One other view may, however, yet present itself, in which the scriptures sustain a comparison between jews and gentiles. Our apostle, in this same epistle, describes the jews as living under divine *forbearance*. “Dost thou,” says he, addressing himself to the jew, “despise the riches of his goodness, and *forbearance*, and long suffering; not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance?” Again he asserts, that “God hath set forth Jesus Christ to be a propitiation, through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of *sins that are past*, through the *forbearance* of God.” So then the JEW is governed in *forbearance*.—The apostle elsewhere declares the GENTILE to be similarly situated. “The living God,” he observes, “which made heaven and earth, and the seas,

and all things that are therein, in times past, *suffered all nations* to walk in their own way. Nevertheless, *he left not himself without witness*, in that he did good, and gave us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness." And again:—"God that made the world, and all things therein, seeing that he is Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands; neither is worshipped with men's hands, as though he needed any thing, seeing that he giveth to all, life, and breath, and all things; and hath made of one blood all nations of men, for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation; *that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, and find him*, though he be not far from every one of us: for in him we live, and move, and have our being; as certain also of your own poets have said—'For we are also his offspring.' Forasmuch then as we are the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold, or silver, or stone, graven by art and man's device. *And the times of this ignorance God winked at.*" From all this it is evident, that the *gentiles* were objects of divine *forbearance*, as well as the jews; that if Jehovah had given to the latter a *law*, the first had his witness among them, preaching his goodness, and urging them to seek him. His "purpose of election" does not then involve the reprobation, or passing by, of the **GEN-TILES**; unless it be, as has been observed, so far as a mere official object was concerned.

According to this train of argument, it may be asked, what benefits did the jews derive from being God's elected people? I was fully aware of the objection implied in this question; and if I had not been, the apostle himself would have warned me of it. The argument which he maintained in his epistle to the Romans, was conceived to be liable to the same objection; and the question was asked of him—"What advantage then hath the jew, or what profit is there

of circumcision?" To this he promptly replied—"Much every way; chiefly because that unto them was committed the oracles of God." They had favors conferred on them, which the gentiles did not receive. To the Israelites pertained "the adoption, and the glory, and the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the service of God, and the promises, and the fathers; and of them, concerning the flesh, Christ came, who is over all, God blessed for ever." All these privileges, which formed so peculiar a system of tuition and multiplied so much the means of obtaining information, were surely very great, and presented an interesting spectacle to the world. EDUCATION, afforded either by a divine or a human instructor, is always a benefit, as far as truth and knowledge are acquired. But still these privileges were not so great as to warrant the inference, that all the rest of the world were deprived of their ancestral rights; that the patriarchal dispensation, with its traditions and institutions, was useless; or that the non-elect were handed over to perdition. Because one man may have *ten* talents bestowed on him, it does not follow that another must surrender his *one* talent. In fact the jews had drawn that inference; and it was one of the apostle's objects, in the epistle referred to, to show its total irrelevancy.

But there is another point brought up to view by the quotations that have been made, and which is entitled to careful consideration. We hear a great deal about "the light of NATURE;" and it forms the matter of debate in the deistical controversy. Now the question is—what is the light of nature? It has been explained by some as the light which Adam enjoyed before he fell. The general idea on the subject, it is presumed, is different, and rather represents the light of nature as opposed to *revelation*. Strictly speaking, these two views are the same; but when employed in actual discussion, they are widely different. For the term revelation is then confined to the *scriptures*, which have been given under the two dispensations. All those,

therefore, who have not received these special oracles; live under the light of nature. With this latter view I agree; but I cannot adopt the farther explanations which are given. The Westminster assembly, for example, make this remark:—"Although the light of nature and the works of creation and providence do so far manifest the goodness, and wisdom, and power of God, as to leave men *inexcusable*, yet they are not sufficient to give that knowledge of God, and of his will, which is *necessary* to salvation." Now this appears to me to be entirely *one-sided*—a species of government which is all *penalty*. For, on the supposition that an individual, placed under the light of nature, should act up to its dictates, he gains nothing—he cannot be saved. And yet if he acts not up to its dictates, he is *inexcusable*, and comes into condemnation on account of his aberrations. Surely such an exhibition of the government of God among men cannot be *just*: nor do the scriptures offer any thing to justify it.

It will avail nothing to say, that no individual can comply with the dictates of nature; and that therefore it is perfectly useless to state the case. For certainly mankind are *excusable* in not doing that which they *cannot do*. If it should be asserted by any one that the fact is totally different, and that men may be condemned for not doing what it was impossible they should do, he must be conscious that his own mind revolts from such a statement. He must feel that he has cast on the divine government an imputation of the very worst sort, which nothing can palliate. It will not relieve the difficulty, to appeal to the *sovereignty* of God: that reply would indeed change the terms, but at the same time it would only repeat the imputation. Nor will it answer any better purpose to quote Paul's question—"Nay, but O man, who art thou that repliest against God?" For the question is altogether irrelevant to the matter in hand, as shall hereafter appear.

The texts which we have been considering, have been

advanced in proof of the Westminster assembly's doctrine. But, as we are not under their jurisdiction, and have no belief in their infallibility, we beg leave to re-examine the texts for ourselves. Paul certainly does not offer a view of the divine government so palpably defective. According to his account, the gentiles were not *inexcusable*, because they did not do what it was impossible they should do; but "because that, when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations." They were "given over to a reprobate mind," not because they did not do what they could not do, but because "they did not like to retain God in their knowledge." Neither does the apostle say that the gentiles were under a system which was competent to condemn them for their sins, but incompetent to afford them that which was "necessary to salvation." On the contrary, he represents them as "doing by nature the things contained in the law," and showing "the work of the law written on their hearts." And finally, he declares that every gentile who worketh *good*, should obtain glory, honor, and peace.

The apostle does not oppose NATURE to REVELATION. For he asserts, that "the wrath of God is *revealed* from heaven against *all* ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who *hold the truth in unrighteousness*; because *that which may be known of God is manifest among them*; for God hath showed it unto them." He opposes NATURE TO THE ELECTION. The jews, he declares, are under THE law; the gentiles "are a law unto themselves"—not that they are destitute of, or have no means granted to them by Jehovah, of judging what is right; for they show the work of the law written on their hearts.

It is manifest that the phrase, "light of nature," used in reference to the gentiles, and as opposed to revelation, is applied very incorrectly. For they were under mediatorial law, by virtue of their ancestral inheritance; and me-

diatorial law is *revelation*—God was *manifest* among them. It is evident that they were so completely under the mediatorial administration, that in doing *evil* they were inexcusable; and by working good they might have inherited eternal life. Yet they did not belong to the ELECTION; i. e. viewed in reference to the jewish law. Of course, the extent of the atonement, which belongs to “mediatorial law,” is not limited by the extent of the election; because mediatorial law goes beyond the election.

My own impressions in reference to the subject of REVELATION are, I imagine, very different from those which are generally entertained. If I mistake not, it is for the most part supposed, that revelation has been intended to supply a deficiency in the exhibition made of God by the heavens and the earth, considering man as a fallen creature. I do not question the fall of man, nor yet the insufficiency of the exhibition referred to. Certainly a farther manifestation of God is needed—man in his fallen state does require more, and that in the form called revelation. But a like necessity existed before the fall; the heavens and the earth afforded as insufficient an exhibition then, as they afford now; and the ordinances given at that time were as much matters of revelation, as any ordinances are which have been given since. The process, by which this conclusion can be reached, would be as follows:—God had exhibited himself by his works, to be a great, wise, powerful, and good being: Man, as an intellectual creature, capable of perceiving, reflecting, judging, willing, and acting, would readily make deductions of this kind, both numerous and impressive; and would naturally desire a personal acquaintance and intercourse with that Being. If you would ask for a stronger reason, then let it be observed, that the exhibition afforded by this lower system could not go beyond itself; but man, according to our present phraseology, was made for immortality; or, according to the terms used by Paul, was intended to change his original mode of subsis-

tence, and, by passing from "a natural" into "a spiritual body," to enter upon another state of being. Thus it became necessary that God should **PERSONALLY MANIFEST HIMSELF**, in order that his creature might have intercourse with him; and that he might communicate to that creature the character and extent of those responsibilities under which he was placed in view of another and future world. Here then **REVELATION** comes in—not a casual expedient resulting from the fall; but a providential measure growing out of the nature and condition, and prospects of man. It was a characteristic of "the ministration of **LAW**," as it has been of the ministration of the gospel; and the exhibition made by the heavens and the earth, was as insufficient for the human mind under the original, as it is under the remedial, system.—If this view be correct, what will the advocate of infidel philosophy do with it? Displeased with "the doctrines of grace," he is ever eulogizing the rich and magnificent, the simple and rational, provisions of nature. But lo! while he inveighs so positively, and oftentimes so sarcastically, against revelation as belonging to the remedial scheme, here he has revelation a component part of the system of nature itself. What will he do? He can no longer object to the *principle*; his quarrel must therefore be with the specific *facts*, as these are advanced by men professedly inspired.

Perhaps in so promptly stating the conclusion drawn in the preceding paragraph, I have dropped a link in the chain of argument. For Adam, after having surveyed the works of creation by which he was surrounded, might next have turned his eye in upon **HIMSELF**; and inquired whether he should not have a companion like himself—one of equal powers, and of common sympathies? Certainly at this point of thought even the Creator paused; and, remarking—"It is not good that the man should be alone," he created Eve. Two intellectual beings, of like character and common interests, having thus been formed, they, contem-

plating *together* the works of God, might *together* deduce the inference in question. If so, or if to meet a difficulty occurring in *social* life, God manifests himself **PERSONALLY**, and communicates his will, then **REVELATION** becomes a political matter, or is afforded to human beings as in "the social state"—to organized society. All the oracles which Jehovah, in this view, would give, would have a public character or reference; as Peter remarked was the fact in relation to prophecy, when he said, "no prophecy of the scripture is of any *private* interpretation." This idea is most abundantly sustained by the consequences that have so uniformly followed the abuse of those oracles.—Adam, by sinning, brought death upon all the world.—Cain by his official misdemeanor, involved all his descendants in rebellion and infidelity.—Lamech by his official dereliction introduced polygamy, and so prepared the way for that universal degeneracy, to punish which the desolating flood was brought upon the earth.—Abraham was "the Heir of the world."—The Sinaic covenant was made with the descendants of Jacob as a nation.—The new covenant has been made, as the prophets foretold and as history records, with the "many nations" who constitute the church.—The breach of the legal economy entailed the most disastrous consequences upon the jewish nation, as such; and the papal and protestant corruptions have despoiled the "many nations," of those general influences which the evangelic institute was intended to exert; and, at this hour, are dreadfully felt through the whole of these communities. So then **REVELATION** is a term, by which we properly designate those communications which God has made to societies in their organized forms, and by official agents whom he has consecrated for that purpose, and who for that reason are officially styled **ELOHIM**. These communications are therefore of high public interest, and are to be sustained by public considerations. And while individuals are called upon to secure their own salvation, and to derive un-

der the political administration whatever personal benefits they may enjoy, yet they are most solemnly forbidden ever to grow SELFISH in their views, their feelings, or their habits. They are to follow their great Captain, while he, as Lord of the whole earth, is sustaining his providential government over the whole. Hence he has said to us all—"If any man will come after me, let him *deny himself*, and take up his cross daily, and follow me:"—let him merge personal considerations in the general CAUSE.

If, instead of endeavoring to illustrate the divine government, I should change the terms, and apply the principle of the preceding argument to political affairs among men, every one would readily understand it, and would duly appreciate its force. No one would be at any loss to locate his personal duties, to ascertain his personal interests, or to conceive of that class of political virtues in which selfishness is merged in a high-souled patriotism. And now, if these general views be accurate, or if REVELATION has been exhibited as based on its own substantial principles, ELECTION cannot be a *private*, but must be a *public*, matter; cannot be opposed to *revelation* of which it forms a part, but must be a political operation, over and above that which has been denominated *nature*; or something more than the action of evangelical principle according to the laws of nature.

I said that the advocate of infidel philosophy could not fairly object to the principle advanced; but that perhaps he might arraign the specific facts which the scriptures detail. And what could he say against these? Would he say, "the whole scheme has failed.—The jews, as their own prophets admit, were a stiff-necked and rebellious race.—Christians have not behaved much better either as papists or protestants. And, therefore, the whole pretension to divine revelations is a wretched subterfuge of interested and ambitious priests." Ah! it is a melancholy tale, degrading to humanity, and most repulsive to the intelligent and the good! But what

is the force of the objection? It is this—is it not? Whatever man resists, is not divine.—Then surely there is nothing divine; for what is it that man has not resisted? From north to south, from east to west, what law of nature has not been trampled under unhallowed feet? And does the objector mean to tell us that there is no God? If the priests made judaism and christianity, who made nature?

But why should not divine law be resisted by man? Mark it, I do not say, why ought not man to resist God? That would be moral treason. But why may he not? Is that alone divine, which men cannot resist?—I thought that infidel philosophers were advocates of “free agency”—that they abhorred the idea of *fate*, or of sovereignty which would be found to be synonymous with mechanical force—and that they were great admirers of REASON! And have they come to this? The rational, the literary, the philosophic, the playful, the ironic, the sarcastic, opponents of calvinists, have dipped down deeper into fate, than calvinists themselves. In resisting the bible, they would give us the koran, perhaps even degraded by their own philosophic edition of its abandoned principles!—But enough.

It has often been remarked, that the deistical argument has improved with the progress of revelation; and that deists themselves repose much confidence in the mercy of God, and in the value of repentance. They tell us that these ideas are derived from the light of nature; and talk with a great deal of complacency of such men as Socrates and Seneca, Plato and Cicero, as well as of their fine moral sentiments. Christian moralists, on the other hand, ever endeavor to throw these philosophers into the shade, and deny that the light of nature proclaims the way of salvation. But how could the world be destitute of evangelical ideas and terms? The whole world has been under mediatorial law, and has lived by the forbearance of God. And if God had manifested unto them what may be known of him, or if his witness was ever proclaiming his goodness

unto them, why should not such men as Socrates and Seneca, Plato and Cicero, reason rationally and philosophically? Does not Paul ascribe just views to the heathen poets, when they said, that men were "the offspring of God?" Does he not tell us that the gentiles did by *nature* the things contained in the law, and that they were ever debating moral subjects among themselves? Does he not declare that, in so far as they did not reason right, they were inexcusable? And why should not the deistical argument improve with the progress revelation; when, by that progress of revelation, the very ideas which belong to the light of nature are made more plain and distinct? And why should not the christian philosopher resolve into the righteousness of faith, the morality displayed in the heathen world, as promptly as he does so resolve jewish morality? Was not the righteousness of faith handed down from Adam to Noah, and from Noah to Abraham? Did not the Abrahamic covenant bring out the same doctrine before the world? and the jewish law, as a severe schoolmaster, teach its necessity? As to a light of nature which is independent of mediatorial law, neither christian nor deist knows any thing about it; and when they undertake to argue in relation to such a hypothetical matter, they speak without book, and draw conclusions without premises. *Nature* is opposed to *election*. It is as much *nature* that the world should be under the government of the *Mediator* and his *evangelical* institute, as it would have been *nature* for the world to have been governed by the *Creator* and his institute of *law*, if Adam had not fallen. The state of society or of government among the jews, was *unnatural*—or was *supernatural*—something more than, and above *nature*.

In view of the jewish polity, and while comparing "the atonement" with the election, the scriptures have furnished us with another official exhibition, whose principle is the same with that on which our argument is based. That ex-

hibition is seldom considered in connexion with this subject; because, though mentioned three times in the scriptures, it is supposed to belong to those things, "hard to be understood," which Paul has written. I allude to the priesthood of Melchizedec. It is true, that we know very little concerning this man, and his official relations; but it is presumed, that we know enough to establish the point before us. Melchizedec was a priest of the Most High God. He was not a priest under the Levitical law, as he had no Levitical register, or was "without father, without mother, without beginning of days or end of life"—all of which matters must be stated concerning a Levitical priest.* And Christ was a priest, after the order of Melchizedec, and not after the order of Aaron; seeing that neither had HE any Levitical register, as he belonged to the tribe of Judah. The priesthood of Melchizedec was then in the *gentile* world, and was outside of the circumference of "the election" altogether. Now, the apostle argues that different priesthoods have different laws;—his declaration is that "the priesthood being changed, there is made of *necessity* a change also of the law." Of course, the priesthood of Melchizedec was not affected by any of the restrictions of the Jewish ritual. Consequently the priesthood of Christ, "though it might bring about the redemption of the transgressions that were under the first testament," yet went far beyond them—and was co-extensive with the priesthood of Melchizedec.

The question which now arises is, what was the law of the priesthood of Melchizedec? In answer to which, it is to be remarked—1. That this singular personage is introduced to our notice in the most formal manner. He was priest of the most high God; i. e. he held a special and immediate commission from God himself: for as every head of a family was a priest in his own family, Abraham too was a priest; yet he paid tithes to Melchizedec. 2. Paul

* See Gray's Priesthoods.

argues, that as Abraham paid tithes to Melchizedec, his priesthood was not only outside of "the election," but far superior to the priesthood of Aaron. 3. If "*even* Abraham" paid tithes, any one else might have done the same, on the principle of reasoning from the greater to the less. The priesthood of Melchizedec was therefore characterized by *universality*. Hence the apostle's peculiar language—that Christ being a priest after the similitude of Melchizedec, was made so, "not after a carnal commandment, but after the power of *an endless life*." And as he continueth EVER, he "hath an unchangeable priesthood," and is also able to save unto the uttermost, them that come unto God by him." So that the priesthood of Christ goes backward and forward, with the whole history of the human race; within that range no "beginning of days" nor "end of life" can be specified; and it includes the whole human family, as no particular class of mankind can be genealogically traced, to whom it properly belongs. There is no other priest for either jew or gentile. All have a like interest in him and his official transactions. And the argument that represents him as making reconciliation for one, necessarily represents him as making reconciliation for ALL.

The priesthood of Melchizedec seems then, like the official character of Abraham, to have been intended to prevent all those narrow reasonings, to which the doctrine of election has given rise. The apostle Paul certainly makes no other use of it, than to correct such impressions among the jews: for his evident design in his epistle to the Hebrews, is to put the whole Mosaic constitution into a secondary place; and to lower it in the estimation of his countrymen, who considered it primary and indispensable. And as all their exclusive ideas arose from the fact, that they were the chosen or elected people of God, he, in tracing the limited operation of the law, in view of which

they had been elected, refuted their views of *election* itself.

Nay the *priesthood* itself was originally identified with civil government; for the prince was the priest, and the priest was the prince. All these official honors were bestowed on Adam, and descended to his first born; from which fact Christ himself wears the official title of First-born or First-begotten; and, in correspondence with its import, is a PRIEST UPON HIS THRONE. If then all men have a common interest in civil government, and if there be no election to curtail their political privileges, they must have a common interest in the priesthood; and no election can deprive them of their common lot in its official operations. If all men are under the government of the Son of God as the Heir of all things, they are governed by him as a priest upon his throne. They must ALL have, by the very nature of the case, a common inheritance in his sacrifice, or death, or justifying righteousness; for it is here where we look for his official action as a priest. The First-born of every creature must officiate for ALL, because he is officially related to ALL. The argument that cuts off any from the benefits of his sacrifice, cuts them off from his dominion; and constitutes him only the Heir of those who remain. But they who perish, perish according to the scriptures, as rebels against the Son of God as a priest on his throne; or, as the Spirit has gone forth to convince the WORLD, because they believe not in Jesus. The theological argument in elucidation or proof of a "particular redemption," or a "personal election unto eternal life," throws every thing into utter confusion that belongs either to nature or the election.

Under the christian economy, when a second election occurs, the argument in favor of the universality of the mediatorial institute is comparatively simple. Two particulars alone need to be mentioned.

1. The terms which are used are universal—"Go ye

into *all the world*, and preach the gospel to *every creature*.¹²

"All power is given unto me in heaven, and in earth. Go ye, therefore, and teach *all nations*."—"The times of this ignorance God winked at; but now commandeth *all men*, *every where to repent*."

2. The peculiar designation of the new economy is GOSPEL. And gospel is glad-tidings—glory to God, and good will to MEN. It is "that which was from the *beginning*."

Its subject is the righteousness of faith, which was proclaimed to Adam, the head of our race, after the fall; to Noah, constituted the head of the human family, after the flood; and to Abraham, made "the heir of the world." The gospel is then concerned about that which is the inheritance of MAN, by virtue of the first promise, of the covenant of life made with Noah, and of the evangelical covenant made with Abraham. Such is its general subject; while the particular dispensation, under which its full disclosures are made, will serve its temporary purpose "until the fulness of the gentiles be come in," when all the ends of the earth shall see the salvation of God.

In thus endeavoring to ascertain the position of the *gentiles* under the mediatorial administration of the Son of God, I believe that nothing has been left unconsidered which was worthy of any particular notice; unless it may be, that some one might reproachfully ask—is it not strange that, under such circumstances, we should have no better account of the gentiles than that which history has recorded? Certainly we have abundant reason for sad and mournful reflections, when we turn to the annals of so large a portion of our race. And we wish we had no farther cause of grief. But one portion of the history of man was wound up in the deluge. Was not that equally strange? Another portion was wound up in the necessity for the call of Abraham. Was not that equally strange? Neither have the gentile nations ever been viewed with a kindly eye, either by jews or christians. For they both have uniformly

reasoned as though the world had nothing but EVIL in it; and as though the consequence of Adam's sin had been pure, unmingled EVIL; when Jehovah's own comment is—"Behold, the man is become as one of us, TO KNOW GOOD AND EVIL." And yet Abraham met with Melchizedec; Isaac with Abimelech; Joseph with Potipherah; Moses with Jethro, and Job, and Balaam. Literary men of enlightened and liberal views have spoken much of the philosophers; and the sybilline oracles seem to have been but a collection of fragments of patriarchal traditions, long preserved, and scattered every where. Then again, what shall be said for the *elect* themselves? Moses found them a stiff-necked and rebellious people; often did they relapse into idolatry; Samuel had much trouble with them; Elijah sought their reformation with many tears; the Babylonish captivity was a long and sore punishment of their crimes; ten of the tribes have no habitation which any anxious moralist can discover; in the Redeemer's day, the remainder were guilty of the very immoralities for which they condemned the gentiles, and finally filled up the cup of their iniquity in acting the tragedy of the crucifixion.

And besides, what shall we say for ourselves? What is our own history from the day that ecclesiastical councils were formed, down through the long reign of their pernicious decrees, even to our own times, when the sectarian is trampling on his fellow, and every denomination is writhing under its own legislative mistakes? Or what account shall we give of our own contentions, down from the lofty pretensions of papal misrule, to the lowest socinianism itself? Or how do we appear when, to stimulate ourselves to deeds of discipline, we are ever talking in sectarian jargon about the purity of the church, and purchasing peace on our dying pillow by casting each other out of the church? And do we wonder at the history of the heathen?—Such is human depravity. We fear a new tragedy is in preparation, and will soon lay waste the fairest parts of our once

goodly heritage. For it is impossible that such sectarian feats, so fearfully immoral, and so contrary to every emotion with which christian love might inspire the human bosom, should not have a disastrous termination. Never did society more need reorganization. That reorganization will take place : and the prelude we dread.

We have yet to consider the design and reason of the ELECTION. It is a sovereign act I admit. But Jehovah never proceeds to such sovereign acts without a reason ; and a reason involving the good of his creatures as its object. Nor only so ; but that reason is always assigned, or is within the reach of our apprehension, and will be seen, sooner or later, according as the human mind shall acquire moral vigor, or as succeeding generations shall improve upon the discoveries of those which preceded. Nor has the reason, in the present case, been ever concealed. The history of the rectoral transaction itself states its necessity, and evinces it to be a dispensation of relief ; a dispensation, intended to be “ a schoolmaster ” for the time being, whose services were necessary to expose the errors of idolatry, and lead a mistaken and distracted world to the Son of God, as the only Saviour.

To be more explicit. We must return again to the apostle Paul, who is the great commentator on the mediatorial institute ; and who has, under the direction of the Holy Spirit, traced out all its relations. In his epistle to the Galatians, and in an attempt to explain the extended character of the Abrahamic covenant, he supposes himself to be asked this question—“ Wherefore then serveth the law ? ” This is the very question which we are now to consider. He replies—“ The law was added because of *transgressions*, till the Seed should come to whom the promise was made.” And what were these transgressions ? The descendants of Cain, drawing the posterity of Seth into their vortex of corruptions, had inculcated and established that fearful infidelity, which rejected the whole mediatorial in-

stitute. The postdiluvians, effectually warned by the deluge against such unbridled licentiousness, as the Jews were afterwards warned by the Babylonish captivity against idolatry, supposed a multitude of “incarnations” to have occurred, and so degenerated into polytheism. What may be the different amounts of turpitude between infidelity and polytheism, I shall not undertake to decide. But in all the guilt of the latter the world was involved, when God divided mankind into NATIONS, and proclaimed the purpose of *election* in the call of Abraham. This great patriarch himself was taken from an idolatrous family: so that the evil must have spread far and wide, and the whole science of morals have become most egregiously corrupted. Let us then inquire into the character and extent of this corruption.

The two great correlate facts in the history of man, to which our attention should be directed in the moral disquisition we have undertaken, are, that—*In Adam all men die*, and *in Christ all men shall be made alive*. Or, to vary the mode of expression, the two great institutes, under which mankind have been placed, are LAW and GOSPEL. Or, to vary terms a little farther, the two great views of moral obligation, which the scriptures have employed their writers to discuss, are designated by the phrases—the righteousness of the law, and the righteousness of faith. Now, in the general corruption which prevailed at the time of Abraham’s call, these elemental matters were misunderstood; or the two institutes were mingled together in sad and wretched confusion. Any plan, therefore, which Jehovah would devise, and which should at the same time be suitable to the unhappy condition of mankind, or calculated to redeem them from their idolatrous depravity, must bring out these two great facts—these two great institutes—these two paramount views of moral obligation, in distinct and vivid display. To accomplish this desirable object, was, as I understand the transaction, the design of Jehovah in

erecting the *two dispensations*. The Mosaic ritual was a symbol or "figure" of the first institute, or LAW; and was intended to demonstrate, that "by deeds of law no flesh can be justified in the sight of God." The christian dispensation was a symbol or "figure" of the second institute, or GOSPEL, and was intended to exhibit "the righteousness of faith, just as Abraham's circumcision was a "sign" or "seal of the righteousness of faith which he had, yet being uncircumcised." Accordingly the two dispensations are respectively denominated LAW and GOSPEL; and are continually represented as having those distinctive references.

That such was the actual condition of mankind when Abraham was called, I infer—1. Because, as there are but two institutes, or the two modes of justification, the human mind, in flying from the one, must, of necessity, retreat into the other. If the descendants of the patriarchs had misunderstood the doctrine of the righteousness of faith which had been *revealed* to them, they necessarily run into that of the righteousness of the law: and thus the latter became the basis of whatever hopes they had. If, in the mean time, they still held fast to the positive institutions which they had received, and whose whole reference was to the righteousness of faith—which they might easily do, for a community will change its doctrines much sooner than it will change its *forms*, and will in fact preserve an outward ceremony long after its reason has been forgotten—their theories and ordinances would then be in direct collision; and their theology would become a mass of confusion.

2. That such was their condition, I infer, because, that the official attribute which distinguished Abraham, as the friend of God, was the righteousness of faith. This was the great matter which the covenant made with him was designed to secure; and which his character and history so beautifully illustrate. This spread its glory over mount Moriah, when the father of the faithful ascended to commune with God over the sacrificial pile of his bleeding

child; and where he received him "in a figure," or as a symbol of the resurrection from the dead. But this righteousness of faith could not have so pre-eminently distinguished Abraham, if all around him had not "fallen from grace," and sought justification by the righteousness of the law.

3. That such was the condition of men, I infer, because Job—who was cotemporary with Moses, and whose history appears to have been written by that legislator with a view to show the insufficiency of deeds of law—because Job, though he anticipated the coming of his Redeemer, yet sought to be justified by his own obedience to *law*. That Job had formed such calculations, is evident from his high pretensions, and from the whole train of his reasoning; but particularly from the manner of the divine appearance to him, in the winding up of the protracted controversy. God did not appear to him as he did to Abraham or Jacob in a human form, condescending to plain and familiar converse; for that would have been a manifestation of his mediatorial character. But he came to him as he did to Moses on the burning mountain. He came in a whirlwind or in terrible majesty, and as the great lawgiver; before whom, thus revealed, every human being must bow in self-abhorrence. Moses did exceedingly fear and quake. Ah! no human being can be justified by deeds of law. Without the Mediator we are all undone; and of this important fact the old testament apostle wished to convince his people, whom he was conducting to the land of promise, when he penned this beautiful piece of scripture story.

4. That such was the condition of mankind, I infer, because that, though the jews had the promises and the ordinances, yet their great error was, that they went about to establish their own righteousness, being ignorant of the righteousness of God. Even after they had embraced Jesus of Nazareth as the long promised Messiah, their ideas were exceedingly confused; they held fast to the law, and zealously labored to proselyte the gentiles to their prejudices and

mistakes. Hence Paul's long and elaborate epistles were written ; and his grand theme was, *the righteousness of faith*, as opposed to *deeds of law*.

I have certainly given reasons enough to justify my inference ; and to demonstrate the proneness of men to relapse into a legal condition, notwithstanding that a Mediator has been revealed to them. Or if more were necessary, every deficiency would be supplied by simply looking at the pretensions of infidelity ; which are nothing else than a blinded attachment to the righteousness of law, that the best of men never can render. But if such be the proneness of the human mind, and if the condition of mankind at the time when Abraham was called, was such as I have described it to have been, there was a necessity that something should be done. The then present age needed it. Future generations would require it. As the original mode of communicating instruction to men was by *external symbol* or figure, and as the subjects to be explained had often been so represented before, what better method could be devised, than to reduce the dangerous pretension to actual experiment under a symbolical form ? Thus, the human mind, in all the varied shades and sizes under which *society* at large presents it, and with all the advantages that the special protection of the Almighty could afford, was either left or called to a labored effort to show what *the righteousness of the LAW* was really worth. And when ages had elapsed, and the experiment was fairly and fully tried ; when national grandeur, and political distinction, and military prowess, and monarchical pageantry, and the wealth of a kingdom, had wrought up the period of trial into an epoch in the history of man, never to be forgotten ; and when the demonstration, that by *the deeds of law* no flesh could be justified in the sight of God, had thus become irrefutable ; then came the Redeemer to exhibit *the righteousness of faith*, under a parallel dispensation—a dispensation excelling in its glory, more extensive in its ope-

rations, and more simple in its form.—Can any one object to our principle of exposition? Was not such a proceeding worthy of God, suitable to man, called for by the circumstances of the case, and adequate to achieve the object contemplated?

With the foregoing view, all the common illustrations which the scriptures employ precisely correspond. To exemplify.—“*What the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh*, God sent his Son, in the likeness of sinful flesh, to do.” If the original institute had become thus inappropriate to the human condition, its “figure” must be characterized by that very same inefficiency. And no conceivable end can be assigned, why an inappropriate institute should be revived, even under a symbolic form—and particularly when mankind do not seem to be convinced of its inappropriateness—but to show them its insufficiency.

The law was thus revived in a figure only for a little while—until the Seed should come to whom the promise was made. But why was it temporary? Had it been sufficient, would it not have been permanent? If “there had been a law given which *could have given life*, verily righteousness should have been by the law. But the scripture hath concluded *all* under sin.” And especially the jew; for the law having entered, the offence hath *abounded*.

“The law was our schoolmaster, to bring us unto Christ, *that we might be justified by faith*.” Its object was to refer us to Christ, by demonstrating the insufficiency of its righteousness, and by that means “to shut up” the jews “unto the faith which should afterwards be revealed.” Nor could any atonement which it prescribed interfere with this grand design; but, on the contrary, the ordinance of sacrifice itself formed a very material part of the proof, which the dispensation afforded, of the inefficiency of law. For had those sacrifices been sufficient to take away sin, “they

would have ceased to be offered; because that the worshippers once purged should have no more conscience of sins." The *repetition* of these sacrifices, therefore, was full evidence of their own incompetency.

The law, "written and engraven in stones," which "was so glorious that the children of Israel could not steadfastly behold the face of Moses, for the glory of his countenance," instead of justifying a sinner, was itself "the ministration of death and condemnation." The children of Israel who lived under the law, instead of obtaining life thereby, were actually condemned to death, as the prophet Ezekiel beautifully represents in his vision of the valley of dead and dry bones. Such was the condition of "the whole house of Israel;" and nothing saved them but the fact that the law had been ordained in the hands of a Mediator. Such are the common illustrations on this subject.

In delineating the character of the Mosaic ritual, the circumstances of its introduction, which were so fearful and oppressive, and which precisely correspond with the general idea we have set forth, ought not to be forgotten. We shall detail them in scriptural language. "And the Lord said unto Moses, Lo, I come unto thee in a thick cloud, that the people may hear when I speak with thee, and believe thee forever. And it came to pass on the third day, in the morning, that there were thunders and lightnings, and a thick cloud upon the mount, and the voice of the trumpet exceeding loud, so that all the people that were in the camp trembled. And Mount Sinai was altogether on a smoke, because the Lord descended upon it in fire; and the smoke thereof ascended as the smoke of a furnace, and the whole mount quaked greatly." "And all the people saw the thunders, and the lightnings, and the noise of the trumpet, and the mountain smoking: and when the people saw it, they removed, and stood afar off. And they said unto Moses, Speak thou with us, and we will hear: but let not God speak with us, lest we die." "And he said, Behold I

make a covenant: before all thy people I will do marvels, such as have not been done in all the earth, nor in any nation: and all the people among which thou art shall see the work of the Lord, for it is a terrible thing that I will do with thee." "Forget not the day that thou stoodest before the Lord thy God in Horeb. And ye came near, and stood under the mountain; and the mountain burned with fire unto the midst of heaven, with darkness, clouds, and thick darkness. And the Lord spake unto you out of the midst of the fire." "For ye are not come unto the mount that might be touched, and that burned with fire, nor unto blackness, and darkness, and tempest, and the sound of a trumpet, and the voice of words: which voice they that heard, entreated that the word should not be spoken to them any more: for they could not endure that which was commanded. And if so much as a beast touch the mountain, it shall be stoned or thrust through with a dart; and so terrible was the sight, that Moses said, I exceedingly fear and quake." "Now, therefore, why tempt ye God, to put a yoke on the neck of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we were able to bear?"

Such were the circumstances attendant on the giving of the Mosaic institutions. And what could be the nature of an economy thus introduced? What else shall we make of it, than that it was a law which could not be obeyed, and was, therefore, a ministration of death? How painful and distressing the feelings of the sinner must be in such a situation! How bitter his wailings! How lamentable his cries! Hear the people. Hear Moses. Hear Job. What was to be done? Who can bear to fall into the hands of the living God?—Such an exhibition shut up the whole people of Israel to the faith which should afterwards be revealed.

If there be any flaw in the preceding arguments, then, unable to answer farther, I ask, what could have been the design of such elective ordinances? Certainly they do not

describe the actual condition of mankind ; for God had given the promise of the "Seed of the woman." Neither do they describe the actual condition of the jews; for they were the children of Abraham, to whom the gospel was preached, and the law itself was ordained under the mediatorial superintendence. Nothing is left for us, but to consider the whole transaction as purely symbolic—a figure shadowing forth the insufficiency of the righteousness of law.

How different is the exhibition under the new dispensation ! It is not now the burning mountain, but a crucified Christ—not the awful legislator speaking from the midst of the fire, but the condescending Mediator manifest in the flesh—not the law working wrath, but the gospel proclaiming mercy—not the ministration of condemnation and death, but the ministration of righteousness and life—not the ineffectual sacrifice, vainly repeated, but the one sacrifice that forever perfects them that are sanctified—not the spirit of bondage, but the Spirit of adoption, of power, of love, and of a sound mind—not a condition of pupillage and servitude, but a state of liberty and privilege, where the heir, arrived at full age, has received the inheritance. "We are now come unto Mount Sion, and unto the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to an innumerable company of angels, to the general assembly and church of the First-born, which are written in heaven, and to God the Judge of all, and to the spirits of just men made perfect, and to Jesus, the Mediator of the new covenant, and to the blood of sprinkling, that speaketh better things than the blood of Abel." Now "the riches of his glory" are spread out over "the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory."

Nor were these things done in a corner. The crucifixion was brought about by the jews, whose unique institutions made them the object of universal observation and remark ; and under the auspices of the roman government, which was the mistress of the world. The whole story was speedi-

ly told; the jewish temple was soon destroyed; the gentile mythology was quickly assailed; christians were called to endure the severest persecutions; and wherever the gospel came, her tidings rapidly spread abroad. These two dispensations have been incorporated in the history of mankind, and can never be forgotten. That the righteousness of the law cannot justify any man, and that the righteousness of faith is the only ground of moral calculation, are points which have been thus demonstrated to the world. The errors of scholastic theology may require to be exposed, but no new revelation can be needed.

There is still another view which may be taken of the election, as a display of wise rectoral policy. Previous to the flood mankind had been divided by circumstances into two classes. The descendants of Seth dwelling around the great antediluvian symbol of the divine presence, and those of Cain who had departed from the presence of the Lord—both of which are described under the general phraseology, “Sons of God” and “daughters of men,”—constituted these classes. After the flood, and at the building of the tower of Babel, a new division took place; and one for which no specific ordinances had been provided. This division, you readily perceive, was that which separated mankind into nations. A new mode of social existence, or a new series of social relations, was thus introduced; and certain reciprocities, involving the good of the whole, became necessary. A law, then, would be called for, which should fairly recognise and regulate those reciprocities; and which should, under some general form or magnificent symbol, set forth the great principles of national intercourse. Thus a new branch of political science was enacted; and one which deserved a great deal of careful thought and minute inquiry. Any man who has made “the law of nations” the subject of an hour’s consideration, can readily perceive a necessity for some divine communication in reference to so important a matter. Look at the following particulars.—Christian na-

tions, from "a sense of common duty and interest," have thought it necessary to form alliances. "It became a general principle of belief and action, that it was not only a right, but a duty, to reduce to obedience, for the sake of conversion, every people who professed a religious faith different from their own. To make war upon infidels was, for many ages, a conspicuous part of european public law; and this gross perversion of the doctrines and spirit of christianity, had at least one propitious effect upon the christian powers, inasmuch as it led to the cultivation of peace and union between them, and to a more free and civilized intercourse. The notion that it was lawful to invade and subdue mahomedan and pagan countries, continued very long to sway the minds of men; and it was not until after the age of Grotius and Bacon, that this error was entirely eradicated. Lord Coke held, that an alliance for mutual defence was unlawful between christians and turks; and Grotius was very cautious as to the admission of the lawfulness of alliances with infidels, and he had no doubt that all christian nations were bound to assist one another against the attacks of infidels. Even lord Bacon thought it a matter of so much doubt, as to propound it seriously as a question, whether a war with infidels was not first in order of dignity, and to be preferred to all other just temporal quarrels? and whether a war with infidels might not be undertaken merely "for the propagation of the christian faith, without other cause of hostility?"* When you reflect on these opinions, and the course of policy which the nations were led to adopt, you can readily perceive the necessity for some general law; and law too proceeding from the great arbiter among the nations.

The call of Abraham, which was the first step Jehovah took in order to introduce "the mystery of his will," was synchronous with the division of mankind into NATIONS. The covenant made with this patriarch constituted him "the

* Kent's Com. Vol. 1. Lec. 1.

Heir of the world," and promised that in him and in his seed all the FAMILIES or nations of the earth should be blessed. A moral object of most interesting character, was thus held up to the view of his posterity. When the descendants of Jacob were brought into their national organization by the law given at Sinai, the compact then made, though particular in its application, was designed to exert a moral influence of the widest extent. Consistently with that design the Israelites were forbidden to oppress the stranger or the foreigner; were explicitly told that God loved the stranger; and were reminded that, by having been themselves strangers in the land of Egypt, they were taught a lesson of kindness to strangers. The whole nation was thus required to set a moral example before the eyes of the nations; and by this means to promulgate PUBLIC LAW in view of the national divisions which had taken place; and law which was like all other forms of divine law—THE LAW OF LOVE.

The new covenant, or the christian dispensation under which the gentiles have been elected, confided to the apostles a moral commission, which is expressed in the broadest terms that human language affords. "Go," said the risen Saviour, "and disciple all nations—preach the gospel to every creature—ye shall be witnesses for me in Jerusalem, in all Judea, in Samaria, and to the uttermost parts of the earth." The members of the new testament church were afterwards admonished not to maltreat the jews; and while they did good especially to the household of faith, yet to do good to all men. The Redeemer is declared to be the Saviour of all men, while he is especially the Saviour of them that believe; and a millennium is foretold, in which all the ends of the earth shall see the salvation of God. Here, then, is a second exhibition of public law—the law of nations; and again it is the law of LOVE. But the doctrine of personal election unto eternal life has frittered away all these high political considerations, and con-

verted "the mystery of the divine will" into a small metaphysical dogma. Election, as exhibited in the scriptures, served a very different purpose from that on which theologians have so often and so strenuously insisted; and a purpose which manifests the wisdom and love of the great Governor of the world on a much higher scale than that which these moralists appear to have contemplated. *Election exhibited the law of nations under a visible symbol.*

Such has been the policy of the two dispensations—and can any one doubt its wisdom? How can we judge of the propriety of a measure, but by its design? and if the design be accomplished, while its character is unequivocal, who shall condemn the measure? In the present case Jehovah comes forth from his place to reorganize society, whose way had been corrupted before him; while he graciously refrains from pouring out his judgments, or visiting general depravity as it deserved. He aims at recalling the human mind to consider its evangelical privileges, and to abandon its errors. When his whole plan is developed as rapidly as men can bear it, it turns out to be a clear and irrefutable demonstration of the truth which had been proclaimed from the beginning, and the perversion of which was the very error that needed correction. No one can say that this plan did not involve "a purpose of ELECTION;" or that the history of the two dispensations is not the history of such a purpose carried out into execution. And if so, *that election* ought to stand forth distinct and prominent, in a systematic detail of the divine proceedings. But in the anxiety to maintain an individual election to eternal life, this "mystery of the divine will" has been almost entirely forgotten: and those portions of scripture which actually belong to it, have been purloined from their own connexions, in order to sustain the sectarian dogma.

Of the wisdom of such policy, we may the most readily judge from reviewing the character and operations of the dispensation under which we live; or we might do so,

had it not been so strangely metamorphosed by the false philosophy and false politics which have reigned so empirically in our ecclesiastical councils. It was scarcely possible, methinks, for a man of reflection, who can divest himself of popular prejudices, and who can dare to inquire after the reason of opinions which have been so long protected by great names, to read the new testament without feeling himself surprised by the simple organization it enacts. The unostentatious eldership, the intellectual employment which preaching the gospel enjoins, and the few memorials which are embodied in symbolical institutions, are so well adapted to a matured state of society, that such an individual would necessarily be charmed. But councils and popes, and ambitious dioceses, and inconsistent or imperfect reformers, and contending sects, have so disfigured the whole, and have so completely substituted physical power for the moral sense, that Bacon himself would in vain try to assure us that "knowledge is power;" and Paul, the apostle, could not assign to conscience its appropriate sphere. A hierarchy and a creed seem to constitute the loftiest conceptions of learned polemics—or perhaps they may rise a step higher, and covet a monarch's smiles, or grasp a chieftain's sword. And can this state of the church be typical of the coming times when the knowledge of the Lord shall cover the earth as the water covers the seas? Yet evangelical society, as exemplified among the elect, ought to be a type of society under the universal reign of righteousness and peace. With such facts before us, it is not matter of wonder that we have so much difficulty in describing beforehand what the millennium shall be; or that the tendency of the present agitations is not foreseen. But if our exposition of the mystery of the divine will has been correct, we ought long since to have disclosed to the nations the glory that awaits them. The ELECTION has been but an intermediate link in the chain of the mediatorial government—

a conspicuous, a magnificent exhibition of the divine wisdom—an interesting and glorious display of the divine mercy—as the Prince of life hastens to establish his mediatorial kingdom, ere the awful catastrophe when the judgment shall begin, and time shall be no more.

I have now given the *first* view of the scriptural doctrine of election. While this view cannot be denied to be scriptural, there is nothing appearing in it to contradict the *universality* of the gospel, to contravene the doctrine of PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY, or to limit the *extent* of the atonement, or the institute of reconciliation. The word of reconciliation, proclaiming the righteousness of faith, is the property of neither jew nor gentile, separately considered; but has been given to the whole world. And this I believe has been fairly demonstrated.

LECTURE XIII.

Subject continued—Jewish Proverb—The two Covenants—farther illustrated—God's dealing with Nations—Action of the social principle—Principles of judgment—Sons of God—First begotten and Heir—Voluntary associations—Elect Angels.

Before I leave the subject of the last lecture, another feature of the two dispensations deserves our particular attention. Many a moral physiognomist has mistaken its indication, or misunderstood its expression. Indeed, on the commonly received principles of exposition, I do not see how the moralist could satisfactorily explain the biblical difficulty, and yet enforce the doctrine of *personal re-*

sponsibility on the human conscience. You will feel all the perplexity which I suppose to exist, the moment the matter alluded to is announced. It is very distinctly declared in the second commandment, that God "is a jealous God, visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generations of them that hate him; and showing mercy unto thousands of them that love him and keep his commandments." You realize the difficulty—do you not? and find yourselves hard pressed for an explanation, when an infidel avers such a providence to be unworthy of Jehovah. The fact is seen in every age, in every country, and in every family. It is again and again recognised in the scriptures. Yet the sceptic objects, covering his argument against nature, against facts, and against the essential principles of political science, by seeming, or pretending, to criticise only the scriptures.

The objection is old. The difficulty has been felt, and the subject has been canvassed a thousand times. You remember that the jews themselves said—"The way of the Lord is not equal;" and used the proverb concerning the land of Israel, saying—"The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge." Many quotations might be made, in which this political operation would appear prominent and distinct; but with these you are no doubt familiar. You may remember that Jehovah more than once argued with his people on this very point. At one time he said—"In those days they shall say no more, the fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge. But every one shall die for his own iniquity: every man that eateth the sour grape, his teeth shall be set on edge." * At another time he said—"As I live, saith the Lord God, ye shall not have occasion any more to use this proverb in Israel—Behold all souls are mine; as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine: the soul that sinneth it shall die." †

*Jer. xxxi. 27, 30. †Ezek. xviii. 2, 4.

Sceptics are not always as ingenious nor original as they would appear to be. Their objections have been anticipated and answered by inspiration itself. I am, however, far from being certain that this divine assurance has relieved the difficulty, when it has been subjected to polemic analysis. God, on the contrary, I apprehend, is sometimes supposed explicitly and formally to repeal a part of the statute, and *to pledge* himself no more to "visit the iniquities of the fathers upon the children." But is this true? Are there no hereditary maladies or disabilities? Is it so that, in political, commercial, or domestic circles, children do not suffer on account, or in consequence, of parental delinquencies? Neither theologian nor philosopher can take this ground, and dispute a fact which is so common. And if they did, or if they fairly could, what would become of the sceptic's objection—that such a fact is inconsistent with a divine administration, as it would be neither just nor good? Are we to concede that, up to the time of this supposed formal repeal of the statute, the divine government was not just nor good? This we cannot do. The christian minister, with the bible in his hand, must take a different course when he would

"Justify the ways of God to man."

Christianity is a mediatorial system—the administration of grace. Its elemental principle is peace on earth and good will to men; and its apostles must proclaim freely and unreservedly its messages of love. Let us try to explain this matter in a different way. It has several peculiarities which must be patiently considered.

1. We have already seen that Adam's sin has introduced death and a series of evils commensurate with our interest in the material system. These consequences descend, not only to the third and fourth generations, but to the latest posterity of man, involving every age and every clime. The introduction of the gospel assures us of the resurrection, but does not remove death. "It is appointed

unto all men once to die." In like manner the various calamities of life are not removed, though they may be the sanctified means of our moral tuition.—The ground, laboring under the original curse, still yields briars and thorns, and leaves to man to gain his bread by the sweat of his brow. Even the subsequent curse attendant on the deluge remains to this day, and the years of the life of man are few and evil. Such has been God's providential course, and such it must necessarily be. Let the politician arrange his civil code, and the counsellor or the merchant tell the consequences of violated trust without stating analagous circumstances, if they can. No community can be organized without involving all its members in the transactions of its official agents to the whole extent of the social compact by which it exists. The natural relations, in like manner, must involve children in the consequences of the conduct of their parents. Such is fact—such is philosophy—such is nature. Who objects to it? Who can make it different? How can it be otherwise? If the divine government be not formed on the same general principle, it cannot be consistent with the nature of man; and what will those do then who are ever deifying nature, and offering their homage in her great temple? Will they take up the jewish proverb—"The fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge;" and carry it out as an apology for political iniquities or commercial frauds, personally considered? In such connexions, would any man even dream of uttering such a proverb? Or, offering it, would not the whole world smile at his simplicity, or reprobate his knavery?

The question is—how far is the political operation to be considered as necessary and just in tracing or justifying such consequences? And the answer must be, just so far as the constitution, which applies the principle, goes, and no farther. Can any constitution go so far as to destroy all personal responsibility? As all social compacts are appli-

cable to external things, is not that argument certainly sophistical which presses these political consequences beyond those external things? The conclusion in such a case reaches farther than the premises; and, by encroaching on personal responsibility, must accuse of personal sin. The same limit must be equally supposed in reference to divine constitutions, which actually do embody the laws of social life in certain external relations. None of those constitutions can merge personal responsibility beyond a mere external compact or connexion. If we derive our spirits from our parents, then, as our spirits would belong to the material system, they would certainly be involved in Adam's sin. All distinction between matter and mind would immediately be obliterated, and individuality would be entirely lost in the social relation. My father's sin, to all intents and purposes, would be my own; and his misconduct would involve me in both sin and suffering. But if God gives us our spirits, then the natural relation is necessarily within the limits of political influence, and personal responsibility remains unhurt. The social fabric might be dissolved, but the individual members, though common sharers in the suffering, would yet be personally free from sin. Hence the argument which we have pursued, that Adam's sin might involve his posterity in external suffering; because thus far, from the nature of the case, the paradisiacal institute extends. But beyond this the judicial question turns on personal responsibility. To apply the jewish proverb further than the essential law of all social life, and to teach men either not to do, or to excuse themselves for not doing, their personal duty, is most assuredly false reasoning in morals. No man may thus justify himself at any bar, human or divine.

The argument in reference to Adam's sin has thus been briefly recapitulated, with a view of again distinctly stating the general law of official life; and because the proverb under consideration being hastily applied to the effect of

the first transgression upon the human family, it might be inferred that the declaration of Jehovah to the people of Israel, was an absolute repeal of that law. To the eye of every moral philosopher no such repeal has taken place; nor could it, he sees, without destroying the whole organization of society. But I go on to remark,

2. That the proverb, whose force we are endeavoring to ascertain, when uttered by jewish lips, had no reference to Adam's sin at all. The jew was complaining of the operation of his own institutions. "What mean ye," says Jehovah, "that you use this proverb *concerning the land of Israel?*" That land was under a very peculiar administration, or the people were organized under very peculiar laws. As a society, therefore, the general principle of social life must be established among them as it is in all other communities; and to the whole extent of the singular constitution which has been given to them. Parents and their children together formed the body politic, and the social compact embraced successive generations. It is manifest that in no other way could such a community be framed. As in the human body, if one member suffer, all the other members suffer with it, and no one member could say to another, "I have no need of thee"—so is it in the body politic.

The sinaic covenant, as has been observed, was very peculiar in its character. It was "the ministration of condemnation and death," because it was a temporary revival of LAW. Designed to be symbolic of the action of law as originally given to Adam, and which, being broken, had entailed death on Adam's POSTERITY, it, according to the principle of a symbol, must accurately and distinctly delineate the great outlines of the thing symbolized. If the paradisiacal constitution was social or official in its character, and brought in such a deteriorating influence on Adam's children, the corresponding attribute must, of necessity, be strongly marked in the jewish economy as its

symbol. If, as law, the operation of the Mosaic system might be viewed as oppressive, and so evidently oppressive that even an apostle would describe it as "a yoke which neither we nor our fathers were able to bear"—is it very marvellous that, in a fretful mood or in a rebellious humor, a stiff-necked race, who often declined from the whole system, and rushed into idolatry, should utter the proverb we are considering? It is unfortunately but too common to hear christians, even with superior privileges, complaining of the harshness and severity of divine providence, as though *even now* "the ways of the Lord were not equal."

You perceive that no part of our exposition embraces the idea commonly represented to be PELAGIAN; nor supposes that Adam's posterity were not affected, either in their persons or circumstances by his sin. We must first abandon the scriptures, and become blind to all nature around us, before we can advocate such an idea. Our controversy on this subject is with dogmas, not with facts—not with the principle of official life, which is as necessary as it is philosophical, but with the sophism which merges every thing *individual* in the *social* compact, and throws moral science into confusion by desecrating personal responsibility.

3. The repeal supposed to be implied in the declaration,—"As I live, saith the Lord, ye shall not have occasion any more to use this proverb, in Israel,"* cannot extend to the general statute, which from the beginning involved the interests of parents and children in a common constitution. Some, it is true, have so interpreted the divine averment; while every medical, political, or commercial observer knows that such a divine declaration would not correspond with divine providence. The repeal can affect the statute in question, only so far as that statute applies to the jewish

* Ezek. xviii. 3.

commonwealth, and as it is considered to be an emblematical exposition of the nature of law.

But even when thus restricted, the difficulty is not entirely removed. For it can scarcely be asserted by any biblical student, that, from the time Jehovah gave this promise, the attribute of government under consideration was discarded as no longer characteristic of Jewish law. Such a legislative act would have taken from the Mosaic institute a large part of its typical character; and would so far have defeated its very object. Nor is this all. It might be further asked, how, in that event, could we explain the Redeemer's judicial announcement—"Upon you shall come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel unto the blood of Zacharias, son of Barachias, whom ye slew between the temple and the altar?"* Manifestly there must be some mistake when such comments are offered to us as scriptural truth. We must go farther for a more consistent explanation.

If you will refer again to the quotation, you will find that it is a part of the *prophetic* roll. The Spirit of prophecy is declaring by his servant that which would occur at a future period. It is on this roll we find "the testimony of Jesus," and by it the saints of old learned beforehand his sufferings and *the glory that should follow*. This simple circumstance offers a very different view, and refers the supposed repeal of the statute in question to coming times. But lest any should reject the idea as a mere conjecture, evincing a fancy more exuberant than accurate, let us turn to the prophecies of Jeremiah, who has furnished us with the fuller details of the contemplated change. "*In those days*," he reports, they shall say no more—"The fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge. But every one shall die for his own iniquity, every one that eateth the sour grape, his teeth shall be set on edge.†" What days? The prophet proceeds—"Behold the

Mat. xxiii. 34—39. *

† Jer. xxxi. 30—34.

days come saith the Lord, that I will make a NEW COVENANT with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah." This prophecy then should be fulfilled, when a new covenant should be established; and the proverb should be wholly inapplicable under the new administration, which that covenant should erect. What this covenant is no one can mistake; for the apostle Paul has applied the prophecy explicitly to the christian dispensation.* The force of the divine declaration, therefore is, that the legal operation of visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation, shall not be the CHARACTERISTIC of the new economy.

As the old dispensation was something appended to the ordinary forms of government, so also is the new. The judicial action contemplated belongs to the ordinary forms of government; but under the Mosaic institute it was brought in by a new enactment, and applied to a new set of circumstances. The operation was like that which was sustained by the Mosaic law in reference to death. Death came into the world by Adam's sin, and involved the jews in common with the rest of the race. But the jews sinned LIKE Adam, and thus incurred death by their own transgressions. Hence they lived under a "ministration of death;" and hence Paul remarks, "I was alive without the law once; but when *the commandment came sin revived and I died.*" Now, i. e. under the new dispensation, we do not and cannot sin like Adam, and therefore are not under "the ministration of death." The law as enacted on Sinai for symbolical purposes has been repealed, and the operation of it, as such, under every form, has ceased; of course this form of its operation, in which, symbolically, the iniquities of the fathers are visited upon the children, is done away too. The proverb can no longer be used concerning Israel as God's chosen or elected people—con-

* Heb. viii. 7—13.

sidering the term ISRAEL as now applicable to the christian church.

On the other hand, the new covenant is "the ministration of righteousness and life," or is designed symbolically to exhibit the means and conditions of salvation. Its *distinguishing* feature therefore cannot be a "visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children"—an administration with which Jehovah himself "finds fault." It must be altogether different, and visibly "better." Its great CHARACTERISTIC must be—"Mercy shown unto children's children." Had Adam kept the law, he would have secured life instead of death, and blessings instead of evils, for his children. The other side—or that which is opposed to law—the other side of the social principle belonging to organized communities would have been exemplified. In this view that principle belongs to GOSPEL, is brought into action by the righteousness of Christ, and necessarily forms a part of an evangelic administration. While gospel is the technical term of the new economy, this social operation, modified by evangelical privileges, must particularly *distinguish* that economy. The proverb is now entirely changed. God's Israel, instead of complaining—"The fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge," may take up their song and sing—"His mercy is unto children's children." Hence the Redeemer admonished his disciples—"Suffer little children to come unto me, and forbid them not, for of such is the kingdom of heaven." Hence Peter, who was honored to be the first to open the doors of that kingdom, at one time to the jews, and at another to the gentiles, defined its extent in these delightful terms—"The promise is to you and YOUR CHILDREN." With one accord, all the Master's disciples, who went out commissioned to preach the gospel to every creature, celebrate the exceeding riches of grace.

But the history of the church here reminds us of one of her unhappy divisions, and one which, by a

strange anomaly, would leave the jewish proverb to press upon us with unbroken force. God has always afforded to mankind external symbols of moral truths. He made FIRE the emblem of himself, in the burning bush, on Mount Sinai, and between the cherubim. He assumed a human form and conversed with the patriarchs like a man speaking with his fellow.—He symbolized his perfections in the heavens and the earth.—He typified at the altar the crucifixion of his Son. He has memorised that crucifixion in the ordinance of the supper, and the resurrection in the hallowed sabbath.—The jews and their children had been circumcised.—A thousand like interesting exhibitions, vividly setting forth intended benefits, have been made. Yet now, though a *distinguishing* feature of the new dispensation is “mercy unto children’s children,” an external symbol of that delightful truth, we are told by many, is absurd, and infant baptism is declared to be entirely unwarranted. The political provision that identifies parents and their children in every other organized community, is downright folly, it has been said, in an evangelical community; unless it may be recognised so far as to crush our hopes and break our hearts, when our infants die. The doctrine of native depravity is unhesitatingly received, and our children are remorselessly thrown under the condemnation of temporal, spiritual and eternal death for Adam’s sin;—“The fathers have eaten a sour grape—the children’s teeth are set on edge.” But the idea of salvation by the righteousness of Christ unequivocally and freely spreading the riches of grace over our offspring—who distinctly apprehends it? Baptism, we are told, does no good, and has no meaning, when children are its subjects. With such doubts and scrupulous restrictions on the promises of redeeming love, and the remedial extent of the new covenant, my soul asks no communion.

It may, perhaps, be asked, whether our argument does not entirely destroy the whole doctrine of the iniquities of

the fathers being visited upon the children? By no means. In consequence of Adam's sin, evil has become an integral part of the material system; nor can we escape from it without the whole physical organization being altered, or our connexion with it being broken up. The gospel is remedial; but as a remedy it is carried out in the midst of the circumstances where the remedy is needed. Destroy those circumstances, and you take away the necessity for the remedy. You know how the fact is presented in view of death. Christ is the resurrection and the life, yet still "it is appointed unto all men once to die." So is it in regard of our present subject. The operation of the gospel is to bring in *mercy* on us and our children; but while we and they are in this world, and form a part of the general physical system, we cannot escape from the action of its constituent principles. The facts then stand thus:—while on the one hand Adam's sin brings death and evil, and these pass down from generation to generation; so on the other hand, Christ's righteousness brings life and blessing, and these pass down from generation to generation, extending over the whole human family. By one man's sin all are brought into condemnation—by one man's righteousness all are brought into justification of life. "Man is born to trouble as the sparks fly upward."—"The Lord is good unto all men, his tender mercies are over all his works." These things are every where exhibited, and respectively belong to the system under which we live, as modified by an evangelical administration. Every where if men, notwithstanding such provisions, will live in sin, they must expect evil, and that evil will pass from generation to generation. But if profiting by evangelic privileges, they are induced to do good, that good will be followed by blessings, and those blessings will descend from generation to generation. In that case, even affliction will be but a "blessing in disguise."

It is a very strongly marked circumstance in the history

of mankind, that whole nations will gradually deteriorate in their physical constitution and external circumstances, and as a matter of consequent necessity in mental energy. It is equally striking that other nations improve in their physical constitution and external circumstances, and consequently in mental energy. What a multitude of instances of this kind, have historians and naturalists brought forward to astonish and perplex the theologian; who, cutting the gordian knot, as usual retreats into mystery and sovereignty. Here the sceptic and the christian are at issue; and one talks about the gospel, while the other eulogizes *education*, without suspecting that, in principle, each is suggesting the same remedy. If one generation becomes sensual or superstitious, how can it be otherwise than that a like character should be stamped upon that which succeeds? If on the other hand one generation becomes intelligent and virtuous, how can it be otherwise than that that which succeeds should be in like manner cultivated and refined? Surely in such practical results must be found the whole philosophy and force of the natural relations; and to recognise it in theory and practice is essential to the well being of society, both in an intelligent and moral point of view. It is here where the theologian has committed his grand mistake, when he learned to merge the freedom of individual thought and inquiry in official infallibility. It is here where the politician has committed *his* desolating error, when in his military might he rode triumphant over the prostrated rights of his country. It is here where the parent commits the deepest offence against the souls of his children, when by severity of restraint he arrests their intellectual growth; when by corrupt practices he vitiates their consciences or misdirects their faculties; and when by excessive indulgence he renounces his official influence. The very fountains of social life are poisoned, and every thing hastens into prema-

ture decay, needing some new revolution to burst the fetters of social death.

These general principles our exposition of the two dispensations does not overthrow. These principles cannot be overthrown, though they may be misunderstood and forgotten. Illustrated and sustained by the results or operations of the paradisiacal constitution and the mediatorial institute, yet men seem to have lost sight of them. Jehovah steps forth in mercy again to exhibit them; and, in erecting the two dispensations, creates two new, but temporary, symbols. These take up respectively the laws of social life; and when repealed, overturn not the laws themselves, but merely remove their symbols, or leave those symbols as matters of history, never to be obliterated from the records of man. They interfere not with the general political operation which seems to convey the consequences of Adam's sin over the whole world, and throughout all generations. Nor do the facts and the objections urged by the sceptic, militate in the least against the doctrine of symbols now advanced in connexion with that of election. The election merely brings in a second and strongly marked illustration of the same general laws; an illustration which, though analogous, is intended to be highly beneficial, yet temporary. Accordingly, any one who compares the history of the jews with that of the gentiles around them, may readily perceive how very superior the descendants of Abraham were, in consequence of the better tuition they enjoyed. He may mark that superiority in physical circumstances and intellectual character, distinguishing generation after generation; though he may mourn over their many national derelictions and the judgments which followed. And he may observe a like superiority when comparing christian nations with heathen communities, though he may often mourn over the sectarian strife, the aberrations under papal misrule, the metaphysical errors, and the political combinations of the former; and may discern all

those social derelictions to be even now hastening the church into conflict and revolution. But still the great laws of nature have been symbolically and most vividly demonstrated. If this be so, the two dispensations have happily accomplished their object, and our doctrine of ELECTION stands forth justified and commended to every intelligent mind. It drives no inquirer to distraction and despair, but serving the general purposes of mercy, it is calculated to develop the principles of essential truth, and the only scheme of salvation consistent with the nature of man. Political in its character and general views, our exposition yet throws every one on his personal responsibility, and places the moral interests of our race in their appropriate connexions.

4. It may possibly be objected to the foregoing observations that, after all, the remarks which Jehovah made to the complaining jews have not been explained. For the quotation may be extended; and then we shall be reminded, that in very general terms it was said, "the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son: the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him." This, and many such like expressions, might be urged as rather militating against our interpretation. But even this text, the strongest perhaps which could have been selected, cannot sustain the objection. For the new clause—"neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son," seems to extend the field of observation, and to throw the whole subject into some new form. The context also confirms that idea; for Jehovah is represented as asking—"Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should die?" Do ye suppose that in any way I should interfere with the wicked, "that he should not return from his ways and live? or that "the covenant" which I gave should be really injurious, instead of being beneficial? No verily: "Repent and turn yourselves from all your transgressions;

so iniquity shall not be your ruin." The plain meaning of all which is, that while law operates in the manner stated, the only remedy is to be found in the gospel; and this, as has been already shown at large, announces its proposals on the principle of *personal responsibility*. All this is evident; for that God has no pleasure in the death of the sinner, is the magnificent idea every where expanded on the face of the scriptures; and repentance is an evangelic duty, called for by our mediatorial prince, in view of which he forbears to execute his wrath and waits to be gracious.

From the hour that the first promise was given, the consequences of violated law were modified by the remedial institute. Good was mingled along with the evil. Every part of the world and every generation of man, has heard Jehovah's witness. "He did good—he gave rain from heaven and fruitful seasons, filling the hearts of his offspring with food and gladness." He made his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sent rain on the just and the unjust. His sound went into all the earth, and his words unto the ends of the world. The times of ignorance he winked at, leading men to repentance by his "goodness, forbearance, and long-suffering kindness." Thus he deals with the world still. The seasons have never ceased, and the bow in the clouds has never lost its promised beauty, nor disappointed human hope. Never has the humble suppliant been refused—never has the returning sinner been rejected. How could any one suppose that Jehovah had ever withdrawn his gospel, or disregarded the repentance, which a sense of personal responsibility, a conviction of sin, and a longing after immortality had produced?

Of course, while the general laws of social life were of this mixed character, their symbol must have corresponding attributes. The jewish dispensation must recognise the remedial agent, and remit to the penitent the iniquities he had committed. Could any doubt arise in your minds, or could you question the accuracy of my remarks,

a simple reference to the Abrahamic covenant, under which the sinaitic ritual was given, would immediately relieve you. For you remember that the covenant made with this friend of God was purely evangelical. Or if you ask for more, you have only to call up to your recollection, how often that people cried unto the Lord in their extremity, and were heard and delivered : and finally, to consider, but for a moment, the proclamation in Messiah's days, when the whole world had become guilty before the Lord,—“ Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.” Here in truth every moral revolution must commence. Such a change calls on men to see and mourn over, not to justify or defend, their father's errors ; and, betaking themselves to *personal responsibility*, where all gospel begins its remedial display, to turn from sin and folly that the Lord may bless them. Such will be the incipient exhibition which the millennium shall succeed. Here the agitations which are now convulsing the world arise. And they who have gone no farther than to tell to every perplexed mind and troubled heart, how excellent, virtuous and wise the fathers were, and bitterly to mourn that the former days were better than these, have yet to learn the first lesson of moral improvement. Repentance, resulting from the exercise of PERSONAL responsibility, is the harbinger of social blessedness.

I cannot persuade myself, though it may seem to be a digression from the regular course of the argument, to suffer to pass by unimproved so favorable an opportunity of remarking, that *law* and *gospel* do not seem to be such discordant systems, as they have been sometimes represented to be. They do not appear to be so far distant from each other, that when Adam fell, a remedial agency was nowhere to be discovered, until God in the exercise of absolute sovereignty should create one. Nor do they seem to be so entirely unlike to each other, that the gospel should be constantly represented to be so profoundly mysterious, that nature, reason, and philosophy should be consid-

ered as inimical to her claims, and irrelevant in the illustration of her doctrines. In the history of the jews the two may be seen side by side, without betraying any discrepancy; nor is a sufficiency predicated of the one, or an insufficiency of the other, in any other view, than that of "the weakness of the flesh." Their principles are essentially the same; and their object they have in common—i. e. the conformity of man to the image of his Creator, is the design of the political and moral operations of both. Yet literary men, who venture to speak about reason, philosophy, and nature, in connexion with moral subjects, are generally frowned upon as infidels; while yet they may have done nothing more than protest against the superstitious dogmas of theological systems. Such men may blame themselves, because that, when they assailed established superstitions, papal or protestant, they did not substitute something better. If they reply that, they did attempt to offer more rational views, the answer is at hand—They offered their explanations, at the expense of the bible and the mediatorial provisions which it unfolds. Here is their folly. The bible and its mediatorial system, they never can eject from the world. It is in vain for them to try the hardy experiment. They ought to have studied the bible; and then, while they would have enlightened their own reason, they might have corrected the superstition of their neighbors. The ministers of the gospel are the best agents to effect the abduction of the bible, as the history of papal infallibility has abundantly evinced. Would to God that protestant ministers were intelligent and faithful enough to bring the bible back again, as the reformers professed. But, alas! they have given us their creeds and their sectarian codes. And the disciples of reason, of nature, and of philosophy, have not, no not even in the dark ages, done one single thing to bring the mediatorial laws of Prince Messiah to bear upon the human conscience. And what may be expected for a system, whose friends and foes are alike

ignorant of, or inimical to, its lofty and magnificent views. Thus christianity has fared. Thus it fares now; and our intelligent and professional men, seem to be holding on in the same course which their predecessors followed; and who left the world to grow in infidelity or superstition—as the case might be.—Will any one be courageous enough to take the ground that nature, reason, philosophy, and the gospel are all alike? or that the works of nature and grace are in most perfect harmony with each other?—To return.

There yet remains one other inquiry. If social law will run the course which has been described, and if, when a community has gradually deteriorated through a succession of generations, personal responsibility must be relied on by every remedial agent, what extent of moral effort will be called for? or will be either acceptable or profitable? How far, and by what rule, are human beings, thus circumstanced responsible? These questions are very important, and to many may be very troublesome. Let us look after their moral bearings.

1. Paul remarks to the Corinthians, that—"If there be first a *willing mind*, it is according to that a man hath, and not according to that he hath not." The Master said—"That servant which *knew* his lord's will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with *many stripes*. But he that *knew* not, and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes." "For unto whomsoever *much* is given, of him shall *much* be required; and to whom men have committed *much*, of him they will ask the *more*." He who had received five talents was accountable for *five* talents: he who had received two talents was accountable for *two*; and he who received one talent was accountable for *one*. Distribution is "made to every man according to his several ability." Every man is then *accountable according to his several ability*. This is perfectly fair, is it not? Can a blind man be accountable for not seeing? a deaf man for not hearing? a lame man

for not walking? a child for immaturity? an idiot for mental imbecility? a poor man for riches? a sick man for health? a slave for freedom? Certainly not. No man can be accountable for that which he has not, unless he lost it by his own fault; or declined the duty, by the performance of which he might have acquired it. Such communities then, as our questions regard, are accountable according to their ability. Reduced low in physical constitution and external circumstances, and consequently in mental energy, they are not asked for five talents when they have but *one*.

2. The nature of personal responsibility is the same, though the amount or extent of it may vary. The jew and the gentile were each *morally* accountable; but the jew must be judged by the law he had received; the gentile was a law unto himself. What was the real difference between these two responsible beings? or the laws by which they were respectively judged? Paul tells us, in very simple terms, that one law was written on *tables of stone*, and that the other was written on *the heart*. In speaking of the gentiles, he is referring to all who are outside of the election, and of course, to those very classes of beings—to those very deteriorated generations—whose case we are considering. While then the jew shall be condemned as a transgressor against his own law, the gentile shall not be judged by it; but by the law written on *his own heart*, under whose moral force his conscience was roused to thought and action.

A similar comparison is instituted between the subjects of the two dispensations. The christian is not judged by the law written on tables of stone, because he is not under that law. His responsibilities are higher, because his advantages are greater. The argument is—"If the word spoken by angels was steadfast, and every transgression received a just recompense of reward, how shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation?—of how much *sorer* punishment shall we be thought worthy? By parity of rea-

soning, the heathen around christendom, deteriorated as those nations may have become under the action of social laws, shall not be judged, either by the jewish or the christian institute. They are still amenable under the law *written upon the heart*. The nations are accountable according to that which they *have*, and not according to that which they *have not*, or according to their *several ability*.

3. The apostle further informs us that the REDEEMER is the judge of the world, and that he will try the secrets of men by the GOSPEL. All the results of Adam's sin, we have seen, are modified by an evangelic administration. The symbolic action of law, under the Mosaic ritual, was held in check by the evangelic principle of the Abrahamic covenant, as well as by the circumstances of its own institution, inasmuch as it was ordained in the hands of a MEDIATOR. Of the evangelic attributes of the new covenant, no one has any doubt. In fact, as the scriptures have averred, ALL MEN are brought into a justification of life by Christ's righteousness. Consequently all men are to be judged according to the principle of personal responsibility, which the mediatorial institute, spread out over them all, is intended to evolve. Or all men are to be judged according to their WORKS—their works performed according to their several ABILITY—their works performed under the mediatorial reign of the Son of God, whose official agents every where proclaim divine "goodness, forbearance, and long-suffering kindness," as the practical mean of producing repentance. Good works among them all partake of the same general character; are put into the same general evangelic associations, and must lead to the same general results. The difference of accountability is here—They to whom MUCH is given, must account for much; and they to whom LITTLE is given, must account for little. And in that hour—can you deny it—the uncircumcision may judge the circumcision; the unbaptized may judge the baptized. Sodom and Gomorrah may appear against Jerusalem—the

queen of Sheba against the auditors of the Son of God—the despised jews against haughty and supercilious christians—the unlearned against the learned—and the noiseless against the busy and the boastful. The dishonoured Saviour may say—“If I had not spoken unto you, ye had not had sin; but now ye have no cloak for your sin.” They who have done GOOD, whether jew or gentile, shall go into everlasting life. They who have done EVIL, whether jew or gentile, shall be driven from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his power. You understand all this. No impenetrable mystery hides from you the principles of judgment, when the Mediator shall appear to try men by the GOSPEL; and when the fruits of righteousness may be in some thirty, in some sixty, and in some an hundred fold.

4. Among such classes of human beings, as the questions under consideration contemplate, much is not required, because much has not been given. The gospel is the distribution of GIFTS; but gifts are bestowed on every man according to his several ability. How much ability may these deteriorated generations be supposed to possess? Not much it will be replied. In the distribution of the Master’s “goods,” even when “a willing mind” is evinced, would he give ten talents, when only ONE could be employed? Listen to him addressing himself to the multitudes in parables, because that unto them it had not been given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven. How differently he treated the disciples, to whom the higher privilege had been granted! And yet he could not tell even to them all he had to say, because they were not able to bear it.

The history of the Messiah’s ministry is a beautiful exhibition of the divine providence to *nations*. Let us trace it. The jews had substituted the traditions of men for the commandments of God; and proffered the “tithe of mint, anise, and cummin,” in room of “judgment, mercy and faith.” What a deterioration was here! All society was thrown into confusion. The instructor was a mere novice,

living on the thoughts of other ages—or he was not “apt to teach;” and was easily confounded by a quotation from the scriptures, having never apprehended the elemental principles of the divine government. The ruler was a mere politician instead of being a moralist—the child of intrigue instead of the bold, candid and dignified champion of truth—the creature of hereditary prejudice, instead of the close, accurate and prayerful student—the metaphysical blunderer, instead of the biblical monitor—or the agent of party plots, cowering to interested leaders, instead of coveting the plenitude of grace, or being anxious to possess ministerial gifts. Among these the Saviour could find no official helpers, nor obtain any thing for himself, save poverty, ignominy and death. A few men of moral worth he found at the seaside, or sitting at the receipt of custom, or attendant on the declining ministry of his forerunner. See “this mustard seed”—the smallest among seeds! Who could have anticipated the result? But God sees not as man sees.

In connexion with this history, we can hardly fail to recollect the young man whom Jesus loved—the centurion whose faith rose superior to any evangelical effort that had been seen in Israel—the publican whose timid cry for mercy was heard on high—the poor woman who came with her alabaster box of precious ointment to anoint the sacrificial lamb who was to take away the sin of the world—the thief on the cross breathing out his soul with his first prayer for everlasting life. And while we recollect these affecting and lovely incidents, we may be constrained to admit, that attributes of moral character, or instances of moral duty, which we have judged to be small and equivocal, may constitute the records for trial and be remunerated with everlasting honor, in the day when the great white throne shall be erected, and the books shall be opened. How often, in estimating the merits of the subject before us, may the sectary in his polemical zeal have mistaken the wheat

for the tares? How often has the chieftain in theological enterprise despised the day of small things, and overlooked the starting points of moral revolutions? They were too trifling to interest him; for he had forgotten his philosophy amid his sectarian engagements, and misunderstood the bearings of moral principles or human associations. No wonder that good works, done before what HE calls conversion, have been considered by him as lacking the essence of virtue, or that our present subject should have greatly perplexed him. "A willing mind" is worth millions of dogmas, and is itself the glory of regeneration. God looks upon the heart.

We have thus had another opportunity of developing the objects of the two dispensations, constituted by the election. And certainly the sovereign act does not appear the less important, when viewed as social rather than as individual, it accomplishes practical purposes so needful and dignified. Thus set forth, it involves none of the difficulties which, on the principle of individual interpretation, it has ever introduced; and instead of embarrassing, it very much facilitates the inquiries of the student, who would understand the principles of moral government; and it enables him intelligently to survey the general providence under which that government is administered through the world.

Pursuing our general subject, we must now turn to look at a different series of divine transactions. Possibly the preceding argument may by many be considered as defective, because no notice has been taken of a previous train of scriptural facts, which will be urged as a very clear and decided evidence of PERSONAL election. I allude, as you may readily suppose, to the very brief sketches which Moses has given us of the antediluvian age, in which he so distinctly recognises the sons of God as a favoured, and perhaps you will say, an *elect*, class. Of course, the election must be something else, or something more, than a

mere appendage of the two dispensations consequent upon the call of Abraham.

I cannot deny that this race of patriarchal chiefs may be very appropriately denominated "the elect of the Lord:" but I have no recollection of their history ever having been referred to, when inspired writers would illustrate the "purpose of election" on which they argue so freely. From the argument advanced by the apostles in this connexion, the advocates of a personal election unto eternal life derive the premises and technicalities on which they reason. Paul does not allude to these early transactions when, in his epistle to the Romans, he endeavors to rectify the false theology of the jews. It was this "PURPOSE of election," as giving occasion to the long and interesting debate, which new testament theologues have protracted to the present hour, which I particularly contemplated in the preceding lecture; and I was induced so to treat the subject by the form of discussion adopted in the scriptures themselves. Still no good reason can be assigned, why these prior facts should not be explained, both for their own sake, and on account of the general subject. Let us turn to them—but you must allow me to choose my own mode of illustration.

When Paul would set forth before his countrymen the peculiar glory of his Lord, you remember that he denominates him the Heir of all things. In proving the accuracy of this view, he quotes a call made by Jehovah upon the angels (the Elohim) to worship the HEIR. He introduces this quotation in this singular manner:—"When he bringeth in THE FIRST-BEGOTTEN into the world, he saith, "let all the angels of God worship him."* The First-begotten and the Heir are the same individual; and the legislative provision, which appropriates these technicalities to him, constitutes him the Heir because he is the First-born—and why? What is the reason of the statute? What object is gained?

To answer these questions you must trace the matter af-

* Heb. ch. 1.

ter which we inquire to its origin. In such a research you will be irresistibly led to the transactions which transpired before the cherubim, when the controversy between Cain and Abel was brought up for divine adjudication. In pondering over the records of this early "cause" and its important decision, your minds must promptly fasten on this peculiar remark of the divine judge—"If thou doest well shalt thou not be accepted?—And unto thee shall be his desire, and *thou shalt rule over him.*"* What, you ask, is implied in this RULE?

Going back still farther, and reading over the constitution of society, which was given immediately after the fall, we find that the mediatorial Prince makes a similar remark to Eve.—"Thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall RULE over thee." When long after, Paul would communicate the things he had received of the Lord, and would state the general provisions of the constitution of human society, with which that of the new testament church should not interfere, he says—"I would have you know that the HEAD of every man is Christ; and the HEAD of the woman is the man, and the HEAD of Christ is God.—The man is the *image and glory of God*; but the woman is the glory of the man."† Again he says—"Let the woman learn in silence with all subjection. But I suffer not a woman to *teach*, nor to *usurp authority* over the man, but to be in silence. For Adam was first formed, then Eve:"‡ These comments sufficiently explain what Jehovah meant by RULE in his address to Eve: and attach no small importance to the fact of Adam's being *first* formed, in assigning the reason of the constitutional provision.

Transfer these comments to the second case, and the RULE, which God speaks of in his address to Cain, is merely that official prerogative or *headship* which constitutes those who are invested therewith "the image of God" for certain purposes, and for the time being. It is then an ar-

* Gen. iv. 3—7, † 1 Cor. xi. 3—7. ‡ 1 Tim. ii. 11—13.

rangement, out of which, as an ordinance of God, civil government arises. A preference is given, but for a natural reason—Cain was **FIRST** born. An election may then be asserted, but it is neither arbitrary, nor is unto eternal life; for, on the one hand, the reason of the preference of one individual to another is assigned; and on the other, the object of the institution itself is declared to be official. The political prerogative is the birth-right of the first-born. In process of time, when the exercise of that prerogative would become burdensome or expensive, the family inheritance would accompany the official honors, because the **RULE** would be a common benefit. Hence Christ, as the First-begotten, is Heir of all things:—all things in which the family of man have a common interest.—Was not the peculiar manner of his birth specifically intended to illustrate his official prerogative? As **FIRST-BORN** he would be entitled to **RULE**: and as the first-born of every creature, he rules over **ALL**.

According to this view, election is still an official affair, “and the purpose of election,” which came in afterwards as an appendage of the two dispensations, was only a modification of the original principles of government.—Then other children, besides the first-begotten, did not cease to be members of the family; but were members of the family under rule, and had a common interest in the government under which they were placed. And when Christ is made the First-begotten among men, or the Heir of all things, all other human beings are children of God. None of them, by such a political transaction which constitutes the Son of God the Head of every man, loses his membership in the family. All have a common interest in the mediatorial government; and the discussion which controverts that common interest, and asserts that “redemption is particular,” that Christ did not **DIE FOR ALL MEN**, or that his righteousness is not intended for all, is both puerile and anti-scriptural. To say that he

died for the elect alone, is to proclaim that he died only for official men; and is to allot the BREAD as well as the CUP in the Lord's supper, and the things signified thereby, to the priesthood. Who is prepared for such a result? The priesthood alone to be saved!

In consistency with the principle of exposition thus advanced, the sanctification of Jacob's seed occurs, the scriptures themselves being judge. For when Moses was sent to Pharaoh, the message he delivered was couched in this language:—"Thus saith the Lord, Israel is my son, even my first-born:—Let my SON go that he may serve me. And if thou refuse to let him go, behold I will slay thy son, even thy FIRST-BORN." i. e. In the proceedings on which Jehovah entered, when he consecrated the children of Abraham, the Israelites stood, to the rest of the nations, in a relation correspondent with that in which the first-born stood to the other members of his family. It was altogether official. And if the gentiles are brought in now, they occupy the same official position—like Seth, taking the place from which Cain by transgression fell. And as Seth bore the image and likeness of his father, officially considered, so now the gentile church has been conformed to the image of the Son of God, according to the predestination, or "the purpose of election," which Jehovah had formed.

In confirmation of the preceding view, it deserves to be further remarked—

1. That Cain was excluded from his official station, and forfeited his birth-right or political pre-eminence, not under any arbitrary proceeding, but because he did not do WELL.

2. That both Peter and Jude speak of these sons of God as ANGELS OR MESSENGERS, thus substituting one official term for another.

3. That these apostles, instead of describing these patriarchal chiefs as elected unto eternal life, speak of them as having "sinned"—as cast down to hell—as delivered into

chains of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment, because they kept not their FIRST PRINCIPALITY, but left their own habitation, and went after strange flesh.

4. These apostles also take occasion, from the history of this early apostacy, to warn the christian church against like official treason, perpetrated by men who are called false teachers.

I do not know that these early political arrangements require any further elucidation, other than to observe that "the purpose of election," which created the two dispensations, is only temporary; and that, when it runs out, human things shall return to their original organization. The millennium is described to us as a political state of universal righteousness and universal knowledge, when society shall not need, but shall be delivered from, the complicated machinery under which we now live. In such an issue, characterized by so much simplicity in official provisions and so much vigor of individual conscience, I imagine that our political and ecclesiastical contests shall ere long be wound up. Not that I suppose there will then be no government—for Christ will still be the Head of every man—the man will be the Head of the woman—God will be the Head of Christ—and NATURE will honor her FIRST-BORN. It will be the reign of righteousness. Nor yet that I suppose that church and state will be united, according to the present import of those technical terms.—For as the church, properly so called, is formed by "the purpose of election," when that purpose shall be accomplished, the particular organization which it creates shall be done away. Amid the preliminary revolutions which shall "overturn, and overturn, and overturn, until he shall come whose right it is," and through the present contests in which mankind have so determinedly arraigned both their civil and ecclesiastical rulers, may the Prince of Peace graciously and gloriously preside.

Thus far then, or throughout the various facts and the different periods which the discussion of election has led us to review, Jehovah himself appears to be the great author of our social institutions. Civil government is established by his own ordinance, and the two dispensations constitute what has been called "the mystery of his will." As Paul would say, "every house"—using the term house in a metaphorical sense, or to designate a community—"every house is built, or every community is framed by some one." Moses was faithful in ALL God's house or church, when with apostolic authority, immediately derived from the great lawgiver, he framed the legal dispensation. Christ was faithful to him that appointed him, and as a SON over his own house, or in his own church, when he erected "the kingdom of heaven." But he who built all things, or framed all communities, is God. They derive their existence, and all the official powers incidental to their appropriate operations, directly from himself. None but an APOSTLE can alter or modify them; and he must be prompt to furnish the proof of his heavenly commission. A reformer may call men back to the divine institutions, but may frame no new ones. The whole modern doctrine of voluntary associations—inasmuch as, aiming at reformation, they interfere with the ecclesiastical organization, is entirely aside of scriptural law; is an assumption of the divine prerogative; and ever ends in a burdensome, expensive and corrupting RITUAL, which turns the human mind away from the simplicity of the gospel. Days and weeks, and months and years, come in under the sanction of ecclesiastical authority, availing itself of the morbid excitement which transient circumstances may create, and dignifying the ebullitions of undisciplined feeling with the lofty phrases which an intelligent piety is supposed to deserve. The very times to which theologians so reverently refer, rapidly and incautiously multiplied the most meager ceremonies and profitless services, and paved the

way for all the absurd dogmas and degrading forms of the papal hierarchy; and that too under the pretension of doing good, or of leading sinners to repent and believe. Against such like interferences with Jehovah's government, which, by substituting human institutions suggested by mere caprice or sectarian projects, must lead to similar disasters, and which, at the present day, are so common and popular, the church should enter her unanimous and uncompromising protest.

Perhaps it may be urged that there still remains a scriptural fact, prior even to the antediluvian circumstances that have been noticed, which is beyond the social organizations of this world; and which might be relied on as distinct proof of an *individual election*. Paul, in his instructions to Timothy, employs this singular address:—"I charge thee before God, and the Lord Jesus Christ, and THE ELECT ANGELS, that thou observe these things."* Gabriel and his fellows, it will be said, have been elected, while Lucifer and his wretched companions have been rejected. The reprobation in this case, as in all others, must be inferred from the intimation of an election. But the value of the inference must entirely depend upon the interpretation of the terms ELECT ANGELS; and the question will be, whether those terms refer to the personal condition of angels as accountable to their Creator? or whether they are the mere expression of an official relation? To aid us in answering these questions, the following points should be distinctly noticed. The term angel signifies MESSENGER.—The angels are ministering spirits, sent forth to a ministry on account of the heirs of salvation.—They are called ELOHIM.—Even Satan is called the god (Elohim) of this world—the prince of the power of the air.—In Eden, when conversing with Eve, he seems to hold fast to his forfeited dignity, and to act adroitly the false interpreter of the divine statute.—On the day when THE SONS OF GOD, another offi-

* 1 Tim. v. 21.

cial title applied to angels, came to present themselves before the Lord, as the fact is recorded in the book of Job, "Satan came also among them."—The power of DEATH too, as he was a murderer from the beginning, is ascribed to him. All these circumstances indicate that the term elect, as applied to angels, is, as we have shown it to be in every case that has yet been noticed, purely *official*. Nothing therefore is made out for the doctrine of a personal election unto eternal life, by the apostle's charge to his son Timothy.

Once more. A case still remains in which this term ELECT is used, and in which every one will immediately perceive it to be official. Jehovah, speaking by the prophet Isaiah, observes concerning the Saviour—"Behold my SERVANT whom I uphold, mine ELECT in whom my SOUL delighteth."* The apostle Peter utters the same idea, when speaking of the same glorious personage, he describes him as—"a living stone, disallowed indeed of men, but CHOSEN of God."† In this peculiar phraseology he used prophetic language, and immediately confirms his assertion by a quotation:—"Behold I lay in Sion a chief corner stone, ELECT, precious." In what sense is the term ELECT applied to the Redeemer? From among whom has he been elected? Who, in view of his election, are the reprobates? Like its fellow term—servant—used by the prophet, is not ELECT merely an official epithet? Can any one dispute, in relation to this fact, the correctness of our interpretation of the term? And if the LORD himself is thus denominated God's elect, may not all the official agents which are employed—angels, prophets, apostles, the saints under both covenants—be with equal propriety so denominated? Or if they are so denominated, must not the principle of interpretation be the same all round? At least, must not the advocates of an individual election unto eternal life show, why they have changed the principle of interpretation? And more

*Is. xlii. 1.

† 1 Pet. ii. 4.

particularly, are they not bound to assign a reason for their peculiar exposition, when it is recollected, that the scriptures do not refer to these cases so confidently quoted, when they argue on “the purpose of election” involved in “the mystery of the divine will,” and out of which “the two covenants” arose.—We leave calvinistic disciples to the accomplishment of their task, and to the defence of their favorite theme, while we shall return in the next lecture to the scriptural argument.

LECTURE XIV.

Subject continued—Ishmael and Isaac—Esau and Jacob—Type of the Potter—Pharaoh—General reasoning—The oath.

RESUMING the general subject of discussion, on the doctrine of ELECTION, as it is sketched on the scriptural page, I must now proceed to call up to your consideration, sundry instances which appear to be *individual* in their character; but which, after all, every one must perceive to be purely *political*.

Certain PERSONS, whom God called into his service, and whom he consecrated for special purposes, are mentioned with peculiar honor; while others are reprobated as openly wicked and incorrigibly corrupt. But it is evident that this *second* view of election, if such it may be called, is perfectly analagous to the *first*, and is also *official*. Moses, Aaron, Levi, Judah, Saul, David, the prophets, the apostles, and many others, were all respectively CHOSEN. Jehovah had selected them to accomplish some particular end; but their ELECTION did not secure their everlasting life. However highly they might have been distinguished by the

special commission put into their hands, yet it was a very possible case for them to fail ; and, instead of securing eternal glory, to incur official disgrace, and serve as a beacon to all coming generations.

The history of Balaam, the suicide of Judas rendered desperate by his own remorse, and the persevering efforts of Paul using every wise and well timed precaution, lest, after having preached the gospel to others he should be a cast away himself, amply elucidate this fact. All such cases of election were acts of the Mediator, exercising that *sovereignty* which belonged to him as Lord of the universe, or using the *prerogative* of a ruler. So an earthly sovereign would act. Such patronage is attached to his official station ; and he employs it accordingly, ever using it for the good of his subjects, and like a father to his people, if he be a righteous ruler. He puts into commission those whom he judges to be best qualified to manage the trust to be confided, and whose services he can obtain ; or he aims to achieve the greatest amount of good. And while he thus acts, he secures the confidence and wins the applause of all honorable men.

In the capacity of a wise and righteous sovereign, the Son of God presides over the world and its concerns. In managing the vast variety of interests committed to him, he chooses his own servants, or official agents. Nor is there any thing capricious or oppressive, invidious or injurious, in the choice he makes. He never acts without reason ; nor without a reason, which fairly and fully justifies his proceedings to all who are concerned. Those who are elected are highly honored, but their responsibilities are increased. They are not introduced into a sinecure, where nothing is to be done ; but they are called to action, which requires the full exercise of all their talents. And those who are not chosen are not injured : they are not deprived of any of their rights, they are not reprobated, but are left in the free and unrestrained enjoyment of their

privileges ; and they have no ground to take offence, or to talk of partialities which are cherished to their detriment. In fact, they who are *elected* are servants to those who are *not elected*.

Let us look at the particular examples referred to, which will fully illustrate my meaning ; and which may, perhaps, need some explanation on their own account. God chose Isaac in preference to Ishmael :—had he any reason for so doing ? Yes, replies an apostle. These “ things are an allegory ; for these are the two covenants ; the one from mount Sinai, which gendereth to *bondage*.”—But we who live under the christian dispensation, “ are, as Isaac was, the children of *promise* ;” or, we are “ children of the *free* ;”—are not in *bondage*, but are heirs of *liberty*. Thus God, in the election of Isaac, while Ishmael was passed by, gave, long before their introduction, an emblem of the *two covenants*, and a view of their respective *characters*. Has not Paul assigned a sufficient reason in this case ?—Neither was there any violence offered to the parties concerned, agreeably to the ideas which then prevailed, or the distinctions in society which then existed. For Ishmael was the son of the bond-woman, and Isaac was the son of the free woman : and the respective circumstances of the two individuals, furnished a fair opportunity to make the allegorical representation.

Afterward Jacob was chosen in preference to Esau ; not personally, but *nationally*. While they were yet unborn, and when they had done neither good nor evil, their mother was informed, that “ the one PEOPLE should be stronger than the other PEOPLE, and that the elder should serve the younger.”

Here, by the way, we may remark, the *election* contemplated had not the most distant reference to *Adam's sin*, according to the connexions in which the fact must stand, if the popular doctrine be admitted ; for then, the apostle's remark—that the children had personally done neither

good nor evil—would be altogether 'superfluous'; and his further explanation—that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth—would not reach the case; because the choice made is resolved into the simple purpose of God—it is *of him that calleth*: and because, that when the objection, which charges partiality or unrighteousness on the government of God, is met, the apostle never even hints at Adam's sin, which yet, according to the doctrine maintained on the subject, would have effectually justified the whole transaction.

But to return; God told Rebecca that the elder should serve the younger. And why? Can any reason be assigned for so singular a transaction? In the preceding part of the chapter, where the statement is made,* Paul had detailed the privileges of Jacob's descendants; but he had done this with great heaviness of heart, because he foresaw the sore judgments which should soon overtake them; and he was just about entering on the painful subject. In the outset of his discussion he meets an objection which might embarrass his argument; and, apparently keeping away from the distressing subject as long as possible, or designing to open it up gradually to his brethren, he first meets that objection. It is this. If the children of Israel be cast off, the promise God gave to Abraham would be violated:—"The word of God hath then taken none effect" is his language. Now, as God's promise cannot be broken, it follows that the children of Israel cannot be cast off. The objection had its weight, but was not unanswerable. He then proceeds to reply to it.

"They," said he, "are not all Israel, who are of Israel; neither because they are the seed of Abraham, are they all children." You remember, he continues, that the promise itself was—"In Isaac thy seed shall be called;" but Ishmael was of the seed of Abraham. The casting out of

* Rom. ix.

Ishmael did not make void the promise. And not only this, but you also remember the case of Esau and Jacob; of whom God had said, "Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated." Now Esau was of the seed of Abraham, and yet was rejected. The rejection of Esau does not violate God's promise. In other words, the casting away of Abraham's literal posterity will not destroy the covenant made with him. Your standing, therefore, as God's peculiar people, is not secured by the consideration, that you are Abraham's literal seed.

The case of Esau and Jacob was intended to explain the then present condition of the jews; or, like that of Ishmael and Isaac, had been a provision for the coming times—an allegory, whose import subsequent events would unfold. And to make this provision was the simple reason of the election in both cases. Adam's sin had nothing to do with either the one or the other.

Accordingly, when the purpose of election, which had been announced to Rebecca, was executed, no outward violence was done to the two brothers. Esau sold his birth-right, and behaved himself as indifferently as Ishmael had done. Jacob, it is true, appears to have acted very disingenuously; and his mother deported herself as strangely as either. But the providence of God, declining to interfere with the free agency of his creatures, must take mankind as he finds them, and as he certainly foreknows they will be; nor can he do otherwise, unless he shall directly interfere with, and effectually control, their personal volitions. He must, therefore, act on his own foreknowledge.

Further, the apostle, in stating the case, uses the prophet's language instead of his own; and thus he eluded any personal reproach from the jews, while he established his argument by authority which they could not dispute:—"Jacob have I loved, and Esau have I hated." But perhaps the prophet did not mean that which the apostle endeavored to make him speak. The jews, consequently

must, as fair reasoners, either give up the point in debate, or go back and inquire what the prophet did report. Perhaps our own argument may be thought defective; let us then go to the witness himself. Malachi's language is as follows—"I have loved you, saith the Lord. Yet ye say, wherein hast thou loved us? Was not Esau Jacob's brother? saith the Lord: yet I loved Jacob, and I hated Esau, and laid his mountains and his heritage waste for the dragons of the wilderness." What exhibition of God's hatred to Esau is here furnished? None that we can see, saving that the Lord says—"I laid his mountains and his heritage waste for the dragons of the wilderness." And what proof have we of God's love to Jacob? None that we can see, saving that he did not deal with him as he did with Esau; i. e. he did not lay his mountains and his heritage waste for the dragons of the wilderness; but gave him a goodly heritage in the land of Canaan. This view of the transaction precisely corresponds with our general argument; and, instead of describing an election of individuals unto eternal life, asserts an election of a different character altogether; an election which is to subserve the general purposes of the mediatorial government, as presiding over the whole world; an election purely national, according to the annunciation to Rebecca, when "the Lord said to her—Two NATIONS are in thy womb and two manner of PEOPLE shall be separated from thy bowels, and the one PEOPLE shall be stronger than the other PEOPLE; and the elder (people) shall serve the younger (people)."*

The account given by Malachi is the very same given by Moses, when he records the whole matter with regard to the two brothers. Isaac said to Jacob—"God give thee of the dew of heaven, and the fatness of the earth, and plenty of corn and wine: let people serve thee, and nations bow down to thee: be lord over thy brethren, and let thy mother's sons bow down to thee: cursed be every one

* Gen. xxv. 23.

that curseth thee, and blessed be he that blesseth thee." Afterwards Esau came, concerning whom Paul remarks—"for one morsel of meat he sold his birth-right; for ye know that afterwards, when he would have inherited the blessing, he was rejected; for he found no place for repentance, though he sought it carefully with tears." What blessing did he so ardently covet? When did he so bitterly weep? Who rejected him, and would not *repent*, or recall what he had done? Look at Esau standing in his father's presence. There he weeps; there he reproaches Jacob; and asks his *father to repent*, and recall the blessing which had been given to Jacob. Isaac did not repent; he did not recall what he had done; but, while he blessed the humble and weeping suppliant, he left Jacob in full possession of the birth-right, and all its privileges. It is to this transaction, whose results so exactly correspond with God's purpose of election—the elder shall serve the younger—that both the prophet and the apostle refer. This case of election, therefore, stands forth before us a pure *official* matter, and totally different from what it is often represented to be.

Who can object to the preceding exposition? The Eternal must have, so to term them, such political rights and powers, whether the view of election which we controvert, be true or false. To object to them, it appears to me, would defraud him of his prerogative, and disrobe him of his supremacy; and what then should become of the doctrine of divine *sovereignty*? An earthly potentate, thus treated, would be deprived of all legislative power and executive patronage; would be in truth converted into a mere royal pageant, whom no political party could respect; and all government must be at an end, or the prerogative must be transferred to ministerial hands. And can any one so regard the King of glory? To object, seems to me to impeach his wisdom and integrity, and in effect to say—"why doth he then find fault, for who hath resisted his will?"

Then we retire, leaving Paul as the respondent. "Nay but O man," he rejoins, "who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump, to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor?" The objection is met and answered.

The apostle, however, in replying to the objection, has made use of an analogical case, which has been, and very often is erroneously interpreted. He is supposed to speak of the glory of God, abstractedly considered, and without any reference to the good of the creature—a moral view which certainly ought not to find any place in the preaching of the *gospel*; seeing that the gospel, while it proclaims glory to God in the highest, yet, at the same time proclaims peace on earth and good will towards men. But the case which he states calls for no such interpretation. The whole matter is a quotation, and is taken from the writings of Jeremiah; to which we must turn in order to ascertain its true design. Jeremiah was told by the Lord to go down to the potter's house. He went as he was commanded, and the potter "wrought a work upon the wheels. And the vessel that he made of clay was *marred* in the hands of the potter: so he made it again *another vessel*, as seemed good to the potter to make it." The clay was then so marred that the potter made another vessel of it than he at first intended. This circumstance forms the turning point of the allusion. And though a sort of sovereignty is predicated of the potter, evidently he is represented as making the best of the disappointment he had met with.

The Lord himself applies the symbol, to which he had called the prophet's attention.—"O HOUSE OF ISRAEL, cannot I do with you as this potter? saith the Lord. Behold, as the clay in the hands of the potter, so are ye in my hands, O house of Israel. At what instant I shall speak concerning a NATION, and concerning a KINGDOM, to pluck up and

to pull down, and to destroy it; if that NATION against whom I have pronounced, turn from THEIR EVIL, I will repent of the evil that I thought to do unto them. And at what instant I shall speak concerning a NATION, and concerning a KINGDOM, to build and to plant it; if it DO EVIL in my sight that it obey not my voice, then I will repent of the good wherewith I said I would benefit them." Here Jehovah himself makes the doings of the potter symbolical of his own transactions among the NATIONS, of whom eternal life is not to be predicated; and declares his intentions concerning them to be modified, according as they shall, or shall not, DO EVIL:—even as the potter makes *another* vessel, when the clay is marred in his hands. Accordingly thus the apostle applies the simile. "What," says he, "if God, willing to show his wrath, endured with much long-suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction!" Vessels of wrath—or clay marred in the hands of the potter—nations that had done evil in the sight of the Lord—the jewish nation, who were now about to be cast off for their unbelief! The analogy has nothing to do with an election of individuals unto eternal life; nay, even while the nation was rejected, a REMNANT was saved, or incorporated, for the father's sake, in the new dispensation, of whom eternal life, unless it be in an official sense, is not at any time asserted. Would you award eternal life to them for Abraham's sake?

The case of Pharaoh has often been an *offence*, or a stumbling-block, in the way of an inquirer after truth. He has been led to imagine, that God did actually *harden* Pharaoh's heart; or, by some direct agency, did prevent him from obeying the divine command, delivered by Moses; and that too, on purpose to destroy him; or to compel him, under a most miserable infatuation, to rush presumptuously on his FATE. A mere sectarian, ignorant of the purity and loftiness of moral principle, and repulsing every fair and consistent explanation, might strenuously defend such a theocratic view; or he might pertinaciously assert, as Jehovah

declares that the jews did assert—ye “come and stand before me in this house, which is called by my name, and say, WE ARE DELIVERED to do all these abominations.” But from such a fabulous and harsh commentary on the divine proceedings, or from such a defence of the flagitious conduct of men, the human mind, if it has not been spoiled through philosophy and vain deceit after the tradition of men, instinctively revolts. The question, however, is—how can we escape from the interpretation when we look at the terms? The theologian is perplexed; and the infidel feels himself entitled to scoff at divine revelation. But manifestly the whole case is covered by the principles developed in the quotation, just made from the prophecies of Jeremiah. If the views which have been advanced in relation to ELECTION be correct, this case presents the opposite side of this great subject: and both sides of that subject may well be looked for under an administration which presides over GOOD and EVIL. Why should not the consequences of sin be symbolized, as well as the consequences of righteousness?—Let the following explanatory remarks be duly considered.

1. It is abundantly clear, that though Pharaoh appears to be referred to individually, yet that reference is to his *official* character, as the king of Egypt. The language is similar to, and to be interpreted on the same principles with, that which is used concerning the hebrews, when God said—“Israel is my son.” The whole case is to be expounded by the rules which belong to Jehovah’s government over NATIONS; and which he himself has so distinctly stated by the prophet Jeremiah.

2. The judgments inflicted were national in their character; and that which was the last, and at the same time the most distressing, was peculiarly so; for then the FIRST-BORN, or the family heirs officially speaking, were destroyed.

3. It is positively asserted that Pharaoh *hardened his own heart*. He reasoned on the whole subject which Moses

presented to his consideration, as a politician. He was calculating the consequences which would occur to his own people from *the sudden exodus* of such an immense multitude of slaves, on whose labor the nation had been so long accustomed to depend. He foresaw the serious difficulties in which his people should be involved—the utter helplessness to which they should be reduced. The rights of the Hebrews—the history of their settlement in Egypt—the gratitude which any recollection of Joseph's ministerial services might have inspired—the well known tradition that Abraham's children should return to their own land—and the miracles which had been wrought before his eyes—were the considerations which, as a moralist, he ought most carefully and deliberately to have weighed. But I will freely admit, that when politics and morals are brought into collision—whether the problem be presented to civil or ecclesiastical politicians—mankind have found considerable difficulty in acting RIGHT. And surely they have no reason, in doing wrong, either to complain, or to be surprised, if a retributive providence should at last overtake them. Should a course of forbearance be pursued, which allows them full time to reconsider and rectify these errors, this is more than they could demand from mere JUSTICE; and all that they could expect from GRACE. Thus God does deal, even with NATIONS—as he states in the passage already quoted—“At what instant I shall speak concerning a *nation*, and concerning a *kingdom*, to pluck up, and to pull down, and to destroy it; if that *nation* against whom I have pronounced, *turn from their evil*, I will *repent* of the evil that I thought to do unto it.” Thus God did deal with Pharaoh. Long did he forbear; and at any time had Pharaoh turned from evil, he might have escaped the calamities under which he suffered, and the catastrophe in which the judicial process terminated. Under this view no case can be plainer, whether that case be individual or official. Nothing more is required of any controvertist in order to see

it so, than to consider that politics are but a branch of morals; that God governs nations as well as individuals; and that his providence towards one is emblematic of his providence towards the other.

4. The difficulties which theologians have felt with regard to the expressions concerning Pharaoh, arise from their not considering the use which the Hebrews made of active verbs. These were often employed to express a mere permission to do a thing, or a mere prophecy of some particular event. Take this example of the FIRST—"If the prophet be deceived, when he hath spoken a thing, *I the Lord* have deceived that prophet." Do you, can you, for a moment suppose that God is guilty of the immorality of practicing a deception upon the mind of any creature, who, in consequence of that deception, is involved in everlasting perdition? If the use of terms, or a grammatical principle belonging to any language from which those terms are derived, will explain such a measure in a consistent manner, all difficulty is removed; and no wisdom is displayed in the fastidiousness that refuses to be satisfied. Every generous and elevated mind would rejoice to be relieved from such an onerous and dishonorable imputation on the moral system he has espoused.

Take these examples of the SECOND: God said to Jeremiah—"See I have this day set thee over the nations and over the kingdoms, *to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy, and to throw down, to build and to plant.*" Thus Ezekiel speaks of himself, referring to his official attitude as a prophet:—"And it was according to the vision which I saw, even according to the vision which I saw when *I came to destroy the city.*" God gave this command to Isaiah—"Make the heart of this people fat, and make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes; lest they see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and convert, and be healed." The chief butler, giving an account of Joseph's ability to

interpret dreams, said—"Me *he restored* unto my office, and him *he hanged*." Mere prophecy, and nothing more, is expressed by the terms; as is abundantly evident, not only from their own application, but from the fact that, when the Redeemer interpreted the prophecy uttered by Isaiah, he charges the guilt directly upon the jews.—"Their eyes *they have closed*." Interpret the term HARDEN, when applied to God's dealings with Pharaoh, under the recollection that the Hebrews did thus employ active verbs, and the whole matter is plain.

5. Let us put the different passages, as the apostle Paul applies them to Pharaoh, *together*, and then we may perhaps distinctly perceive their import.—"I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have *compassion* on whom I will have *compassion*.—Even for this same purpose have I raised thee up, that I might show my power in thee; and that my name might be declared throughout the earth. Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he *hardeneth*. What if God, willing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, *endured with much long suffering* the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction." In Exodus the phrase is, "I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will show mercy to whom I will show mercy." The very same principle runs through all these passages: they all express the same political operation of the Governor of the world. To have *compassion*, to *show mercy*, to *harden*, and to *endure with much long suffering*, are, in this connexion, synonymous and interchangeable. They are not intended to convey any idea of judicial blindness, or of a direct agency, by which Jehovah rendered it impossible for Pharaoh to obey the summons which he had received. On the contrary, their meaning is perfectly coincident with the fact, as the history evinces. God did show *compassion*, or *mercy*, and did *endure with much long suffering*, when, on Pharaoh's professed repentance, judgment after judgment was kindly removed. The effect which

followed was, that Pharaoh hardened his own heart. And as this effect did follow the compassion and long-suffering which God displayed, he is said, not positively nor judicially, but agreeably to the use of active verbs among the Hebrews, to *harden* Pharaoh's heart. Besides, the expressions refer simply to national character and doings, as is evident in relation both to Pharaoh and Israel.

Moreover, the interpretation which God gives of his own transactions by the prophet Jeremiah evinces that, not only was the removing of the judgments in Pharaoh's case merciful, but the object of that removal was to give him space to repent: for it is said—"If that *nation*, against whom I have pronounced, *turn from their evil*, I will *repent* of the evil which I thought to do unto them." Accordingly Pharaoh is exhibited as a vessel of wrath fitted, or who had fitted himself, for destruction. He did profess to *repent*, and his prayer was granted; yet he became like the clay marred in the hands of the potter, by which Jehovah figuratively describes a *nation* which had *done evil*.

But still God said to this infatuated politician—"For this same purpose I have raised thee up, that I might show my power in thee, and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth." True. But in the original the phrase literally signifies, "I have made thee to stand." This declaration, too, is equivalent with showing *compassion* or *mercy*, and *enduring with long suffering*. For it was by these means that the nation was *made to stand*, or was preserved; otherwise any one of the judgments would have swept them into destruction. Time was granted for repentance; but as repentance was not produced, God dealt with that obdurate people as the potter dealt with the clay when it was marred in his hand, and while he was endeavoring to make it "a vessel of honor." So God, in his providence, presiding over an intermixture of good and evil, must deal with mankind. If they will not suffer him to guide them to glory, honor, and immortality, and there-

by demonstrate the connexion between *righteousness and life*, they must expect to be dealt with "as vessels of wrath," long *carried* with great care, but at length dashed into pieces, that the connexion between *sin and death* may be set forth. The apparent assertion that God dealt thus with Pharaoh on *purpose* to destroy him, is nothing more than the idiomatic form of speech, so common in the hebrew language; and which has already been noticed in the peculiar use of active verbs which characterizes it.*

Now as this nation did not repent, as the Governor of the world must make a consistent and profitable use of their official relations, and as a period had occurred in the history of man when something must be done in order to preserve truth in the world; while Jehovah, on the one hand, **ELECTS** the children of Israel through grace, to be a symbolical exhibition of truth, so, on the other, he "reprobates" or "passes by," or manifests correlative views of truth, by his dealings with Pharaoh. The whole matter is brought out on both sides to stand distinct and prominent; not to show us that God elects some to everlasting life, and reprobates others to everlasting condemnation, but to "declare his name *throughout all the earth* :— Or his design was and is to manifest his truth, that all men might see, believe, and be saved. The display comes home to them as being thrown on their personal responsibilities; and not as having their fate determinedly and unalterably fixed by an eternal and arbitrary decree. So then, if man perishes, he perishes by his *own fault*, the **ELECTION** itself being the criterion by which the moral problem is to be solved.

The subject of this providential superintendence, admitting so broad a distinction between official services and individual interest, is also beautifully illustrated by the Redeemer in one of his parables. "The kingdom of heaven," said he, "is like unto a man that is an householder, which

*See M'Knight's Notes on Rom. ix. 4.

went out early in the morning to hire laborers into his vineyard. And when he had agreed with the laborers for a penny a day, he sent them into his vineyard." At different times during the day he sent other laborers into the vineyard, promising to give them whatever was RIGHT. In the evening, when the hours of labor were past, he called the laborers to give them their hire, and he gave to each one a penny. Those who came into the vineyard early in the morning were offended at the conduct of their employer, and remonstrated against his apparent injustice. "These last," said they, "have wrought but one hour, and thou hast made them equal to us which have borne the burthen and heat of the day. But he answered one of them, and said—Friend I do thee no WRONG: didst not thou agree with me for a penny? Take that thine is and go thy way; I will give unto this last even as unto thee. Is it not *lawful* for me to do what I will with my own? Is thine eye evil because I am good?" Now, says the Redeemer, the kingdom of heaven is like to this householder. But in what respect? In this, he replies, that "many are called, but few are *chosen*." If this be so, then the choice of the few does not interfere with the rights of the many: these are still respected, and get their penny, the full reward of their labor. Their responsibilities are not nullified; nor do they lose the fruit of their effort. Or, God in his own goodness, regulating his kingdom according to his own wisdom, may confer distinguished honors on a few, and carry out in his providence a "purpose of election," without infringing on the moral privileges of the rest. The way to eternal life is open to ALL, notwithstanding the election which has taken place. The election does not impinge upon the universality of the atonement; neither is it an election unto eternal life, which leaves all who are not chosen to perish, that is, involved in the divine transaction; but it is a pure rectoral matter, by which God does no *wrong* to any one; and is perfectly consistent with the

salvation of every man. The scriptural doctrine on this unutterably interesting subject, leaves the personal responsibility of each one, as placed under mediatorial law and accountable to Christ his judge, unimpaired.

Such are the scriptural views of the doctrine of ELECTION. Nor do I know of any other form in which the bible states that doctrine, unless it may be that which is implied in the declaration—"The Lord has *set apart* him that is godly *for himself*:" And this exhibition of the doctrine, so far as personal responsibility is concerned, is exactly what it should be. It leaves the statement which the Redeemer has made concerning the resurrection unembarrassed:—"The hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and shall come forth; they that have done good unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of damnation." It involves no reprobation, nor giving over unto eternal perdition, excepting on the ground of personal crime. And in fact, no other view in reference to personal responsibility, would correspond with the gospel as an exhibition of the righteousness of Christ; for by that righteousness *all men are made righteous*, and are brought into *justification of life*. THERE IS NO ELECTION TO RESTRICT THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD.

It now only remains for me briefly to consider some general reasoning, which is conceived to be utterly subversive of the preceding views, and directly in favor of a limited atonement, or an election of individuals unto eternal life. All will say, God is omniscient, and therefore he foreknows whatever comes to pass. And what then? Whatsoever God foreknows will certainly, it is supposed, come to pass; and is of course, fixed and certain—fore-ordained, or predestined. Foreknowledge and pre-ordination, are thus represented to be *in fact* the same thing; and we are often told that it is scarcely worth while to distinguish between them, seeing that either will lead infallibly to the same re-

sult.—Nay more; it has been said that nothing can be foreknown which has not been pre-ordained: so that the divine decrees are the basis of the divine foreknowledge. Such, it is imagined, is the order of nature in the case. This reasoning will be applied to the subject we have in hand, as follows:—God foreknows who will ultimately be saved, and who will not. This is necessarily implied in the fact that he foreknows all things that come to pass. In this matter God cannot be deceived. The precise number of those who are eventually to be saved is therefore certainly fixed, beyond the power of change; and it is a matter of small difference, whether, in respect of that number, God be said to foreknow or to fore-ordain it. Still further; as God cannot foreknow a thing to come to pass, which is not pre-ordained, that precise number is fore-ordained:—those that are saved, are elected, and those who are not saved, are reprobated. I believe that I have stated the argument fairly. If any object to the statement, and instead of *reprobating*, would say that those who are lost are *passed by*, I answer, that either this *passing by* is the consequence of a divine decree so predestinating the matter, or it is not. If it be the consequence of a decree, it is *reprobation*. If it be not the consequence of a decree, God has simply foreknown the things, and has predetermined nothing about it. Then foreknowledge and fore-ordination are not the same; and as foreknowledge is not fore-ordination in the one case, neither is it in the other; so that, if there be no *reprobation*, there is, by parity of reasoning, no *election*.

I object to the whole argument, though it be thought by many, to be unanswerable. The *necessary* connexion between foreknowledge and pre-ordination, which it supposes, is not called for by the philosophy of MIND. We foreknow that the sun will rise to-morrow, and we cannot be deceived. It is true, that the rising of the sun to-morrow is a predetermined event; but though it be so, yet it certainly does not depend on our volitions, or on any predetermining power.

which *we* may possess. Here then is MIND, foreknowing an event which must take place, and yet without pre-ordaining that event. So far from our predetermining this event, we merely foreknow it, while its occurrence depends upon the volitions of *another* being; and had we been ignorant of the plans and intentions of that *other* being, we should have foreknown nothing about the matter.

We may shrewdly predict the results which shall occur in the history of an individual, whose character, or conduct, or circumstances, may have furnished us with premises from which to reason. We may foretell with unerring accuracy the downfall of an empire, or a revolution in a community: and yet the events which are so unerringly prophesied have no dependance on our volitions. We may kindly use all our efforts to prevent these foreseen disasters, may feel the most pressing obligations so to act, and yet our influence shall be exerted in vain. The more intellectual or intelligent a man may be, the more familiar he may become with such painful calculations. Yet his power to anticipate and declare these and like results, though amounting almost to the impossibility of committing a mistake, argues no pre-ordination on the part of the individual whose prophetic vision has been so clear. In fact, the old testament prophets, as well as the new testament apostles, did thus distinctly and indubitably foretell events which occurred centuries after they had gone to sleep with their fathers, and others, which, to this hour, are not fulfilled. Yet their foreknowledge did not exhibit any power on their part to predestine what they had prophesied; though, in using active verbs according to the idiom of the language in which they wrote, they *seem* to *pre-ordain* what they could only foretell. All this is perfectly accordant with the philosophy of MIND. For in all the cases specified, intellectual beings simply declared what they had the power to perceive, without any power to preordain. The volitions of numberless other beings, and even of generations of beings, passed un-

der their prophetic glance: and all that can be predicated of the intellectual phenomenon is, that great power of judgment has been evinced.

God knows all things. To him the darkness and the light are both alike. One day is with him as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day. He understandeth our thoughts afar off; there is not a word of our tongue which he does not know altogether. Give to a human being such power; and what will he not be able to foretell? What calculations can he not make?—Where is any necessity that he should constrain, or control, the volitions of beings, whose hearts and ways are thus open before him? Could he not predict who would do good, and who would do evil?—We repeat it: the philosophy of MIND requires no such indispensable connexion between foreknowledge and fore-ordination. And therefore the foreknowledge of God does by no means necessarily imply his fore-ordination.

To me it seems, that the argument which I have framed, bespeaks a higher degree of perfection in the Eternal, than that which I combat. For certainly it requires more intellectual reach, and a wider range of thought, in an intelligent being, to foreknow and foretell the instantaneous volitions and varied movements of millions of other beings—of *all* other beings—than to foreknow and foretell what his own volitions and movements shall be. The one implies *omniscience*, and the other does not. Beings who are free to think and free to act, belong to a higher order of intelligence, than they do who have no freedom of volition; and it is always more difficult to read their character, and fathom their purposes. A slave can never be compared with a freeman; as he never can possess half the intelligence, nor evince half the intellectual force. Slavery destroys mind; liberty cherishes and enlarges it. The officer who can govern a slave population, is, or may be, wholly incompetent to preside over a free community. Now, man as a free agent is altogether a different being from man as not

free, in respect of religion, as well as in regard of any thing else. In the latter case, he may be charmed with a series of "carnal ordinances:"—pictures and images, fasts and festivals, pomp and ceremony, are all that he delights in. But in the former case he calls for thought and argument, which must become refined, or profound, as rapidly as he advances in intellectual growth. The nearer therefore that he approaches to that, which his Creator intended he should become, the greater is the degree of mind which he calls into communion with himself, and the higher does the Creator rise in his view. So that the philosophy of mind not only supposes no necessary connexion between foreknowledge and fore-ordination, but absolutely breaks it up, inasmuch as it requires more mind to govern man as a free agent; and inasmuch as free agency improves and exalts man himself.

But again I remark, that God foreknows what has never come to pass, and what therefore could not have been pre-ordained. If this assertion can be made good, the argument we are combating will be completely overthrown. Let us try. When Jehovah made man at first, he placed him in a probationary state, endowed with power to keep the law, and yet liable to fall. The constitution which the lawgiver established had two sides; for it might be fulfilled, and one train of consequences would follow; or it might be broken, and another train of consequences would follow. Certainly Jehovah knows both sides of his own constitution. This cannot be denied. The denial of such a plain common sense truth would be in a high degree irrational. If it should be denied, we have only to add, that the law was broken, and the appropriate consequences have followed, all of which were confessedly foreknown; and now, the very object of the gospel is to recover what has been lost, and to bring about the other;—an operation which is in actual progress, and therefore, on the same ground, must have been equally foreknown. Indeed from the first,

Jehovah declares himself to know both good and evil; nor could he threaten, on the one hand, or promise on the other, that of which he knew nothing.

A similar state of things is described by the psalmist, in which God actually *declares* what would have occurred, had his people obeyed his commandments. "O that my people," said he, "had hearkened unto me, and Israel had walked in my ways! I should soon have subdued their enemies, and turned my hands against their adversaries. The haters of the Lord should have submitted themselves unto him: but their time should have endured forever. He should have fed them also with the finest of the wheat: and with honey out of the rock should I have satisfied thee. But my people would not hearken to my voice: and Israel would none of me. So I gave them up to their own heart's lust; and they walked in their own counsels." Here, what came to pass, and what did not come to pass, are both distinctly asserted.

One more example.—"O Lord God of Israel," said David, "thy servant hath certainly heard that Saul seeketh to come to Keilah, to destroy the city for my sake. Will the men of Keilah deliver me up into his hand? Will Saul come down as thy servant hath heard?" The Lord replied to him, that Saul would come down, and that the men of Keilah would deliver him into Saul's hand. Now the fact is that Saul did not come down, neither did the men of Keilah deliver David into his hand: for David immediately made his escape. Here then God positively *foreknew* and actually *declared* what did not come to pass. The indispensable connexion between foreknowledge and predestination; which has been so often asserted, is therefore a pure theological figment—destitute of all liberal thought, and as cramped as it is untrue.

But perhaps it may now be objected that my reasoning destroys predestination altogether. This objection would be inconsiderate. For such a being as I have supposed

God to be, presiding over such a race of intelligent creatures as I have supposed men to be, must have his own views and designs; and would certainly predetermine to the extent of his own volitions and plans. No intelligent being can act without some defined purpose and intentions. Neither would God so act. We may then expect to find, as a matter of course, "fixed points," established rules, and unavoidable events, displayed under his administration. He will carry on a line of moral causes and effects, as indispensable and certain as any laws in physical nature. He will create official trust, as seemeth good to him, in order to sustain his own government. He will bring about certain events—the crucifixion of his Son for example—as indispensable to the accomplishment of his own wise and gracious purposes. And all these events may be fore-known and foreordained. But none of them infringe, nor is there any necessity that they should infringe, in the least degree on the volitions of his creatures, beyond their own proper responsibility.

Unless I greatly mistake, some such distinction as this, involving the immutability of established laws and the mutability of divine dispensations, is indispensably necessary to the interpretation of the scriptures throughout. There must be some points which are unalterably *fixed*, and others which may be *changed* according to the issues of the sinner's probationary course. This peculiarity of every government, which recognises the free agency of its subjects, would no doubt be readily conceded as a characteristic of the divine government, had not an ideal perfection, which has no coincidence with the sinner's imperfection, been so long and so strenuously asserted as indispensably resulting from the divine attributes. Hence certain texts have been purloined from one view, and inconsiderately appropriated to the other, as though every thing were absolutely fixed, and any idea of change were perfectly inadmissible in reference to the divine mind.

Let us lay some scripture passages along-side of each other. "Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights, *with whom is no variableness nor shadow of turning.*" "God is not a man that *he should lie*, neither the son of man, that *he should repent*. Hath he said, and *shall he not do it?* or hath he spoken, and *shall he not make it good?*" "The Strength of Israel will *not lie nor repent*: for he is not a man that *he should repent.*" "I am the Lord, *I change not*, therefore ye sons of Jacob are not consumed." "I am God—declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, *my counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure.*" Many such texts might be copied out, all of which would immediately be recognised by certain theological disputants, as sustaining the heavy proposition that God "has *foreordained* whatsoever comes to pass."

But there are other texts which are identified with the free agency and imperfection of man, which, to some, are apparently contradictory to those quoted. Such as—"It *repented* the Lord that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart." "It *repenteth* me that I have set up Saul to be king, for he hath turned back from following me." "And God saw their works, that they turned from their evil way; and God *repented* of the evil that *he had said* he would do unto them, and he did it not."—"Should I not spare Nineveh?" "Turn unto the Lord your God, for he is gracious and merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness, and *repenteth him* of the evil." "For the Lord will judge his people, and he will *repent* himself concerning his servants."—How shall these things be reconciled? They perplex many a plain christian; and as much as the Redeemer's declaration has done, when he said—"But of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, NEITHER THE SON BUT THE FATHER."

Now observe that both classes of texts belong to the revelation which God has given us. The first refers to established laws, which cannot pass away, or to the gospel which endureth forever: the second refers to the actions of the creature, moving under the burden of his lusts, or amidst most powerful temptations. The first is *statute*, and the second is the *application* of the statute to changing circumstances. If circumstances change, ought not the application of the statute to change? If the sinner repent, ought not his cry and prayer to be heard, though judgment had been proclaimed? "Come Jonah," says Jehovah to his servant, I put the question home to yourself—"should not I spare repenting Nineveh?" Would LAW thus be abandoned? Is not this GOSPEL? But, while THE SON is presented before us, as such a Lord, to conduct such an administration, as BECOMES US, and while this want of knowledge predicated of him is the correlative of his avowed sympathy or fellow-feeling; this proposition—"God hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass," passes by THE SON, or overlooks all his official attributes, and pries into the Father's secrets, of which we can know nothing but as the Son reveals them. Hence the controvertist talks about mystery, and presumptuously reasons on what he is pleased to term THE SECRET WILL OF GOD. Our perceptions cannot keep pace, and we demand him to retrace his steps and preach THE GOSPEL to men, instead of confounding them with his conjectures. That God hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass, is an unrevealed, incomprehensible and irrelevant proposition, and is utterly out of all character with the fact that God has assumed *personal form*, or has made himself known to us by *external manifestation*. The theologian who maintains the difficult and abstruse dogma, has ventured to speculate outside of the world in which he lives.

But has not the distinction which I have made, been unequivocally stated in the scriptures? When illustrating the

priesthood of Christ, by a comparison with that of Melchisedec and Aaron, and measuring the period during which the Mosaic law imposed its obligations, Paul framed the following argument: Jesus was made a Priest WITH AN OATH: the levitical priests were made WITHOUT AN OATH. Is there any valuable difference? and if there be, what is it? An OATH among men, says the apostle, is "for confirmation," and "to them is an end of all strife." Accordingly, he adds, "God willing more abundantly to show unto the heirs of promise THE IMMUTABILITY OF HIS COUNSEL, confirmed it by an OATH." Thus Jesus was made a priest. "The Lord SWARE and will not repent, thou art a priest FOREVER." There is therefore no changing the priesthood of Christ. It is IMMUTABLE. But the levitical priesthood was not confirmed by an OATH. It therefore was not IMMUTABLE, and not only might be, but actually has been, changed. Is there not then a difference between the rectoral transactions of Jehovah? May they not be mutable, or immutable? and that according as they have or have not been established by an oath? On what principle then, do theologians undertake to tell us, that all events are "fore-ordained," or unalterably fixed? Have all events been established, and immutably so by an oath? And why should theologians smile at our idea of "fixed points" in the government of God? and justify that smile by an appeal to the abstract perfections of God? Will an intelligent being swear to every thing he *knows*?

The transaction alluded to, by which Jesus was made a surety of a better covenant, and a priest after the power of an endless life, forms the second instance in which the apostle had reasoned on our general principle. The covenant made with Abraham had been confirmed by an oath, to show the immutability of the divine "COUNSEL, which shall stand." That covenant has never been "disannulled." How should it be, when it had been thus confirmed? The distinction should have been familiar to the jew. Many

cases had occurred within the history of his own nation :— God had sworn that the generation which came out of Egypt, should not enter the land of Canaan—did they enter? He had in like manner sworn concerning Moses—did he go into the promised heritage? He sware unto David—and was not Jesus of Nazareth David's son? And why should not the christian understand this as well as the jew? Look ye to it, and weigh well the idea that God "has foreordained whatsoever comes to pass," and the argument from divine omniscience which carries you beyond the revelation by THE SON, before you permit yourself to be troubled by such profitless metaphysics. How strange that all this confusion, and abstraction, and terror, should spring from those who appear to be afraid of nothing so much as an attempt to be "wise above what is written." The argument of the apostle is as much against them as is the philosophy of mind. The connexion between foreknowledge and foreordination is not indispensable, though the two may be combined, for the crucifixion of Christ occurred according to the "DETERMINATE COUNSEL AND FOREKNOWLEDGE of God."

In fine. Reasoning from the perfections of God, abstractedly considered, we may sustain the most palpable contradictions, and annihilate moral science. I will frame various arguments, that you may see what absurdity may thus be introduced.

1. God is *omniscient*—Therefore, without any reference to human contingencies, *he has foreordained whatsoever comes to pass.*

2. God is *omnipotent*—Therefore, without any reference to human powers, or the formation of human character or its own constituent principles, *he may save us if he will, or he may crush us if he will*—he performs whatsoever comes to pass.

3. God is infinitely *merciful*—Therefore, without any reference to personal sanctification, *he will save all men.*

4. God is infinitely *just*—Therefore, without any reference to infancy, ignorance, infirmity, repentance, or personal virtue, *he will destroy all men in hell forever.*

One argument is as good as the other. Introduce the intermediate circumstances, which have been excepted, and all are false. Throw out those circumstances, and these several arguments destroy each other, because they are contradictory. I infer that no one of them is true; and that all of them incontestably prove, that the human mind has no power to reason from the abstract perfections of God.

From the whole it follows, that there is nothing in God's foreknowledge or foreordination to interfere with the universality of the gospel. And we are left free to declare that CHRIST DIED FOR ALL MEN; THAT HIS GOSPEL MAY BE PREACHED TO ALL MEN; AND THAT WHOSOEVER WILL, MAY BELIEVE, AND BE SAVED.

LECTURE XV.

Faith and Vision—Reason of Faith—Nature of Faith—Operations of Faith—Repentance—Gifts of God.

I HAVE endeavored to explain the nature, and to define the extent, of the mediatorial institute. The obligation, in which that institute involves mankind, is our next subject of inquiry. And here, as in the preceding lectures, my remarks must be considerably modified by the views which theologians have advanced. For, if I should affirm that the gospel is addressed to the FAITH of the human mind, and that every human being is required to believe the principles and facts which are detailed, then the questions will immediately arise—what is FAITH?—are men

ABLE to believe? These are very important questions. They are important, if for no other reason, yet because they have been so variously argued, and have agitated the public mind so much. It would therefore be in vain to pursue our observations, without keeping these inquiries continually in view. To answer them, shall be the object of this as well as of the next lecture.

If Adam had obeyed the law, should there, in that case, have been any room for the operations of *faith*? Perhaps you would immediately answer, no. But why? When God said—"in the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die," were not our first parents required to *believe* him? If they were, then certainly faith was demanded, even in paradise. And yet nothing is more plain, than that the scriptures place *faith* and *deeds of law* in direct contrast with each other. By the one the sinner may be justified: by the other justification is impossible.

Again. When the redeemed of the Lord shall have been delivered from their earthly troubles, and introduced into their heavenly habitation, shall they any longer exercise *faith*? This question also may promptly be answered in the negative. But why? Shall all eternity be spread out to the view of the ransomed? Shall nothing be future to them? Or shall the promises of Jehovah not embrace the future? And shall not the redeemed believe those promises?

In short—can a *community* exist without *faith*? Is not reciprocity, or a mutual confidence, indispensable to social intercourse? Elevate the characters of the individuals who may compose a society, and in proportion as that is done, faith becomes strong. Alter the circumstances in which these individuals move, lift them beyond the reach of temptation, multiply their facilities to become or remain virtuous, and faith will calculate with firmer confidence. In fact, whenever we, and in proportion as we do, get out of the range of *vision*, we get into that of *faith*. Such is the

creature distinguished from the Creator—"all things are naked and open to the eyes of him with whom we have to do."

But though what I have said be strictly correct, though faith may be predicated of Adam in paradise, and of the redeemed in heaven, yet it is evident that, when we compare the primeval condition of our first-parents and the future glory of the righteous with our present state, faith is not to be viewed as their *distinguishing* characteristic, while yet it is ours. Because "deeds of law" were required of Adam, which are put into direct contrast with faith that is required of us; and the ransomed shall SEE God as HE IS. On the one hand, we cannot render "deeds of laws," but "faith is counted to us for righteousness;" and on the other, we do not *see* God, but live by faith, waiting patiently "for that we see not."—Now, if faith may be predicated of the three different states to which we have referred, and yet does not occupy the same relations in all, the true way to understand our own present and immediate interest in it, is to ascertain what is the difference of those relations it sustains. In other words, if the distinguishing characteristic of the primordial condition of man, or that which may specifically belong to his future state when perfected in Christ, shall be laid alongside of faith as our distinctive peculiarity, the comparison will furnish us with the best view of faith itself.

Adopting the mode of explanation which has just been commended, a very little reflection will convince every one, that the point of contrast, which will thus be brought into view, is between *faith* and *vision*. Nor is there any thing unnatural or arbitrary in the moral distinction. For, if a man cannot *see*, what relief has he except in *believing*?—Every being, in proportion to his helplessness, is reduced to a dependency on his fellows: and to meet such exigencies, whether they argue perfection or imperfection, is the very design of *society*. Hence, it has been stated, that commu-

nities cannot exist without faith : and the facts, which have displayed the existence of faith in the original and future conditions of man, show that it belongs to the constitution of the human mind. Instead, therefore, of the mediatorial requisition, which calls upon us to *believe*, being a sovereign or arbitrary mandate, it results from the nature of the case ; and instead of faith itself being a supernatural or extrinsic property, it belongs to the operations of mind itself. We are consequently called upon to *believe*, because we cannot *see* ; and in so far as we cannot see, whether we be in paradise or out of it, in heaven or on earth, we are reduced to the simple necessity of believing. If the present state of man involves or supposes any disabilities, which were not characteristic of his condition in paradise, nor shall be characteristic of his condition in heaven, those disabilities, and that too, as far as they have occurred, are the simple reason why faith is *now* so imperatively required. We are not enjoined to render “ deeds of law,” merely because we *cannot* render them : neither is it exacted of us to *see*, because we *cannot* see. So the command has gone forth, calling for faith, because believing is all we *can* do. It is laboring under this disability that the Redeemer finds fallen man ; and taking him just as he finds him, the gospel is suited to faith, as the law had been to vision. The sectarian who has represented faith as supernatural or extraneous, and the sceptic who has declaimed against it as irrational, have alike misunderstood and misrepresented this momentous matter.

Nothing is more common than the ministerial announcement, that faith is the GIFT of God : nor is there any doctrinal disquisition more frequently heard from the pulpit, than that which arrays scriptural texts in proof of this proposition. It would appear very ungracious, roundly to deny so favorite an assertion ; and yet if it be true, as it is generally understood, manifestly no man *can* believe until the special GIFT is bestowed ; and they are acting according to the

strictest philosophy of the gospel, who are *waiting* to receive it, and *living* without regard to personal responsibility. It will avail nothing to reply, that as faith is a gift, our personal responsibility requires us to *ask* for it; because the prayer that seeks it must be itself an exercise of faith. Either then there must be some mistake in the manner of representing this subject, or personal responsibility must be abandoned.

Suppose we should allege that *vision*, with which, as we have seen, faith is contrasted, is the gift of God: what should we thereby declare? Would any one understand this proposition as affirming that an individual, who has the organ of vision, *cannot see*? Would it not be apparent to every one, that the statement must imply that God had given to man the organ of vision, and spread before it the objects which it was intended to perceive? For an individual, to whom God has given this faculty, *not to see*, is culpably to shut his eyes; or to decline the opportunity of observation, with which he has been furnished. The guilt of not seeing is his own, because he can see if he will. Now though faith be described as a GIFT of God, yet is it not to be so considered in like connexions? God has given to man a *mind*, and spread before it objects which it can perceive. Then, not to perceive those objects, is culpably to shut the *mind's eye*, and to decline that intellectual observation for which he has been qualified. The guilt of not perceiving, is our own; because we *can* perceive, if we will. And accordingly the unbeliever is condemned for this very reason. He has eyes, but he sees not; he has ears, but he hears not; he has a heart, but he understands not. If he could neither see, nor hear, nor understand, there would be some apology—there would be no guilt.

Let us carry our hypothesis a step farther. Suppose that an individual, endowed with the organ of vision, should assert, that the objects which Jehovah has spread out before his eyes have no existence; or that they are not, what they

plainly are. He does not *believe* what his own eyes see? Let him argue out his own untenable dogmas. He will be learned and ingenious; and when we try to detect his sophistry, we may, perhaps, become so much perplexed by his artful refinements, that we may be almost convinced he is right; while yet our own senses demonstrate that he is wrong. *Cannot* this philosopher see? *Can he not*, or is he *unable* to, believe what he sees? In like manner, God has given *mind* to man, and has spread before it objects suitable to its perceptions. The power of perception as clearly belongs to mind, as the power of vision belongs to the eye. *Cannot* mind perceive? We might just as well ask, cannot the eye see? If mind perceives, *cannot* mind believe what it perceives? We might as well ask whether man *can* believe what his eye sees? As he who *cannot* see is blind, or has not the organ of vision; so he who *cannot* believe is idiotic, or is destitute of the organ of intellectual action. This is the direct conclusion to which the general argument based on the nature of man necessarily leads. It as certainly belongs to mind to perceive, as it belongs to the eye to see. And it as clearly belongs to man to believe what his mind perceives, as it belongs to him to believe what his eye sees. Destroy the eye, and vision is destroyed: take away mind, and the power to believe is gone. It is therefore utterly in vain to preach about man's *inability* to believe, as long as mind is conceded to him.

Perhaps I ought, in order to save an apparent confusion of terms, to have remarked in the outset of the argument, that as faith, to a certain extent, is to be predicated of Adam in his state of innocence; so vision, to a certain extent, is to be predicated of us in our present lapsed condition. I was relying on the reader's own discernment in the case; on the force attached to the statement, that vision was the *distinguishing* attribute of Adam's primeval, and that faith is the *distinguishing* attribute of his subsequent,

estate ; as also on the scriptural details which I shall presently proceed to exhibit. Mind belonged to Adam at first, and therefore he had the power to believe ; we have the organ of vision, and therefore we see ; but by the fall such a change has occurred, and the relative proportion of our animal and intellectual faculties has been so far affected, that while Adam at first was placed in a condition characterized by vision, he afterwards was reduced by “ the weakness of the flesh ” to a condition characterized by faith.—But the scriptural illustrations will make my meaning more apparent.

The apostle Paul remarks—“ We walk by faith, not by sight : ” thus putting faith and vision into contrast. He further observes—“ whilst we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord—we are willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord. ”—Vision implies presence with the Lord : as faith supposes absence from him. Were it our privilege to enjoy that vision, which is put into opposition with faith, we should see God. For, in any other sense, God is ever present with us : and when we shall realize that state, which Paul describes as being “ absent from the body, and present with the Lord,” the apostle John tells us, “ we shall see God as HE IS.” Vision therefore implies a sight of God.

Paul again declares—“ Now we see through a glass darkly ; but then face to face : now I know in part ; but then shall I know, even as also I am known.” We see darkly or obscurely as in an enigma, in which one thing represents another ; i. e. we do not *see* the great and important objects with which we are concerned. They are represented to us by way of preparing us to see them, and that representation calls for our faith. Could we see the objects themselves, we should not need the representation, and of course there would be no room for the exercise of faith. I mean that vision, not faith, would be our *distinguishing* characteristic.

The Redeemer also asserts, that “no man hath *seen* God at any time ; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him.” Vision is here put in contrast with revelation ; and revelation, which is the divine testimony, is the great object of faith. Again he remarks, in one of his arguments with the jews—“not that any man hath *seen* the Father, save he which is of God, he hath *seen* the Father.

The same general truth was proclaimed to Moses, when he desired to see Jehovah’s glory:—“Thou canst not see my face ‘said Jehovah ;’ for there shall no man *see* me and live.” Such is the fact ; and it has been thought to be of sufficient importance, to be thus formally, distinctly, and frequently announced.

In the last instance, however, which has been quoted, we have more than the simple statement of the fact. Jehovah assigns the reason why Moses could not see his face. He had gratified his servant as far as was proper, and said—“I will make all my goodness pass before thee, and I will proclaim the NAME of Jehovah before thee, and will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will show mercy on whom I will show mercy. Behold there is a place by me, and thou shalt stand on the rock ; and it shall come to pass, while my glory passeth by, that I will put thee in the cleft of the rock, and will cover thee with my hand, while I pass by : and I will take away mine hand, and thou shalt see my back parts ; but my face shall not be seen. Thou canst not see my FACE ; for there shall no man see me and live.” Had Moses been indulged any farther, “had the face” of Jehovah been exposed to his view, it would have cost him his LIFE. But how, or why ? Death is the consequence of *sin* ; and in what way could it be produced by a sight of the face of Jehovah ? which is the highest privilege of an intelligent, unsinning, or redeemed man. Angels, said Jesus, behold the face of my Father, which is in

heaven. Manifestly there could be no immorality about obtaining the view; and how then could it produce death?

The history of such transactions, or the effects of such appearances, as are recorded by Moses, will sufficiently explain the whole matter. The people said to him—"Behold Jehovah our Elohim hath showed us his glory and his greatness, and we have heard his voice out of the midst of the fire: we have seen this day that Elohim doth talk with man, and he *liveth*. Now, therefore, why should we *die*? For this great fire will consume us: if we hear the voice of Jehovah our Elohim any more, then we shall *die*. For who is there of all flesh that hath heard the voice of the living Elohim speaking out of the midst of the fire, as we have, and *lived*?" Moses himself said—"I exceedingly fear and quake." And are such feelings unnatural? Are not supernatural appearances the dread of all the world?—The animal nature of man could not have borne the view. "The weakness of the flesh," superinduced by Adam's sin—for by his sin *death* has come into the world—incapacitates the human being to sustain the resplendence of such glory: and Moses, with all his official honors, was subject to the infirmities, and exposed to the death, which belong to the lot of his race. Take away this incompetency, thus brought about, and the effect stated would not have followed; for the scriptures have given us no explanation of death, but as it is the consequence of SIN. Plainly then VISION is not, nor can it be, the *distinguishing* principle or attribute of our present condition; and that simply because of the disability or weakness of the flesh, under which, in that condition, we labor.

It is here where the doctrine of FAITH comes in; i. e. by reason of that same disability, faith is the *distinguishing* attribute of our present state. Will the theologian turn round and tell us that man *cannot* believe? What? *Able* neither to *see* nor *believe*? This is surely strange. Where, then, is the remedy? The controvertist must not retreat

into divine *power* ; for God can qualify us to *see*, as well as he can to *believe*. Neither must he talk about *consistency* ; for in so doing he would yield the whole argument, seeing that the only circumstance with which God is called upon to legislate consistently, is human *infirmity*. If, after all, faith is above his ability, man is no better off with, than he was without, the remedy. It follows irrefutably that he *can* believe the gospel which is addressed to him.

The term *faith* is generally used in a technical sense ; which sense it is not easy to apprehend or explain. There are definitions in abundance, and there has been controversy without end. Treatise after treatise, exegesis after exegesis, homily after homily, and sermon after sermon—all have been furnished to explain and elucidate this interesting particular ; and yet, after all, faith is, in the minds of most people, a mysterious something,* which they have not precisely understood. And they are not a few who, despairing of acquiring any clear views about it, have abandoned their research, and exclaimed in pettish disappointment,

For modes of faith let angry bigots fight,
His can't be wrong, whose life is in the right.

This difficulty occurs in the evangelical use of the term, while, in the common affairs of life, every body uses it, and with a clear, well defined idea. We read a history, or hear an oral relation, and talk about our belief, or our faith, in what we have read and heard ; and every one understands us to assert our intellectual conviction of the truth of what we have read or heard. An interchange of information creates every day universal excitement of feeling, and calls every body into action : and all this is nothing but the influence of faith, or reciprocal confidence, without which society must be dissolved. Nor is there

* This term *something* appears to be taking the place of the old term *mystery*. “There is *something* in God common to the three persons”—“there is *something* behind sinful acts.”

any wretched fatuity betrayed in this social excitement. It gives birth to the most vigorous thought, and to most extensive inquiry. The character of witnesses, the probability of testimony, and the consequences of events, are carefully scrutinized and canvassed. The fewer the legal restraints that are imposed, the more intelligent the community becomes; so that faith is always the associate of light and liberty, of honor and benevolence. Introduce legal enactments beyond the simple necessities of the social compact, and in interfering with the operations of social confidence, they become substitutes for the workings of mind, and the harbingers of conflict and strife. So that this very principle, called faith or belief, while it is so well understood in the commonest affairs of life, rises with the elevation of individual intellect, and expands with the extension of our social relations; until it pervades the highest concerns, in which men can have any community of interest. In short, how can any man avoid believing that which he knows to be *true*? or how can he believe that which he knows is *not true*?

But when we become religionists, and undertake to discuss christianity, where *faith*, from the condition of man, from the constitution of the human mind, and from the nature of social principles, is as necessary as it is in common life, we possess not this clearness of view; because we have lost its simplicity. They who can believe the historian, or the oral narrator, of any train of circumstances, and easily give the rationale of this mental operation, seem to be at a loss to explain what it is to believe a historian, or an oral narrator, when relating sacred truths. They who are every day scrutinizing the character of witnesses, canvassing the probability of testimony, or predicting the consequences of events, with a view to making up their judgment, or forming an opinion, or exercising faith, are at a loss to explain the same intellectual operation in its spiritual relations. They can be believers, habitually and unre-

servedly, as friends, as merchants, as politicians, as philosophers; in all these connexions they can display the greatest mental force—the highest excitement of feeling—the wisest, the boldest, the most persevering, the most efficient action—and yet they fail to carry the principle of these affinities into religion. They can believe their fellow man in any relation of life, but cannot believe him as a *christian*. They can believe God, as he moves in his daily providential transactions; they can read his volume of nature, as they call it, with accuracy and care; but when they hear him speaking as the God of grace, they know not how, nor what it is, to believe him; neither can they imagine that his BIBLE is a plain, intelligible, book.

Now the reason of all this embarrassment on a subject which, in any other form, is familiar, is very evident. Whenever men turn to the science of morals, as it is displayed in our inspired manual, they *assume*, as an incontrovertible position, that the subject of inquiry is altogether a *mysterious* matter. They have been often told so. So the books and the pulpit have declared. And who would not tread lightly and cautiously on mysterious ground? They do not seem to be aware, that the gospel has any coincidence with that which is natural; but are rather inclined to suppose that it is contrary to, and above, nature. Consequently, the operations of mind are not the same in religion that they are in any other branch of science; and faith in christianity is wholly different from what it is in our common transactions. Thus robbed of the analogies by which divine truth is to be illustrated, and led to abandon the visible symbols which so variously and beautifully represent it, men sink into despondency and unbelief. Could they give up their false assumptions; could they unlearn the dogmas which have “grown with their growth and strengthened with their strength;” could they carry along the unbroken chain of human interests, through all the varying circumstances of life; and could they perceive

the intellectual identity of the believer, as he examines and apprehends both physical and moral subjects, their difficulty would vanish. They would find it as easy to understand faith in christianity, as they do in any secondary form in which it occurs. They would carry their illustrations from the fireside to the sanctuary, from the volume of nature to the volume of inspiration, and understand the doctrine of our moral dependencies with as much facility as they do that of our domestic or political relations. Nay more, they would find, that throughout their whole pilgrimage, in those reciprocities which they have thought to be natural and philosophical, they have been sustaining the same moral operation, which they imagine to be so very mysterious and incomprehensible in religion.

Unfortunately, however, the common theological discussions to which sectarian disciples may have the opportunity of attending, will afford them no aid in their retrograde movement after truth. From these discussions they derived all their erroneous views; and to remain under the scholastic dominion, is only to perpetuate their own perplexing mistakes. They will still be entertained with the injudicious distinctions that have involved the whole doctrine of faith in all its obscurity; and have forms of faith described to them, which are at the same time declared to them not to be faith. There is an historical faith—there is a speculative faith—there is a faith of miracles—there is an appropriating faith—there is a reflex faith—there is a saving faith. The mind is bewildered by “distinctions without a difference;” and the man expires amid the obscurities of learned and ingenious explanations. I wish that all this were pure fabrication. Cheerfully would it be retracted, and the inquirer be referred to better instructions wherever they may be found.

I have been exhibiting faith in contrast with vision: or, to use Paul's language, as “the evidence of things *not seen*.” There are “*invisible* things of God,” which he

has manifested in such a manner as to be "understood by the things that are made." And can any one object to such a display on the part of God, made with a view to the instruction of his intelligent creatures, who have no better means of acquiring knowledge? Is there any known principle belonging to the philosophy of mind, which would evince such a display to be irrational? Man, as he is, SEES a great deal of the wonderful works of God; is this irrational? Should he see *more*, would that be irrational? And if he shall be incapable of *seeing* more, yet is not incapable of learning more by some other method, is that other method irrational? If by that other method, some truth, or a series of truths, which he had not *seen*, and could not *see*, should be brought home to his mind in clear and satisfactory demonstration, would that mode be subversive of mental philosophy? Truth is not absurd, come in whatever form it may be made known. And if a manner of communication is used, without which truth cannot be made known, that manner of communication cannot be absurd. Yet this is the attitude in which the sceptic stands who laughs at the doctrine of *faith*. For faith is the evidence, the subsistence in the mind, the demonstration to the mind, of that which is not *seen*. It is an operation by which the mind, through the intervention of surrounding emblems, gets at the knowledge of things that are *invisible*, in which it argues from the type to the antitype, from the symbol to the object symbolized. Plainly then between faith and ignorance, there is no intermediate state. For what should the mind do with a truth, made evident by *vision*, but *believe* it? And what can that same mind do with any other truth, demonstrated in any other way, but *believe* it? I see no alternative.

Such is faith in christianity. God has made known to man certain matters which he cannot *see*. But then they are demonstrated to him to be *true*; and when he is convinced by this demonstration that they are true, what else

can he do with them than believe them? An individual *sees* his father die—what else can he do than *believe* that his father is dead? Would it not be folly for him to doubt?—But he was not an eye-witness to the domestic catastrophe; he has simply received information of the afflictive fact—yet it is information whose verity is fairly proved; what else can he do than *believe* what he has heard? Just so with regard to scriptural truth. It stands demonstrated: and must not the mind, to which the proof has come home in undeniable form, *believe* scriptural truth?—Where then is the difficulty of, or objection against, the doctrine of faith?

It may be replied that the truth of that which the scriptures have stated is doubtful. Be it so; but that involves a totally distinct question. Faith, as belonging to the philosophy of mind, is one thing; and the character of any particular matter offered to consideration, is another thing. A man may disbelieve what he knows is not true; or he may doubt what he does not know to be true; and yet reason will bind him down to believe what he knows to be true. If any one doubts the truth of the scriptural statements, it does not follow that he may begin to declaim against *faith* as irrational: but leaving faith to possess its own philosophic attributes, his business is to ascertain the truth or falsehood of these scriptural statements. He must scrutinize the character of the witnesses; he must canvass the probability of their testimony; he must follow out effects to their causes, and causes to their effects; he must pursue the argument in every direction, and in every form, to which his intellect may make him competent. He must take up the subject just as he would any other matter, of the truth of which he desires to be informed. And whether he believes or disbelieves when he has done, the philosophy of faith, as a mental operation, remains undisturbed; or it is alike demonstrated by his belief or unbelief. In the one case, he exercises faith in that which he has found out to be true;

and in the other, he withholds his *faith* from that which he has found out to be untrue.

Now, suppose an individual to have instituted, and efficiently to have carried on, such an investigation into the truth of the scriptural statements. After he shall have accomplished his task, he proclaims himself to be convinced of their truth. Is he not a *believer*? Has he not *faith*? What else is left for a man under such circumstances to do but believe? Can faith be predicated of a man who has no *conviction*? Is it not the province of revelation to make its subjects *clear*? Does not the Spirit of God *convince* the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment?—Take the other side, and suppose that, instead of all this investigation, by which an inquirer has been convinced, he had enjoyed unclouded *VISION*—what would have been the effect in that case? Would it not be *conviction*? And when this favored individual should be convinced by what he *saw*, would he not be a believer? Certainly this idea of faith must be palpable to every one, as being the moral operation which the scriptures require of all their readers. What other idea of faith can there be from the nature of mind? Or what other connexion can there be between christianity, as an intellectual system, and man as an intellectual being?

It may, perhaps, be objected to the foregoing observations, that a man, who has gone as far as has been described, is a mere *speculative* believer; and will in all probability stop short with the conviction he has reached. His heart, it will be said, is not touched; and there are hundreds like him, who have never gone one step farther in the way to eternal life.

We do not know exactly what theologians mean by the *heart*. If they mean by it that it is a part of man's *intellectual* nature, we cannot conceive how it is to be touched, but by such a train of convictions, as this objection seems to consider so trivial or equivocal. The probability, in our

view, is that the heart would be reached by the process which has been suggested ; and that the individual who has advanced to the specified point, would be strongly impelled to go farther. Will the objection imply that when, for example, Paul says—"with the *heart* man believeth unto righteousness," he means to say, that the *head*, the understanding, the judgment, has nothing to do with faith? Or does he not, on the contrary, mean by the heart; *the whole intellectual man*? There is much loose talking in religion about the *head* and the *heart*, as though they belonged to different systems, and in character and location corresponded with the anatomical fixture of the literal head and heart in the human body. Hence some teachers of christianity undertake systematically to address the head, and others employ all their force in assaulting the *heart*. Which of them deal with man as an intellectual being?

As to the other part of the objection, in which hundreds are so summarily included, as being thoroughly convinced while their speculations lead to no practical result, I should doubt the *facts*. The process through which we have supposed our case to run, would certainly bespeak better results. But men differ in their views of human society, and often trace what they see to very different causes. In the present instance, lest we might be supposed to be too much prepossessed in favor of our own theory, we shall take cover under *authority*. Halyburton, whose "rational inquiry into the principles of the modern deists," it has been said, remains unanswered, makes the following remarks—"It is much to be regretted, that the bulk of mankind found their principles, as well as practices and hopes, on no better bottom than *education* ; which gives but too just occasion for the smart reflection of the witty, though profane poet,

By education most have been misled,
So they believe, because they were so bred.
The priest continues what the nurse began,
And thus the child imposes on the man,

“Most part seek no better reason for their belief and practice, than custom and education. Whatever those offer in principle, they greedily swallow down, and venture all on so weak a bottom. And this surely is one of the great reasons, why so many miscarry in this important matter.—The more considerate and better part of mankind, in matters of so high importance, will, with the nicest care, try all, that they may hold fast what is good. If a man understands the importance of the case, he will find reason to look somewhat deeper, and think more seriously of this matter, than either the unthinking generality, who receive all in bulk, without trial, as it is given to them; or the forward would-be-wits, that oftentimes are guilty of as great, and much more pernicious credulity in rejecting all, as the other in receiving all.”

The Master seems to pass the same judgment, and to view the individual whose case we have specified, as having attained to a high condition of intellectual privilege:—“That servant,” he remarks, “which knew his lord’s will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes. But he that knew not, and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes. For unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required: and to whom men have committed much, of him they will ask the more.” And indeed the man, the prospects of whose course are under consideration, if he shall reject the gospel, will generally distinguish himself in *abusing* what he has acquired. He will reach greater lengths in depravity, and rush to a more fearful extreme, than the generality of those around him; because he has had more to overcome, and therefore feels a stronger stimulus urging him onward in his iniquitous career.

But why should not a well formed conviction of truth lead to the happiest results? Let us call back to our aid that which has been contrasted with faith. What effect would clear and unclouded *vision* produce? Would it end

in mere speculation too? Or would not the inducements to effort be proportionably stronger? Taking the figure under another aspect—is light no stimulant? The day dawns, and all the world is roused to action. And will not intellectual light produce a correspondent effect? Is truth an inert matter, or has it not, by its own nature, an influence on mind? “The words that I speak unto you,” said Jesus, “they are spirit and they are life.” Instead therefore, of conviction, produced by fair investigation, being likely to end in mere speculation, its natural tendency is to impel the man who has acquired it, to still further exertion. So that the very nature of *faith*, as we have presented it is, to lead to action; and that to the whole extent of the subject with which it is concerned. “As a man thinketh in his heart,” says Solomon, “so is he.”—“A good man,” says the Redeemer, “out of the good treasure of the heart, bringeth forth good things: and an evil man, out of the evil treasure, bringeth forth evil things.”

I have already intimated that there is a very striking coincidence between this mental operation, and the nature of truth itself. It as much belongs to truth to excite the mind to action, as it belongs to the mind to act, when excited.—The effect of truth on the mind, is like that of light on the eye; and the mind under the influence of truth, is like the eye under the stimulus of light. Truth excites, and the mind is excited. They bear therefore, a reciprocal relation, which is both evident and natural; and which is sustained in all the circumstances where they can possibly meet. There are a thousand cases, it is true, in which men are commonly said to act by intuition; whence has arisen no small controversy, intended to settle the philosophy of intuitive truth. Still, truth and mind bear to each other, in these cases, their natural relation. An analysis will easily discover a regular and accurate process of argument, through which mind has passed, rapidly arriving at a conclusion which has been fairly deduced from premises dis-

tinctly perceived. Or, if any should deny the actual process of thought, in the cases alluded to, on account of the rapidity of the supposed operation—which perhaps, many might do, notwithstanding the proverbial quickness of thought—yet evidently, the whole process can be readily made out by an after review; however instantaneously it may seem to have occurred. “It may be difficult,” says a popular medical writer, “for a person not accustomed to reflect on such subjects, to believe that every time his leg is moved in walking, he performs a distinct act of volition; but he will be convinced of this, if he observes the motions of those whose power of volition is impaired by disease.—He will find the patient hesitate which leg to move at every step; and at length his attempts to move the limbs produce a confused and irregular action, incapable of carrying him forward. The act of expanding the chest, is an act of volition; it is an act, in ordinary breathing, rendered extremely easy by the gentleness of the motion required, and the continual habit which renders it familiar, and is excited by a sensation proportionably slight; but which is as *essential* to it, as stronger sensations are to more powerful acts of volition. Thus it is, that on the removal of the sensorial power, respiration ceases.”*

The direct tendency of truth operating on mind is, to lead to any train of actions which it may prescribe; and the direct course on which mind enters, after perceiving truth, is *obedience* to injunctions so communicated. The attribute of mind, so called out and displayed, is precisely the principle of intellectual vitality, on which rests the whole value of divine *revelation*. By revelation, Jehovah communicates *truth* to men; truth appropriate to their nature and circumstances; and in a form suitable to, or within the range of, their apprehensions. This truth, thus afforded, it belongs to them to perceive, and having perceived

* W. Philips' Treatise on the nature and cure of Diseases. &c. Amer. ed. page 54, 55.

it, it is the nature both of truth and mind that they should comply with its dictates. All the adjuvants which are employed, direct their influence to the same point; and they are the mere agents of the Spirit, in his great work of *convincing* the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment. Nor is there any arbitrary or incomprehensible influence exerted in the manner of executing their task; but they address to the human mind a varied and satisfactory *argument*;—an argument, made up as processes of ratiocination are in all other cases, and equally as clear and conclusive. He who is convinced of truth, which has been thus substantiated and demonstrated to his own mind, is a *believer*; and, as a matter of course, must act accordingly. So that we may include, and the scriptures often evidently do include, under the term faith, the appropriate consequences of conviction, or of a full persuasion of the truth believed. This is philosophy. This is scripture. Just such a moral operation is called for by the condition of man, and it is as consistent with the grace of God, as it is with the liberty of the human mind.

The effects of faith will always correspond with the nature of the truth believed. If a credible witness shall recite to us a tale of crime and infamy, we are immediately struck with horror. If he shall, on the contrary, communicate some pleasing intelligence, we instantly become sensible of pleasurable emotions. Such is the fact in christianity.—God reveals himself to us as LOVE. He declares that he has loved us so tenderly, as to give his only begotten Son to die for us. He assures us that he has no pleasure in the death of the sinner; that he is long-suffering and kind—always waiting to be gracious; that he will forgive iniquity, transgression and sin; and that whosoever cometh unto him, he will in no wise cast out. It is the direct nature and tendency of these truths, to excite in the human mind the most delightful feelings; and, under the obligation which they create, to call forth its gratitude and love.

Ought we not to, is it not natural that we should, love that which is *good*? Whatever is beautiful and excellent, is the legitimate object of esteem and admiration; and we cannot withhold our praise without violating nature, or betraying some obliquity that falls not within the ordinary or legitimate operations of mind. It is for this very purpose that God has revealed his love in Christ; given to its display so much interest; adorned its circumstances with so much glory; and identified its overtures with every earthly interest that man can consider valuable, or worthy of effort.— And what can be more beautiful and lovely, what more likely to captivate and charm, or what more capable to dignify and bless, than the gospel? Earth suffers, angels mourn, and Jehovah grieves, when man acts so unnatural and irrational a part, as to repulse from his bosom such an enchanting scheme of love.

Again. If a credible witness should apprise us of some imminent danger overhanging, which jeopardds life, estate, and whatever we hold dear, we should be instantly and greatly alarmed; and would make every effort in our power to avoid or escape the threatened calamity. Or, on the other hand, if he should disclose something which would be greatly to our advantage, and which we might certainly secure by well timed and diligent effort, we should be immediately roused to action. This illustration all men are prepared to appreciate; for it is their daily employment to avoid the ills, and to secure the joys of life. And should they make like effort, and on the same principle of acting, in relation to religion, they would meet their moral obligations, and carry out, to its whole extent, the scriptural doctrine of faith. A dire calamity overhangs our race, filling time and eternity with its fearful consequences. Of this the scriptures have distinctly and fully informed us, adding in their details the divine testimony to human experience. They have pointed out a way of escape; have proclaimed a Saviour; and promised everlasting life. They bring the

divine agency into co-operation with human effort, and identify human happiness with practical righteousness. They disclaim any interference with intellectual liberty, and call for personal conviction, designing thereby to excite to individual purpose and effort. Every sentence which they reveal or proclaim, is the testimony of Jehovah, as a credible witness ; and our faith in, or our belief of, what he has said, should naturally lead us to avoid the evils and secure the benefits of which he has spoken. And thus would follow, in all their consistency, and variety, and beauty, and richness, those multiform virtues and good works, whose precise place in the christian economy, its expositors have found no little difficulty to ascertain. They arise as all other human actions arise ; and by a simple operation, with which every child of Adam is perfectly familiar, and which he is exemplifying every day and every hour throughout his entire life.

I protest I cannot see this deep mystery about FAITH, which seems to perplex so many ; and which calls for so many distinctions, when a formal statement of its nature and attributes is attempted. I discern nothing in it but a plain, easy, natural operation of mind, in which a man believes, on the testimony of others, what he has not *seen*. Nor can I perceive any reason why it should occupy so conspicuous a place in christian morals, other than that as through the sin of Adam we are rendered incapable of VISION, there is no resource left, save to believe what others tell us.

It will still be urged that, after all, men who have been and who are convinced of the truth of the scriptures, and of the philosophy and propriety of their doctrines, do live in sin. Be it so. What then ? Will it follow that the previous elucidations of faith are therefore imperfect ? Will it thereby appear that faith has not the tendencies which have been ascribed to it ? I judge not. For is it not unnatural and irrational that men should act contrary to their

own convictions? Is such deportment honorable or consistent? Can any plea be offered to justify it? And is not this the very reason of their condemnation at the bar of God? Are they not "beaten with many stripes," because that when they *knew* their Master's will, they would not fulfil it? "Because," saith the high and holy One, "I have called, and ye refused; I have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded; but ye have set at nought all my counsel, and would none of my reproof; I also will laugh at your calamity, I will mock when your fear cometh." To rebel against their own convictions is then highly criminal on the part of mankind. But if resistance against these convictions is implied in their course of sin, our argument is sustained even by the very threatenings of the scriptures; because the crime of the resistance consists in its being an opposition to those very tendencies ascribed to faith. Their living in sin, therefore, instead of disproving the practical influence of faith, by exciting all holy affections, and inducing to all good works, is demonstration that faith has that influence.

And even this *touching the heart*, as it is called, which so many think to imply a full initiation into all the mysteries of spiritual living—does it involve no deception? or never end in a moral result as equivocal as that which the ardent sectary so familiarly and unhesitatingly reprobates as mere speculation? We live in an age of "revivals" and "protracted meetings," of matins and vespers, of weekly lectures, and of religious associations almost without end. And are not all these, which shut out the minister from his *study*, and prevent the people from *thinking*, designed to produce excitement, to rouse feeling—to touch the heart? Are there no hasty purposes by which the sinner, who has *felt* much, and *thought* none, "commits" himself? Even with those who tell us that "the saint cannot fall from grace," are there no falling away of "hopeful" converts? Have these "new measures" awakened no painful

suspensions? called forth no warning prophet? produced no controversy? ended in no evil? As chivalrous as they are mechanical, and as poisonous as they are exciting, these movements are but too painful an illustration of what many mean by touching the heart, and of their gross misconceptions of the work of the Holy Spirit. Accordingly a new proposition asks for "rectified revivals;" and, admitting the value of "protracted meetings," yet would restrain their frequency—perhaps to copy out the festivals of the obsolete Jewish ritual, or the holy days of a papal rule of faith, and establish an annual ordinance. The standard of piety, I greatly fear, is at present a very childish sophism. The whole experiment, notwithstanding it is sustained by so much effervescence, will terminate in languor and coldness, and substitute for the morality of domestic and civic life, the mere versatility and exaggeration of outward forms.

In averring that faith has a tendency to produce all the varieties of practical godliness, I have had no intention of attributing to it an irresistible mechanical force. Whatever may be predicated of man, viewed in his probationary character under the government of God, must be consistent with his free agency, or it is false in morals. There may be a thousand counteracting agencies, whose tendency would naturally lead to practical ungodliness. They are equally destitute of mechanical force; and yet a man may feel their full influence, and suffer himself to be misled by them into most criminal indulgencies. He may choose the good or he may choose the evil, for God has characterized him by freedom of will: but his mistakes are at his own peril. He lives in the midst of circumstances where there is an intermixture of good and evil—each having its own associations, or being a property of every part of the system. He has intelligence to discern between them, and the gospel is intended to afford him the greatest facilities in following the one and avoiding the other, which his condition will admit. His knowledge of evil can exert no

irresistible agency ; for his knowledge of God, by the introduction of the gospel, is more than equivalent to that agency. Yet he may yield to that agency which he *can resist*. His first parents, though more happily situated, became polluted by transgression, and angels themselves fell, and were dealt with as guilty. Thus man may *fall* at this hour, and be condemned as faulty and criminal in falling. And such is the scriptural view of his case in his present condition. He *minds* the things of the flesh, instead of *mind*ing the things of the spirit. He has cherished instead of mortifying his lusts. He has loved the world instead of loving God. He has tried to effect a compromise between God and mammon ; but has failed in the impracticable scheme, and fallen a victim, as he might have foreseen, to the lust which he brought into competition with his moral sense. He has entertained the agents which decoy to evil, and thus nurtured his passions with all their hurtful tendencies ; and he has done this at the expense of his better convictions and his purer feelings. The operation is common, and the consequences are natural. No mechanical force is necessary to explain the catastrophe.

The human mind may, after having reached the most vivid conviction of any particular truth, soon lose the *sense* or impression of that truth. Pains may not be taken to preserve its freshness. Its value may not be fully credited, and attention may be withheld from it : and so a ready admission may be given to other impressions than its own, and which may be very insidiously made. Its companions may not be sought—the mind may not persevere in its habit of inquiry—a single virtue may be thought sufficient—and thus an appearance of morality will cover a formal treaty with lust, or serve as an apology for indolence. The *sense* of truth is in this manner lost, and conviction has not produced its natural results. In order to preserve the force of truth when it has been acquired, its bidding must be obeyed, and its influence be sustained by practical effort. Otherwise there will be a total failure in

the great work of regeneration, by which alone, as being an entire transformation, man can be fitted for the enjoyments of heaven. There is a vast deal of moral philosophy in the simple adage—"practice makes perfect;" and in no connexion is its philosophy more apparent than in the cultivation of faith. Faith leads to works, and "by works faith is made perfect." Without works, faith is like a body without a spirit—it is in an unnatural state—it is dead. There is no matter of wonder that a man, who resists his own convictions, should soon loose this *sense* or impression of truth on his own mind; or, in other words, that he who does not yield to their influence, or follow out their tendency, until his affections shall become gracious, should lose the convictions themselves, and be justly denominated an unbeliever.

The Redeemer very explicitly stated to the jews, that they could not attain to evangelical truth in any other way. They were very much astonished at the moral elevation which he evidently occupied, and seriously inquired by what method he had reached it. "How knoweth this man letters," they asked, "having never learned?" To this he replied—"My doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me. *If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself.*" To apply the principle of this answer—Every man has some degree of knowledge. The very heathen, as we have seen, have the law written on their hearts, and do by nature the things contained in the law. Their own conscience is ever bearing witness to them; and God himself has afforded them ample and varied exhibitions of his nature and proceedings. It is surely not too much to assert that, in christian lands, the elemental truths in evangelical morals are equally apparent. If any man, be he christian or heathen, shall do the will of God as far as he knows it, or shall carry out into actual practice the convictions which he cannot disavow, he shall continue to grow

in knowledge to the whole extent of his effort. The principle may be carried up to the highest degree of moral refinement, to the greatest reach of intellectual improvement, or to the loftiest assurance of faith; and it can be as effectually and profitably applied in that condition of extended privileges. The sphere of action has then become enlarged; all the fine affections and more delicate sensibilities of the human heart, all the broad and expanded views, and all the magnificent conceptions of the human mind; all the dependencies of human life, in which multitudes, unable to sustain themselves, look out for a leader, desire instruction and call for example; are then to be supported by the practical operations of faith. He who has received ten talents, must do the will of God, so fully and extensively, as to gain *ten* talents more: at the same time that he who has received but one talent, moves in an humbler sphere and with feebler ability, to gain *one* talent. These moral agents cannot exchange places; but each must do the will of God according to his ability. If either declines to meet his own *personal* obligation—it matters not which of them it shall be—he resists his own conviction, loses the *sense* or impression of divine truth on his own mind, and retrogrades into unbelief. It is natural that it should be so; and just as natural as that he should grow in knowledge by doing the divine will. “If any man be a hearer of the word,” says James, “and not a doer, he is like unto a man beholding his natural face in a glass, and goeth his way, and straightway *forgetteth* what manner of man he was.” Christian, jew, or heathen, will be alike amenable to the unhappy issue; for it follows, simply according to the essential laws of human nature, which have indissolubly connected faith with works, or principle with action. Christian, jew, or heathen, in the very act of resisting conscience, will *sear* conscience; or, not liking to *retain* God in his knowledge, will sink into a reprobate condition of mind.

There is another scriptural subject which is closely allied to faith, because it is analogous in its character ; and which is, perhaps, as widely misunderstood. I refer to REPENTANCE : and call it up in this place, both for its own sake, and on account of its analogical attributes. It is not uncommon to hear of some, who are always repenting and always sinning, or alternately sinning and repenting ; and it is equally common to view the convulsions of feeling which others may experience, the many sighs they heave, and the floods of tears they shed, as being truly penitential. Indeed great effort is frequently made to produce these paroxysms of feeling ; and that effort is giving character to the ministerial operations of the present age. Sin being a great evil, abominable in its nature, and fearful in its consequences, it seems befitting that the sinner should deeply mourn ; and that he should so deeply mourn, as though he had discovered himself to be “ the chief of sinners,” the vilest of the vile ; a very wretch, whose visage has not a lineament of moral beauty, and whose heart is nothing but “ a cage of unclean birds.” This awful conviction being produced, and all hope being merged in a sense of self-degradation, so that the sinner begins to writhe in agony, and tells in unmeasured terms the torture of his soul, repentance is supposed to be strikingly exemplified. To such a statement of the interesting subject before us, I do most seriously demur : my ideas of repentance are totally different ; yet they neither justify sin, nor exclude feeling : but they are far more consonant, as I believe, with the condition of man under the proclamation of mercy—under which *whosoever will*, may be saved. I do not see how, nor why, any man should be brought into such a state of mind, who has not harboured some most diabolical intentions, or committed some most flagrant transgressions ; who is not entirely ignorant of the calls of mercy, and therefore, put on his justification under LAW ; who has not been brought under some artificial excitement,

which is neither wise nor pious ; or who is not a pitiable instance of nervous derangement, whom no argument can reach, nor promises soothe. This kind of feeling appears to me to be that worldly sorrow which, Paul declares, worketh death : such as distracted the bosom of Judas, when he threw back in anguish the thirty pieces of silver, and in horrible despair terminated his wretched existence.

These ideas of repentance, which happily may be more rare than I imagine, I suppose to originate in an injudicious theory, which refers the sinner to *LAW*, as the condemning power under which he lives. Now the fact is that we are under *grace*, and not under *law*. The call to repentance is not a legal, but an evangelical matter. No man since the fall has ever been under *law* : unless the symbolical exhibition of *law*, involved in the jewish dispensation, be considered as throwing the children of Israel into that relation. Change the fact, and bring law, deprived of all the modifications of the divine government which grace has introduced, to bear in its appropriate force upon the human conscience, and I readily grant that we may be remitted to unmingled terror, and to the wildest distraction. Associate with such a statement of the law a corresponding view of the divine character, and introduce upon the whirlwind the coming Judge, infinite in justice and almighty in power, instead of describing the yearnings and declaring the loving kindness of the God and Father of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, and the tumultuous horror is protracted. Much I fear that this is sometimes done in the most unwarrantable manner, as though the Saviour were yet to die, and God were to be reconciled. The effect thus produced inspires the individual, who so keenly suffers, with false views of God, and sends him forth into the world to criticise and condemn his brethren by a mistaken standard of piety : to inject doubts, where he should have offered consolation ; or to stand off in all the coldness of suspicion, when he should have unreservedly afforded

the sympathies of a brother's heart. Such an effect is undesirable in every view; and, in the guise of evangelical purity, makes sad the heart of those whom God has not made sad. Repentance is evangelical in its character, and ought to be equally so in its terms. Thus it is set forth in the scriptures, and thus it ought to be exhibited from ministerial lips.

There are two greek words which the inspired writers have used in their various grammatical forms, and which our translators have uniformly rendered *repent*, or *repentance*. The one signifies an uneasy condition of mind: a state of regret or sorrow, for something that has been done, without any regard either to duration or effects. So Judas is said to have *repented*. The other word expresses *a change of mind*; and consequently of conduct or behavior. Both these terms are used by the apostle, when he remarks that, "Godly sorrow worketh *repentance* to salvation, not to be *repented of*." This "play upon the word *repent*" is not in the original; which would be better rendered—'Godly sorrow worketh REPENTANCE unto salvation not to be *regretted*.* The word, which signifies *a change of mind*, is always used, when the *repentance* under consideration is called for. Manifestly no sorrow for sin, however protracted or deep, makes up *repentance* before God. Something more—a great deal more—is required, and that in the most positive and solemn terms. Many a man weeps over his sin, and greatly regrets it, who has not *repented*, because he commits it still. His feelings have been transitory; his mind has not been changed; and until his views are entirely altered, and sin is abandoned with a firm and intelligent purpose; until his feelings, under the direction of an enlightened mind, have become pure and staid; and until his habits shall be correct and uniform; he has not, however deep his sorrow, heavy his sighs, or loud his lamentations, attained to repentance unto salvation.

* See Campbell's Four Gos. Dis. vi. p. 3.

Very probably repentance has been misapprehended for the same reason that faith has been misconceived : i. e. it is viewed as the *gift* of God ; and therefore the intellectual operation it implies has been slighted. Christ, it will be said, has been “ exalted to *give* repentance unto Israel, and forgiveness of sins.” But it is to be observed that the word *Israel* is a general term, and is applied to the whole nation of the jews. And can it be said that repentance was bestowed as an individual gift upon that people ? or that repentance was, strictly speaking, a gift to them at all ? Certainly not ; for that nation, instead of repenting, were cut off. A more liberal construction must therefore be sought ; and *giving* must be taken in the sense of proclamation. Instead of cutting them off instantly, Jehovah waited on them in much long suffering, calling upon them by his apostle to repent ; and delaying, in order to *give* them full opportunity to repent. Hence Paul reasons with them on this principle—“ Or despisest thou the riches of his goodness, and forbearance, and long suffering kindness ; not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth (moveth, exciteth, or urgeth) thee to repentance ? But after thy hardness and *impenitent* heart, treasurest up unto thyself wrath against the day of wrath.”

The same expression—God’s giving repentance—is also applied to the gentiles. When Peter “ rehearsed ” unto his brethren the occurrences that had transpired during his visit to Cornelius, they rejoiced and said—“ Then hath God *also* unto the gentiles *granted* (given) *repentance* unto life.” The language is general, and denotes the call of the gentiles, according to the purpose of election, which had been distinctly announced by the prophets. The great matter of offence with Peter was, that he had gone among *gentiles*. The inference drawn from his explanation was, that he had done right, and that from henceforth any of them might imitate his example ; seeing that it was now evident

that God had conferred the privileges of the gospel upon the gentiles, as well as upon the jews.

In like manner, Zacharias, being filled with the Holy Spirit, prophesied concerning his son John the baptist—"Thou shalt go before the face of the Lord, *to prepare his way; to give knowledge of salvation unto his people.*"—The same kind of phraseology is used in relation to Jezebel—"I *gave* her space to repent—and she repented not." In fact this mode of expression is common with both profane and sacred writers.

Faith resembles repentance in this respect; or is the *gift* of God in a similar manner. The human mind is *passive* in neither, but is *active* in both. And the texts which are brought to show that *faith* is directly the *gift* of God, are like those which have been advanced to establish a corresponding view in relation to repentance. Thus—"Unto you it is *given*,* in the behalf of Christ, not only to *believe* on him, but also to *suffer* for his sake." Here suffering is as much the gift of God as faith is; and evidently nothing more is intended, than is implied in Peter's declaration—"for even hereunto were ye called, because Christ also hath suffered for us." The suffering, which is alluded to, resulted from the nature of the *calling*, to which those who endured were required to respond under peculiar circumstances. The mind is not *passive*, but is called particularly to *endure*; which requires a great deal of active energy. Such was the duty assigned to the Philippians—not only to believe, but also to suffer. And that duty was assigned to, or this task devolved upon them, with the view of their promoting more efficiently the kingdom of Christ; so that the matter of favor figuratively applied to the means, belongs properly to the object. Suffering, simply considered, is not a *gift*; nor is it so represented in this passage; but, it is spoken of in an *official* view. Being then placed un-

* A particular favor has been granted, or ye have been favored.

der those circumstances which called for suffering, the whole text must be interpreted on the same general principle: i. e. He who has been exalted a Prince and a Saviour, to *give*, to grant, or to proclaim, repentance unto Israel and remission of sin, hath given unto you—hath called upon you—not only to believe, but also to suffer. And such being the call, you must not decline it in either respect.

Again, it is said—"For by grace are ye saved, through faith; and that not of yourselves, it is the *gift* of God." In this expression, the apostle is supposed to assert unequivocally that faith is directly the *gift* of God." But a little reflection may convince any one that the expositor has been too rapid: for why may not the relative refer to the whole proposition as well as to faith? It is the gift of God that "ye are saved by grace through faith." The whole economy is a divine gift, and particularly was so to the Ephesians; because they, being gentiles, were now called in, according to the purpose of election, which Jehovah was executing at the time in erecting the new dispensation. This peculiar favor, conferred on the Ephesians, was the very subject which he was arguing out with them; as is evident from the whole chapter from which the text is taken. "You," says he, "who were dead in trespasses and in sins, hath he quickened—That *in the ages to come* he might show the exceeding riches of his grace." If any one should demur to this analysis, and assert that faith is the nearest antecedent, and that therefore the relative must necessarily refer to it, we must ask him to go a little farther, and to observe the grammatical construction of the sentence. He will find that the relative is in the neuter gender, while the supposed antecedent is feminine. Of course they cannot agree; and the assertion, that faith is the gift of God, is not in the text. Further remark must be entirely unnecessary.

These two matters then, faith and repentance, are intellectual exercises: repentance is change of *mind*, and with

the *heart* man believeth unto righteousness. In view of a general argument they illustrate each other, as kindred operations of mind. They differ as the corresponding phrases in the old testament—forsake your sins and turn unto the Lord—differ. The call to repentance, requires of men to alter their views, feelings and habits—to abandon or renounce them, because they are sinful. The call to faith, requires of men to accept the offers of mercy, and to think, feel, and act accordingly. A compliance with these calls imperiously demands the human soul to put forth all its energies—which effort being declined, or carelessly made, sin is committed, and condemnation incurred.

It thus appears that the call to BELIEVE, like the call to DO, results from the simplest attributes of man as an intellectual being. He has been made for faith and action. There can be nothing so deeply mysterious, nor so awfully distant and impracticable, in a system of evangelic legislation, which requires of man the very effort that his nature was framed to produce. Between believing and doing, as distinguishing features of gospel and law, there is no difference, excepting that which arises from our present condition as encompassed by infirmity, when contrasted with the original condition of Adam, as he came from the hands of God. The simple reason why faith is called for as it is, is that man *cannot* meet the original requisition of works; and the very next step, in the process of his intellectual operations, is to take him up where he stands, and to effect the object of his creation, by turning to the best account whatever remains. He can believe a truth which is demonstrated to him; and to act accordingly is the natural result. The present institute of grace is as philosophical as the original institute of works; or the gospel is as consistent with human nature in its present condition, as law was consistent with human nature in its original condition.

The question which involves the agency of the Spirit of God in the evangelic objects under consideration, would now

demand our attention. This, however, is a subject which requires to be discussed by itself; and I shall take it up in the next lecture, when a fair opportunity of exhibiting the general principles belonging to it will be afforded.

LECTURE XVI.

Subject continued—Divine POWER, whether physical or moral—SPIRIT's operations—Analogies—Physical agents—Philosophy of MEANS—Mistakes of official men—The moral sense—Popular hypothesis examined—Doctrine of Faith sustained—Individual application.

AFTER having explained the nature and operations of faith, on the common principles which belong to the character of man as an intellectual being, the question—whether he has the *power* to believe, becomes a mere inquiry whether he has ability to observe, read, and hear? or to think, reason, decide, and act in relation to any thing he has observed, or read, or heard? We might as well ask—can the farmer plough, sow, reap, and gather into his garner? Can the mechanic handle the implements of his trade; or ingeniously contrive and promptly execute those various combinations, which have both multiplied and supplied the artificial wants of mankind? Can the philosopher, by his researches, ascertain the laws of nature, trace the path of a celestial luminary, or analyse the properties of matter? These queries are too simple and plain to admit any hesitancy in replying. And if man has power to do all this, where lies the difficulty? Is it not strange that there should be any perplexity about such a familiar matter?

But it will be said, that the argument maintained precludes all the Spirit's operations, and shuts out divine power

from all concern with the subject. If so, I recant, and condemn the whole reasoning so carefully elaborated. But is it the fact, that the Spirit of God has nothing to do with the operations of the farmer, the mind of the mechanic, or the genius of the philosopher? If, instead of faith, we had been so fortunate as to enjoy *vision*, would such superior ability have rendered us independent of divine power? Or doth not Jehovah “hang creation on his arm, and feed it at his board?” Why then should not faith be as fairly represented in its own place, as vision may be in its own place? Is diminution of power an annihilation of power? Or may not man be a responsible agent, as well as an angel?—There must be some fearful premises, both distant and occult, from which the conclusions we would combat arise; or moralists would never have gotten into such unhappy collision with all the plain perceptions of common sense, and the beautiful analogies of nature.

Let us minutely trace one of these analogies. *A* says to *B*—the farmer *cannot* plough nor sow his field. *B* stands astonished at so unblushing a declaration, which every one may be conscious is untrue, and intimates his great surprise. *A* replies—I made the statement merely for illustration, and freely admit that the farmer *can* plough and sow his field. The dispute is at an end. But *C* steps in and remarks, the farmer cannot plough and sow his field, unless God shall co-operate with him. He is a poor feeble creature, and his Creator must support him every hour, and in every movement; and not only so, but he must bless his labors, and by a providential agency make the earth to bring forward the seed sown to the maturity of harvest. I know it rejoins *A*; God sends forth his Spirit, and the face of earth is renewed; nor did I intend to utter any doubt about the agency of divine providence. So I understood you, adds *B*; for the connexion and consistency between the farmer’s ability to plough and sow, and the co-operating agency of God, is too plain and evident to be denied. And in fact

the farmer ploughs and sows, because he knows that God sustains him, and will bless his labors.—All parties are agreed, and the controversy is over. And thus all the world talk about ability and inability; and say what can, and what cannot be done, with well defined ideas, and in perfect harmony. No evil passions are engendered; no harsh language is used; every one does his duty in his own place; and the beautiful system which God has formed, is preserved in regular and uniform operation.

I desire to be as plainly understood in my ideas of faith. When I say that man *can* believe, I have not a solitary doubt with regard to the Spirit's agency or an overruling providence. On the contrary, the promises of the gospel guaranty to us this divine agency; and the believer "works out his own salvation with fear and trembling," because he knows that "God works in him, both to will and to do, of his own good pleasure;" just as the farmer goes forth to plough and sow, knowing that God will sustain his being and prosper his labors. I mean nothing more, nor any thing less. Dropping technical terms, I use words in their plain and common acceptation, and suppose man in his moral relations to be the same creature that he is in other relations. And if christians in general would adopt this course, they would soon understand christianity, and understand one another. The scriptures speak in this manner; and appeal to the analogies of nature, which no one mistakes, to illustrate their meaning.

To return to the analogy, and change the point of argument.—*A* says to *B*, the farmer *must* plough and sow his field. He has no choice in the case. *B* is as much astonished as before, and again expresses his surprise. *A* must again recant, for the proposition is too monstrous to be sustained. And *C* can have nothing to object; for here the equivocal doctrine of election would be out of place, though one man is rich, and another is poor. No decree beyond the common laws of nature is suspected; and, as the free agency

of the farmer stands undisputed, all ideas of compulsion are cheerfully given up. Some individual, laboring under a pitiable obliquity, or yielding to the prejudice of a grievously faulty education, or anxiously endeavoring to invent an apology for criminal indolence, might frame an objection, whose apparent ingenuity would please himself. But all the world would smile at the petty conceit, and, having no time to waste on the freaks of abstract theory, would industriously pursue their course; while he himself, not capricious enough to carry out his own system, would eat his daily bread and enjoy his nightly rest, as though he knew that effects had causes, or that ends were to be accomplished by means. The truth of the case is simply this. The farmer is fully aware that *labor* is the common lot of humanity, and that unalloyed good is not to be attained in this world; that, if he does not plough and sow, he can reap no crop, for the beams of the sun and showers of rain will not supply his lack of service; that he must gain bread by the sweat of his brow, or starve; that he must provide for his own house, or make his wife a widow, and his children fatherless, before he descends to the grave; that to neglect his employment, and to "follow vain persons," is to show himself "void of understanding," while his field is "all grown over with thorns, and nettles hath covered the the face thereof;" and that his indolence will convert him into a wretched and degraded pauper, reduce him to infamy and crime, prepare for him an inglorious death and a dishonored grave, and usher him into the presence of an angry God only to banish him to hell. These are spirit-stirring reflections. They inspire him with motives both rational and powerful, and he neither "observeth the wind," nor "regardeth the clouds," but goeth forth to his labor with the morning dawn, gathers his fruits in their seasons, and is "satisfied with bread." Reverse the picture, and the disastrous consequences of which he had been distinctly forewarned, come in regular and rapid and certain suc-

cession. His own conscience accuses and condemns; and all the world affirms the decree, pronouncing a "judgment that will not linger," and "a damnation that will not slumber."

Just so do I understand the matter in reference to religion. The christian is a moral farmer, and is called to plough and sow, if he desires to reap. A thousand motives, involving honor and happiness, both individual and social; extending in their application both to time and eternity; and which he can comprehend and appreciate, agitate his mind. His soul feels their power; for they are not mere words whose sound has fallen on his ear, but "they are spirit and life," and have reached his inmost mind. He must obey their impulse and live, or resist and perish. There is no other alternative. God, in much forbearance, is ever varying the form in which these interesting truths are presented; or, multiplying and simplifying their illustrations, is waiting for a decision; or, inducing a review when a false decision is made, and appealing, while the moral sense is not entirely stupified, he appears to calculate on its last and least remains. Angels have tuned their harps, and wait to rejoice. Ministers, parents, a ransomed church, wait. How can the sinner resist? Or resisting, say—let common sense speak—is he not guilty—fearfully guilty?

It appears to me, that theologians have failed satisfactorily to illustrate the subject of divine power, in view of its mediatorial operations, or in respect of its consistency with human free agency, because they have never considered, or have lost sight of, that which constitutes its PECULIARITY. Speaking by one of his prophets, Jehovah uses this singular language:—"Not by might, nor by power, but by my SPIRIT, saith the Lord of hosts." There is a distinction between MIGHT or POWER and the SPIRIT of the LORD. You may then make a difference between physical power and moral influence if you please, and as multitudes do; but remember that Jehovah speaks of acting by his SPIRIT

as distinguished from power. The scriptural reference, in relation to this matter, is uniformly to the agency of this Spirit; and if you predicate power of that agency, as inspired writers have unquestionably done, you must not forget the distinction which has been so pointedly expressed. This fact, that Jehovah acts by his Spirit—meaning, recollect, not might or power—is the *peculiarity* to which I adverted; and its force must be fully and accurately estimated, before the subject in hand can be understood.

When I remarked, that theologians appear to have lost sight of this peculiarity, it was not intended to assert that they do not refer to the agency of the Spirit, in their speculations on divine POWER. They are exceedingly free and abundant in their allusions to the divine SPIRIT; in their quotations of biblical phrase which proclaims his operations; in their prayers for his outpouring, and in their praise for results which they have been impelled to ascribe to his presence and goodness. But after all, they are contending whether it is physical or moral power which is exerted; are laboring to sustain their dogmas as consistent with human free agency; and, when they have finished their lucubrations, they retreat into mystery as their last resort. You feel that not only the subject is not explained, but that the explanation they profess to give, involves you in fresh difficulties; and readily ask—"Why then are not all men saved?"—"Must not all men be saved?"—"Is it the sinner's fault if he should not be saved, seeing that his salvation depends on an exercise of divine power, which is both sovereign and irresistible?" Is it any matter of wonder, that a system of divine policy, like that involved in the preceding statement, should perplex the world?

But how, I pray you, could theologians help themselves? Their doctrine of power is the legitimate and necessary result of their view of the AGENT who exerts the power. Their idea of TRINITY leads them to represent the agent as a distinct divine PERSON. Means may be used, but means

are insufficient, and the agent must proceed to act with HIS OWN HANDS. Of course he exerts his physical agency, and must accomplish a *physical* result. With the premises which they have adopted, these commentators are perfectly right in referring the mediatorial operation to divine omnipotence. When that agent calls for the use of secondary means, they are right again in insisting on the use of those means, because as a sovereign he does what he pleases? And when they tell the world that they cannot explain the consistency between these two—that it is a mystery—that we must wait until we get into the next world—they are right a third time; for the human mind cannot reconcile such discrepancies. Their error is in the start. The first step taken is wrong. If the Spirit is not a distinct divine PERSON, the whole argument, which hinges on the supposition that he is, is immediately changed; and the popular idea of power must be dropped.

Let us call back the simile—the image—by which this subject was illustrated on a former occasion,* and which Paul so unequivocally employs, when he says—“What man knoweth the things of man, save the SPIRIT of man which is in him? EVEN so the things of God knoweth no man, but the SPIRIT of God.”† When you would explain the operations of the Spirit of God, you must take up the only competent analogy which is afforded you, and that is to be found in the operations of the spirit of man. You have no reason to proceed timidly in the illustration; for an inspired apostle has taught you to employ the image; and you will find yourselves, as you proceed, getting out into light and truth. Now when you speak of a man acting on the minds of his fellow men, do you mean that he is exerting physical power? or do you intend to convey the idea of what you call moral influence? When a man is bodily present to accomplish some particular design by his own hands, or, when being bodily absent, it is executed by others under

* See Lec. IV.

† 1 Cor. ii. 12.

the influence of his spirit, is there any difference? Which of these is physical, and which is moral power? When Paul says to the corinthians—"I verily, as absent in *body*, but present in SPIRIT, have judged already, as though I were present, concerning him that hath so done this deed; in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, when ye are gathered together, and *my spirit*, &c."—when Paul brought his apostolic influence thus to bear upon the case involved, was it physical or moral? When an author's spirit pervades his book, and through that agency convinces his reader by his argument and illustrations, what kind of influence does he exert? When a father, going from his house, is said to leave his spirit behind him, what is the character of that controlling influence which is felt by his family? is it physical or moral? When Solomon says—"Where the word of a king is, there is POWER: and who may say unto him, what doest thou?" what kind of power is it—physical or moral? And when the Son of man, "as a man taking a far journey, who left his house, and gave authority to his servants, and to every man his work, and commanded the porter to watch," they not knowing when the master of the house should return—when thus Jesus ascended on high and promised that his SPIRIT should dwell in the church, to convince the world of sin, of righteousness and of judgment, what kind of influence is exerted? is it physical or moral? When that SPIRIT acts by the word of truth—written or preached, what power—physical or moral—will you expect him to exert?—Can it be personal, when the *person* is removed, and the presence of the *Spirit* alone is felt? Yet it must be personal, if the agent be a *person*, and be personally present.

Again. On the principle of illustration thus exhibited, can you feel any difficulty in respect of human free agency? Were the corinthians not free agents when, by Paul's direction and in communion with his spirit, they excommunicated the individual concerning whom he wrote? Is

the reader destitute of free agency when he feels the spirit of the author whose book he reads, and by whose argument he has been convinced? Have children lost their free agency, because they feel parental influence, though their father is not personally present? When the spirit of the community has chosen its official agents, and established various institutions for the purpose of government, do the citizens forfeit their free agency? Is it folly to talk any longer of liberty? Or does free agency imply the desecration of truth and righteousness, and the means by which they are held up to observation? Is there any mystery about the political or intellectual operation? Must we wait to escape from this state of being, where we see as "through a glass darkly," and to enter into the loftier relations and the clearer atmosphere of a better world, where, with the refined organs of a spiritual body, we shall see as we are seen, before we can understand the philosophy of political ethics? If these things are plain now, and create no perplexity to the philosopher or the moralist, why should we feel any difficulty in view of our free agency in christian morals, or because God "strengthens us with all might by HIS Spirit in the inner man?" This exposition of divine power, which so happily corresponds with intellectual fellowship, afforded in all other social relations, leaves the human mind precisely in that condition where, from the nature of the case, it ought to be left; where every thinking man perceives it to be; and where no confusion, nor uneasiness, nor uncertainty can be produced. The principle which so entirely clears up the subject of human liberty, and yet brings in a divine influence so salutary and efficient, while no objections can be reasonably made, must be true.

It may enable you more fully to appreciate the argument of the preceding paragraphs, if I remind you of the distinction between soul and spirit in man, which we

before made.* **SPIRIT** is the intellectual part of man, irrespective of its bodily connexions. **SOUL** is that same intellectual part of man in its embodied state. Soul, when predicated of Jehovah, always refers to that divine person which was constituted at first by the assumption of form, and was denominated the **WORD**; which Word was afterwards "made flesh," and dwelt among us in "the man Christ Jesus," affording thereby to mankind an exact image of the divine **PERSON**. Such is the scriptural testimony. Having the distinction again before you, you may now observe that this divine power, which we have under consideration, is not ascribed to the **SOUL** but to the **SPIRIT** of God. Search and see. You cannot find any allusions of the kind, excepting under the Jewish dispensation, when Jehovah presided, so to speak, **IN HIS OWN PROPER PERSON**, or as Creator and Lawgiver. Our concern is with the mediatorial institute, where the reference is to Jehovah's **SPIRIT**. The exception which thus occurred under the former economy, when you duly consider the nature and objects of that economy, confirms the idea now advanced; and leaves us to interpret the divine influence by the laws of spirit, as it is distinguished from **SOUL**. It cannot be otherwise, for we cannot see God and live. The original manifestation is inappropriate to our present condition as sinners; and, therefore, when a second manifestation is afforded, a second divine Person must be constituted; and thus two Gods would be revealed to us, or God must act according to the pure philosophy of such a transaction—**BY HIS SPIRIT**. Hence the Redeemer told his disciples that when the Spirit should come, he would not speak of **HIMSELF**.

It is precisely here where the whole scheme and doctrine of means arise. Theologians admit—they most strenuously contend for—"the use of means." A man who cannot accomplish in his own proper person, or by his

*See Lec. V. Lec. IX.

own individual acts, an object he has in view, employs secondary agencies. I say *secondary*: for as they are employed by him, he is the *primary* agent. His spirit moves, animates, controls them. They are his means.—A philosopher wishes to instruct the community. His voice cannot be heard very far. His strength will not hold out long. His argument may be dense, and require patient and careful study. His object may be to reach higher classes of mind, that they, in their turn, may instruct the lower classes. The explanations he has to make, the experiments he wishes to describe, the doctrines he is very desirous to sustain, he designs shall live after he has gone to his fathers. Here is a long series of effects which may place him by the side of Aristotle, Plato, and a multitude of others. It is obvious that he cannot accomplish all this in his own proper person. He writes a book, which is read by thousands. Many espouse his doctrines, and use his volume as a manual for the instruction of others—you cannot number up all the agencies which are thus employed. And these are his means. His spirit animates them all. He has put them all in motion; and by them, like Abel, though dead, he yet speaks. This species of intellectual operation pervades social life in all its departments. All the different branches of science—moral, political, legal, medical, mechanical—are now taught as they were exhibited by the master spirits of some preceding ages. Nay, you cannot start aside from the beaten tract without being reviled for your heresy, lashed for your presumption, and avoided for your impiety. The glory of great names, the authority of precedents, the infallibility of the fathers—under such “tutors and governors,” like dutiful children, we all live. The example which I offer you in illustration “must needs” be perfectly understood.

Let us delineate another. A prince cannot be personally present in all parts of his dominion at once. There is no sense in which ubiquity can be predicated of him,

unless it be that his SPIRIT is every where felt by the instrumentality of the secondary agents he employs—his officers, laws, institutions, courts, military or naval establishments. Thus, and thus alone, he sustains his administration. All things go on according to his wishes, as though he were present. He will impress his image upon his country—upon his age—upon generations to come. Alexander, Cæsar, Washington, Bounaparte, though dead, still live among men, like Aristotle, Plato, Newton, Bacon, and a host of others. Here again every thing is plain and easy to be apprehended.

On this principle, why may not the Creator of the world, though he be not visible to the eye of his creatures, move and reign among them by his Spirit? Creation is his store-house of means—a tissue of secondary agencies which he employs. Why may not the Redeemer thus rule on earth—the Lord of glory sustaining his evangelic administration by his SPIRIT? He is no more visibly dwelling among us—we henceforth know him no more after the flesh. If he reigns at all, it must be by his Spirit. There is no other line of policy to be pursued. And commentators on the mediatorial government must either freely and fully admit the whole doctrine, or give up the subject. They do not admit the doctrine when they descant, as they often do, upon the use of means or on the action of the Spirit; and they give up the subject whenever they retreat into mystery, or stretch the sovereignty of the divine government beyond its own proper attributes. Here then we take our stand, and interpret the POWER of God, so far as it is the subject of our discussion, by the laws of SPIRIT, as Spirit is to be distinguished from SOUL.

But it may be that we have not yet entirely escaped from the entanglements of the philosophy which we have endeavored to expose. The means which are employed, it may be said, are physical: and, it will be argued, we are necessarily under the action of *physical* power. It is un-

questionably true that the material system affords to us, as well as to the great Governor of the world, the means of action. Such was the object and design of that system. It was intended to subserve a moral purpose, and to furnish to moral beings their secondary agencies. But will it follow that the moral purpose must be forgotten? that the moral being must be degraded to a level with his secondary agencies? that the material system must be considered as primary? or that we have no will to exercise, no liberty to choose? Is there nothing wrong in stretching a system beyond itself? Have we heard nothing of the evil of being carnal, when we ought to have been spiritual?

Suppose we subject this matter to the test of experience. The prince has forgotten to be a father to his people, and has put on the character of the military chieftain. Swords and bayonets, armies and navies, mighty preparations for war and slaughter, have been the secondary agents which his ambition has selected. What has been the result? His subjects have been despoiled of their free agency—politicians would say, of their liberty. See what physical power has done! It is no wonder that theologians cannot sustain human free agency in consistency with their view of divine power; for you see that the direct consequence of physical power, when carried beyond its appropriate limits, is the destruction of free agency.

Again. The priest has forgotten his official place. Instead of being a "helper" to the people of God, he has become their "LORD." The gibbet and the stake, the star-chamber and the inquisition, the synod and the council, both general and particular—by such agencies as these mankind have been despoiled of their rights—their moral liberties, their ecclesiastical free agency. The sanction which ecclesiastical law has extended to these measures, can be justified in no way but by the doctrine of physical power. By maintaining that doctrine, moralists have been united with political and military chieftains in a crusade

against the well-being of man. In fact, notwithstanding all their boast, there is nothing in which mankind believe so little as they do in free agency. They are afraid to trust it; and, pretending that it will necessarily go wrong, they have trembled to let mankind have even the bible.

The legislative policy pursued by the Mediator, and the reason for which is found in the circumstances of the nations, illustrates our general argument. The former economy, as an administration of LAW, was made up of "the elements of the world." Physical agents were employed to a fearful extent—so much so that an apostle describes the institute as "a yoke which neither we nor our fathers were able to bear." Jehovah presided, so to speak, in his own proper PERSON; and though the Spirit, as such, exerted a moral influence—for a father may do this even when personally present in the midst of his family—yet you remember that God then spoke of motions and actions of his SOUL. "Shall not my SOUL be avenged on such a nation as this?" According to the distinction already set forth, here is room for more than moral influence. Physical power may be readily discerned and safely asserted, yet only to a certain extent: but up to the whole extent of the physical operation the influence of Spirit would be modified, as you may perceive, if you place yourselves for a moment by the burning mountain in the wilderness, and endeavor to estimate the scene of terror which made even Moses exceedingly to fear and quake. But let God be his own interpreter. He represents his people under that dispensation as being in a state of bondage—under bondage to *physical* agents, or the elements of the world—under tutors and governors like a child, and differing nothing from a SERVANT—and the SPIRIT to be a Spirit of bondage and fear. Symbolically and comparatively speaking, did not that institute, in making so large a use of physical agents, interfere with the free agency or liberty of the jews?

On the other hand, these physical agents are discarded under the new dispensation, and in their room we have "the ministration of the Spirit." Jehovah makes no reference to his SOUL. No fearful transactions are recorded : —no mighty wind—no alarming earthquake—no consuming fire—but a still small voice. The whole is emphatically sustained by the Spirit : and to blaspheme against the Spirit, is to turn traitor to the gracious government under which we live. The ignorance of childhood is passed away. Light and knowledge have been brought in. Physical agency yields to moral influence. "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is LIBERTY." Intelligent men must, and will be free ; and Jehovah's government recognises the fact, uttering a still small voice, instead of those "almighty volitions" of which some theologians pompously but ignorantly speak. An apostle would say—"Stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage." I am not sure but that some one shall infer from the preceding argument that, as the government of LAW has been represented to be a condition of BONDAGE, it would follow that if Adam had not violated law, all mankind, who would then have been under law and not under gospel, would have been in *bondage*. Such a controvertist, however, must be called upon to remember that his argument assails the facts as they have been given by inspiration. He might accordingly be left to settle the question with, and for, himself. But we have no wish to evade a difficulty, nor any objection to try the doctrine even by this test. Cannot a parent *personally* dwell in the midst of his children, after they are "of full age," without destroying their individual liberty ? Some parents, we know, cannot, or do not. Their children are always children, and never are considered to be, or are not dealt with as though they were, men and women. But is any parental wisdom thereby displayed ? Is such conduct right ? Is it consistent with the nature of the

case? Can such children ever become respectable, influential, or prosperous? You can have no difficulty in understanding, and deciding upon such a case. Yet this is precisely what theologians have made the government of God to be, and is the real import of all their speculations about physical power and "electing love." Physical agency is followed by a train of partialities, which not one of these reasoners can explain, and over which they necessarily throw the veil of mystery.

Still further. While the Mosaic economy, considered simply as LAW, is described as so oppressive, it was yet under the control of the evangelic principle involved in the Abrahamic covenant. The action of this evangelical principle would imply the operation of Jehovah's Spirit, according to the distinction under consideration. Hence God said by one of his prophets—"According to the word that I covenanted with you when ye came out of Egypt, so my Spirit remaineth among you, fear ye not." The existence of law as a principle of government, would not break up the moral influence involved in the operation of Spirit. You may then, if you please, carry this back to the original circumstances in which Adam was placed, and learn, that when God had finished his works, and entered into his REST, the world was left under "the ministration of the Spirit." In fact, the remedial institute is a modified application of original principles. Christ, who is the exact image of the divine Person, enters into his REST, as God did, and leaves his SPIRIT, as God did, to sustain his rectoral plans.

But leaving the political view, in reference to the divine government just advanced, out of consideration, we might anticipate the heavenly state itself, by supposing that Adam had not sinned—that all his children were consequently under LAW—that Jehovah presided in his own proper person as their Lord—and that men obeyed the law. Our heavenly Father would betray no want of intelligence. He

would do whatever is RIGHT; and all would display wisdom and love. His children would act precisely right, and from their own inward impulse, or the impulse of their own feelings; for law, in view of the original constitution of man, is written on his heart, or incorporated with his nature. Man would, in such a case, act intelligently and kindly.—How much physical power would then be required? How much liberty is sacrificed when an intelligent being does what he knows to be right? And how much of the slave does he betray, when he is guided by wisdom and moves under the impulse of the best feelings? Where love, wisdom, and right action are found, who discovers bondage? Such a condition affords us the best view we can have of Jehovah—the very view he gives of himself; and at the same time presents men as they ought to be, and as finally they shall be—like God. That Jehovah should dwell in the midst of them under such circumstances argues any thing but the bondage of his children. To accomplish that which is right, and in the wisest and most benevolent manner, is the object of all government. When that is accomplished, or when such a system of administration is regularly and fully sustained, government may be *felt*, but it will not be *seen*; and the feeling will be associated with every movement that is dignified, noble, generous and heavenly. The simple characteristic of the whole will be—unity of Spirit. Compulsion by physical power will not be sought nor desired. Instruments of oppression would be transmuted into instruments of general use, and that which is carnal would be exchanged for that which is spiritual. God would be the centre of union and love—God would be ALL AND IN ALL.

The most compendious view which the scriptures have given us of the mediatorial government, I suppose is to be found in what is commonly called “the apostolic blessing,” and which is expressed in the following language—“The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and

the communion of the Holy Spirit be with you all. Amen." By the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, I understand all that belongs to the mediatorial administration of Jesus in his official character, as constituted "the Head of every man." By the LOVE of God I understand, not merely divine love as that in which the plan of redemption originated, but that which HE, as "the Head of Christ," extends to every one who believes and acts accordingly. All who, by the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, are brought as new creatures to walk in newness of life, are objects of, and sharers in, this love of God. It therefore, occupies its appropriate place in the apostolic benediction, when it succeeds "the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ;" and is intentionally put in its proper order, as that order is prescribed, not by the popular doctrine of trinity, but by the essential philosophy of christianity as a remedial system. The COMMUNION of the Holy Spirit, I understand to cover our present subject; i. e. in contemplating the principles, in attending on the ordinances, and in performing the duties, which the gospel unfolds to the human mind, we have fellowship with the Spirit of God, just as we have fellowship with an author in reading his book; with an apostle in perusing one of his epistles; with a departed friend in any memorial which may delineate an image of one who, personally, can no more be seen in this world. To realize that fellowship, in any of those intellectual exercises to which the truth may invite us, is to feel that moral influence which God exerts—that wisdom and power of God which, through the preaching of a crucified Christ, converts the soul.

Such an intellectual operation you distinctly perceive is implied in the moral influence, which is exerted by the spirit of man; and man is like God—and like him in this very connexion. "For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? Even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God." The similitude thus traced out offers no violence

to true philosophy. It is merely the human mind rising from fellowship with an intellectual creature, to fellowship with the intellectual Creator, and that by a direct process—communion with a brother—a father—a minister—a prophet—an apostle—Jehovah himself. All the way it is communion of SPIRIT with SPIRIT. Physical power belongs no more to one part of the process than to another—no more to the operation of the Holy Spirit, than to the spirit of a father upon his child; the spirit of a minister upon his people; the spirit of a prophet or an apostle upon the church; the spirit of a ruler on his subjects; the spirit of the community upon its members; or the spirit of the world on the ungodly. It is the communion of mind with mind, and must be explained on the LAWS OF MIND. Physical power in such relations is a very small matter; physical agencies are but the means by which the mind acts, and without which, in this material world it cannot act.

Let us exemplify.—Some stranger undertakes to counsel a wayward youth. The advice offered is just such as ought to be given. Its TRUTH is unquestionable and easily perceived. Perhaps the youth may bow submissively; for there is nothing unnatural or improbable in the idea that mind may yield to the influence of *truth*, or that the SPIRIT of one human being may strongly affect the SPIRIT of another human being. But the stranger may possibly be considered to be officious and impertinent, and may be treated accordingly. Yet he uttered TRUTH, and in all probability the truth he uttered was distinctly understood. Why then has his advice been rejected, and himself disdained? The objection supposed, you perceive, is personal. Though the stranger has uttered truth, yet he is considered impertinent or officious—the errant boy declines all fellowship with the stranger's spirit.—The father then appears; offers the same advice, and urges the same truth; or it is made evident that the stranger interfered, not on his own account, but as the father's agent, and the desired impres-

sion is produced. What is the difference? TRUTH is declared in both cases. No arbitrary power, no physical compulsion has been employed. Had such power been called in, the impression desired might not have been made. The only difference which can be perceived is, that the *personal* objection supposed has been removed, and that **FELLOWSHIP OF SPIRIT** has sustained the appeals of truth.

The gospel is preached by a fellow-man, and no good effect follows—the sinner remains unmoved, unconverted. On some occasion a circumstance occurs which leads that same sinner to recognise the presence of the Spirit of God. He listens, and hears the same gospel which he had before heard unmoved and unconverted. An impression is now made, deep and fixed. He weeps—he repents—he forsakes his sin—he turns to the Lord! what is the influence? The gospel, or truth, is the same in both cases. No arbitrary power has been exerted. Had there been, it might have alarmed—peradventure it would have hardened—the sinner; for what wonderful works did not the children of Israel behold in the wilderness, or in Messiah's day? But now the conscience has been convicted, the God of love is believed, the sinner instantly sets out on his career after glory, honor and immortality, and may soon be heard singing the song of Moses and the Lamb before the throne. What has transpired? Simply this—He has perceived that God addressed him. The gospel was wisdom, from the first, but now it is discerned to be the wisdom of God; it was power from the first, but now it is discerned to be the power of God; and is not this precisely what is meant by **THE COMMUNION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT**? The God of love has sustained his own truth, and the combination—truth demonstrated in love by the SPIRIT—has been perceived and felt.

It is not however to be denied, that after this intellectual operation the sinner may continue his course of transgression. If he should, what is his crime? Has he not resist-

ed—grieved—vexed—quenched—blasphemed the Holy Spirit? Will you bring in physical agency—at this crisis? will you throw the sinner into the omnipotent hand, to be remoulded in some of his intellectual qualities; and call it the renovation of his WILL, or the renewing of the Holy Spirit. While this deteriorating process has been going on, much forbearance has been extended. One kind providence after another may have renewed the opportunity of repentance; and thrown the sinner's mind into the centre of most interesting circumstances, betokening the presence, and inviting to the fellowship, of the Spirit of God. In an age of miracles many mighty works may have been performed. In the ordinary course of human events arguments may have been framed; appeals may have been pointedly addressed; threatenings fearful and alarming may have been uttered; mercies may have been bestowed or withdrawn; afflictions may have been sent; sins may have been visited with appropriate punishment; marked deliverances may have been accomplished; Jehovah may say—"All day long I have stretched forth my hands unto a disobedient and gainsaying people." Every step of this remedial process is like the first which has been described, and when at last the Spirit has been blasphemed, is there any pardon to be obtained? is there any more sacrifice for sin? is there any omnipotent, irresistible, agency to be put forth? is unreserved mercy to be extended, indiscriminately saving ALL? is Jehovah to be censured? or is the sinner alone, and altogether, in fault?

Now God is always speaking in his gospel, and this fellowship of the Spirit may be enjoyed by all. The hearers are not always conscious of the fact. And why? Their "carnality of mind," or their "minding the things of the flesh," is the scriptural exposition of the melancholy scene, and not a personal election unto eternal life, nor a deficiency of divine power. The hearer places the world as an intermediate object between him and the truth, and per-

ceives not what is transacting, because he is shutting out the whole scene from his view. If, while a father is delivering his earnest and affectionate advice, the mind of his son is dwelling on the anticipated sports of to-morrow, neither the truth uttered, nor the strong working of the parental heart, *can* be perceived. A dead, stupid, silence might prevail; and so far parental authority might be recognised. Just so is it with the hearers of the gospel. They listen silently, and visibly acknowledge the divine institution, but do nothing. Perhaps they are waiting for God, like the jews waiting for the Messiah; and are wondering at the mighty things which are doing around them. Should they venture to ask—how is it that these things are so? I would answer as the Redeemer did—“If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it is from heaven” or not. But you see that this is not the course which multitudes of gospel hearers adopt. They are delighting themselves with a display of eloquence—are admiring a beautiful piece of fancy—are following an ingenious argument—are criticising oratorical, or logical, or philosophical mistakes—are carefully squaring what is uttered with their sectarian standards—are arranging plans of business—or are fatigued, and anxiously waiting for the close of an uninteresting service: but fellowship with the Holy Spirit in his own ordinances they neither hold nor seek. Perhaps, like certain disciples baptized unto John’s baptism, they “have not so much as heard, whether the Holy Spirit is. Can such hearers of the gospel be roused? Can the thunders of violated law and a coming judgment alarm them? Can the voice of love call them off from their vain pursuits? Can a season of affliction break the spell that binds them to ruin? Can any agency bring them into communion with God?—a communion which demands their best affections, and in which is to be realized the living and transforming influence that saves the soul.

This power of God, of which you hear so much, and

which is so often represented to be something more than, and something above, the truth, is simply fellowship with God in the truth. Here is moral influence—the secret of evangelic philosophy. The gospel reveals Jehovah; opens up the way into the holiest of all through the rent veil of the Redeemer's flesh; consecrates "heavenly places" where God and the sinner meet on common principles, and hold fellowship in common transactions; and encompasses the sinner with suitable and appropriate images in which he beholds the glory of the Lord, and so is transformed into the divine likeness. God is in the sanctuary—in the family—in the closet—in the heart. The sense of his presence and love, with thrilling influence wakes up all the fine sensibilities of the soul, and bears the sinner aloft, regenerated, redeemed, and glorified, to the mansions of everlasting life.

With what alacrity Moses headed the hosts of Israel and marched to the land of Canaan, when he received the assurance that God would go with him! With what confidence the disciples went forth to organize the kingdom of heaven, when the Master fulfilled his promise to be with them, and sent the Spirit to hold fellowship with them in their work! How the laborious and abused apostle to the gentiles felt himself inspirited for duty and toil, for enterprise and danger! and with what unbending purpose he went to the synagogue, to the temple, to the court, or to prison, when he heard the Master say—"Fear not Paul, I am with thee!" And the humblest or the feeblest among us may do likewise. If we live in communion with the Holy Spirit, the proudest philosophy cannot shake our faith; the severest, the longest, trials cannot exhaust our patience; the most painful or ignominious death cannot defraud us of our integrity, nor take away our crown; we can glory in tribulation, or triumph amidst floods or flames. This is POWER—is it not? Just such power as we need, and which will make us sufficient for every effort—is it not?

What more can be desired? unless indeed the human mind be *physically* dead, i. e. has lost all power of intellectual action. In such a case, intellectual fellowship is not to be spoken of, until by physical power intellectual vitality shall be restored.

The character of theological controversy makes it necessary for us to dispose of another idea, which may be embarrassing. The Spirit of God sustains in being whatever it pleased him to create. God sends forth his Spirit, and thus *renews* the face of earth. In like manner he sustains the human mind, and seeks to *renew* it. In him we live, and move, and have our being. He has an access to our spirits as free and unreserved as to any object visible to us. Darkness and light are both alike unto him. He looks upon our inmost thoughts with as much ease as he looks upon a blazing sun, or the brightness of the seraphim that are near his throne. He dwells in us. Of course he sustains us in our actions; both mental and corporeal. We can no more think without him, than we can walk without him.—The analogy cannot be disputed. But to what conclusion will the analogy lead? Does not the Spirit act in perfect consistency with all the laws of the material system? and will he disregard the laws of the intellectual system? When he renews the face of earth, does it follow that the withered vegetation was literally dead, and that the farmer *can* do nothing? When he speaks of renewing the human mind, does it follow that mind is dead, or that the sinner *can* do nothing? If mind and matter belong to different systems, and are governed by different laws, will not the agency of the Spirit conduct trains of operations correspondingly different? Will he sustain the actions of the creatures when they cultivate the earth? and not sustain their actions in the cultivation of mind? When beauty, and verdure, and fruitfulness, and fragrance, proceed from human agency, as sustained by the co-operating agency of the Spirit of God, would you not thankfully as-

cribe the whole to a divine blessing, without inferring that man could do nothing in view of the effect produced? In the acquisition of science, under the direction of an intelligent preceptor, is the pupil incapable of exerting his own mind? or is not the very object of tuition, which the preceptor keeps constantly before him, the eliciting the pupil's own mind, and teaching him to *think for himself*? And in morals, as superintended by the Spirit of God, must not a similar intellectual process be sustained? or are we to be forever talking about our inability?

But then is not this agency of the Spirit, in sustaining his creatures, physical? Be it so. Free agency is not here asserted. Whether we shall live or not, is not a question for us to determine. It has been *appointed* unto all men once to die. Does it follow that our intellectual operations, which imply free agency, are controlled by the physical energy of Jehovah, because we have the evidence of that controlling energy, where free agency is not implied? Or when we look around upon the other parts of creation, of which free agency is not predicated, do we not observe even then that visible effects are flowing from visible causes? Or, as science advances, and new discoveries are accumulated, do we not ascertain that visible effects, which were deemed mysterious, or were referred to an inscrutable sovereignty because they could be assigned to no *known* cause, are, after all, the product of secondary agencies? And while infidelity is flattering herself that these various disclosures shall confirm her adventurous theories, does not the enlightened christian exult in his enlarging views of his great Creator? Can any one prescribe a limit to this series of created laws, or intermediate instrumentalities? Does not the illumined mind go onwards in its intellectual investigation, until it discovers spiritual intelligences of other and higher orders, mingling amid the busy scene, and God himself putting on external form, on purpose that his SPIRIT may act by interme-

diate agents? And yet theologians around us are referring every operation to his physical power, and frittering away *means* by the very argument professedly designed to uphold them.

I cannot conceive of any other operation of divine power in the case, than that in which God—acting as an intellectual being, and with man as an intellectual creature, on the laws of mind or spirit—accomplishes his designs by appropriate means; unless man shall be stripped of his free agency, and be as destitute of power of volition as an inanimate machine. That operation of power, as we have seen, Jehovah disclaims:—"Not by might, nor by power, but by my Spirit, saith the Lord." He promised much to Israel of old; but said, "I will yet for this be enquired of by the house of Israel to do it for them." We are kept by his power *through faith*. Neither can I see any valuable end to be answered by any other view of divine power. If men can be saved, according to the system laid down, and consistently with their own responsibility, what need is there for any further operation of power? -If a farther exercise of power will necessarily construct individual salvation upon divine *sovereignty*, and take it away from human free agency; then, to bring in that additional power, is not only to introduce *another* but a *worse* system of morals. It would distinctly follow that God must, without any reference to their moral abilities, save *all men*; or assign a reason why he has, in sovereignty, made a selection. In the one case men are responsible to the extent of their capacity, and in the other they are dealt with as responsible, while they have no capacity. Surely this latter view is incomparably worse than the first; and there must needs be a very sufficient reason for so strange a proceeding.

The hypothesis which strikes me as so singular and objectionable, has been both stated and defended. What is the reason by which its advocates would justify it? Some

will reply, all men have forfeited their moral rights; God is under no obligation to save any of them; and he may surely save some of them without doing injustice to the rest. That answer might do if it corresponded with facts. But mankind have not lost their *personal responsibility*; and consequently have not forfeited their claims to a form of moral government which shall be consistent with that responsibility. It is true, that personally they have sinned; but then they have been brought into a condition of infirmity, by a fault *not their own*; and therefore are objects of forbearance—and this same matter of forbearance is a favorite attribute of the evangelical administration. Moreover, the gospel is as happily suited to one human being as it is to another; and, on a principle of free agency, is just as practicable for one as for another: so that if there be no omnipotent combatant on the field, one might be saved as well as another. And finally, they who are condemned, are not condemned on account of an original forfeiture, in view of which the gospel has passed them by; but because they have rejected the gospel in their own unbelief. "The Spirit shall convince the WORLD of SIN, because they BELIEVE NOT on me," said the Redeemer. The answer stated does not correspond with the facts.

Some may attempt to meet the difficulty by asserting, that man is not competent to fathom so deep a mystery; and that God gives no account of his matters to his creatures. Such a reply makes the whole hypothesis equivocal. Every man should speak very modestly, when he professedly does not understand the doctrines which he advocates. I see no advantage to be gained, by proclaiming a moral system which is so defective and unintelligible at the very start. Besides, this reply is directly opposed to the facts in the case. For God has given the reason, why he condemns any of our race, with as much distinctness, as he has explained why he has accepted others. The law of the moral system is explicitly applied both ways. He who believeth

shall be saved—he who believeth not shall be damned. Nor only so. But Jehovah has not curtailed the intellectual inquiries of his creatures, in any such abrupt manner. He has spread the universe out before them, and bid them carry their researches as far as their capacities can extend. He has called upon them to canvass his character, and investigate his proceedings. He has no fear of his own integrity, nor does he dread our scrutiny on our own account; but unhesitatingly commands us to see, whether the judge of all the earth must not do right? Under such circumstances, the plea of mystery betrays our own ignorance, whenever it is heard. It is sheer cowardice not to investigate. No doubt we shall meet with mystery—or that which to us is a *secret*—at last; for who can, by searching, find out God? But reach mystery, when and where we may, it will still betray merely our ignorance. We may go on, therefore, until faith is beginning to mingle with vision, and patiently wait the disclosures of the eternal world, where we shall see God as HE IS. “I gave my heart,” says Solomon, “to seek and search out by wisdom concerning all things that are done under the sun: *this sore travail hath God given to the sons of men* TO BE EXERCISED THEREWITH.”

Theologians have, however, offered a formal reason for this forbidding hypothesis, which seems to them fully to sustain it. They tell us that God carries on this system of operation *for his own glory*. But is this dark expression made up of mere words? or does it contain an idea? If there be an idea, what is it? Let us attempt to analyse it. Glory is manifested excellence. Now what excellence is there in God's saving *some*, and not saving others? What excellence is there in God's saving *any*, in a manner which is not consistent with the attributes of their own nature? or in not saving *all* if it may be done in a consistent manner? Wherein is the greater glory displayed—in a scheme constructed on the intellectual free agency of an intelligent creature? or in one which converts that creature into a

mere mechanical agent? Again; admitting that excellence may be predicated of the transactions under review, to whom is the manifestation made? To God himself? This would be too small an idea to be gravely entertained, in explaining such high concerns. To us, is the display made? Then what is the excellence, which is thus vividly exhibited? We are left to admit its existence, without being able to perceive it: and this is no manifestation at all. Can *you* see the *excellence* of God's condemning immortal spirits solely for his own glory? I cannot. My soul shudders at the thought. The angels on the plains of Bethlehem sung—glory to God, peace on earth, and good will towards men. Perhaps it will be said, that the glory of God is designed to be set forth before the *universe*. But for what practical purpose? To afford inducements to obedience, and to deter from rebellion—it may be answered. Then God governs the *universe* on the principle of moral agency, which we have been setting forth as belonging to his government of *man*; and our doctrine belongs to every part of God's dominion, excepting this *earth*, and to every intelligent creature, excepting *man*. And where is the proof, or what is the principle of proof? Is *spirit* one thing on earth, and another thing elsewhere? or shall not redeemed spirits be *like* the angels? But conceding even this monstrous absurdity, by which method would the end be best answered—by an example, in which free agency is laid aside, and which would consequently be altogether irrelevant, as other intelligent creatures are free agents? or by an example in which free agents act out their own character? How would proceedings purely arbitrary, instruct a rational creature to judge of the character of proceedings which are not arbitrary? place him in what part of God's dominions you please.

Still farther—By what principles of jurisprudence shall some not be saved, but be left to sink into perdition for the instruction of others? Surely the case is a most strange

anomaly, which has not an analogy to support it.—The Redeemer suffers for the benefit of others; but then his sufferings do not involve *perdition*, and he endures them *voluntarily*; which is a totally different matter. His was a magnificent undertaking, which gave form to the *love* that God has for man, and has long since been rewarded by an exaltation to the throne. Believers may suffer now, and the good of others be promoted thereby; but then suffering is a constituent part of their earthly lot; and the means of doing good are derived from the nature of the case; nor do they perish, even when called to martyrdom itself—but their afflictions work out for them a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory. There is no way to explain how any sinner is ruined, but that it is his own fault. He does evil, and therefore goes down to weeping, and mourning, and lamentation, and woe. Nor is there any rule to show how God, who is a righteous Lord and loveth righteousness, who is just while he justifies the ungodly who believe in Jesus, and who has no pleasure in the death of the sinner, can be *glorified* in the sinner's condemnation, save that which belongs to an administration strictly JUST.

It may now be objected, that simple as the foregoing views represent *faith* to be, yet after all, the scriptures have argued out the matter at very great length; from which it would appear, that the subject has not all the simplicity which I have supposed it to possess. But unless I very greatly mistake, theologians have here committed another grievous error. I very much doubt, whether the scriptures ever argue out the question—whether man *can*, or *cannot*, believe the gospel?—On the contrary, they positively require him to believe, and unhesitatingly condemn him if he does not believe, the gospel. They certainly do take up the subject of human “ability and inability,” and reason upon it at large; but their remarks take a different direction, and are applied to another point altogether. Mankind have been placed under two distinct forms of moral

government—the one called *law* and the other called *gospel*. The respective attributes of these two systems have been the frequent subject of discussion. Their reciprocal relations call them up, for the sake of mutual explanations. The *gospel* has been introduced to effect what the *law* could not do, in consequence of “the weakness of the flesh.” Of course the *gospel* could neither be illustrated nor defined; it could not be traced to its origin, and defended on the plea of necessity; nor carried forward to its results, and commended on its sufficiency without referring to *law*, the previous institute which had become ineffectual. Besides, the question whether man can or cannot be justified by “deeds of law?” or whether he does or does not need a Mediator? has given rise to a great deal of controversy in the world. The antediluvians abandoned the Mediator altogether; the postdiluvians preserved the external mediatorial symbols, but stammered about their import, as appears from the fact, that Abraham’s covenant relations, and official actions, were intended to illustrate “the righteousness of faith;” the jews were, notwithstanding their zeal of God, seeking to be justified by *law*, and going about to establish their own righteousness; and to this hour the christian soldier, professedly contending for “the faith once delivered to the saints,” seems to have but a cloud-capt tower of strength. How then could the scriptural writers avoid discussing the comparative merits of *law* and *gospel*? or informing men, that they could not be saved by *law*, and that they must, as a matter of imperious necessity, flee to the *Saviour*? This is the point of their argument on the subject of human ability and inability. In view of one institute—man *has not* ability to meet its requirements, according to the scriptures: in view of the other, he *has* ability; and if he does not rise and diligently use it, he must perish forever. In view of the one, no interference of divine power, consistent with the intellectual and moral nature of man, nor any agency short of physical omnipotence,

so to speak, could extricate him ; in view of the other, divine power, as in every other instance, acts in perfect consistency with the nature or abilities of the agent employed ; and man escapes, or is lost, on his own responsibility. In other words—as by the sin of Adam, his children are unable to meet their *personal* engagements, Jehovah has extended favor or grace unto them ; and put them into a condition where they *can* meet those engagements.

A few texts it may not be improper to quote, in order to exhibit this contrast.—“By the deeds of law, there shall no flesh be justified in his sight ; for by the law is the knowledge of sin.” Every man who makes the experiment of deeds of law, will utterly fail ; and instead of justification, will acquire the knowledge of sin—the law will charge sin upon him because he *cannot* fulfill it. “Therefore we conclude, that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of law.” The knowledge of *sin* does not follow the experiment of faith ; because faith is within the range of human ability, and the call for it *can* be met.

“Without me,” says the Redeemer, “ye can do nothing:” i. e. remove the Mediator, and man is undone ; for then he is referred to “deeds of law,” and his case terminates in the demonstration of his guilt. That this is the meaning of our Redeemer, is evident—1. from the nature of the representation he makes. “I am the *true vine*, and my Father is the husbandman.”—Another vine may be said to exist ; but I am the true vine. Abandon me and ye are undone, be your proposed relief what it may. I am the *true vine*. To send me into the world is the Father’s great plan of salvation : and to me you must come, or perish. Moreover, the whole practical operation of faith is compared to the process of vegetation : in which, not only the original cause is presented, but an ulterior result is produced, through a series of agents ; each of which occupies its appropriate place, and ministers according to its own capacity. And, 2. The Redeemer is addressing himself to jews,

who misunderstood his mediatorial character, had forgotten the righteousness of faith, and were seeking to be justified by law. In opposition, therefore, to their mistaken theology, he was pointing out the position and connexions of the mediatorial institute.

The rigid sectarian, who has diverged so far from the simplicity of moral philosophy, as to mistake the scriptural argument in relation to human ability, never meets the terms *can*, or *cannot*, in the scriptures, without imagining that they afford full proof of his dogma. And perhaps the general impression is in his favor. Let us quote some examples of its use. “How *canst* thou say to thy brother—let me cast the mote out of thine eye?—Ye *cannot* drink the cup of the Lord, and the cup of devils.—If this cup *cannot* pass from me, unless I drink it.—Christ *could not* enter into the city—his disciples *could not* eat bread.—Christ *could not* do many mighty works, because of their unbelief.—How *can* ye believe, who receive honor one of another?—How *can* you, being evil, speak good things?” A thousand instances of this kind *can* be quoted, and no one will suppose them to imply positive inability. Sometimes an inconsistency is asserted; and at others a breach of law is merely supposed.

Let us select a particular example, which is often adduced in a very positive manner. “The carnal mind, the minding of the flesh, is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed *can* be.” Now this has nothing to do with the inability of man to believe the gospel, considered simply as a moral agent. The assertion is applied to him, in view of certain circumstances which are stated. He is supposed to be minding the things of the flesh, or giving his affections and time to worldly pursuits and pleasures. The mind, thus employed, *cannot* obey God; but is engaged in actual rebellion against him. The Redeemer has paraphrased this matter thus—“No man *can* serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and

love the other ; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other. Ye *cannot* serve God and mammon." "Doth a fountain," says James, "send forth, at the same place, sweet water and bitter? Can the fig-tree bear olive berries? either a vine figs?" Surely, all this is plain enough: and no one can suppose it to follow, that because a man *cannot* serve God and mammon, therefore, he *cannot* abandon mammon and serve God. Because a man *cannot* see in the dark, it does not follow that he *cannot* see in the light.

It appears, from the whole survey of God's works, that he exerts an agency which can be distinctly recognised, and which always adjusts itself to the nature and capacities of the creatures whom it sustains. Such is the fact, physically, intellectually, and morally considered. Terms may be employed, which may be respectively applied to the creature or to the Creator, according as the agency of the one or the other is intended to be expressed. If, in relation to the subject before us, we shall suppose regeneration, new creation, being born again, and such like terms and phrases, to belong to the divine agency ; then faith and repentance, thought and feeling, principle and action, may be as safely predicated of human effort. The foregoing argument has been constructed, under this impression ; and our subject has been involved in no confusion, but stands out fairly and prominently, preserving simply its own identity.

It further appears from the investigation of this whole matter, that the very point at which Jehovah aims, is to revive and cherish the MORAL SENSE in the bosom of man. To revive it, to call it up in powerful and efficient action, is regeneration : to cultivate and train it—to subdue every faculty, and affection, and habit—to bring the whole man, in all his individual views and social relations, in reference both to time and eternity, under its enlightened control, is sanctification. Here is the value of education, and the true secret of government, personal, domestic, political,

and divine. And hence it is, that you find an apostle, after all his toils and labors, retiring from the busy scene of action, and hastening away to be ever present with the Lord, having a GOOD CONSCIENCE as his great characteristic. With this testimony he dared to challenge the accusation of all his adversaries, could invite the closest inspection of his most intimate friends, could take God to record on his soul, and could depart to the judgment seat like one "ready to be offered," and in the full assurance of the crown of life. Here too the Holy Spirit would bear witness with his spirit, and seal him up for everlasting glory. Can you frame a good conscience? Can you create *common sense*? Can you endow a man with *consciousness*? Are not all these, notwithstanding the great and protracted metaphysical discussion to which they have given rise, the same thing? And can you produce these effects by physical power? You perceive that personal responsibility is a perfectly philosophical matter, and of necessity must give form, and shape, and interest to any regenerating or sanctifying influence which may be employed. The plea of INABILITY is nothing more than the refuge of an unenlightened conscience—of an unexercised, and consequently an undisciplined moral sense. And that, not because conscience is by nature dead; but because men have grown carnal amid spiritual privileges, and have become hardened by resisting truth, and impetuously pursuing the gratification of their own lusts; or under false social principles—domestic, fraternal, political and ecclesiastical—have followed the multitude to do evil.

Thus the Spirit of God acts:—he leads the human conscience to the knowledge of truth, holding fellowship with us during the whole process of thought, of feeling, of anxiety, of action, through which we pass—our helper amid our infirmities, and our comforter under our sorrows. Thus a man should govern himself, and acquire self-re-

spect, not from the plaudits of the multitude, not from the amount of his wealth, not from the reach of his intellect or the range of his literature—all of which may only cherish his pride and ruin his soul; but from the consciousness of innate principle. The Redeemer bid his disciples to live in this holy and heavenly manner, though it should bring them before kings, or to the martyr's stake. Thus a parent should govern his children. Thus a minister should deal with his people. Thus a prince should rule his subjects. And here it is where, at this moment, with so much pain and convulsion the human mind is studying its individual liberty, and pondering over personal responsibility. The dogmas of ecclesiastics will no longer be accepted as a substitute for conscience; nor will the burdensome legislation of politicians be any longer greeted by an imbecile and uninformed patriotism. And any man who feels an interest in "the spread of the gospel," or in the destinies of the nations, must become the advocate, not of deadening terror, nor licentious feeling, nor military supremacy, but of educated consciences. Our ministers need, and should seek for, a treble portion of Elijah's spirit; and our rulers ought all to be "men after God's own heart." O that our controvertists did but understand the philosophy of the scriptures, instead of bolstering up that of the dark ages! O that they could rise to think in fellowship with the Holy Spirit, instead of eulogizing the virtues, and portraying the apotheosis of worthies of other days! They would quickly find that a cultivated conscience would be a never failing source of practical efficiency. The individual man, they would perceive, should soon become conscious of personal ability; and truth would govern the world, which physical force has only degraded. God governs man by GOSPEL, not by LAW—by CONSCIENCE, not by FORCE.

But it is time this discussion should be concluded. I will close it by remarking on its individual application in

the differing circumstances of society. That I may be understood, permit me to state a particular case. Saul of Tarsus was converted from his persecuting purposes, and enlisted in the support of the great cause he had been attempting to overthrow. His history is supposed not only to exhibit more power than my doctrine has conceded; but to be a good sample of Jehovah's ordinary proceedings, in bringing sinners to the knowledge of the truth. I remark concerning it, 1. That it occurred in the age of *miracles*. The new dispensation was established by such exhibitions of divine power, and men were thereby convinced of the truth of Christ's pretensions as Mediator. Hundreds of others had been in like manner convinced. No one can calculate on such a peculiar interference now; for the new dispensation has been long since established. 2. Paul was, by this means, professedly called to the apostleship. In truth, it was his official designation, and not his conversion, which formed the object of this interview. God appeared "to him as he did to Abraham, when he constituted him the heir of the world;" as he did to Isaac and Jacob, when he selected them rather than Ishmael and Esau, and renewed his "covenant" with them; or as he did to Moses in the burning bush, when Israel was to be brought to the land of promise. And who would interpret any of those events, as a sample of God's *sovereignty in conversion*? No one. The case is again lifted above the ordinary occurrences of our own times; is exhibited as belonging to that peculiar age; and is to be interpreted on official principles. 3. Both the miracle of the divine manifestation and the call to the apostleship, though above ordinary occurrences, appealed to Saul's mind and heart. And throughout his entire course, no man appears more conscious of personal responsibility, nor has any one ever manifested a deeper solicitude to fulfil its claims. He studied closely, thought profoundly, labored industriously, and closed his life rejoicing in the testimony of a good

conscience. Had he not done so, notwithstanding the extraordinary circumstances which roused his spirit to thought and action, he might have preached the gospel to others, and have been a cast-a-way himself; or, like Balaam, he would have sunk into perdition unsanctified by his official honors. This case, therefore, offers no opposition to the doctrine advanced; but lends all its influence to establish and maintain the principles I have advocated, and sheds all its glories upon the dignified theme—PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY.

This cultivation of mind, this watchfulness over self, this careful improvement of privileges, and this conscientious regard of circumstances, which so highly distinguished the apostle, and so strongly marked his career, every moralist should exhibit. But the exhibition must necessarily be exceedingly diversified. The varieties of human life are endless. There are babes, young men, and fathers. One portion of human beings is described as the image and glory of God; and another as the glory of the man. Some are rich, and others are poor; some are learned, and others are unlearned. The mechanic is not the chieftain; nor is the divine the physician. Mind is developed under different auspices, in different countries, and by the excitement of different objects. Empires rise or fall, and social habits are revolutionized by the change. War is waged, or peace is proclaimed, and new associations are immediately formed, or new habits of action are required. Each age has its own peculiarities, and each series of ages seems but to afford a proportionate period, for the revolutions which belong to our political or moral atmosphere. False prophets mingle with the sons of God, and these are at last not unfrequently led away to deserve the fate of apostates. Primitive simplicity has yielded to the pageantry of the papal hierarchy; and reformation seems to carry the attributes of "the man of sin" into her professedly more accurate organization. And do theologians expect to reduce all these discordancies to their stan-

dard of uniformity? or hope, by a creed, to relieve the fearful distraction? Who can preside over such moral desolation save the mediatorial prince? What secondary agent can control such excited passions, or such multifarious interests, save *conscience*, grown enlightened and vigorous? And how can harmony be produced by abstract legislation? or by any other means than the sympathies of a living intercourse, creating reciprocal confidence, and operating by the principle of faith?

Thus Jehovah, well estimating human affairs, and seeing the end from the beginning, prescribes. The lordship he reserves to himself; his ministers must keep knowledge, that the people may learn the truth from their lips; and they must divide to each one his portion in due season. A good conscience, faith as the result of conviction, and forbearance amid varieties of opinion and interest, form the prominent items of the moral code he has given: and when the ministry come forward with their substitute—power, terror, excitement, feeling—and deceive the people and themselves by the representatives of the good that is done, they try a fearful experiment over which succeeding generations may weep. In such a social state, philosophy is sure to be laughed to scorn as a pagan or infidel heresy; and the love of wisdom must give place to the ebullitions of undisciplined feeling. The intelligent stand aloof, too timid or too powerless to stem the current; or take refuge in infidelity, vainly hoping to find something more coincident with common sense.

Such is the present state of society; and if, in describing it, I incur a harsh condemnation, my refuge is—a good conscience and the Master's truth. But however the censure may be expressed, the revival and education of the moral sense, now become puerile by the oppression of authority or the force of prejudice, is the great object of the Spirit's operations; is the philosophy of faith; and is the mystery in all those laborings of individual mind, while seeking to sus-

pend its eternal destinies on its own convictions, or while aspiring after "salvation" as "the end of its own faith."

LECTURE XVII.

Infants—Sins of ignorance—Characteristics of the two covenants—Mystery and knowledge—Law and Gospel in their results in view of conscience—Social influence—Annual atonement typical of Christ's sacrifice—Sin taken away—Relation of children to the mediatorial institute—Sin against LAW—Sin against GOSPEL—Theological mistakes.

IN view of the application of the general principles of moral government, a question remains to which we have had, thus far, no fair opportunity of turning our attention. It is this—What is the relation of INFANTS to the mediatorial administration? Are they to be considered as SINNERS? Are they sinners by an inbred corruption? or can they be such only by actual transgression? Were they sinners before they were born, as Augustine taught? or do they sin as soon as they are born, knowingly violating divine statutes? See what multitudes die! What becomes of them? Are they saved or lost? Are any of them saved—any of them lost? Can any light be shed on their fate? or is it a dark, mysterious, convulsing theme, on which it is our wisdom to be silent and submissive? These are thrilling questions to the parental heart, waking up its deepest sensations. And they are scarcely less interesting, as topics of moral science, to the philosophic theologian.

You are, no doubt, fully aware of the varied views, and of the frequent and protracted controversies, which this interesting subject has originated. Perhaps you feel that it

is a branch of morals on which but little light has been thrown. For yourselves you can speak with no confidence, and you know no one who can. Certain common sense ideas which seem to be true, which you wish to be true, and which, if true, would relieve your anxieties, occasionally flash upon your minds. But theologians have perplexed you by their subtle speculations. Divine justice is in your estimation such an abstruse matter, defined by no rule, and regulated by nothing but the secret will of God; and divine mercy is so entirely resolved into a mere sovereignty, which acts by no established principles that are within the reach of the human mind, or whose reasons must be reserved for another world, that you are fearfully embarrassed. Have your infants, who, while they live, are in the midst of death, and whose numerous ailments give you so much anxiety both by day and night—have those, whom death has borne from your embrace, and cast as moulder'd ruins into the grave, any interest in the cross of Christ? Have they been delivered from the entanglements of "the sin of the world?" The multitude of their acts which yourselves condemned as wrong—are these condemned as sin by the Judge of all the earth? Can—shall such sin be forgiven for Christ's sake? Will the Prince of life bring our children along with those who have "fallen asleep in him?" or shall they appear to be cast off with them who know not God? Every query, clothe it in what language you may, goes to the heart, and, perhaps, remains unanswered; or hope is distracted by fear, and no assurance can be cherished. Perhaps you even now rebuke me for adverting to the painful topic, and tell me—"all has been said that can be said—it is cruel to torture us into an excitement, you have no power to allay." But the candle of the Lord, as I believe, has shone upon our path thus far, perhaps we may take it, and go a step farther.

In this course of "lectures" I have so often been called to contemplate the characteristics of the two dispensations,

and to array them before you in a form seemingly so novel, that almost every subject belonging to moral science appears to participate in that novelty. Even the interesting topic before us, it will be seen, has some close associations with these two covenants; and associations which very few have been induced to notice. It is true that, in the controversy to which infant baptism has given rise, very distinct and frequent reference has been made, and justly made; to the circumcision of infants as belonging to the Abrahamic and Sinaitic covenants, and as consequently being both an evangelic and a national privilege; to the unequivocal and unqualified interest, which children are thus demonstrated to possess in the administration of the divine government upon earth; and to the elemental principles of organized communities, which were so promptly and fully recognised in the formal instruments alluded to. My present remarks however, though I may have occasion in some manner to incorporate those general considerations, are aside of that familiar train of argument. There is another spot in this ecclesiastical field, over which the star that has guided me thus far, has rested; and my own heart, not only as that of a moral reasoner deeply committed in his own speculations, but of one who feels that he has no slight interest in the subject under consideration—my own heart has been both delighted and satisfied.

You remember that Paul has described the church under the jewish dispensation as *a child under age*, and as differing nothing from a servant. "When we were children," he remarks, "we were in bondage under the elements of the world." On the other hand, the church under the gospel dispensation he describes as an heir arrived at full age. "Thou art no more a *servant*," he said, "but a *son*." "The fulness of the time—the time appointed of the Father—has come; and God has sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father." God's deportment to the jewish people was therefore a typical exhibition of

the ecclesiastical relations of CHILDREN. And it is by analysing this type, following it up on the scriptural page, and noticing those coincident views which may occur, that I expect to present our whole subject in the most interesting and instructive light. In framing my argument, you may be solicited to start at a point, apparently very distant from the object I propose to reach. But you must allow me an opportunity to gather materials, and to lay down premises distinctly and fairly ; that the conclusion may appear with becoming strength, when it shall be brought out. Mr. Tucker once observed, while framing a like, but longer, and more abstruse argument, and when making similar preparations for future conclusions—"While this is doing, we work under ground. You see we are very busy, but to what purpose is not so readily visible ; nothing appears useful, nothing convenient, nothing serviceable for the purposes of life. Have but patience until we come above ground, and then perhaps you will see a plan arising that promises something habitable and commodious, and which could not have stood secure without the pains we have been taking underneath." This, you remember, was my urgent entreaty when this course of lectures was commenced : and those who would not, or did not, patiently listen to the detail necessary for the statement of the premises, are even now embarrassed by the conclusions already drawn, and cannot see how they have been reached.

The apostle, whom the Spirit employed as the great expounder of ecclesiastical law, when he undertook to sketch out the ground on which "the High Priest of our profession" should perform his official duties, was necessarily led to compare the two covenants together. These official duties included two distinct series of services—the sacrificial ceremonies, and those that attended the entrance into the Holiest of all, and that were typified by the Jewish high-priest on the great day of expiation. In stating the particulars of the annual atonement, the apostle remarks, that

the high priest offered for himself, and then for the **ERRORS OF THE PEOPLE**. Now the argument which I am about to develop, will turn upon the import of this phrase "the errors of the people;" and before that argument shall be closed, I hope to present before you, and in a very plain form, the **RELATION OF INFANTS** to the mediatorial administration.

The term **ERRORS**, by which our translators thought proper to render the greek word used by the apostle, is sufficiently general to hide any peculiarity that may belong to it; and to suffer a reader, unacquainted with, or inattentive to, the original, to pass on, without suspecting that the whole of the sentiment, intended to be conveyed to his mind, has not been expressed. The commentators have noticed this circumstance, and, by their critical emendations and remarks, have endeavored more accurately and fully to state the apostle's idea. I shall quote the observations of a few of them—those which are at hand—by way of affording you an extended view of the peculiarity adverted to; and of bespeaking for the general argument the favorable consideration of those, who are disposed to regulate their own opinions by the authority of commentators.

Dr. Scott translated the word—"IGNORANCES," and remarks—"It seems to denote **ALL** those sins, for which sacrifices were appointed; indeed all, but those presumptuous sins, which were punished by death."

Dr. Clarke observes in explanation—"Transgressions of which they were not *conscious*: there were so many niceties in the ritual worship of the jews, and so many ways in which they might offend against the laws, and incur guilt, that it was found necessary to institute sacrifices to atone for these sins of ignorance. And as the high-priest was also clothed with infirmity, he required to have an interest in the same sacrifice, on the same account. This was a national sacrifice; and by it the people understood that they were absolved from all the errors of the past year;

and that they now had a renewed right of access to the mercy-seat."

Dr. Whitby explains as follows—"And for the IGNORANCE of the people. It is certain that the law allowed of sacrifices for sins committed not out of mere ignorance, i. e. for lying, and false swearing. We therefore must either say with Vatablus and Munster, *in locum*, that sins committed through the violence of our passions and affections are called *sins of ignorance*, and so they stand opposed to *sins of presumption*, or that the sins of the people are here so styled, because they are mostly such."

Dr. Macknight, after having assigned to the atonement by the ordinary priests its own place, considering them as God's ministers, by whom his government as king of Israel was carried on, and by whose service a political pardon from Jehovah as the head of the Jewish commonwealth was extended, goes on to remark—"The sacrifices offered by the high priest on the day of expiation, had a quite different effect. They were offered for THE WHOLE NATION, to make atonement for the sins which they had ignorantly committed during the preceding year, and to open the tabernacles to their acts of worship during the succeeding year. And to show this, the high-priest carried the blood of these sacrifices into the inward tabernacle, and sprinkled it before the symbol of the divine presence."

Dr. Owen observes on the passage—"To offer for the errors of the people, is to offer for *all their sins*, of what nature soever they were. And they are thus called, because indeed there is no such predominancy of malice in any sin in the world, as wherein there is not a mixture of error, either national or practical—of the mind or of the heart—which is the cause or a great occasion of it. Here indeed is the original of all sin. The mind being filled with *darkness and ignorance*, alienates the whole soul from the life of God, &c."

But enough. These quotations are sufficient to show that, even when the original term is so rendered as to express the peculiarity of the apostolic idea, commentators throw the whole subject unexplained upon the public mind. The difficulty must lie deeper than they seem to have imagined. Some other political idea must remain behind the sectarian veil, that separates them from the holiest of all, which idea they have not discerned; otherwise they would speak and write more intelligently in their comments on this peculiar phrase. For the same reason, or because the theological sentiments of their age seemed to require it, our translators have used a very indefinite term; or, in the changes to which every living language is liable, that term did not mean in their day precisely what it means now. Understand me then. When the apostle declares that, on the great day of expiation, the high-priest offered for the ignorances of the people; while the Mosaic statute, which called for the sacrifice, specified "the uncleanness of the children of Israel," and "their transgressions in all their sins," I intend to ask the broad question—what does he design to express? Was the uncleanness of the children of Israel—concerning which a prophet confessed, "We are all as an unclean thing, and all our righteousnesses are as filthy rags"—the *ignorance* of the *people*? Were *all* their transgressions in *all* their sins, *ignorances*—sins of ignorance? or, to vary the question, that its whole force may be felt—does not the statute bring the uncleanness and transgressions of the children of Israel together as a **WHOLE**, for which one annual sacrifice was offered? and does not the apostle intend to express that very idea in the phrase he employs—*ignorances of the PEOPLE*? and that with the view of exhibiting in its own proper connexions, the one great and all sufficient sacrifice of Christ for **THE SIN OF THE WORLD**?

These questions, or the one question thrown into these different shapes, can be answered only by referring to the

comparison of the two covenants, which is drawn out in the context. By carefully noticing the characteristics of these two institutes, the difficulty, which has so evidently perplexed the commentators, may possibly be removed; and a great variety of scriptural texts, or phrases, may be more easily explained. Such at least, is my impression.

The Lord had spoken by Jeremiah; and in the argument pursued by the apostle,* the declarations made to the prophet are quoted, and the attributes of the two covenants are stated. For the sake of order, and in view of the phrase before us, the following arrangement may be necessary.

I. "This is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, saith the Lord; *I will put my laws into their mind, and write them in their hearts*: and they shall not teach every man his neighbor, and every man his brother, saying KNOW THE LORD: for all shall know me, from the least unto the greatest." Here knowledge is, in the most unequivocal terms, declared to be the characteristic of those who live under the new dispensation.

This covenant is not like, or "according to the covenant that I made with their fathers in the day when I took them by the hand to lead them out of the land of Egypt; because they continued not in my covenant, and I regarded them not, saith the Lord." What is the difference? The particular which is mentioned, is, that under the new covenant the people should have KNOWLEDGE; of course under the old covenant the people had not that knowledge. Ignorance was their characteristic. You can readily distinguish, with such a statement before you, between SINS committed under the two covenants—the one being sins of *ignorance*, and the other being committed against *knowledge*. When, therefore, the apostle is speaking of the annual atonement, which regarded the nation as a WHOLE, the phrase, "ignorances of the people," is most expres-

*Heb. viii. 7—13.

sive; and particularly when you consider that his design was to show the superiority of the new covenant.

This symbolical illustration,—I say *symbolical*, for it is not intended to be asserted that the jews knew nothing—is very common in the scriptures. In fact the scriptures have been given in connexion with the two covenants, and are Jehovah's "rule of faith and practice" to those who, by election, have been placed under these covenants. Paul, drawing the contrast on another occasion, remarks—"Ye are manifestly declared to be the epistle of Christ, written not with *ink*, but with *the Spirit of the living God*; not in *tables of stone*, but in fleshly tables of the heart." He does not mean to assert, that the jews had no divine laws incorporated in their nature, or inscribed on their hearts; for he says that even "the gentiles show the work of the law written on their hearts." He is speaking of different communities as compared with each other, and of the two covenants as symbols of LAW and GOSPEL. This being understood, I may ask, what is the difference between two communities, when one has truth in a series of hieroglyphics, and the other has it "written on the heart?" Is it not simply this?—the one community is ignorant and the other is intelligent.

The same apostle again speaks of the *mystery* which in other ages was not made known unto the sons of men, as it is now revealed unto his holy apostles and prophets by the Spirit:—"of those glorious things which 'eye had not seen, nor ear heard, neither had entered into the heart of man to conceive;' and 'of the mystery which hath been hid from ages, and from generations, but is now made manifest to the saints; to whom God would *make known* what is the riches of the glory of this mystery among the gentiles, which is Christ in you, the hope of glory.'" A mystery is a secret—a thing *not known*. The age of mysteries is therefore the age of ignorance; but when myste-

ries are revealed or uncovered, and that which was secret is brought to light, the age of knowledge has arrived.

Again this apostle represents the jewish church as a *child*—an heir under age; but the new testament church he describes as an heir arrived at full age. On the one hand you have the ignorance of childhood, and on the other the knowledge of mature life. Even the prophets sat down to ponder over, made an earnest and laborious effort to understand, the very mysteries which the Spirit of Christ employed them to testify. They were all, without any exception, in a state of tutelage. The law was their “schoolmaster.” As incompetent to regulate themselves, because not sufficiently informed, they were “under tutors and governors.” They wistfully looked forward with juvenile anticipations, and not unfrequently with juvenile fretfulness, as though “the ways of the Lord were not equal,” to the time appointed by the Father. They desired to see the things which we see, and did not see them; and to hear the things which we hear, and did not hear them. Many a youthful conception is but the play of an untutored fancy; many a boyish desire is doomed to be disappointed; and the progress from infancy to manhood is slow, and depends upon the growth of intelligence. The infancy of society is like that of the individual, and must be judged of on analogous principles. Many mistakes are, in such a case, committed through ignorance—mistakes which will not occur, when information shall be acquired by experience.

The heathen world itself is supposed to have been in a like situation. This fact is abundantly proved by its own history; and has never been more strikingly displayed than in the interesting account which Luke gives of Paul’s visit to the Athenians. That exceedingly superstitious people had erected an altar—TO THE UNKNOWN GOD. This inscription as emphatically declared the condition of the gentiles, as the jewish proverb—“the fathers have eaten a

sour grape and the children's teeth are set on edge," declared the oppressive character of the Mosaic ritual. Paul promptly availed himself of a fact so prominent and characteristic, and said—"Whom therefore ye IGNORANTLY worship, him declare I unto you." And after having pointedly exposed the folly of their idolatrous system—for divine truth may be demonstrated both to idolaters and philosophers—he added, "THE TIMES OF THIS IGNORANCE God winked at; but now commandeth all men every where to repent." Because of the ignorance of the gentile world Jehovah forbore; as he did with the jews, to whom he granted "remission of sins through forbearance," and in view of the righteousness afterward to be wrought out by the Mediator. If you carefully consider these peculiarities, you cannot fail to understand what the apostle meant by "the ignorances of the people," for which the high-priest offered on the great day of atonement. The people lived in TIMES of ignorance, and their sins were sins of IGNORANCE.

2. A second point of contrast between the two covenants, which Jehovah states by the prophet Jeremiah, and which Paul quotes, is expressed in the following language—The PEOPLE whose fathers were brought out of Egypt, continued not in my covenant, and I regarded them not, saith the Lord. "But under the new covenant, which I will make with the house of Israel, I will be merciful to their unrighteousness, and their sins and their iniquities will I remember no more."—This language appears to be involved, and there may be some difficulty in getting at the precise ideas intended to be conveyed. Theologians have studied the bible so much as a compend of abstract philosophy, and have so entirely forgotten that it is the rule of faith and practice in connexion with the two covenants, that they have lost the "key" when they would open up its phraseology. Quitting these abstractions, let us place ourselves within scriptural restrictions.

The jewish dispensation, as has been shown at large, was a symbolical exhibition of LAW. By law no one can be saved, because no one can obey it. The hebrews, when put under the law, could no more obey it than other men. In fact the ecclesiastical operation, which placed them under it, was intended by the mediatorial sovereign to show to the world that none of our sinful race could obey law; and thereby to shut all up to the faith which should afterwards be revealed. Of course the jews SINNED—sinned LIKE ADAM—and consequently incurred death. For this reason the lawgiver, as their judge, did not *regard*, but rejected them. Hence the jewish law is described to be “the letter that killeth”—“the ministration of condemnation”—“the ministration of death, written and engraven in stones.” On the other hand, the new dispensation is an exhibition of gospel. It is constructed on the finished righteousness of the second Adam, and substitutes faith as the principle of moral obligation. Mercy is its appropriate attribute; for it is enacted in favor of those who are encompassed by the “infirmities of the flesh,” and who carry with them “a body of sin and of death.” Apply the principle of law to these—“Do and live, transgress and die”—and they also certainly perish; as our doctrine has uniformly asserted, and as the history of the jewish nation has abundantly demonstrated. If then the jews had no dependence but their own law, they were entirely ignorant of salvation and life. The typical “shadows,” which belonged to their institute, referred them to the coming Saviour, and thereby was imparted to them what knowledge they had.

Accordingly the apostle, when commenting upon the official services of the jewish high-priest on the day of annual atonement, remarks that the gifts and sacrifices then offered were a figure—A PARABLE for the time then present; but they “could not make him that did the service perfect, as pertaining to the CONSCIENCE.” The reason is.

abundantly evident. The blood of bulls and of goats, as any rational man may distinctly see, could no more take away sin, than baptism can be regeneration, or the bread and wine become the body and blood of the Redeemer, under a priestly consecration. On the other hand, the blood of Christ, having offered himself through the Eternal Spirit, purges the conscience from dead works. The CONSCIENCE—a failure here—no perfection here—ceremonies that could not remove its guilt—unsanctified—unenlightened—with no sense of pardon and acceptance—how deep the darkness! how dreadful the IGNORANCE! But the conscience purged, sanctified, perfected—how blissful its peace! how heavenly its assurance! how luminous its KNOWLEDGE! Life and immortality brought to light, are shining all around, and the sure and steadfast hope of heaven spreads its glory over life and death.

An enlightened conscience, responding to the claims of moral obligation, sustaining hope in view of the final judgment, and bearing a good testimony in the presence of the Searcher of hearts, is the greatest blessing, is the richest treasure of a redeemed man. Without this, God with all his glory, heaven with all its bliss, could not make a human being happy. You never heard of a saint, a prophet, nor an apostle, rejoicing or peaceful on any other terms. The pardoned, the regenerated, the sanctified man, is the heir of glory. Mere education—mere literature—mere philosophy—a mere acquaintance with theories and their external symbols, never satisfied the human mind. Satan might, and does believe, but he trembles. He might transform himself into an angel of light, but would not be relieved from his dreadful fate. Saul of Tarsus could excel all his equals in native mind and literary acquisition; and yet, with all his official pre-eminence, *ignorantly* “think that he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth.” Aristotle, Socrates, Plato, and a host of others, might be reputed wise—philosophic

—divine, and yet leave the world in darkness; transmit theories, and distinctions, and subtleties to embarrass and perplex succeeding generations, and substitute “the wisdom of words” for truth. Even the high-priest of the Lord might accurately conduct the external forms of divine worship, and yet be any thing else than infallible, or “perfect as pertaining to the conscience.” The whole world, at this moment, waking up from the deadly sleep of centuries, and speaking in highest strains of gratulation of “the march of intellect,” has yet to learn that intellectual cultivation, without the resuscitation of the moral sense, will not meet the exigencies of the coming times. *Regeneration* is the only principle of reform, politically as well as morally considered. Social combinations, and multiplied days and ceremonies, though their advocates had the “tongues of men and of angels,” and “though they had the gift of prophecy, and understood all mysteries and all knowledge, and had all faith so that they could remove mountains,” could only deceive sinners by the miserable tones of “sounding brass or tinkling cymbals.” CONSCIENCE must be enlightened and made PERFECT. Charity must take the reins, and rule and bless the rich and the poor, the learned and the unlearned. If this be the moral philosophy which the Mediator propounds by his Spirit, it is no wonder philosophy has failed to regenerate the world, and that the nations, misled by their systems of political ethics, have been “all as an unclean thing, and all their righteousnesses as filthy rags.” When Paul then, is led to describe the old covenant as not making perfect in view of conscience, and the new one as purging the conscience from dead works to serve the living God, he may well use IGNORANCE and KNOWLEDGE as most expressive technical terms.

Listen to the Redeemer’s remarks. You remember that he addressed the multitude in parables, but explained all things to his disciples. When asked why he did so? he re-

plied—"Because it is GIVEN TO YOU TO KNOW the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it is not given."* Their position, which is GIVEN or assigned to them, is under the old covenant, which was a PARABLE.† I speak to them according to the nature of the dispensation under which they live—and for a very plain reason. They are ignorant: like children, they have not their "senses exercised by reason of use to discern both good and evil." "They seeing, see not; and hearing, they hear not, neither do they understand." But unto you is given a position under the new covenant, and it belongs to "you to KNOW the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven." "Blessed are your eyes, for they see; and your ears, for they hear." Like children arrived at "full age," and having your senses exercised by use, "strong meat belongeth" to you.‡ But they need to be taught "the first principles of the oracles of God," because they are "unskilful in the word of righteousness." "WISDOM" is spoken "among them that are PERFECT."

Listen again to the Redeemer.—He had been describing the new dispensation under the figure of a vine and its branches, when affording to his disciples a train of preparatory instructions, in view of their official relations.—"I am," said he, "the vine—the true vine. My Father is the husbandman. Ye are the branches. Ye are my friends, if ye do whatever I command you. Henceforth I call you not servants"—the technical term under the old covenant—for the servant KNOWETH NOT what his lord doeth; but I have called you friends; for all things that I have heard of my Father, I have MADE KNOWN unto you. Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you, and ordained you that ye should go and bring forth much fruit, and that your fruit might remain: that whatever ye shall ask of the Father in my name, he may give it you." Under this ecclesiastical constitution of knowledge and liberty go, and preach the gos-

* Matt. xiii. 11.

† Heb. ix. 9.

‡ Heb. v. 13, 14.

pel to all nations—to every creature.—Must we not suppose that the disciples understood this difference between servants and friends—between ignorance and knowledge; and that in the case under consideration, Paul is using familiar jewish language?

3. Jehovah, speaking by Jeremiah, affords us a third point of contrast between the two covenants? “In those days,” saith he, “they shall say no more—The fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children’s teeth are set on edge. But every one shall die *for his own iniquity*: every man that eateth the sour grape, his teeth shall be set on edge.” The first covenant, as a symbolical exhibition of law, exemplifies the action of social influence; like the law given to Adam, the breach of which brought death into our world and all the evils we are enduring. The new covenant, which is an emblematic exhibition of gospel, is, like gospel itself, constructed on personal responsibility, and exerts no social influence but that which is kind—mercy upon children’s children.

The errors, or sins of ignorance, of which Paul speaks, and for which the annual offering was presented, were the errors of the people—of the **WHOLE NATION**. It was therefore an official service, rendered in view of the social principle, as an attribute of the legal covenant under which “the people” lived: or it regarded that thing which theologians have called *imputation*, and on which they have reasoned so harshly. And may not sins, committed under the action of social influence, be correctly enough denominated sins of ignorance? What consciousness can a child have of the faults of its parents? These committed the sins—it did not. Children may suffer because of the errors of their parents, according to the necessary operation of the political or social principle. They may be conscious that they are suffering; and conscious that they are suffering on account of parental delinquencies; but of parental sins they are not, nor can they be conscious, be-

cause they never committed them. Their own character may remain unhurt—their own integrity may be unsullied. They may most righteously, and most severely, condemn the crimes for which they suffer, and yet justify the action of the political principle which involves them in consequent suffering. In this way they became interested in the annual atonement, which was offered for sins which they did not commit, which did not rest on their consciences as their own guilt, and which would thus be to them matters of personal ignorance.

Again. Under the force of social institutions, or under the influence of parental tuition and example, children might be led to commit the same offences, by which their fathers fell. These would be sins of ignorance to them; because they knew no better; and would be followed by corresponding consequences, because causes must produce their effects. Here then would arise the necessity for the annual atonement, with its peculiar character, and in all its political bearings. And that provision should be made for such a case, any benevolent or evangelic moralist would promptly admit. To deny it, is to sweep away the very basis on which the gospel rests; to confound social and personal responsibility together; and to refer for hope to some arbitrary statute, which can have no foundation in nature.

To show you that mercy not only may be, but actually is, extended to such cases, and in consideration of the ignorance they imply, I quote to you some scriptural examples. The crucifiers of our Lord—you are wont to reprobate their crime as diabolically malignant, and themselves as the vilest murderers. And truly it was a most atrocious deed they committed. But Jesus prayed for them. He said—"Father forgive them." And why should they be forgiven? He added—"For they know not what they do." It was a sin of IGNORANCE. They did it, with their own hands—with wicked hands; but under the false rea-

sonings, the mistaken notions, and the erroneous politics of the age, which had been handed down from the fathers. Blinded by a false philosophy, they knew no better. Peter declared the same facts when he said—"And now, brethren, I wot that through IGNORANCE ye did it, as did also your rulers." Paul gives the same testimony, and asserts that had "the princes of this world KNOWN the wisdom of God spoken in a *mystery*, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory." And well did this apostle know how to sympathize with these men—for he himself was a persecutor; and telling his own story, he frankly declares—"I was a blasphemer, and a persecutor, and injurious. But I obtained mercy, because I did it IGNORANTLY in unbelief; and that in me first, Jesus Christ might show forth all long-suffering, for a pattern to them which should hereafter believe on him to life everlasting." He acted under the social influence exerted at the time by his nation, and his sins were sins of ignorance.

Indeed God long forebore with the whole jewish nation. The Redeemer himself besought them; mercy upon mercy did he show; miracle after miracle did he perform; argument after argument did he urge; year after year did he wait; and when he could do no more, he wept. His apostles came to vary and renew the effort, and the Spirit descended to convince them of sin, of righteousness and of judgment. All was done that could be done. They were not cast off until every expedient had failed. Mercy was not regarded; forbearance was exhausted; ignorance ceased to be a plea, after all overtures were despised, and all means were tried in vain. Thus Jehovah pities the ignorant. The annual atonement was no anomaly. It was a mere figure of the doctrine of the cross—God's evangelical plan for regenerating and saving the world. A mode of moral action presented for our own imitation, and which we must carry out if we mean to be ministers of grace to a dying world. The age in which we live demands from us every

thing that is kind and benevolent in the human heart—particularly in that heart as sanctified. Were such feelings reciprocal, catholics and protestants might soon harmonize together, and harmonize where both would be right. Love to God and love to man, the grand moral characteristics of the redeemed, would grace them alike as partakers of a common salvation ; and bring light and truth to scatter the ignorance and errors that now involve them in common mistakes.

Having thus exhibited at large the characteristics of the two covenants, and having shown that the annual atonement respected those of the first covenant, we may proceed to remark, that this annual atonement was a type of the sacrificial services of “the High-Priest of our profession.” He, having been “put to death in the flesh,” entered by his own blood into the holiest of all, or appeared in heaven for us. But the atonement of the great day of expiation was made for the errors, or sins of ignorance of “the people :” i. e. for the WHOLE NATION. The sacrifice of Christ, therefore, must be of a like *general* character, else the type is destroyed. The question, consequently will be, to what “people”—to what community, that can be politically considered as a WHOLE, did his sacrifice apply? The answer to this question is a matter of primary importance. So theologians have considered it to be, and it has given rise to protracted controversy among them. Some have maintained that Christ died for “the elect alone ;” and that they, as the invisible church, constitute the people, the whole community, whom he seeks to save. Others have averred that he died for “the whole world.” How shall the question be determined?

The atonement, be it remembered, is made for transgression of LAW. The jewish people, as placed under the first covenant, were all under law. The typical character of this transaction then requires that those for whom our High-Priest should offer, should be under law as a covenant or

dispensation ; and that those who were thus circumstanced should constitute the people—the **WHOLE** for whom he should die. Who were they ? The elect, or the whole human family ? Doubtless the whole human family were under law, or the covenant made with Adam, seeing that they all suffer the consequence of its breach. Of course, Christ died for the whole human family. The elect, as such, never were under law, considered as a *covenant*, or dispensation, except the **JEWS**, to whom no one confines either the term elect or the death of Christ. The elect were under law, only as they formed a part of the human family, and can come in to share the benefits of an atonement made in view of law only in that connexion. The “one offence” involved all men in condemnation, and the one righteousness brought a justification unto life upon all men. Our sacrifice is “the lamb of God that taketh away **THE SIN OF THE WORLD.**” Either law has nothing to do with this subject—and yet Christ was made under the law—or there is no escape from the conclusion that Christ died for **ALL MEN.**

The same conclusion may be reached by considering the peculiar phrase employed by the apostle, and which is now under consideration. Surely the whole world, as under law, which had been broken, and living under the action of social principle, and knowing Jehovah’s purposes of mercy only as they were hidden in a mystery, were as much guilty of sins of ignorance, as the jews who were so placed typically. In fact the jews were put under these circumstances figuratively, because the whole world was under them really.

The mystery was concealed not merely from the Israelitish fathers, but from “the sons of men.” It “had been hid from the beginning of the world in God, who made all things by Jesus Christ.” And when it is made known, gentiles have an equal interest in it with the jews—are fellow-heirs, and of the same body ;” and to themselves the whole pur-

pose of mercy is revealed. They, to whom knowledge is imparted, must have been previously in a state of ignorance.

Under the law, as broken by the great progenitor of all, there was no relief for any; yet every one was by necessity personally responsible to God. In such a condition, what could any one do?—either gentile or jew. Take away the first promise, the sacrificial institution, the cherubic symbol, in which salvation was presented in a PARABLE, and the world is reduced to the most profound ignorance. You have heard of the superstition of the gentiles, and of the wisdom of their philosophers; but while, on the one hand, the annual atonement among the jews could not make *them* perfect as pertaining to the conscience, so on the other, “in the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom KNEW NOT God.” Boastful as the learned and philosophic have been, long and loudly as their objections to christianity have been proclaimed, have they ever solved the problem of “moral evil? Look at the world as it is now, when emerging from the deadly influence of false politics and false morals, for which infallibility has been pleaded. Who can satisfactorily answer the many questions, which are at this time agitating the community? Who anticipates any good from any controversy at present in progress? or is cheered by the intelligence communicated by our ecclesiastical partizans? What humble inquirer feels the dogmas of any party, coming home to his conscience in “demonstration of the Spirit and with power?” Drilled bands, full of prejudice and conceit, exchange their pæans; social combinations multiplied almost to infinity, have tried every expedient; the Eternal has been invoked from his throne—what have not sectarian chieftains tried? and yet men’s hearts are failing them for fear. Preaching the terrors of the law to beings who are “not under law,” the result shows what the whole world, as guilty before God, shows; i. e. until the gospel is made known, all are in ignorance.—When the Son of man cometh, shall he find FAITH on the earth?

Under the social principle, as such, not only may the jew say—"The fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge;" but all the world mourns over "the infirmities of the flesh," superinduced by Adam's SIN. Can any one of us be *conscious* of Adam's sin?—I mean of the thing itself. We may feel its effects, we may have full proof that the crime has been committed, but not one can be conscious of having committed it. With none of us is it our own; nor can it so rest upon the conscience of any. In this view again, the whole world is in ignorance, and labouring, by the action of the social principle, under the effects of "one offence," committed by "one man." If then there was a manifest propriety in meeting such a case as typically presented among the jews, was there not an equal propriety in meeting it, as it really existed in THE WHOLE WORLD?

If the case was not met by the sacrifice of Christ in view of the world, you perceive that it could not be met even among the jews: for, among the jews, the whole affair was typical. Take the world out of these sacrificial relations, and there is nothing for the type to represent; because an essential part of the type is, that the jews were under LAW. But if Adam, as the head of the human family under law, be thrown out of consideration, the type has no correspondent, for no one else was under law. Nor only so: but if Christ's sacrifice did not respect "sins of ignorance," the type is again destroyed; because for such sins the annual atonement was made. Nay more. The annual atonement "could not make him that did the service perfect, as pertaining to the conscience; or the blood of bulls and goats could not take away these sins of ignorance; so that for those very sins of ignorance, the jew himself was referred to the sacrifice of Christ. If then Christ's sacrifice takes away sins of ignorance, THE WHOLE WORLD, as involved in such guilt, is interested in his death and intercession.

The fact, however, is broadly asserted in both views—

"The redemption of the transgressions, that were under the *first* covenant," is directly referred to the "death" of the "Mediator of the *new* covenant."* The principle of this political operation is declared to be divine forbearance:—Christ Jesus hath been "set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are *past*, through the forbearance of God." And that forbearance, Paul tells the Athenians, was freely extended to all. "We are all his offspring," he remarked, "as certain also of your own poets have said." "Forasmuch then as we are the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold, or silver, or stone, graven by art and man's device. And *the times of this ignorance God winked at*; but now commandeth all men every where to repent, because he has appointed a day in the which he will judge THE WORLD by that man whom he hath ordained; whereof he hath given assurance to all men, in that he hath raised him from the dead." The cases are perfectly analogous; are parallel operations under the same general political measure; and exemplify divine forbearance, running down through "times of ignorance," and on to times of knowledge, when the mystery should be revealed, in consideration of the righteousness of Christ; and when he should be made perfect through suffering. In fact they are finally amalgamated—"out of twain, one NEW MAN" created in knowledge, righteousness and true holiness "is made."

And why should it not be so? Could the ignorance of the gentiles not receive indulgence as well as the ignorance of the jews? Was it inconsistent that the intercessory prayer should rise for them—"Father forgive them for they know not what they do?" Should they not obtain mercy, if they had committed sin "ignorantly in unbelief?" Would they not have acted differently, had they known better? Is Jehovah "the God of the jews only? is he not the God of

* Heb. ix. 9.

the gentiles also?" Did they act worse than the jews? Did they "crucify the Lord of glory?" Would not Tyre and Sidon have repented in sackcloth and ashes, had they beheld the mighty works which were done in Chorazin and Bethsaida? Shall it not be more tolerable for Sodom in the day of judgment than for Capernaum? Shall not the uncircumcision judge the circumcision? Shall not the greek, who has done good, have eternal life, as well as the jew who has done good? Whither, O whither, have we been led in our sectarian folly?

Here then is a WHOLE, made up of two parts. The same things are asserted of both; and must—must they not?—be true of the whole. Therefore, Christ died for all men, or he died for none. He has mercy on all, as encompassed by "the infirmities of the flesh;" or "the infirmities of the flesh" are no reason why he should die, and why he should have mercy on any. In his gospel he calls upon all men, every where, to repent, or he calls upon none.—ALL—ALL—are thrown on their personal responsibility, and their final destiny shall be the just award of a righteous government to beings thus situated. If any shall be lost, it is because they have not met that responsibility.

We have at length reached the point, in view of which the whole argument has been elaborated. If you have carefully attended to that argument, you can scarcely avoid going directly to the conclusions, in view of the relations of children, which we must now proceed to contemplate. And 1. Children were evidently included among the PEOPLE for whom the annual atonement was made. If that atonement was typical of Christ's sacrifice, then the sacrifice of Christ was offered for a people—some political whole—in which, according to the plain meaning of terms, children are necessarily included. Can there be a nation—a people—a political community—without children? Assuredly not. Either therefore the political principle had nothing to do with the annual atonement, and with the mediatorial right-

eousness of the Son of God, or children were included under this political operation. But you know that the Jewish nation, as such, were God's people; and that he himself was their KING. According to the old prophets, when God should elect the gentiles, he would call in a PEOPLE; or, those called would be as the apostle Peter expresses the divine proceedings, when addressing the "elect according to the foreknowledge of God"—"Ye are a chosen GENERATION, a royal priesthood, an holy NATION, a peculiar PEOPLE—which in time past were not a people, but are now the people of God." The terms thus employed, cannot be explained, if children shall be shut out from the ecclesiastical privileges to which allusion is made. To make full proof of this argument, let us review the history of God's dispensations, which, as the Governor of the world, he has based on the social principle.

I have already shown to you that the paradisiacal constitution was a political institute. By denying, or overlooking this important consideration, theologians have destroyed all just views of personal responsibility; and have merged our personal obligations in the divine sovereignty. All men, they say, are thereby brought into temporal, spiritual, and eternal death; and of course, they readily see, that children may perish. Our baptist brethren, who advocate this view of the original covenant, when they come to consider the provisions of the mediatorial covenant, exclude children, because they overlook or disregard the political character of both covenants. Here is the origin of their difficulty. But let them reason as they may, the consequences of Adam's sin come down upon ALL—children suffer and die. When Christ appears, he is proclaimed to be the SECOND ADAM. His righteousness, from the nature of the case, must afford its application to ALL—children as well as adults, else there would be no resemblance; Adam would be no FIGURE of Christ. If the consequences of Adam's sin were death temporal, spiritual and eternal to

ALL—children not excepted; then the consequences of Christ's righteousness must be life temporal, spiritual and eternal to ALL—children not excepted. If the consequences of Adam's sin were temporal death, with all the various temporal ills we suffer, to ALL—children not excepted; then the consequences of Christ's righteousness must be deliverance from that death, and all the blessings which can be afforded in this life, for ALL—children not excepted. Hence Paul asserts, that as by one man's sin all men were brought into condemnation, so by one man's righteousness all men were brought into justification of life. As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive. As by man came death, by man also came the resurrection from the dead. Viewed as parallel political operations, the interest of children in these two covenants is thus demonstrated. Every one may understand such an argument, who can understand how children are identified with parents in the common concerns of life; how their interests in the political charter of their country are recognised; and how property descends from parent to child.

Let us suppose that Adam had not eaten the forbidden fruit—what then? None would have been subject to death, nor would have known good and evil. Children consequently would not have suffered as they do now. And why? Because they would have been covered by the official righteousness of Adam their federal head; and would have enjoyed all the facilities which the covenant, as fulfilled, could have afforded to them, in view of their personal responsibility. When therefore Christ fulfils the law, his righteousness covers ALL, and children are entitled to all the remedial benefits it affords, as they are advancing under a system of personal responsibility to meet the awards of the last day; and that because he fulfils the righteousness of the LAW. Thus again the case before us is necessarily provided for, and in the most ample manner.

The jewish and the christian dispensations, which have

been brought in are emblematical, the one of law, and the other of gospel; and are in like manner political in their character. They are therefore based on social principle, and consecrate NATIONS as their agents. The jewish NATION was brought in under law—MANY NATIONS are brought in under gospel. Children must necessarily be included in this political operation; for 1. The jewish institute, as symbolic of law, referred to law which had been violated by Adam, and which has entailed the consequences of sin upon children as well as upon adults; and the christian institute, as symbolic of gospel, refers to Christ's righteousness, which brings a justification unto life upon all—Children as well as adults. And 2, as under both, NATIONS are made the ministerial agents, and as children are parts of nations, to leave those out is to destroy the official exhibition. Accordingly the facts, in the history of both dispensations, sustain the general doctrine.

The jewish dispensation did, in the most unequivocal manner, include children. They "were shut up" with their parents under "the ministration of death and condemnation, "unto the faith which should afterwards be revealed;" or were put under the law as "a schoolmaster to bring them to Christ." Hence, you remember, they were circumcised; and the circumstance, whether they *understood* the nature of that ordinance or not did not vitiate the ceremonies; even as in every political community children are entitled to its privileges, and are not deprived of them in consequence of not understanding their import. Doubtless under such an institute as Moses established, children would do many things that would be a violation of the rigid statutes which he enacted. But such acts would be sins of ignorance, and this great annual atonement would cover them.

Now would it not be a strange inconsistency, if, after children had been shut up under a ministration which was professedly intended to lead to Christ, they should have no interest in Christ and his institutions when he should come?

Yet how much difficulty has been felt! Our baptist brethren cast off children as having no place in the church; and many others carry out their doctrine of "personal election" among infants. What are the facts in the case? Christ said—"Suffer little children to come unto me." And will any of you keep them back, or condemn those who would bring them?—But why should they come? The Redeemer himself assigns the reason, and observes—"For of such is the kingdom of heaven." The present dispensation is here called a KINGDOM:—can there be a kingdom without children? Where there is a kingdom, all its subjects are under the action of its constitutional principles; so that if children are in the kingdom of heaven, they are necessarily under the action of its constitutional principles. Where there is a kingdom, there is also a king, and he is Lord over all that belong to that kingdom; so that if children belong to the kingdom of heaven, Christ is their Lord and Saviour.

Again. On the day of Pentecost, when the multitude addressed Peter and the rest of the apostles with so much feeling, and said—"Men and brethren what shall we do?" Peter replied—"Repent and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of sins; and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Spirit. For the promise is to you and your CHILDREN, and to all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God shall call." The PROMISE, to which the apostle alluded, was that of the "new covenant"—or the charter of their ecclesiastical state under the new dispensation. This promise, and of course "the covenant," or dispensation, the apostle appropriates to them and their CHILDREN; and, on the ground of its extensive application, exhorts them to repent and be baptized. In like manner, when the Philippian jailor inquired of Paul and Silas what he should do to be SAVED? they replied—"believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be SAVED, and thy house"*—Can any one demand any

* OIKOS, or family.

farther statute, in reference to the church-membership of children? and that when he lays these explicit declarations alongside of the political principles which have just been stated?

But once more. When a particular case was referred by the church of Corinth to the apostle Paul on the subject of divorce, he replied—"The unbelieving husband is sanctified by the believing wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified by the believing husband: else were your children **UNCLEAN**; but now are they **HOLY**." Did the unbelieving husband, or wife, by being sanctified, become really **HOLY**? Surely not. The apostle uses the term officially, in order to state the constitutional principle on which children came into the new testament church, or the company of God's saints. If it were not as I have described to you, says the apostle, your children would be among the **UNCLEAN**—the unsanctified heathen.* Now they are not unclean, but holy—saints—belonging to God's sanctified ones. In like manner, this same apostle, describing the character of those who might be ordained as elders, mentions that they should have "faithful children." **FAITHFUL** is another term like "saint," and belongs to members of the church: and if children can be described as not unclean—as holy, or as saints—and as **FAITHFUL**, it seems to me that the most fastidious might be fully satisfied.

As not unclean, and as holy, under the former dispensation, children were circumcised, or had the seal of their ecclesiastical state under the jewish church. Why should they not now have the seal of their ecclesiastical state under the new testament church? Will you reply that circumcision was the seal of their national relations under the Sinaic covenant? Suppose I grant this: then it will follow, that children are identified with their parents in a political organization; which is one of the matters I insist on. But I must go farther and remind you, that circumcision

* Acts x. 28.

was appended to the Abrahamic covenant; and as such was "a seal of the righteousness of faith." Any one, who is acquainted with the bible, knows that the new testament church is a society under the Abrahamic covenant; and consequently under that covenant children are, and must be, members of that society. And farther, that man knows that the distinguishing attribute of this new society is "the righteousness of faith." But children had been entitled to the SEAL of the righteousness of faith; and that not only by the Sinaic ritual, but by the covenant with Abraham, whose children we are. Where is the statute by which they are deprived of that seal, seeing that the Abrahamic covenant is still in force? Let the opponent to infant baptism show his authority; or, taking the whole argument together, answer if he can. .

Speaking on the subject of a statute for infant baptism, it may not be amiss to observe, that the Redeemer calls upon parents to educate their children in his laws. According to the doctrine I am canvassing, he would then require them to obey the laws of a kingdom, which does not recognise them as subjects. The old testament was a RULE to the jewish church, and not to the gentile nations: the gentiles, Paul declares, had not the law, but were a law unto themselves. Now when Christ has given us the GOSPEL, understanding thereby the new dispensation, and has called and consecrated MANY NATIONS as his CHURCH, those, whom we call the heathen, are not under it, and shall not be judged by it. They stand to the new testament church in a relation similar to that in which the old gentiles stood to the old testament church. The law, of which I am speaking, and which requires parents to bring up their children in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, is a law of the new dispensation, AS SUCH. Of course children are members of this dispensation, because they are under its own peculiar laws. Those, who are not members of this dispensation and are not subject to its re-

gulations, are STRANGERS to the covenant of promise—ALIENS from the commonwealth of Israel. And none of these terms are applied to the children of believers. On the contrary, they are called SAINTS and FAITHFUL. It will not do to reply that parents are by nature required to bring up their children in the fear of God; because the statute to which I refer belongs to the bible, which is the rule to the CHURCH as such, and the subjects exhibited are those which belong to the DISPENSATION.* How then can children be under the municipal regulations of a community, of which they are not members.

It may not be amiss to inquire how this idea, which shuts children out of the christian community, could ever have been entertained? There must be some reason for it. The argument which is generally offered in its defence, cannot sustain it. That argument is so palpable a breach of general principles, that it always appears to me like a conclusion whose premises are not known. But I apprehend that the premises may be ascertained, though they lie far back; and that they will be found the fruitful source of many errors. To explain. In the second century the christian community, in imitation of pagan associations, was divided into two parts, which have been called CHURCH and CONGREGATION. For this distinction there is no warrant in the word of God. But when it was made, the question would of course arise—who are the members of the CHURCH? The ground on which the Saviour constructed his dispensation, or the principle of organization which brought in MANY NATIONS, and separated them as a peculiar PEOPLE, was abandoned; something purely spiritual was substituted for that which was political; and the tie, which united children with the christian community as the CHURCH, was broken. The scriptural doctrine of ELECTION was perverted, and instead of being a great political transaction of the Gover-

* See my Essay on Creeds chap. xi.

nor of the world applicable to the many nations, it was frittered down into the frigid dogma taught by Augustin, and afterwards by Calvin. And when the doctrines of election, of definite atonement, of particular redemption, &c. came in, I see not why the antipædobaptist might not bring in his heartless speculation, and unfeelingly drive children from the mercy-seat. In truth the ideas to which I have alluded, have made the subject of infant salvation a difficult problem among theological dogmatists every where. Abandon the distinction between church and congregation, come back to the broad views of the new dispensation afforded in the scriptures, and reason on the political principles necessarily belonging to "a peculiar PEOPLE," composed of MANY NATIONS and constituting THE CHURCH, and infant baptism will be restored in all its plainness and simplicity; while those forbidding peculiarities, called calvinistic, and which, in the view of so many, border so close on fatalism, will immediately disappear.

But I have followed this matter farther than I intended.—To return. Children were members of the jewish church; the annual atonement was made for the PEOPLE; therefore it was made for children, inasmuch as there cannot be a people or nation without children. That atonement was typical of Christ's sacrifice; his sacrifice must have been made for a people, and consequently children were included in his sacrifice. He was the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world; consequently the children of the whole WORLD are interested in the righteousness he fulfilled. ALL MEN are brought thereby into a justification of life; so that children are interested in this justification of life, and shall be raised from the dead to see God as HE IS. After having pressed our argument thus far, and ascertained the political relations of children under the government, or in the kingdom of Prince Mes-

siah, it only remains that we follow out the subject in view of their personal responsibilities. Then,

2. I inquire, may not children—do they not—sin against Christ? and if they do so sin, what must the issue with regard to them be? Here is the only connexion where any difficulty can possibly remain. Covered under the mediatorial mantle, and brought into “a justification of life” by the Mediator’s righteousness, their final salvation can be jeopardized in no other way than by their personal delinquencies. Accordingly theologians have not failed to advance certain most fearful and heart-breaking sentiments concerning the personal character of children. A child, they say, cannot believe, and is therefore destitute of evangelic virtue; and farther, they say, it actually sins as soon as it is born, and thereby deserves death under God’s righteous government;—in support of which harsh and aguish notions, the text will be quoted—“The wicked are estranged from the womb; they go astray as soon as they are born, speaking lies.”*

Now, while on the one hand, the psalmist, in the text quoted, is speaking of the development of youthful character in the midst of a corrupted community, and under the force of parental vices; *death*, on the other hand, we have seen, is the consequence of Adam’s sin, is not originally connected with personal responsibility, and cannot be incurred by, but is executed irrespective of, infantile errors. These defences of the theological dogmas in question, having been thus easily removed, the inability of the young to *believe* yet remains in our way. What does an adult believe? Just what may be represented to him as true, and as far as his ability to apprehend can embrace what is represented. And cannot children do the same thing? They may not be able to read and analyze a printed book—they may not know how to estimate lofty strains of eloquence, nor be competent to follow a long and ab-

*Psalms 58, 3.

struse argument, proceeding from the pulpit—they may not be intellectual enough to measure the manifestation which God has made of HIMSELF in the heavens and the earth, nor understand his “witness” always speaking in goodly tones in his providence. All this adults may be able to manage, while their children cannot. But God has provided for children their own ministers of grace, around the family fireside, in the parlour, in the chamber. And can they not, do they not, *believe* their parents, when speaking of Christ—his love and his sorrows? nay, do they not believe more implicitly than adults? The Redeemer seemed to recognise the pure moral character of children, when he said to his disciples—“Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.” Nor only so; but he warned his disciples not to “offend one of those little ones which *believed in*” him; thereby, in explicit terms, predicating *faith* of their mental exercises. But we must treat the subject more at large.

That children do many things which, abstractedly speaking, are wrong, and which, left to an operation purely legal, would work condemnation, or bring suffering until relief is obtained, no one can deny. The moral reasoner gains nothing, either for the cause of truth and benevolence, or for that of biblical exegesis and parental comfort, by denying the fact. This being admitted, it will be said—“Sin is transgression of law;” and thus children, by their own actual transgressions, incur the penalty of the law. What relief then has the parental heart? None, but in the sovereignty of God, it may be answered. And as that proceeds on a principle of election, we may be certain that *some* will be saved—it may be that a great many will be saved; but whether or not—or who—or how many—no one can tell. How such remarks try the soul! The heart bleeds, the eyes grow dim, the spirit droops, every nerve quivers, under such preaching. By what authority

do ministers of the gospel thus torture the spirits of believers, whose children God promised to take into covenant with himself? or the feelings of any, of any nation, to whom they are sent to preach the gospel? By what right do they thus limit the action of the first promise under which the world was called to live in hope? or the "riches of grace" and "riches of glory," which the new covenant has spread out over christian communities? The Master never gave them such a commission; and no ordination vows they ever assumed can justify such official severities.

It appears to me that theologians uniformly suppose that temporal death is the result of *personal sin*. On no other supposition can their argument rest. Then, as infants *die*, it will follow that they have personally sinned. But this is not the scriptural view of death, as has been abundantly proved. Death is the consequence of Adam's sin. "In Adam all die." "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin." "By one man's offence death reigned by one." "It is appointed unto man once to die." The political operation—for such it is—is the great proof of the scriptural doctrine that sin will bring misery:—proof inscribed on *nature*, to which even they must yield who so proudly affect to condemn the bible. Controvertists have, I conceive, forgotten that "we are not under the law, but under grace;" that law was put under mediatorial restrictions when the first promise was given; and that the bible unfolds the philosophy of this new and evangelic policy. The law, it is true, was again introduced—it entered privily, among the jews—they sinned like Adam—they therefore mourned under a "ministration of death" and "condemnation:" but this has long since decayed and vanished away. Has the law come in a third time? Do we sin like Adam? Are we under a "ministration of death and condemnation?" Within this periphery, it appears to me, that theologians are always

circulating their dogmas; and therefore they reach conclusions which they cannot sustain to the common sense of mankind, and by which they can do nothing but torture the parental heart. It is doubtless true that—"Sin is transgression of LAW;" but it is equally true that, "sin is not imputed where there is NO LAW." And law was not "from Adam to Moses," during which period mankind did not sin after the similitude of Adam's transgression." LAW IS NOT NOW, and has not been since the old covenant vanished away; so that none now "sin after the similitude of Adam's transgression"—neither adults nor infants. Our infants are not under "the ministration of death."

It is not a little strange, that mere abstract law should be judicially applied to the case of infants. For even in political science with which you are all familiar—and you must remember that civil government is an ordinance of God, and the human being is its subject—in political science abstract law cannot be carried out. Law must be administered on mediatorial principles, and with a view to reformation. Or, in so far as it is not, our political rulers commit mistakes, from whose consequences physical power cannot extricate them. The Redeemer is a "*Priest* on his throne," governing the world by love; and at first the civil ruler was both prince and priest. The philosophy of the divine and the human governments is thus the same. To exemplify. LAW forbids one man to take the life of another, and threatens death. Let us suppose that life has been taken. The law then has been violated. But life was taken ignorantly or accidentally, and the penalty is not in that case incurred. Mediatorial principle comes in and modifies the action of law, and the sin of ignorance is not punished. "Malice prepense," knowledge, purpose, must be proved, to produce conviction.—Other alleviating circumstances might warrant an appeal to the pardoning power reserved to the chief magistrate, and the mediatorial principle will again be displayed.—In causes of a different

nature, and under a multitude of forms, LAW would utter a decision which would be very oppressive, and political science must refer such causes to a "court of equity." Mere law, however righteous in view of abstract principle, will not answer for society in its present condition. And yet on mere law the whole argument rests, which has originated all the doubts concerning the destiny of infants; and that too, when, not only has the gospel come in, in terms most forceful and tender, but when Jehovah most specifically appropriates its provisions to those who are the most helpless—the Levite, the stranger, the widow, the fatherless and the orphan—as though the more helpless a human being is, the more certainly we may calculate on divine grace.

I know very well, that the law of the state presumes no man to be ignorant of its statutes. It is a part of the necessary rigour of LAW. Man cannot judge the heart; and for this reason, as well as from its own nature, mere law cannot be relaxed. For that very reason the pardoning power has been entrusted to the magistrate; and for that same reason the sympathies of the public mind so often and so readily appeal to principles of equity. So in the government of God, causes, as is necessary, hasten on to their legitimate effects; while yet the individual, who may appear criminal under the operation, shall be pardoned by both God and man. The interminglings of the personal and the political systems require this double action. But can any of us be strangers to the wisdom of a policy, or to the morality of the jurisprudence which leans to the side of mercy? And yet theologians, living under the mediatorial government, and continually discoursing about its attributes, seem to know no remedial principle which can cover the case of INFANTS. These are unceremoniously thrown under the action of abstract law, and as "sin is transgression of law," they have incurred its penalty; and can you believe they must perish? Are you doubtful?

cannot the mediatorial government rescue, save, and glorify them with the Redeemer on high? Pardon me—I cannot, must not, dare not, follow the sectarian in his petrifying speculations.

We must fix a different centre, or use a larger radius, when we would describe the evangelic circle. It has already been admitted that “sin is transgression of LAW.” But law has been put under mediatorial restrictions. Mankind are called upon to believe. The question then is, what is *sin* under this new form of moral obligation? As most assuredly our accountability must be regulated by the government under which we live, sin must be defined by the statute which that government has proclaimed; and of every other rule *ignorance* must necessarily be presumed. Accordingly “the Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment to the Son;” neither shall we be judged by the law, but by the gospel. How then does the evangelic legislator and judge estimate and explain sin? This question you must answer, in order to take an intelligent view of the subject before us. Would you go to the charter of a monarchy, in order to ascertain the constitution of a republic? or to a code of criminal law, when you would define the powers of a court of equity?

The apostle James has told us, that “to him who KNOWETH to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is SIN.” The apostle Paul has said—“Happy is he who condemneth not himself in that thing which he alloweth. And he that doubteth is damned if he eat, because he eateth not of faith: FOR WHATSOEVER IS NOT FAITH IS SIN.” He acts contrary to his knowledge.

Jesus told the jews—“If ye were BLIND ye should have NO SIN; but ye say, we see, therefore your sin remaineth;” and said of them—“If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had SIN: but now they have no cloak for their sin. If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin: but now

they have both seen and hated both me and my father.”* The jews should be judged by the law, because they were under it; the gentiles were not under it, and could not be judged by it. Christians shall be judged by the rules of the second covenant, or of the new dispensation, because they are under it; the heathen shall not be judged by those rules, because they have not received those rules. “How shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? How shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they preach except they be sent?” And yet the heathen shall be judged by the gospel, for “faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God. And have they not heard? Yes verily, their sound went unto all the earth, and their words unto the ends of the world.”† If they sin against the GOSPEL, or against the word of the Lord, which has gone to them, though they may not know the present dispensation under which we live, or though they may not have the new testament scriptures, as the old gentiles had not the old testament scriptures—if they sin against nature, as we sin against the special act of revelation afforded to the election, they perish under the same evangelic principle of judgment, for they sin against KNOWLEDGE—the knowledge they have. “They perish without law.”

It is no wonder then that the philosophy of civil government should be like the philosophy of the divine government, for both are founded in nature. Nor is it any matter of wonder that theologians should have been involved in difficulty, and run out their speculations into such fearful consequences; for, in constructing their argument on law, abstractedly considered, they have forgotten the first promise, which placed the world under law in no other form than as it has been modified by mediatorial restrictions, and have abandoned NATURE. You see that SIN now, as it involves any of us as accountable beings, or as it is to be interpreted in connexion with our personal respon-

* John ix. 41. xv. 21, 24.

† Rom. x. 13—21.

sibility, must be transgression against *the word of the Lord which has come to us*—against our KNOWLEDGE—the knowledge which, from the nature of the case, we must be supposed to have. All else are sins of IGNORANCE, and are covered by the great sacrifice.

But even with these restrictions, we have not stated the whole indulgence afforded by the evangelic institute. The judgment of ignorance, or the presumption of knowledge, is not committed to our discernment, or to our hasty and partial, and censorious criticism. All this belongs to the Searcher of hearts, whose ways are not like our ways and whose thoughts are not like our thoughts; but whose ways and thoughts are as far from ours, as heaven is distant from earth, or east from west. The old testament prophetesses “made the hearts of the righteous sad, whom God had not made sad;” and the leaders of the people caused them to err. The Redeemer noticed the absurdity of the popular theologians of his day, who were foolish enough to mark the mote in their brother’s eye, and to forget the beam that was in their own; and positively refused to entrust to his disciples the difficult and delicate task of separating the tares from the wheat. Well knowing that they would ignorantly, or recklessly, or in the heat of party zeal, “pluck up the wheat with the tares,” he reserved the judicial distinctions for the day of judgment; never hinting the bestowment of that “infallibility” to which, with such monstrous absurdity, some have since pretended.

Now then throw the problem of infant salvation under the light of these principles, and where is the difficulty? Has the word of the Lord come to infants? Have they read the volume of nature or revelation? Have they heard, that they might believe? Have their “senses been exercised to discern both good and evil? Do they sin against knowledge? if they have done many things which, judged of by mere law, are wrong, have they KNOWN to do good? and in not doing it, sinned? The church under the Jewish law was a child under age. Was perdition her

fate? Were her sins then committed against knowledge? Was the sacrifice, offered for sins of ignorance, and for the **WHOLE**, of no use? or did the gospel, as preached to Abraham, as involved in the typical character of the institute they had received, or as wrapped up in the mystery of which their official circumstances formed a part, cover every iniquity; and protect them from the consequences of sin committed against law? Did the covering cherubim, overspreading the mercy-seat, hide the law? Has the mediatorial righteousness of the Son of God been thrown as a mantle over the sins of this typical child? and can you feel any difficulty about your little ones? whom the Redeemer has recognised as belonging to the kingdom of heaven, and whose angels do always behold the face of your Father which is in heaven.

Farther. When the Redeemer told his disciples—"Except you be converted, and become as **LITTLE CHILDREN**, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven;" but "whosoever shall humble himself as this little child, the same is greatest in the kingdom of heaven; and whoso shall receive one such little child, receiveth me; but whoso shall offend one of these little ones which believe in me, it were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depth of the sea"—how much "sin," as "transgression of law," does he charge against infants? When he "took little children in his arms, and put his hands on them and blessed them," and assigned as the reason—"of such is the kingdom of heaven;" when his apostle said, that the unbelieving husband is sanctified by the believing wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified by the believing husband, in both of which cases the children are **HOLY**; and when the same apostle exhorted the corinthians—"Brethren be not children in understanding, howbeit in **MALICE** be ye children, but in understanding be ye men;" how much "sin as transgression of law," would theologians suppose them to aver in

the case of children? Do you not perceive that the condition of children is professedly covered by the righteousness of the Son of God.

The theological dogma, with which we are in conflict, seems to have been advanced without any reference to the attributes of the new covenant. Describing that institute, Jehovah long since promised by his prophet, as quoted by his apostle—"I will be merciful to their unrighteousness, and their sins and their iniquities I will remember no more;" and yet ministers of the new testament can discern nothing moral in the condition of infants, saving that they are SINNERS. Perhaps they will reject the promise just recited, as having no application to the case in hand, although it was originally given in reply to the proverb—"The fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge," and was therefore professedly intended to meet the action of social law. They may, perhaps, as rapidly despatch the clause which can be adduced from the second commandment, and which evidently belongs to the general administration of the divine government—"I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me, and showing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and keep my commandments." Children, it might be churlishly said, are not mentioned here, although the last clause is palpably correlative with the first; and the continuous operation of social law under different institutes, appears to be the very thing, and the only thing, that is stated. Let the Spirit himself speak—"The mercy of the Lord is from everlasting to everlasting upon them that fear him, and his righteousness unto CHILDREN'S CHILDREN."

But our commentary may be still resisted; or, while it may be admitted that children are referred to, it may still be urged that the quotations do not cover the whole subject, and that they only state exceptions; for the language

is evidently applied to "them that fear him," and to their children. Then let me ask, why the children of those? The exceptions, admitting them to be such, are ranged under a particular rule, and are therefore not arbitrary nor mysterious. That rule expresses the very principle—the connexion between righteousness and life—which Jehovah is carrying out every where; and it expresses that principle as belonging to social law. The symbolical character of the new covenant is therefore the reason of the operation; and the new covenant is a symbol of gospel. Now gospel rests on the righteousness of Christ as bringing all men into a justification of life. The symbolical action is consequently the proof of the general action—the particular exceptions confirm the general rule—ALL INFANTS are, therefore, covered by the mediatorial righteousness of the Son of God. They are identified with the mediatorial system, just as they are with the intellectual system—just as they are with the animal system—just as they are with the political system; and no difficulty occurs any where but in theology. Parents carefully cherish the bodies of their children, and never doubt their resurrection because their bodies are small when they die; the annihilation of their spirits is not inferred because they had received no intellectual cultivation; their interest in the political institutions of the land is not denied—their rights in law are not rejected—because they have not apprehended political principles; and why should their rights in the mediatorial administration be so enigmatical?

In all ordinary cases children are put under tuition, and are not considered as culpable and degraded, because they are ignorant of doctrines and statutes beyond their years. And may not the mediatorial Prince place them "under tutors and governors," without rejecting them as guilty, and worthy of perdition, because they have not discerned both good and evil while their senses have not been exercised?—But here is the origin of all our ecclesiastical strife.—

Personal responsibility has been lost sight of; every thing is merged in the results of the social system; and that social system is always—or for the most part—considered to be violated LAW, bringing in death. Wherever good is the result, and the social operation is supposed to be merciful, why then we are told, it is an inexplicable *anomaly*—a glorious mystery of grace—God so determined in his sovereign purpose of election, and he gives no account of his actions. But how theologians can see so distinctly the connexion between Adam and children, while their vision is so indistinct in view of the relation between Christ and children, is the wonder. Could they but learn, that the mediatorial government recognises personal responsibility, that its design is to cultivate the moral sense, or make the moral agent perfect in view of conscience; and that the remedial operation consists in moral tuition under the superintending care of the Holy Spirit, their difficulties would be removed. Christ is the light of the world—the Holy Spirit convinces the world—knowledge is the attribute of the saint. There is no other principle of reformation, where sin—which is darkness and wraps the world in ignorance—prevails. Political economists must learn the value of the moral sense. Civilians must teach a better philosophy than that of abstract law. Theologians must turn from sectarian infallibility to conscience. After every other experiment has failed, moral education must display itself as the world's last hope; and when this only remedy shall have been fairly tried, “all shall know the Lord from the least unto the greatest.” In such a case, what other destiny can await those who die in infancy, than that which the gospel, the social system under which they live and die, brings to light—LIFE AND IMMORTALITY?

It may now, in conclusion, be asked, what shall infants, on the preceding principles, *praise* God for? I answer, for life and immortality—have their parents any more? But you may say, no sin is forgiven to them—but many sins

are forgiven to their parents. But how much sin have infants committed, even on the system we reject? As many as their parents? For what shall "elect infants" give praise? If Adam had never sinned, would he have had no harp to tune in glory? or, would his children, enjoying life and bliss in this world as the consequence of his righteousness, have passed through this life, without discovering objects for praise, or feeling influences that would wake up "melody in their hearts to the Lord?" These questions you see, drive us into a mere commercial comparison; and then, what can John have to give praise for compared with Peter or Paul? What trifling! when all God's character shall be understood, and all his glory shall be displayed—when moral excellence shall be set forth in its own cloudless brilliance and its supreme control—when we shall see GOD AS HE IS, and shall be like him—when those who have been brought from a world of sin and death—and, seated by the Redeemer on his throne, shall review the remedial operation which made them partakers of life and immortality—think you that children, gathered with the saints to know, admire and enjoy all these things, shall lack subjects of praise?—Ah! me. What a puny affair scholastic theology is! How could the world believe in the infallibility which counterfeited such dogmas in the name of the King of glory? or pay any respect to creeds, the symbols of such absurdities? It is high time these parables of a false philosophy, which never have made the worshippers perfect in view of conscience, should be cast, with the idols of the heathen, "to the moles and the bats."

Our conclusion then is—That infants are placed under the government of Jesus Christ, who is made Head over all things: that they are partakers of life and immortality as brought to light by the gospel: and that their character is developing under a system which holds their race responsible, each according to his ability, or according to the light dispensed. If, as infants, they die, they are made par-

takers of life and immortality ;—and as it cannot be said of them, “they knew to do good, and did it not,” nothing is in plea against them at the bar of the Judge of all the earth.

LECTURE XVIII.

Reason why Jehovah-Elohim sent our first parents out of Eden—The principle of Labor—Jewish Laws—Provisions for the Poor—New Testament regulations—Origin and evil of Public Charities—State of Society—Remedies—Ecclesiastical mistakes—General conclusions.

The new constitution, so precisely suited to man as *personally* responsible, having been announced, Jehovah-Elohim sent our first parents out of the garden which he had planted for them, and which had become the scene of their crime and shame. Why did he do so? Why did he not suffer them to remain and enjoy its beauties and its fruits? Was not this step unnecessarily severe? These questions merit a deliberate answer.

The historian represents Jehovah-Elohim as tenderly commiserating the situation in which these unhappy beings had involved themselves by sin; and assigning their ejection from paradise to the same general cause.—“And Jehovah-Elohim said—Behold the man has become as one of us, to know good and evil. And now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever; therefore Jehovah-Elohim sent him forth from the garden of Eden to till the ground from whence he was taken.” As Adam had brought himself into the condition of the knowledge of good and evil, by eating of the forbidden fruit, he might still continue to eat

of the trees of the garden—and might so *live forever*. To prevent his thus living forever, he was driven to till the ground from whence he had been taken.

The reason seems to be sufficient. But the question is—what is really meant by it? Are we to suppose that if Adam had eaten of the trees of life, he would have never *died*? Perhaps the generality of readers have taken up this very impression; and do in fact suppose that, by these means, he would have escaped death. Nor is it easy to see how any one, from the first view of the case, could avoid entertaining that idea. But is it not strange that Adam himself never thought of this expedient—at least so far as the narrative reports. Instead of sewing fig-leaves together, he might, if he did not, have resorted to this simple and better remedy. Is it not strange that Satan never suggested it? And stranger still, that Jehovah-Elohim should have prevented it, when he was professedly stating the outlines of a remedial plan? or that he should have excluded Adam from the means of living forever, when the very object of Christ's death and resurrection is to bring in eternal life?—This view, arising so directly from the appearance which the narrative gives to the fact, cannot be sustained.

Moreover, the *physical* agency, by which death was brought in, was the ground, as *cursed*. The tree of life, if such a particular tree there was, must have been material in its own nature; and consequently, being subject to the deleterious influence, under which all material things change and wither, it was liable to decay. How could it, while under the general sentence which followed Adam's sin, be the means of imparting everlasting life to him? The idea is manifestly most incongruous—there is nothing, in any form, plausible about it.*

It has farther been supposed, that though Adam, by eating of the trees of life, would have lived *forever*, yet

*Lecture VIII.

he would have led a life of misery. But from what source would this misery have proceeded? That source must have been external or internal. If the first, in what way could external agents injure an immortal being? Could they inflict disease? Could they make him feel the sensation of want? Could they occasion any alarms? If internal, then what would his misery be? Not disease—for disease is the working of death; disease could make no impression upon his immortal imperishable frame. Would it be a sense of guilt? Then this *living forever* would be only temporal life; and where, when, and how, has spiritual life, which theologians carry in their speculations up to this very point, been dropped from their thoughts? According to this view man would live forever, while he was spiritually dead; and as the consequence of eating of the tree of life! i. e. consistently with the doctrine under consideration—the consequence of Adam's eating of the forbidden fruit was temporal, spiritual, and eternal death. But it is supposed that eating of the trees of life would have controlled the sentence, and man should not have died. Then surely, if his eating of the trees of life would have controlled the effects of his eating the forbidden fruit, the consequence of eating the forbidden fruit could not have been death temporal, spiritual, and eternal; or the consequence of his eating of the tree of life would be life, temporal, spiritual, and eternal. No sense of guilt could exist in the case, and the account of the fall is a mere fable.

The truth is, that this whole matter turns upon the force of the original word, rendered FOREVER. Now this word, as formerly observed, may signify endless duration; but it does not necessarily do so. It is as often finite, as it is infinite, when used by the scriptural writers; and it implies a duration that is not known, but which may be longer or shorter, according to the nature of the particular subject to which it is applied. To repeat the examples already

adduced. If a hebrew servant did not wish to "go out free," his master was required to bring him to the judges, and to the door post, and to bore his ear through with an awl; which being done, he became a servant FOREVER. So Hannah proposed to bring her child Samuel to the temple, that he might appear before the Lord, and there abide FOREVER. The passover was established as an everlasting memorial:—"You shall keep it," said Jehovah, "a feast to Jehovah throughout your generations; you shall keep it a feast, by an ordinance, FOREVER." In the case before us, as in that of the hebrew servant, the term is simply applied to the duration of a man's life. Adam was driven from the garden to prevent him from spending his life in eating of the fruit of the trees of life; and he was sent out to *till* the ground from whence he had been taken. The term *forever*, and the circumstances of the case, call for nothing more: and this interpretation leaves the whole matter plain and unembarrassed.*

The Lord had just informed Adam that, in consequence of his sin, he had forfeited his peculiar privileges; that he was now destined to a life of labor; that he should from henceforth obtain his bread by the sweat of his brow; and that the earth would bring forth briars and thorns unto him, which would occasion much toil and sorrow. This would certainly be any thing but an agreeable prospect to one who had been accustomed to better circumstances; and he would very naturally prefer to live on the fruit of the trees of life, growing luxuriantly and spontaneously, rather than to eat the herb of the field, which was to be the product of his own labor. Jehovah-Elohim therefore interferes, and puts him directly under the necessities of the condition to which he had reduced himself; breaks up all those associations which could now lead only to indolent and hurtful indulgence, and sends him forth to *work*. Thus was established the operative system, which has re-

*Lectures VII. VIII. Kennicott's Dissertation on the Tree of Life.

ferred the means of human subsistence to human labor; a system which must be perpetuated with all the coming generations of mankind; and which shall be as steadfastly kept up as the sun in its course. Labor or starvation is the simple alternative. There is no escaping from it; there is no modifying it; there is no putting forth the hand to pluck the fruit of the trees of life; nor can the experiment of a different system be tried in any form, without inflicting an injury upon individuals and upon society—an injury which will be felt to the whole extent of the experiment. Here is the first principle of political economy; and the true and only remedy for the immense evils of pauperism, which no effectual method has yet been devised to arrest.—This principle I now propose to consider at large, and in its various bearings on society: as such a discussion may, perhaps, be the very best form in which the wisdom and goodness of God to man, in removing him from Eden, may be made to appear; while, at the same time, the doctrine of *personal responsibility* will be still farther illustrated.

Under the jewish polity, this same system was made the basis of all the political regulations, which Moses, by the divine appointment, enacted. There were many statutes then enforced, which may appear to a modern reader very singular, perhaps even objectionable, and which are altogether inappropriate now. But circumstances have been very much altered; society, then young and immature, has now arrived at full age; bondage and minority have been exchanged for liberty and manhood; and the external policy, which must be sustained in view of the present condition of mankind, is necessarily different from that which any legislator could then have adopted. Still the general principles, which belong to the intellectual and animal natures of man, must be essentially the same; and Moses regarded nothing with a more careful eye, than he did the indissoluble connexion between human labor and

human subsistence, which God established on that eventful day, when he sent our first parents from the garden.

Moses did not forget *the poor*; or push the system so far as to disregard the emergencies which are continually occurring; and under which a fellow man might "fall into decay"—as he expresses it. His code has specified several provisions, by which the poor might be relieved from any present distress; but they seem to have been intended rather to preserve, than to set aside the original system, with which the Mediator commenced his administration. They are such as follow—"when ye reap the harvest of the land, thou shalt not wholly reap the corners of thy field, neither shalt thou gather the gleanings of thy harvest. And thou shalt not glean thy vineyard, neither shalt thou gather every grape of thy vineyard; thou shalt leave them for the poor and stranger."* "Six years thou shalt sow thy land, and shalt gather in the fruits thereof. But the seventh year thou shalt let it rest and lie still; that the poor of thy people may eat: and what they leave, the beasts of the field shall eat. In like manner thou shalt deal with thy vineyard and oliveyard."†

The poor then had the seventh year—they had the corners of the field—the gleanings of the field, of the vineyard, and of the oliveyard. What was thus to be acquired, called for their own labor; and was not a single gratuity bestowed upon the idle and dissolute. Neither was the labor compulsory, any farther than the actual necessities of life made it so—a sort of compulsion, which, by the laws of his own being, every man should feel, and ought to feel. But it was not the compulsion of LAW. Every thing was left to the moral force of the individual character of the poor. The supply which was thus afforded, did most sacredly regard their character, and was intended to cherish it as far as the nature of the case would allow. Nor yet was the provision thus made of a *public* description, furnish-

* Lev. xix. 9—11.

† Exod. xxiii. 10, 11.

ing a protracted series of degrading statistics, and handing down from age to age the palsyng records of a public establishment. Every man was the almoner of his own bounty, the trustee of his own charity; and the poor, who gleaned in his fields and vineyards and oliveyards, gathered by their own labor whatever they could, thinking of, dreading, feeling, no public exposure. In all this there was no degradation of the poor; no depressing them in their own esteem; no unfeeling attraction of the public eye to their condition; no dissolving of the ties which bound them to society; no breaking up of the mutual sympathies, which resulted from their being brethren and enjoying a common heritage; but relief was afforded in the safest, the most humane and honorable manner. Or if it may be supposed that any degradation was experienced by these eleemosynary provisions, yet they are evidently designed to make that degradation as light, and to counteract it as far as possible—by calling out, on the part of the poor, whatever character they had; and taking from the bounty itself much of the appearance of a gratuity: and by not only securing to the poor the heart-felt sympathies of their brethren, but taking care that those sympathies should not run riot, and become the mere ebullitions of undisciplined feeling. The question of almsgiving was thus put into all its moral connexions; and the almoner had something more to do, than merely to shed a tear and give a mite. The poor man was his neighbor, became his companion, and might be courted as his fellow traveller to eternity. He is thy BROTHER, said Moses.

Among the hebrews, it was a custom to tithe all the increase of their seed; to go up to the place where the Lord had chosen to put his name; and to eat before the Lord. They carried thither the tithe of their corn, of their wine, of their oil, and of the firstlings of their herds, and of their flocks. Or if they thought the way too long, or found it very inconvenient to carry up their tithe to the chosen

place, they were at liberty to sell their tithe; and, taking the money, they might on the spot, buy whatsoever their soul lusted after, oxen, sheep, wine, strong drink, or whatever they desired—and feast with their households before the Lord. On these great festivals they were not to forget the levite, who had no inheritance among them, nor the stranger, nor the fatherless, nor the widow. This was another provision in behalf of the *poor*, which was calculated to affect their character and standing in the community, in a very favorable manner. It preserved their brotherhood and prevented their sinking into disgrace; it stimulated them to action, and cherished their most honorable feelings; it hushed their complaints and awakened their best affections; it tutored even the orphan in social virtue, by extending the fostering care of a kind parentage, and prepared him, not only to display the most enthusiastic patriotism, but the most filial regard to the religious institutions of the land. Politically and morally considered, it must ever be a most disastrous occurrence, when the poor are cut off from their interest in the state, or from the friendships and great social movements of the community to which they belong. They grow, in such a case, into a distinct, independent, and degraded class; and they acquire an anomalous character, which fits them to commit depredations on society, or prepares them to execute a despot's will. Moses wisely prevented all this; and, by preserving, them in their political and moral standing as an integral part of society, he secured all their feelings and efforts in harmony with the general weal. His statute was founded on principles of a fine moral cast, which the Redeemer himself distinctly recognised, when he said—"When thou makest a supper or a dinner, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren, neither thy kinsmen, nor thy rich neighbors; lest they also bid thee again, and a recompense be made thee. But when thou makest a feast, call the poor, the maimed, the lame, the blind; and thou shalt be blessed, for they cannot re-

compense thee : for thou shalt be recompensed at the resurrection of the just."

Moses farther provided for the poor, by requiring that their wages should be faithfully and promptly paid ; by affording them every facility to redeem their land when it was sold ; and by liberally assisting them, when they were reduced to want ; i. e. according to the laws he ordained, the poor must not be oppressed nor maltreated ; their hardships must not be cruelly increased ; but rather they themselves must be sustained and helped. "Thou shalt not," said this lawgiver, "harden thy heart, nor shut thine hand from thy poor brother ; but thou shalt open thine hand wide unto him, and shalt surely *lend* him sufficient for his need, in that which he wanteth. Beware that there be not a thought in thy wicked heart, saying—the seventh year, the year of release is at hand ; and thy eye be evil against thy poor brother, and thou givest him nought." This assistance was to be afforded by *lending* to the poor according to their necessity, and was to be extended cheerfully and with all integrity. It was not a public charity, but a matter of private concern, by which a sufferer was enabled to meet some emergency, without any sacrifice of character.

It is true, Moses had no *beggars*, as they are now termed, to provide for. Why, or how, on his principles of legislation, which were so admirably calculated to tutor and elevate the moral feelings, both of the giver and the receiver, should he have any ? Indeed, says Michaelis—"If we trace back the history of most nations, to their ancient state of general poverty, we shall find, the farther we go back, that beggars more and more decrease, until they almost entirely disappear in *statu naturæ*. Perhaps, instead of them, we may occasionally meet with an account of some brave man, who by the labor of his hands, could scarcely earn bread enough for himself and his children ; and who actually was under the apprehension of starving,

when, to save his country, he was called from the plough to the dictatorship."* All this is to be accounted for, on the one hand, by that vigor of individual character, whose force and delicacy Moses seemed to be so anxious to preserve; and on the other, by the absence of those public charities, which have corrupted the poor without relieving them. The Mosaic law comes in as a commentary on the general statute, given at first; and which made the means of subsistence to depend on human labor.

In the new testament, our subject is presented in the same general form; and the principles which belong to it are very briefly, but very distinctly, stated. "The laborer" is emphatically declared to be "worthy of his hire;" and the withholding of it is very severely reprehended. "Behold," says James, "the hire of the laborers which have reaped down your fields, which is of you kept back by fraud, crieth; and the cries of them which have reaped are entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth."—The necessity for labor is declared with equal point: and the neglect of it is condemned with equal severity:—"For even when we were with you," said Paul, "this we commanded you, that if any man would not work, neither should he eat. For we hear that there are some who walk among you disorderly, working not at all, but are busy bodies. Now them that are such, we command and exhort by our Lord Jesus Christ, that with quietness they work, and eat their own bread." And again—"But if any provide not for his own, and especially for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel." Christianity therefore, is, in this respect, "the same now that it was when the Seed of the woman was promised, and man was sent forth to till the ground whence he was taken.

Legislation for the poor has not been forgotten by the apostles, as is very evident from a great variety of facts,

* Comment. art. 142.

which it is scarcely necessary to repeat. Paul, speaking of the reception he had met with from Peter, James and John, remarks—"Only they would that we should remember the poor; the same which I also was forward to do." It was not uncommon to have collections made by the churches, for the relief of the poor; and though Paul sanctioned and directed them, yet he seems to have his own fears of the consequences, and appeared very anxious that this species of public charity should be confined to those who are "widows indeed." In writing to Timothy, he directs—"If any widow have children or nephews, let them learn first to show piety at home, and to requite their parents; for that is good and acceptable before God." And again—"If any man or woman that *believeth* have widows, let them relieve them, and let not *the church* be charged: that it may relieve them that are widows indeed. Had these rules been duly regarded, and had their philosophy been understood, the state and the church might have been saved at this time a thousand evils, under which they are ineffectually, but loudly, complaining.

The Master himself, in correcting the many abuses which he detected in his own house, reproved the pharisees, because they taught, that a man might take that *portion* of his substance with which he should have supported an aged father or mother, and present it as a gift to the sanctuary. Such offerings were not acceptable in God's sight.—When, at another time, he discovered the pharisees, distributing their alms in the most *public* and ostentatious manner, he described them as a set of hypocrites, and took occasion to lay down this general rule—"When thou doest alms, let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth; that thine alms may be in secret: and thy Father, which seeth in secret, himself shall reward thee openly." A rule which has long since been forgotten, and given place to *public* charities, so extensive and splendid, as to leave the pharisees far out of sight, and to actuate a large class in socie-

ty, anomalous in character and degraded in life, with which neither church nor state knows what to do.

It is very evident that there is nothing exaggerated in the preceding delineation of society, taken from the scriptural pages. The principles are all plain and simple ; carrying their own evidence along with them, and commending themselves to every man's understanding. They are easily enumerated.—Every man should support himself by his own labor.—Every man should support his own family by his own labor ; or every family should have in itself the means of its own support.—Every poor man, who really needs assistance, ought to have it, but nothing more ; i. e. he must labor as far as he can.—Every poor man who has become really disqualified to labor, should be sustained by others.—This assistance, or support, must be derived in the most private and considerate manner ; so that, while the poor man's physical wants are supplied, his moral character may not be injured, nor his moral sense be impaired ; so that, when his distress may have passed by, he may resume his own labor for his own support.—This assistance, or support, should be extended by the poor man's immediate relatives, family connexions, or personal friends ; or, in the event of their incapacity, by his neighborhood.—None but an extreme case indeed ought to be referred to the church. Public establishments, set up by law, can do nothing but mischief, for it is impossible that they should not, sooner or later, and to the whole extent of their means, interfere with all the principles of human society.

These views, which commend themselves to every man, are in actual operation now. They always have been, and always must be, in operation. And up to this point many of the poor do help themselves, rise above their difficulties, and command respect and confidence. But beyond this point, whenever private benevolence becomes indiscriminate and disregards the essential principle of human subsistence, and PUBLIC CHARITIES begin to display themselves, a new condition of society supervenes ; and an un-

suspected evil is betrayed, which quickly demands an extension of these charities. These charities are extended, and the evil soon overtakes and goes beyond them, and loudly calls for more. It fastens itself on the body politic, like a horse-leach, crying, give, give. Such is pauperism and its history.

The ancient monastic institutions, says Blackstone, "supported and fed a very numerous and very idle poor, whose sustenance depended on what was daily distributed in alms at the gates of the religious houses. But, upon the total dissolution of these, the inconvenience of thus encouraging the poor in habits of indolence and beggary, was quickly felt throughout the kingdom; and abundance of statutes were made in the reign of king Henry the eighth, for providing for the poor and impotent; which, the preambles to some of them recite, had of late years *strangely* increased."* Almshouses, hospitals, parish allowances or poor rates, followed; to which have been added work-houses, or houses of industry, and charitable societies without end.

The provisions which have been made to relieve these hordes of paupers, have all originated in the most benevolent feelings, both on the part of individuals, and on that of the different legislatures. But as church and state were blended together, the ecclesiastical ideas, which gave rise to the monastic institutions, and which had made almsgiving a very important item in preparation for heaven, not only pervaded the general mind, but they were carried into the councils of the nation. Thus that, which had been one of the very worst effects of the monasteries, was reproduced by the royal prerogative, and stalked forth in giant form; having exchanged its ecclesiastical habiliments for the civilian's gown. So we have the evil now; and perhaps not altogether divested of the religious sentiment, which the Caliph Omar Ebn Abd'alaziz has so forcefully expressed—"Prayer carries us half way to God, fasting brings us to the

* Com. B. 1, ch. 9.

door of his palace, and alms procures for us admission." After all, let the character of the feeling, in which these institutions originated, be what it may, yet the consequence has been most disastrous; not only to society, but to the poor themselves. A few extracts may confirm our statements.

One writer remarks:—"Since the poor laws were established, however humane and judicious in their first institution, by affording a certain provision for infancy and age, we find pauperism has been continually increasing; and that, with growing wealth, the laboring poor have become more and more numerous and depressed."

Another writer observes—"Those most impolitic of all impolitic laws, were unquestionably established on principles, and from motives, that do honor to the feelings of the legislative body of the time in which they were enacted. They were considered, not only by those who framed and supported them, but by all sensible and intelligent people, as the wisest and most philanthropic of human institutions. They had for their chief object the comfortable sustenance of those, who, feeble through age or misfortune, were rendered incapable of exerting themselves in such a manner as to procure by labor a sufficient supply of the necessities of life, and that by means the most rational; namely, by compelling those who possessed none, or but a small share, of 'the milk of human kindness,' to contribute in an equal proportion with those, who, from liberal and benevolent dispositions, would have continued to do so without legal compulsion. It was expected that the enacting of these laws would have had the effect of introducing a spirit of industry among the lower ranks; which, while it tended to render the operation of the poor laws in a very small degree burthensome to the wealthy part of the community, would also have greatly promoted the prosperity of the nation. But how blind is human foresight, and how imperfect all human institutions! These laws, from the establish-

ment of which so many happy effects were expected to result, have tended to consequences of the most alarming nature; consequences which, if effectual measures are not speedily taken to avert them, may, and probably will, end in universal ruin.

“It is added, that, notwithstanding the enormous assessments to which the poor laws gave rise, they are by no means attended with the advantages which were expected. In place of tending to improve the morals, or increase the industry of the poor, they have had quite a contrary effect. It was but a short time after the enactment of these laws, that the public were insulted with the famous song of,

‘Hang sorrow, cast away care,
The parish is bound to maintain us.’

And how much this sentiment seems to be impressed on the minds of the generality of that description of people, for whose benefit these laws were framed, is well known to all who live under their influence. They require not to be reminded how necessary it is become to endeavor, by every possible means, to curb that spirit of licentiousness, which so generally reigns within the walls of a parish workhouse, whence shame, honesty and pride, seem to be forever banished.”*

The details of this subject are to the last degree distressing and frightful. The rapid increase of the number of this portion of the population; the shame and infamy, and disgrace, which their crimes necessarily produce, which no extent of bounty can ever relieve; but to whose progress, multiplied and misguided charities, both individual and public, must, and constantly do, lend accelerated force, might arouse the deepest slumbers of the community. The statistics of this onerous system have been often presented to the public, without producing any reformation, or leaving any more than an evanescent impression.

It is no part of my object to go out into these details.

Though they belong to the general subject, yet I am looking forward to a class of conclusions, which can be sustained without such troublesome minuteness. These shall appear in their time. I am, at present, merely preparing the way for them.

The question arises, and may be pressed with great propriety and force—how is society to be extricated from this terrible labyrinth? And certainly the answer is both near and distinct, if our statements, taken from the scriptures, be at all correct. There is manifestly neither discretion nor safety in going on, guided by the *ignis fatuus* that has already led us so far astray. The farther we go, the more rapidly the evil will grow, and the farther we may go. Every additional society, intended to relieve the poor, will injure the poor themselves, and add to the burthens which are declared to be already too onerous. To stand still, if that could be done, would be to leave the evil as we find it; and yet the evil could not remain stationary, because it has its own principle of amplification, which would ultimately carry us along with it. The evil itself must be assailed—effectually and successfully, and society be brought back under the force of scriptural laws. No other remedy remains. But how is that to be done?

In attempting to answer a question of this kind, it is indispensably necessary to ascertain the precise object in view. All the facts in the case serve to show that the poor themselves have become degraded; their conscious feeling of individuality is vitiated or impaired, or their moral sense is deadened. The great remedy is a *regeneration*, or a reviving of the moral sense. There is, therefore, in the political object to be achieved, something analogous to that which the great Redeemer himself is aiming to effect; and the principles on which he calculates as remedial, are those on which the operation in view must rely. His grand design is to bring information, varied and extensive—furnishing accurate views of our moral condition, to bear up-

on the human mind. At one time he established a great variety of symbolic institutions, and sent prophet after prophet to enforce and illustrate them. At another, he affords his bible, and organizes society under the inspection and sympathy of numerous ministerial helps. He makes every man a moral monitor to every other man; and calls upon all, by the light of the good works they behold, to forsake sin and turn to his commandments. He thus preserves the whole subject of morals, fairly and constantly before our eyes; and presides, by his Spirit, and in love, over the whole train of instruction thus imparted to us. By argument, by appeal, by entreaty, light is brought into the understanding, and impressions are left upon the heart. His kingdom is thus set up *within us*, and the sinner, learning to act from established principles and rectified views, acts correctly; and attains to those heavenly associations, whose members have all pure personal characters.

A like operation I would commend in the present case; and on the ground that it will be found as effectual as it is consistent, and as practicable as it is unequivocal. The poor must be *enlightened*, that they may be able to look at their own condition through another and a better medium; that they may acquire higher motives and more enlarged views; and that they may learn to multiply their own internal resources, and cherish feelings which will be utterly irreconcilable with their present degradation. The community may then repose confidence in all; as they can, and do now, in the better classes of the poor, whose views and feelings have not fallen below the consideration of personal individuality. Education is by far too expensive, and the poor feel it to be out of their reach. An inequality is thus created; and those who cannot enjoy early tuition, expend their minds on such objects as they meet; often reaching the extreme of vice, before they have known any thing of its enormity. Here then the remedial operation must commence; and as it proceeds, carrying light and liberty

and love along with it, a regenerating influence will be felt, which will ultimately redeem the whole class from infamy and distress. To the accomplishment of this object all the energies of the state, urged on by the wise and good, should be unweariedly directed; the consequences will repay them for their anxiety and toil, and rid them of an evil which has long been a political opprobrium.

I speak not of pauper schools, erected either by public charities, or by religious sectaries, or by the legacies of the rich. These I have ever considered to be of most hurtful tendency; though perhaps they may be the best form in which a mere gratuity can be conferred. But still such institutions treat the poor as *paupers*; and do not fairly identify their children as an integral part of the community. On the contrary, their children grow up with the very associations, with the very habits of thought and feeling, which the remedy proposed intends effectually to destroy. They who get their education as a gratuity, have only to take one step farther, and ask a support as a gratuity. Lessons of independence cannot be taught, without disgusting the pupil with the very institution from which they proceed; or, without disclosing to the child the parent's shame, betrayed by the very act of sending him to school. The influence of the higher classes is not brought to bear upon the poor, in a manner calculated to elevate them, or to cherish loftiness of sentiment; but rather the distinction is made wider, and a depressing influence is exerted; while those sympathies of life are withheld, which can be enjoyed only by a living intercourse. The Redeemer, carrying out his regenerating plan, allows us the most intimate fellowship with himself, and sends his Spirit to dwell in our bosom. The very idea of communion with him is calculated to elevate our thoughts, and to inspire us with lofty purposes and feelings. And in the secondary operation I am recommending, access to the higher classes, familiarity with them, the experience of

their kindness, and the sight of their smiles, would have the happiest effect upon the poor—both old and young. Pauper schools afford no opportunity for such communion, and leave no room for so fine a display of humanity. Moses secured all this, by his regulation of the various festivals which he enjoined; and by the liberty which he awarded to the poor, to go and glean in the fields of the rich. On no occasion ought the rich more distinctly to recollect the reason why Moses did this, than on the establishment of schools. The poor man is thy brother.

It may not be amiss here to observe, that in the higher remedial plan, which is carried out under the superintendence of Jehovah, he is fully and accurately informed on the whole subject with which his agency interferes. In like manner they who would engage in the benevolent enterprise of lifting the poor from their degradation, ought carefully to investigate the subject they seek to relieve. But unfortunately it happens, that they who give are as little aware of the consequences of giving, as they who receive. The community themselves do not understand the principles of pauperism. They see the evil only partially. They think it to be within the compass of their individual or social gratuities; and are grievously disappointed, when they find that their benevolent design has been frustrated. They search a little way for the cause; and, finding something which seems to be sufficient to produce the evil, they inveigh against the insidious agent they have detected; and so leave the whole matter until a periodical excitement again occurs, which again calls forth their unavailing complaints; and seeing no alternative but gratuity or starvation, their own feelings impel them still to give.

How often has intemperance, for example, been declared to be the cause of pauperism; and no doubt in a multitude of instances it has been the fell destroyer. But if there was no intemperance, there are other causes which would produce the whole evil. Pauperism may lead to intem-

perance, as well as that intemperance may lead to pauperism.

How often has pauperism been ascribed to bad and oppressive government; and a bad government is certainly one of the greatest of human calamities. But pauperism may be engendered under any form of government; and certainly will follow a system of legislation which enacts a code of poor laws. It has its own resources, and is characterized by its own attributes, which may be fully displayed independently of government.

Those principles, which are inherent in the subject, whatever they may be, should be fairly and fully canvassed, until both the rich and poor should understand them: or any effort which may be made to eradicate the evil, would be continually counteracted and thwarted; and the benevolent would again, as they did after the destruction of the monastic institutions, seek the coercion of LAW, to compel others to assist in bearing the burdens they had created. And we conceive that there is nothing which ought to be more distinctly impressed on the public mind, than this matter of *general education*; and not education, simply considered, but extended, as it ought to be, in an *honorable* manner; so as to secure both the intellectual and moral elevation of all classes. Again we repeat the important lesson which Moses taught—The poor man is thy brother.

Such a system of *education*—by its general character, as well as by the associations or intercourse it should create among the different classes of society—would carry a *moral* influence along with it, and to the whole extent of pauperism. The Mediator, in seeking the moral reformation of our race through the medium of instruction, sustains an operation of LOVE; nor is there any truth which he more intensely labors to impress upon the human mind, than this very fact—that God is *good*, and really desires to promote our present and everlasting welfare. Such should be the

character of the enterprise now suggested. The greatest benefit which can be conferred on a human being, is to furnish him, in an *honorable* manner, with the means of *intellectual* cultivation. It will be received as an inestimable boon; as the strongest expression of kindness which could be afforded, and as the certain means of attaining whatever is within the reach of human effort. He who engages in the undertaking, feels that he is aiming at a magnificent object, which will absorb his best affections, and carry a purifying influence to his own bosom. There is something in the very nature of the operation, which necessarily assimilates it to the evangelical purposes of Jehovah; so that, when it is fairly tried, it quickly develops, as wrapped up within itself, the principles of its own execution. It has a thousand adjuvants, which are immediately called to its aid; and there are a thousand unfavorable circumstances, which it readily controls, or quickly removes. Instead of restraining the poor by the presence of *power*, it animates them by the demonstration of *love*. It substitutes kindness for whips and scorpions, and the excitements of hope for the shiverings of fear. It represses trains of suspicions and jealousies, and promotes a reciprocal confidence. It elicits whatever is good, and restrains the jarring passions of human nature, which are ever ready to run into the extreme of licentiousness, under the influence of the most vulgar and grovelling temptations. In short, such a general system of education confirms the various ties of life, mingles heart with heart, and identifies the whole of society in the pursuit of common objects, and the enjoyment of common interests. All the better classes of society, by their mutual respect and their harmonious operation, demonstrate the truth of our remarks; and the poor, brought under the same influences, would stand regenerated before us, fitted for the noblest deeds, and stimulated by the purest feelings. Whereas, on the other hand, frowns and penalties, which remove them to a distance, degraded by igno-

rance, and wretched through apprehension, destroy every thing that is noble in their nature, and force them to nurse their evil passions in their own defence. The most impolitic of all political measures, is to throw off the poor from our hearts and leave them to vegetate unregarded ; or to feed them upon charity, and punish them by law. They occupy a higher place in the scale of being, and are entitled to more dignified consideration.

But, if I mistake not, society will throw many difficulties in the way of such a project. They will apprehend that it must necessarily lead to an indiscriminate intercourse between the children of the rich and those of the poor ; and that the tendency of such intercourse will be to corrupt the children of the better classes, by teaching them vulgar and profane habits. Such an objection must necessarily have great weight, as far as it is believed to be true. But the question is, is it true ? I apprehend that it is not.— Somehow, in reasoning on morals, a tendency to evil, sure and uniform, is ever suspected to be the single characteristic of mankind. A tendency to good is seldom supposed ; or if it is presumed to exist, the reasoner who advances the idea, is heavily accused as heretical, or laughed at as chimerical. And yet Jehovah himself describes our condition as an intermixture of good and evil ; and has established all his operations, as a reformer among men, upon that tendency to good. On this tendency he calculates in presenting truth to their minds, and seeks to rouse them to moral action. His remedial interference is neither harsh nor violent ; he seeks not by omnipotence to coerce, but by conviction to persuade, or by love to attract ; and he calls upon us to imitate his example. Christians are the light of the world, illumining the darkness around them ; and the salt of the earth, communicating their own properties for the purification and preservation of others. Nor is the expectation vain ; for the lower are ever copying the higher classes in manners, dress, language, and a thousand

other things, which make up the minutiae of life. In the project contemplated, it will be well if the result be not the reverse of that which the objection urges, and if the children of the rich do not corrupt those of the poor. Many a lesson of false pride, unprofitable and injurious, may be secretly insinuated; and habits, both of thought and feeling, may be most insidiously formed, before the innovation may be suspected, or shall have attracted any notice. But the truth is, from an individual's own heart down through all the forms and circumstances of life, every thing requires vigilance, because every thing may be mismanaged. It belongs not to man to say—*Let it be*. Every object is to be obtained by effort; and the education of the young is not to be effected by magic, nor by an overweening confidence which shall relieve the parent from watchfulness and caution. I recommend no project of spontaneous growth, whose practical operations require no providential care. Christianity itself, devised by infinite wisdom, requires the superintendence, kind and forbearing, of him who framed it.

If, however, the pride of wealth and of family distinction, must still be arrayed against the philosophy of life and its social relations; if the rich cannot consent to identify themselves with the poor, *so far* as to carry a moral and reforming influence into the whole field of pauper wretchedness; if, in spite of our strong republican asseverations, with which we are rendered familiar from childhood itself, an aristocracy, disregarding the morality of benevolence, must be maintained; if the division of mankind into classes by artificial lines, must still be held as natural and sacred; and if the various ideas to which that division has given rise must be pronounced orthodox and wise, without reference to those moral laws which bind man to man, whatever may be the difference of external circumstances; then the alternative remains—charity or starvation. They who have hitherto given, must go on to give. The evil they deplore will continue to grow; and all the facilities and advantages

which our fine country affords, will not save us from the convulsions which must ensue, and which the voice of all experience has proclaimed in the clearest and most unequivocal manner. The only effectual remedy that exists, is to be found in reviving the moral sense of those who have sunk into such great degradation. Abandon all thoughts of this only remedy, and we may as well expect to carry sinners to heaven without regeneration, as to accomplish any permanent benefit for the poor, or cure the evils of which we complain.

This system of general EDUCATION is, however, not the only measure to be adopted, in view of the painful and afflicting subject before us. Our charities must be reviewed; for though they express great benevolence, they are yet most improperly bestowed; and while they professedly seek to relieve the poor, they are actually degrading them more and more. Mere *gratuities*, extended to any one able to provide for himself, are to that individual a positive injury. They contravene the great law which God has established; namely, that man must gain subsistence by *labor*. And that law can no more be safely set aside, than any other law which has been enacted. Suspend the law of gravitation, blot the sun from the firmament, or withhold the rain, and no substitute can be devised by which their effects can be produced. Banish love to God and love to man from a human heart, and that heart must necessarily become depraved and vicious. No more can the means of subsistence be produced without *labor*. Mere dependent poverty, where a man can help himself, is therefore directly in the face of divine law, and is both criminal and disgraceful. Under such circumstances, both he who gives and he who receives are alike in fault; and make an inroad upon the well-being of society, which needs only to be amplified, and pauperism is produced in full size. There is no escape from this statement. It is necessarily true—the effect follows its cause most exactly and philosophically.

It is conceded that the poor we must always have with us; and that they are entitled to the most tender consideration. There are the aged and infirm, the lame and blind, &c. &c. who are not able to help themselves, and who ought to be supported. Oftentimes a poor man is overtaken by an emergency, which he did not foresee, and which he could not prevent; a little assistance would immediately relieve him, and enable him to rise above his difficulty.—That assistance should be cheerfully extended to him. “Thou shalt open thine hand wide,” said Moses, “unto him, and shalt surely lend him sufficient for his need, in that which he wanteth.” Every one will often find himself under circumstances, where he must act the kind almoner to the needy, and God will bless him in his deed; for “he who giveth to the poor, lendeth to the Lord.”

But then the question arises, how shall these charities be extended? The Redeemer considered the pharisees, as has already been intimated, to have interpreted the law falsely, when they excused a son from the duty of supporting his father or mother, on the plea that he had presented as a *gift* that portion of his property which he ought to have devoted to their use. Paul says—“if any widow have children or nephews, let them learn first to show piety *at home*, and to requite their parents; for that is good and acceptable in the sight of God.” And again—“if any man or woman that *believeth* have widows, let them relieve them, and let not the *church** be charged. According to these regulations, enacted by inspired wisdom, and enforced by scriptural authority, charity would be purely an *individual* matter, and should be confined to the circle of *family relatives*.

We should almost be afraid to originate such a mode of relief. But as the scriptures have so distinctly stated it, we

* Agreeably to my ideas of THE CHURCH, as made up of christian or MANY nations, I would consider the apostle to use that term in the text quoted, as we would use the word *public*.

may venture to remark upon its simplicity ; and to assert, that had it been faithfully employed, society would be vastly more moral and benevolent than she is at this hour.— Writers on political economy, when they speak on this branch of their science, frequently refer to Scotland, and note the happy operation of these scriptural rules in that country.—“ Few,” it is said, “ but such as are destitute of relations able to support them, make the application for public charity ; it being considered disgraceful, both to themselves and their relations, to have their names entered on what is called the *poor’s rool*.” So that, though these rules come under the form of apostolic injunctions, yet their wisdom is demonstrated by experiment, whenever they have been tried. And every one will readily perceive that there is no danger of their being carried to any hurtful extreme, nor of their ever operating as a bounty on marriage, and a spur to population.

The apostle does certainly allude to eleemosynary provisions made by the *church, as such* ; and the office of *deacon* was created, to take charge, with other temporalities, of the church’s alms. But observe how Paul limits and guards the whole matter.—“ Honor them,” he says, “ that are widows indeed—let not a widow be taken into the number, under three score years old”—let nephews and children, let any man or woman that believeth, relieve their own widows and not suffer them to be thrown upon the church fund. At the same time, and alongside of these very restrictions, he remarks that, “ if any provide not for his own, and especially for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith and is worse than an infidel ;” the worst species of immorality must follow ; the renunciation of christianity itself will ensue. But guarded by such rules as have been quoted, the *social charity* can do no harm. In fact, it is in consequence of disregarding these restrictions, which have been either forgotten or misunderstood, that this very provision, made for “ widows indeed,”

has become the embryo of all our *public charities*. The rule, good and necessary in itself, has been carried beyond its own limits; and the abuses, endless in variety and fearful in form, have followed. The brief history of the matter may be told almost in a sentence.—“In the first ages of the church, the *bishop* had immediate charge of *all the poor*, both sound and diseased; also of widows, orphans, strangers, &c. When the churches came to have fixed revenues allotted them, it was decreed that, *at least one fourth part* thereof should go to the relief of the poor; and to provide for them the more commodiously, *divers houses of charity* were built, which are since denominated hospitals.” Or, to view the subject in a somewhat more advanced state, as Stuart remarks in his “historical memoirs of the city of Armagh,” and when writing of the different orders of catholic saints in Ireland, where pauperism puts on its most distressing forms—“These pious men seem to have been bound by vows to cultivate the deserts in which they lived, for the use of the poor. Their successors probably gave up the reclaimed land for the joint benefit of the indigent. *Hence we find so many commons in the neighborhood of ancient monasteries.*”

Such is the simple history of this momentous and disastrous matter. In other words, 1. The BISHOPS either assumed, or had imposed upon them, the charge of the poor. Leaving the word of God to serve tables, these official men became secular in their views and habits; and presented in its embryo state that towering system of corruptions, which astounded, distracted, and degraded MAN, and of which pauperism in its general view is only a part.

2. Fixed revenues were substituted for free-will offerings, and the philosophy and morality of benevolence were merged in forced and unwise provisions. Bishops became licentious as the church grew rich; the poor sank into indolence and vice; the moral sense was deadened; society was debased and loathsome, for the very fountains were

poisoned and all the steams administered a deadly draught ; liberty was lost when intelligence was gone ; the bible was surreptitiously taken from the altar ; and the “ shadows, clouds and darkness ” of the middle ages rested on the patrimony of the saints.

3. Almshouses and hospitals, and monasteries were erected ; the poor were removed from the fire-side and home of family connexions ; a new class of human beings, technically called PAUPERS, was begotten ; while those, for whom the scriptures legislated, still remained to be provided for on better principles. These institutions were established for the sake of *convenience*. Bishops and their hearers sought to climb by the easiest ascent to the heights of heaven, and the attributes of individual conscience were lost in a palsyng doctrine of SOVEREIGNTY, to dispute which, even at the present hour, incurs every penalty which the vatican, either papal or protestant, has power to impose. The annals of pauperism form but a chapter in the history of a series of causes which, in producing this evil, has brought in a thousand others.

Thus poor rates were commenced, and almshouses formed ; and they have been perpetuated under the same false views of benevolence, in which they originated. Their abandonment is indispensable to our return to the happier condition, in which the apostolic regulations should have placed us. Corporate bodies in the state, and “ voluntary associations ” in the church, rest on the same principles ; and equally disregard personal responsibility by carrying social law too far.

The Master himself has sufficiently exposed the whole evil. The pharisees, in his day, were exceedingly *ostentatious* in their alms-giving. They sounded a trumpet before them, in the synagogues and in the corner of the streets, and exposed the whole matter to *public view*. Every body KNEW what they did ; and thus in the very act of giving, they lowered their own moral character. *Public charity*

degrades the benevolent themselves. The Redeemer, therefore, forbade his disciples to act in any such manner; and laid down this rule for their regulation.—“Let not thy right hand know what thy left hand doeth, when thou doest alms.” Act not like the pharisees. Never bring your alms before the view of men: your heavenly Father will neither approve nor reward the deed; but let them always be bestowed in *secret*, in the presence of your heavenly Father, who seeth in secret, and will reward you openly. The reason of all this the pharisees themselves made manifest—the duty was vitiated in their hands; their deceitful hearts obeyed the impulse of false motives; and they obtained, in the flattery and adulation they received, all the reward they sought. And if it is more blessed to give than to receive, then how shall the poor fare under the operation of *public charity*, when public charity degrades even the giver.

The Redeemer certainly had no intention to lay down an arbitrary statute, without having a sufficient reason to enforce it. He thoroughly understands human nature, and has no need that any should tell him what is in man. He legislates for mankind, according to their own nature and capacities; ever seeking to promote their welfare, and to protect them from the evils that are incident to their lot.—His statute in the present case, then, is founded on the principles of human nature; and if it be disregarded, the worst of evils must follow. Public charities can, therefore, do nothing but harm, however they may be modified; and the very little ways that the apostle himself went, in encroaching upon the general law, and which he did from sheer necessity, he seems to have passed with a fearful heart and a trembling step. The erection of *houses of charity* was a bold and hazardous adventure, on which, from their own just estimate of human nature, neither he nor his Master would ever have entered. That was left for the ecclesiastics of after times; who, misunderstanding both

human nature and divine law, have flooded society with inventions of their own, which are rife to this hour, and as desolating as they are rife.

There is another objection to *public charities*, in which they seem, under another form, to invade nature's laws, and whose force we see no way of evading. They appear to be increasing the means of subsistence, without actually doing it. The means of subsistence can be acquired only by *labor*. Money cannot raise them; corn will not grow in the rich man's coffers; nor can the treasury of a nation produce a single stalk of wheat. Labor alone can accomplish the growth of grain. But public charities bring hordes of consumers, without providing any additional labor to supply the increasing exigencies. As a natural consequence, when these supernumeraries are driven to occasional work, any given community will feel that there is an apparent increase of laborers beyond the demand; and a reaction, of the most hurtful kind, is carried back to the classes of the honest and habitual laborers, which directly interferes with their resources. With the apparent increase of labor, there is no actual increase of it. Wages of course fall; are not always punctually paid; and the hours of work are hurtfully multiplied. Then the public charities must be increased, for the poor cannot live by what they earn: and as rapidly as public charity grows, the evil grows, and every new society adds to the general stock. Hence, in large cities, where public charities are always most munificent, the operation commences, and the pauper population begins to accumulate. Public beneficence there first hangs out her signals; and the poor, from the country round, feel actually invited to come and partake of the bounty.—If nature's laws are thus defied, what else could follow, than the very consequence that has been realized? The evil has been the legitimate result of ecclesiastical mistakes and monastic institutions.

There has been a very favorite project, which looks well,

and promises fair; in which the benevolent seem promptly to engage, and by which they calculate to do much good.—They have wished to erect *houses of industry* or have framed societies to find *work* for the poor. We could heartily wish success to the plan, if it were not that the prospects with which its friends are flattered are utterly delusive. It has not been left to this age to conceive or execute this apparently excellent enterprise. Public charity has long since tried the experiment. The statutes which have been framed, embraced the double object of providing for the *impotent* poor, and finding employment for those who were *able to work*. Nor only so; but the question was agitated whether it would be better to procure “stocks to be worked up at home,” or to “accumulate all the poor in one common workhouse?”—The latter plan has been objected to, as “tending to destroy all domestic connexions, the only felicity of the honest and industrious laborer; and to put the sober and diligent upon a level, in point of their earnings, with those who are dissolute and idle.”* This project is therefore nothing new, but has already been fully tried, and has contributed all its influence to increase the evil it was intended to relieve.—Such a result might have been expected; and it will infallibly occur. The reasons why, or some of them, I shall proceed to state.

It is very evident that a house of industry, or a society finding employment for the poor, still dispenses a *gratuity*, and a *public* gratuity. The name has been changed, but the thing itself is preserved. *Work* is substituted for *money*; but it is still a *gratuity*. They who receive work on these terms, do not perceive the degradation which begins so insidiously; but, having learned to take work as a gratuity, the very next step is to take money. The idle will turn away from the overture, and the corrupting principle appeals to the better classes of the poor; so that by beginning a step higher, a house of industry becomes a nursery

* Blackstone, B, 1. ch. 9.

for the almshouse. The evil is the same, and its consequences the same, whether the process commences with work or money; or, if there be any difference, the first is the most pernicious of the two.

The agent for such an institution, solicits A, B and C to give to his direction whatever work they have to put out. A, B and C consent to the proposition; and so far as it goes, *they have accepted a gratuity*, and have acted on the pauper principle, by committing to a *trustee* that which they should do for *themselves*. But a still worse effect follows; the poor are by this means removed from the sight of A, B and C. Intercourse between the different classes of society, of which there is by far too little already, is thus broken up. A, B and C, are induced to believe that the poor are well provided for, and never feel their sympathies aroused in favor of those whom they do not see; or, while the evil is rapidly growing, that share of *moral influence* which familiarity would exert, is withheld, and the poor become degraded while the public really know nothing about it. The subject sinks from public notice and public thought; and it presently becomes exceedingly paradoxical, that charity does not relieve the distressed.

Besides A, B and C, were in the habit of giving their work to others, whom they knew and esteemed. What will become of their poor? These must either go to the *public* institution, or suffer. Should they apply to the society who charitably give out work, they meet with crowds of competitors—for such a society will always have more applicants than they can supply—and are probably disappointed. Or should they be furnished with employment, they must execute it for lower wages than they would have obtained from A, B and C, because they must assist in defraying the expenses of the society. Perhaps they may be too sensitive to apply at all; and then the institution has simply taken bread from one poor individual to give it

to another. A, B and C, never learn this unexpected result, until it may be too late to use the remedy.

Farther.—The institution being *public*, the poor are enticed from the surrounding country, and more laborers are brought into the community, where there are too many already. *Wages*, instead of being *increased*, are *diminished*, and the charitable are called upon for farther assistance.—A preference will be given to such an establishment, and the honest laborer cannot bear up under the competition. The expenses of the establishment must be paid; and thus the community will appear to be more charitable than they really are. It was not intended to produce these evils, for they were not foreseen. The community designed to be benevolent; but deceived by fair appearances, they never stopped to analyze the operation in which they so promptly engaged. Good intentions, however, never raised an ear of corn, though they have often created the necessity that it should be done.

With a view to eke out an argument in favor of *public* charity, it may possibly be urged in reply to the preceding views, that the apostle Paul directed that collections should be taken up, on the first day of the week, in the gentile churches, for the poor saints which were at Jerusalem. The fact is not to be denied; but then what are the connexions of the fact? The passages which have been quoted from his epistles, as well as the directions given by the Master himself, are evidently *general rules*. Are we to suppose that the apostle laid down, or re-enacted, rules, which he never intended should be executed; and that personally he said one thing, and did another? Or is it uncommon, that there should be an exception to a general rule, which might suspend it for the time being, without ultimately setting it aside? Such cases are emergencies, which must provide for themselves. A famine or a pestilence would take a community by surprise; and more particularly the poor in a crowded city.—The case would ap-

pear more peculiar still, if that community should be under foreign domination; for then their spirit of independence would be cowed by military oppression, and their energies would be paralyzed by unrighteous exactions. Substitute persecution for the famine or pestilence, and such would be the condition of the poor saints at Jerusalem. At Jerusalem their Lord had been crucified; there some of their brethren had been martyred; and the apostle himself could not enter the city without personal hazard. They had been informed, before they embraced christianity, that they must forsake houses and lands for the sake of the gospel; and they are represented at one time, as being so hard pressed, that they were obliged to sell all they had and make a common stock. Such a case must suggest its own remedy. A general law would yield to a pressing necessity, as when David ate of the shew bread, or the disciples plucked the ears of corn on the sabbath day. But take away the emergency, and the general rule returns with all its authority.

But this case deserves to be more closely investigated. Its circumstances are detailed in the Acts of the Apostles.* The public collections, which were required and made, are referred to in different parts of the new testament.† But the biblical student knows, that the community of goods was established in *Jerusalem*, and nowhere else; and that the public collections were made for “the poor saints at Jerusalem,” and for none else. He also knows that neither was called for by a divine commandment; but that, on the contrary, any divine commandment in the premises was disavowed by the apostles themselves. “While it remained,” said Peter to Ananias, “was it not thine own? and after it was sold, was it not in thine own power?” And Paul,

* See ch. ii. 44, 45. iv. 32—37. v. 1—16. vi. 1—7.

† See Acts xi. 27—30. xxiv. 17. Rom. xv. 25—27. 1 Cor. xvi. 1—4. 2 Cor. vii. 1—24. ix. 1—15. Gal. ii. 10.

when urging the Corinthians to be ready with their contribution, observes—"I speak not by commandment—I give my advice." Consequently there could have been no intention that, either the community of goods or public collections should be continued in the church. For still farther I may remark, that in an analogous case, when no commandment had been given, and where Paul gave his advice, he explains himself as referring to "the present distress;" and declares that the man who should not act according to his advice in that case, would not *sin*.* If therefore, there was no divine commandment, calling for the community of goods at Jerusalem, or for the public collections which Paul solicits, even at the time when these things were done under the eye of the apostles, it is evident there can be no divine commandment for such provisions now. Yet these public contributions are at this day supposed to be matters of positive duty.—It is a mere papal commentary, whose sophistry the protestant church has not detected.

But for the sake of the subject, it may not be unprofitable to inquire, why "the poor saints in Jerusalem" were excepted; and, without a divine commandment, made the objects of such anomalous provisions? And I may answer—1. That there was "a present distress;" and that very distress, on whose account Paul exhorted the Corinthians, on his own responsibility, not to marry. A persecution was about to be kindled, which very shortly broke out, and which would rage severely at Jerusalem. That devoted city was itself to be besieged, sacked and burnt; and the Master himself, alluding to the fearful desolation, said to his disciples—"Then let them which are in *Judea* flee to the mountains; let him which is on the house top not come down to take any thing out of his house: neither let him which is in the field return back to take his clothes. And wo to them that are with child? and to them that give

* 1 Cor. ch. viii.]

suck in those days ! But pray ye that your flight be not in the winter, neither on the sabbath day : for there shall be great tribulation, such as was not since the beginning of the world to this time ; no, nor ever shall be." Of what use was private property under such circumstances ? The disciples at Jerusalem, were in fact declaring their faith in, and ordering their conduct by, the prophetic declarations of their Lord ; and their situation must have become a subject of universal interest throughout the christian church. A strong case, it is to be admitted. There has been, and there shall be, said the Redeemer, nothing like it.

2. The festivals which were so frequently held in Jerusalem, and which were required by the Mosaic statutes, made a community of goods necessary for the time being. The hospitality which such seasons called for, would naturally present such a scene as we have now under consideration. There were many, from different countries, who were attached to the christian community, as was made evident when the gift of tongues was conferred on the apostles : Barnabas was of the country of Cyprus : and the Grecians murmured against the Hebrews, because their widows were neglected in the daily ministration. The habits of the jewish nation would then readily suggest the present expedient adopted at Jerusalem ; and the saints there might, as they did in many other instances of compliance with jewish customs, have acted out of *forbearance* ; or, as even the question of the admission of the gentiles into the church was far from being understood by them, they might have done what they did, from lack of better information.

3. The Redeemer commanded his disciples to *begin* their official career *at Jerusalem*. Here then was the *mother-church*, so to speak ;—the moral centre of official action and official reciprocities. And to this circumstance Paul seems to refer, when he remarks, in speaking of the public contributions made for "the poor saints at Jerusalem"—"If the gentiles

have been made partakers of their spiritual things, their duty is also to minister unto them in carnal things.”* In the beginning of society, all temporal property was necessarily common. Adam and his sons, Noah and his sons, had not formed the idea of property in lands, &c.—That idea seems to have been introduced very late into society; for the next view on the subject of property, in her subsequent history, was that the king was the proprietor of the land. Hence Pharaoh gave Goshen to the family of Jacob: hence Joseph, after the famine, divided the whole country afresh; hence the God of Israel, as king, claimed the land of Judea as his own; and as king of all the earth, declares that the cattle on a thousand hills are all his own—that the earth is his, and the fulness thereof. It is not therefore any far-fetched idea, that in the beginning of the kingdom of heaven, the mother church, called to peculiar official responsibilities, and in the land of Judea, should give up to the divine service, that portion of property which the service called for.

4. From Jerusalem it might be expected that the first preachers of the gospel would go forth. The gentiles were not acquainted with the ceremonial allusions which were to be explained, nor with the prophecies which were to be expounded, as forming the great testimony in favor of the Messiah. They did not even know “the sound words” which the Holy Spirit had taught, and which Paul thought to be so important; but would have filled the church with technical terms, derived from “philosophy falsely so called.” The multitude of believers at Jerusalem appear to have been poor, while not many wise, nor mighty, nor noble, were ready to devote themselves to ministerial service; so that those who did surrender goods, might have done it in view of the ministry. A distinction of this kind appears to be necessary to explain the record; for we are told—“Of the rest durst no man join himself to

* Rom. xv. 27.

them: but the people magnified them; and believers were the more added to the Lord, multitudes both of men and women." In this statement there appears to be a palpable contradiction, which is only, so far as I can perceive, to be removed by some such distinction. Barnabas was a *Levite*, and was afterwards earnestly engaged in preaching the gospel. Ananias might have been of priestly relations, and have contemplated the same official employment with Barnabas; for which purpose he might have joined himself, not only to the church, but to the apostles as an official band.

This point brings up many interesting particulars. When the young ruler wished to be attached to the little company of disciples whom the Redeemer had chosen and ordained; he was told that, to accomplish that object, he must sell all that he had, and give to the poor. When the disciples observed that they had left all, they were informed that they should sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel, because they had followed their Master in *the regeneration*. When a certain individual, who, it would seem, had no qualifications for such an enterprise, proffered to do the same thing, he was bidden to go home, and relate to his family what great things the Lord had done for him.* Nor is such a political measure an uncommon one. The Levites had no portion nor inheritance among their brethren. The Lord was their portion. Nay beyond this—originally the priesthood belonged to the chief ruler. He was both prince and priest; and when the two offices were separated, the last lost not its elevated and public character, nor its interest in the public revenues. Hence the priests in Egypt were sustained by Pharaoh, and Joseph could not sell their lands. So that it was according to generally established law, that the provision was introduced into the Mosaic economy; and the Levites, as attendants on Jehovah the king of Israel,

* See my Essay on Creeds, chap. x.

were sustained at his altars. In the constitution of the kingdom of heaven, the ministry of reconciliation are attendants on Prince Messiah ; and, forsaking all, live in his courts. They administer spiritual things, and are entitled to carnal things in recompense for their labor. This forsaking, or selling all, then manifestly belonged to official life—to those who were following the Master “*in the regeneration ;*” and lays no sort of foundation for a community of goods now ; nor for that degrading system of public charities, derived from the papal church.

In truth every community, whether political, ecclesiastical, or domestic, must sustain its own public servants. The ministers of Christ have, with few exceptions, depended, and ought to have depended, on the reward due to their labor ; as the Levites, with like exceptions—for Barnabas had lands, and, according to the Mosaic law, a Levite might in certain cases, redeem land—as the Levites had done before them. The laborer is worthy of his hire—thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn. Many abuses, it is true, have been introduced, which the revolutions of society have not yet corrected. The abuse of a principle, however, is no argument against the principle itself ; and it must forever remain, at least while God’s government and human nature are what they are, a fair exchange, that the church should give carnal for spiritual things. But public gratuities are as degrading as they are illegal.

There is still another item in this subject of public charity which merits very serious consideration. The apostle has said, “that he who provides not for his own, and especially for those of his own house, has denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel.” But if the public undertake to provide for his family, why should he trouble himself about the matter ? Instead of the moral question resting at all upon his conscience, when he is about to form a family connexion, he sees no evil in which he is likely to

be involved, or which will not, he calculates, be speedily relieved. The great impulse to virtue is taken away. In Paul's strong language, he "denies the faith, and is worse than an infidel;" or, as the fact continually presents itself, he is idle and intemperate, profane and vicious; and not only becomes a pauper himself, but raises up a race who will emulate and imitate his awful example.—I affect not to be a political economist; but plainly state my own impression, long since formed, and every day confirmed; and in behalf of which I appeal to scripture, nature, and history. And if these views are correct, *public* charity is the nurse of pauperism: and while the nurse lives healthful and vigorous, the child will thrive.

As has already been intimated, intemperance has been heavily accused as the prolific cause of pauperism. And most assuredly the drunkard is in a fair way to beggar both himself and family. But then on the other hand, pauperism may lead to intemperance; for if public charity may be relied on, a poor man is tempted to be idle, or to spend his earnings in riot and dissipation. The necessity under which the divine constitution has placed him, to gain his subsistence by the sweat of his brow, is in a great measure removed; and, losing the balance which moral principle would have preserved, he learns to think lightly of an evil which he calculates will be speedily relieved. The statistics of this matter are fairly petrifying. But I feel no great necessity to furnish them, or to protract the argument; because the subject has been attracting public consideration for many years. The political measure of imposing a tax upon whiskey, and a project to plant vineyards in our country, have been largely and variously discussed; so that it were impossible that the information which was thus spread abroad, should not produce considerable excitement. The enormity and extent of the evil were thus exposed to view, and the habits of society have been consequently very much changed.

The abandonment of public charities may be thought to be a very *cruel* step. And so it would be, as all violent measures necessarily are, if it be suddenly done. The charitable are as much in fault as the poor themselves, and must retrieve their own errors in a prudent and cautious manner. But it is presumed the object is not impracticable. If no new societies should be encouraged; if those which are comparatively new should be dissolved; and if then a gradual retrenchment should accompany a general system of education, the end would be ultimately attained. A stopping point must be found somewhere; and that may as well be ascertained by retrograding as by advancing. Should the community, however, be incredulous, or give up the matter in despair, they must only remember that, in all the departments of nature, violation of law will certainly entail suffering; and that the pauper population will as infallibly overtake the means of subsistence afforded by *charity*, as in general society population overtakes the means of subsistence derived from *labor*. The benevolent cannot alter the course of nature, or correct the wisdom and mend the philosophy of the divine institutions.

To remedy the evils of pauperism, we ought still to have another resource on which to rely. It is not to be supposed that Jehovah has framed a system for the moral reformation of mankind at large, without that system being capable of bearing with great effect on our present subject; because the great thing needed, in relation to that subject, is moral reformation. The additional resource should then be found in the CHURCH, which God has made the light of the world—by which he would preach the gospel to all nations—to *every creature*. And it would seem, from the example afforded in apostolic times, as though when a great and good revolution was intended, it should commence with the *poor*. The wise, and mighty, and noble, have all that they desire; and are apt to imagine, from their own flourishing condition, that things are right just

as they are; that no improvement is needed; and that no change would be for the better. Men in power seldom seek or wish for reform.

But when we turn to the *church*, any calculation in reference to the matter in hand seems to be utterly futile. There are, at present, such various and incessant calls for *money*; and we hear so much of education societies, parental and auxiliary; of gratuities and loans; of beneficiaries and scholarships; of bonds redeemed, and bonds remitted; that instead of the church exerting any influence to cure the evil complained of, that very evil has become epidemic in her own precincts. And it requires very little prescience to prognosticate some very heavy calamities as near at hand—calamities which will desecrate the pulpit by degrading the ministry. For pauperism will run a similar course, in whatever connexion it exists; and must necessarily assail, in some form, the integrity of those who are found in its ranks. The analogy is too striking to be disregarded; or if it should be pertinaciously defended, it will not be long until it shall have worked out its own demonstration. It is a pity that honorable young men should not be apprized of the deleterious tendency of public charities, wherever they may be found; and that they are never more hurtful than when they come under guise of promoting the Redeemer's kingdom; because then the equivocal character of the means is forgotten in the contemplation of the goodness of the object. Under such circumstances, an ingenuous youth is in great danger of supposing that "the end sanctifies the means."

Pauperism, which is entirely an unnatural state of society, originated, as has been seen, in regulations intended to direct the application of the *revenues* of the CHURCH. And when the church, as such, has the opportunity of gathering and using large funds, she must necessarily undertake to legislate on secular principles. Instead of wielding a moral influence in her Master's name, and under her

Master's blessing, she has superadded something to the free-will offerings of his people, and becomes distinguished by her political and commercial attributes. She must have a new class of agents and a new class of dependants, because she has a new class of objects. And it would not be very difficult to foretell to what such an operation, sustained by the strong religious feelings of mankind, would grow; even if we had not the history of the papal hierarchy, and the powerful influence of ecclesiastical policy on the general principles of legislation, to forewarn us. The idea of a church becoming rich is not unpopular in our own country, notwithstanding the fearful example of past ages.* Yet money gives power to ecclesiastics as well as to politicians; and to voluntary associations in the church, as well as to corporate bodies in the state. Some alarm has been felt, but that is laughed at as a mere piece of infidel effrontery or folly; and the moral irrelevancy of such means, in promoting the interests of the Redeemer's kingdom, is not suspected. Amass these means, and reform becomes impossible; for they who wield them—at least such is the history of man—have no perception that any thing is wrong. They who have apprehended evil, feel that they can scarcely assail the colossal power without being crushed: and, becoming too timid to meet the danger or make the sacrifice, they cower to the supposed necessity, and call it *expediency*. But should this apparently useful operation be encouraged, or should the events, which are now transpiring in the world, and have given to the papal power so fatal a blow, not arrest it, another Henry the VIII. may be needed in some after age, to cut short the wide spreading degeneracy. Those who are engaged in this matter, have no intentions which deserve censure. They are seeking to do good, but they have mistaken the means, and may discover their error when it is too late. Apprehended contests for church property,

*Deuteronomy xvii. 17.

even now, may impose silence upon many a tongue ; and a civil charter creates the turning point of argument. The moral character of the church is suffering much, at this hour, from her secular measures.

The ostensible or avowed design of these pecuniary provisions is to supply the world with ministers ; and hence they are expended in behalf of theological seminaries, education societies, &c. But when the *object* is stated, another evil is betrayed ; for the population is seen to be increasing far beyond the means of furnishing ministers. Yet it is supposed that the effort is as great as can be made ; and though it is demonstrably insufficient, it will still be maintained and defended, because men can do no more than they can do. In this way the difficulty is kept out of sight, discussion is prevented, and the church remains satisfied with her own unsatisfactory measures. Did the Redeemer or his disciples adopt such a course ? Did they rear such institutions, and wait on the proficiency and promise of annual classes of students ? Did they project a political system which was narrower than society itself ? and, erecting a government within *the* government, did they enact a code, and consecrate official men, for the few who were *personally elected unto everlasting life* ? Or were not elders ordained in every city, chosen from the inhabitants of the city itself ? And must not every society have within itself the means of its own operation ?

I am aware that the power of working miracles has been urged as a sufficient explanation of the rapid manner in which the churches were furnished with official men ; i. e. this power was a substitute for literature ; and now that the power is withdrawn, nothing but literature can qualify a man for ministerial office. But this argument grows out of a misconception of the use of miracles. Adam wrought no miracles, neither did Noah nor Abraham. But when the two dispensations, based on a purpose of *election*, were introduced, that election was so far out

of the ordinary operations of the divine government, that special proof of its divine origin was indispensably necessary. This point having been established, the power of working miracles was withdrawn; excepting that old testament prophets, having received an extraordinary commission, were under a similar necessity to substantiate their pretensions by like proof. Miracles never were intended to be a substitute for literature, nor to have any influence in determining a question, like that which is now called up. The Redeemer carried his apostles out and in with him during the whole of his ministry, notwithstanding his intentions to endow them afterwards with such peculiar gifts. When he wished to instruct the gentiles, he called Paul to the enterprise, because it needed high intellectual character, and varied literary attainments. Paul found it necessary to lower the estimate in which the power of working miracles was held, and represented the constituent principles of human nature, and the ordinary moral characteristics of society, as of much higher consideration. He would rather speak five words with his understanding, that he might teach others, than ten thousand words in an unknown tongue, though the power to do so would have commanded great admiration; and *charity*, or love, he thought far more excellent than all spiritual gifts.

Neither were the elders, among the jews, learned men. True, after the establishment of the synagogues by Ezra, it was conceived to be necessary that the *bishop* should become a literary man; public seminaries were formed to instruct those who were intended to occupy the episcopal office; then honorary titles were bestowed—such as Rabbi, Doctor, &c. Metaphysical questions were soon started; long and bitter controversies divided the community into sects and parties; ordinances and burdens were imposed upon the human conscience; and the traditions of men took the place of the commandments of God. A similar opera-

tion has been most successfully carried on since the ascension of the Redeemer and the death of his apostles, notwithstanding his severe criticism of these public errors of the jews, and his direct charge to his disciples not to imitate their example. And now, with the fully formed impression, that literary men alone should enter our pulpits, multitudes are perishing around us for lack of vision; and the church has no agents to carry home to the poor, the instruction which is necessary to raise them from their degradation. Elders in every city, ordained according to scriptural rule, receive no compensation for their services, though the Redeemer has explicitly declared that "the laborer is worthy of his hire;" and, consequently, no services, or very few, are rendered. The church, by these arrangements, *seems* to be furnished with her full number of official men, when in fact she is not; and the gospel is not, nor can it be, carried to every creature; but the very influence which was intended to bear upon the poor is withdrawn, or is not exerted. The consequence is natural.

Society at large is not literary, either in old or new countries; and particularly, where any considerable portion of the population is made up of the poor. It is, therefore, an idle plan which requires all ministers to form a literary character; and more especially, when the eldership render no actual service. A literary community may call for literary ministers; but an illiterate community would be much better served by those, who are not very far ahead of themselves. As society advances, she will call for official men of improved character; and she will be able to furnish them. But if all classes are put upon a level, and all must have literary preachers, it is no matter of wonder that the supply should be short of the demand, and that large funds are required to meet circumstances which society can never manage. The consequence necessarily is, that public institutions fail to realize their object, even after the most expensive and excessive effort. The poor are disregarded, population increases, and the evil

hourly grows more unmanageable. Occasionally this evil attracts public notice ; a transient excitement is produced ; some new societies are formed ; interesting speeches are pronounced ; painful statistics are repeated ; and the whole matter terminates, as though something really praise-worthy had been done, while the divine law is disobeyed, and society is not relieved.

It may be stated that, in certain sections of the church a different plan has been tried : and that, notwithstanding some objectionable peculiarities, these sections have grown in numbers and influence ; both society and ministerial character have improved with their progress, and they are rapidly spreading themselves over the world. The fact demonstrates the truth of the preceding remarks ; yet, after all, it is only a sectional movement ; and so far as it is of sectarian character, it adds to the aggregate of evil. It would seem strange that the gospel of the Son of God, if it be what it professes to be, should not carry its demonstration to every bosom. Surely it cannot lack proof of its own truth ; and one may be well surprised that there are so many who do not submit to its control. It is easy to explain their conduct by referring it to the depravity of the human heart. I shall not dispute the truth of the position ; but then it is very general. The depravity of the human heart may include in it a great variety of particulars ; and those particulars should be ascertained, that the general mass of evil may be assailed. If the difficulty under consideration should be the result of mismanagement in the practical administration of the church, then to keep that mismanagement out of sight, and to talk of the depravity of the human heart, may seem very pious, but it is trifling with the subject. Peradventure many, who have not submitted to the gospel, have seldom or never heard it ; and to speak in hard terms of their rebellion is dealing unfairly—for “how shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard ? And how shall they hear without a preacher ?” They may have heard the

gospel, and yet some other reason may account for their unbelief. The apostle Paul tells the jews—"The name of God is blasphemed among the gentiles, *through you.*" And perhaps the matter under deliberation may be traced up to a like cause; and that would be the very form in which the depravity of the human heart may be betrayed.

"By this," said the Redeemer, "shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another." And will any man, who has any acquaintance with the different sects in the christian church; who has heard their various controversies, and read their different statements of the doctrines of the gospel; who has observed the principles of their association, adopted and carried out into execution in defiance of the claims of *local* situation; who has watched their emulation, their proselyting spirit, and their sectarian prejudices—will any man, who has known all this, pretend to say, that the sects have demonstrated the truth of christianity by their brotherly love? Can they have carried light and conviction to the houses and bosoms of the poor? or attracted the attention of a casual observer by the moral excellence of their profession, or by the beautiful and fascinating display of their harmonious feelings in a common cause? Will not the multitude be rather intimidated from investigating a subject, about which there is thus apparently declared to be but little certainty? Amid the confusion of angry passions, bitter words, and endless strife, would "one that believeth not, or one unlearned, be convinced of all and judged of all?" The mischievous consequences of sectarianism are altogether incalculable. While they are defended and maintained, the church can bring but a feeble moral influence, to reform the crowds of paupers that fill our land; and can never exert those moral restraints that are indispensably necessary to remedy the evil, which the state seems long since to have given up in despair. If these associations were dissolved, and christians of each community should consider more maturely and harmonious-

ly their own social and *local* interests, they might carry out the Redeemer's rule, and supply the demonstration of the truth of christianity which is so much needed. Those associations must be broken up; either by voluntary consent, or under the force of desolating judgments, which already seem to be abroad in the earth. A bleeding, a wailing, a dying world calls upon christians, of all denominations, to quit their strife, and hasten to preach a crucified Christ in her houses and her streets. And will they still go on, offending and injuring that world by their contention, in despite of all warning? Then the mightiest influence, by which the degraded and unhappy poor should be reformed, and brought back to sobriety, industry, and morality, will still be wanting; and all their benevolent societies, like the monastic institutions, will deepen the gloom, aggravate the sorrows, and increase the calamity, they professedly seek to relieve.

If it were not for these forbidding circumstances—i. e. if the church was not divided into contending parties, if her official principles were not so narrow as to shut out all but classical men from her pulpits, and if the pauper principle were not so popular an ingredient in her own general measures, she might bring in a vast amount of moral influence to bear upon all classes. She would be a praise and a beauty in the midst of every city where her ordinances are administered, illumining the darkness, and relieving the ignorance of all who dwell around her altars. But as matters now stand, the essential principles of human society must yield to her artificial distinctions, and the remedial agencies of the Mediator are paralyzed by sectarian regulations. She has acted not much unlike the rich man, who, fond of pomp and display and equipage, has injured his own children by bringing them up in idleness, and with feelings of pride and selfishness, which have rendered them indifferent to the wants and interests of all around them. How can the world be else than injured in a moral point of view, when the

very means of moral reformation, which God himself has instituted, should be so crippled in their operation, and so circumscribed in their objects? when, instead of elders being ordained in every city, who shall be identified with each particular community, a class of men is detached from society; and, regulated by creeds and laws of their own, are better instructed to *govern*, than to *reform*, their fellow men? Let nature and reason speak, and christianity will justify their decisions; and if those decisions shall be faithfully and affectionately followed up, a thousand blessings will be diffused abroad, and the desert will presently blossom as the rose.

This discussion has been maintained, because its subject fell directly in my way; but more particularly with a view to some general conclusions, which I shall now briefly state. It is very evident, that the argument just closed is perfectly parallel to that, pursued on the subject of *faith*, in the preceding lecture. Man was driven from paradise, because that God would not maintain him as a pauper amid its luxuriance and bounty. And this purpose was adopted and carried out, not in an unkind and arbitrary manner; but because the improvement of human nature, and the necessary restraints under temptation, depend upon the industrious exercise of our own faculties. Such is demonstrated to be philosophy, from the whole history of mankind in relation to the means of subsistence. The same thing would be very apparent, if the acquisition of science had been the subject of inquiry; and morals cannot be considered as an exception to the general law, when that law results from the simple philosophy of mind. *Faith*, therefore, like *labor*, involves the full exercise of the human faculties; and, as the means of subsistence cannot be obtained without, but may most certainly be obtained with, man's personal labor; so salvation cannot be achieved without, but may most certainly be achieved by, the exercise of faith, as the operation of his individual powers.

The objection must not be again returned upon us, that this view of faith shuts out the operation of divine power, while the scriptures declare the necessity for regeneration. For though man must, and can, obtain the means of subsistence by his own *labor*, yet by the divine constitution it is God who prospers his effort; nor only so, but Jehovah carries a regenerating influence into the field of labor. "Thou sendest forth thy Spirit," says the psalmist, "they are created; and thou *renewest* the face of earth." The same word is here used, which is again employed by the psalmist when he prays, "Create in me a clean heart, O God, *renew* a right spirit within." The use of such language in the scriptures, does not at all interfere with our personal responsibility and effort; nor is it ever intended to argue an incapacity on the part of man to *believe* more than it does an incapacity to *labor*. Neither does the use of such terms imply a state of absolute death in reference to the subject to which they are applied; for when the regenerating process is carried on in the spring, life is not *infused*, but is merely called out into exercise. The *dead* tree, or vine, or plant, is not revived: but a principle of life is acted on, wherever it exists; just as we have supposed in relation to morals.

I am not without my fears, that divine grace is often considered as a simple *gratuity*, and the mediatorial kingdom as a kind of pauper establishment. It appears to me, that many, whether conscious of it or not, really mean no more by their doctrines of *free grace and imputed righteousness*. Let them analyze their terms and phrases, and honestly decide—if they can dissolve the charm of, what they call, SOUND WORDS. For myself, though "glorying in the grace wherein we stand," I cannot sanction a notion, which would so entirely desecrate man as a moral agent, and rob him of the GLORY of a sanctified character. The philosophy of human nature, is at irreconcilable war with the idea: and the material world furnishes us with no emblems of it.

God calls upon men to act up to the whole extent of their powers, and demands no more of them. He does not require, "deeds of law," because we cannot render them. "Faith is counted for righteousness," because such a system is consistent with our capacities; and can be fully carried out, according to the philosophy of human nature, and the ordinary laws of his providence. It is true, that God has *given* to us, and for us, his only begotten Son; but it is equally true, that he has *given* the earth to the sons of men. While in the one case, the means of subsistence are the product of human labor, and in perfect consistency with the *gifts* that have been bestowed; so in the other the believer works out his own salvation, on the principle that it is God who works in him. As we are called upon to pray for our daily bread, so we pray continually for the healthful influences of divine grace; and as the Spirit of God responds in the one instance, so he does in the other. If men will not *labor*, they must starve; and if they will not *believe*, they must perish. The doctrine of *personal responsibility* thus again stands out justified and commended as a display of pure moral philosophy, and intelligible scriptural legislation.

In preaching the gospel to any community, the Redeemer directed his disciples to seek out in the first place, the man who was *WORTHY*—like the angels searching Lot in Sodom; or Jehovah making inquiry after "ten righteous men," with the view of ascertaining a *starting point* for a remedial operation. A direct assault upon the worst part of the community, though sustained by the denunciation of most fearful terrors, is not the most prudent ministerial effort; and even when it is successful, it generally amounts to a discovery of some *worthy* men, who might have been called out by less violent measures. But ministers are so much in the habit of calculating on divine *sovereignty*, or which is the same thing, on divine *power*, that they are apt to imagine that God's providence must guaranty all their ab-

surditities. Nothing is set down to the action of *intelligent* human nature; public opinion is set at defiance; and common sense is laughed to scorn, in presuming to judge of spiritual things. But in the mediatorial operations of the Son of God, the human mind must pass for all it is worth; and the only value of a minister himself, consists either in the intelligence he displays, or the moral influence he may exert. An altar inscribed to "the unknown God," may afford a better starting point for a moral reformation, than the talents or eloquence of a Paul, with all the abstract mysteries that all antiquity could afford.

An individual must be approached with like wisdom and caution. The remedial point in his character should be ascertained, and then addressed as though a *thinking* being were to be roused to action. That point may be sometimes very high, and at other times very low. Uniformity is an idea that belongs only to the mind that is ignorant of human nature, or which jesuitically intends to degrade and enslave human beings. Or, as has been well remarked—"by placing force on the side of faith, you put courage on the side of doubt." Call it what you may—grace, sovereignty, power, mystery, law, or gospel—apply it where you may—in religion, politics, literature, or charity—enforce it on whom you may, christian, jew, mahomedan, or pagan—the system, whose formalities do not serve to revive the *moral sense*, nor to awaken the intellectual energies of man, is false in philosophy; is heretical in christianity; and was never espoused by Jehovah, nor successful in practice. I care not what excitement may be produced; what alarms may be roused; what tears may flow; or what numbers may be added to a *party*; the end must be disastrous. There is nothing to prevent such a catastrophe. A high nervous excitability rushes into every extravagance, and is pleased with its own prowess; but its boasted good is based on the heaviest social calamities. Our influential men, who win public favor by popular show, may think

differently. To their own Master they stand or fall. But purperism in every form is false in philosophy and false in morals.

LECTURE XIX.

*Principle of Religious Forms.—Cherubim.—Sacrifice.—
New Testament Ordinances.—Conclusion.*

When Jehovah-Elohim created our first parents, and placed them in the garden of Eden, he afforded to them in forms correspondent with their own nature, every variety of instructive emblems. The heavens and the earth declared his glory—the assumption of personal form presented to them a “ministerial organ” of heavenly fellowship with himself—the garden of Eden was his holy temple, where he delivered his law, and where they enjoyed his presence—the seventh day was a memorial of his finished work, and summoned them to some special services, which they were required to render, in view of a heavenly rest into which they should ultimately enter—the surrounding objects were lovely and good, teaching them of the *love*, the *wisdom*, the *power*, and the *righteousness* of God—nothing was wanting to explain their duty and to attract them to its performance.

Even in a political point of view, when the paradisiacal statute was proclaimed; and social responsibility, with all its multifarious circumstances, was appended to personal obligation as connected with the law written on the heart, the garden furnished a still more exuberant display of divine goodness. If this secondary form of human existence

multiplied duties, it also multiplied exterior advantages as attendant on those duties. It was not good that man should be alone ; so that the paradisiacal constitution was established out of real kindness; and was so set forth by the various circumstances under which it was introduced. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil, placed in the midst of the garden, was like every other symbol, a kind and a needful monitor, as well as a simple and easy test of obedience. In short, place man where you will, his character must be developed by his works. Thus he is to be estimated and judged by both God and men.—“By their fruits ye shall know them.”

In the progress of our discussion, we are now contemplating man as a **SINNER**; and as placed under a remedial system which, like the original institute, must be correspondent with his own nature. He is still surrounded by the outward exhibitions of the divine goodness. Now, as well as at first, the heavens declare the glory of God. Social life, with its appropriate relations, we see have been preserved; and its distinctive purposes are held up to view as good in their intentions, and as important in their operations, as ever they were. A sabbatical ordinance, emblematic of a heavenly rest to be enjoyed after we shall have fulfilled our various responsibilities and finished our earthly labors, was not revoked. **EVIL** it is true has been introduced; but then that evil has not been the entire desolation of the good originally created. The condition, the constitution, and the life of man are an intermixture of good and evil; and a remedy has been promulgated by which he may overcome the evil. And this second constitution, like the first, being based upon, and consistent with the principles of human action, or calling upon men to labor according to their ability, must establish its own external ordinances, and be illustrated by a series of evangelical symbols. The nature of man requires these provisions: the whole material world was construct-

ed to answer such purposes. The cherubic emblems and the sacrificial institution, baptism and the Lord's supper, if they correspond with the peculiarities of our situation, may be sustained by reasons as rational, and fulfil intentions as valuable, as any other ordinance, human or divine. In fact, without such outward forms, the remedial system would soon sink into oblivion; for, by what other means would you furnish man with remedial ideas, seeing that he obtains his ideas by his corporeal senses.

Religious *forms* have created a great deal of discussion. Some moralists can never have enough of them; they add line upon line, and precept upon precept; rites and ceremonies, fasts and feasts, days and weeks have been multiplied without end: new inventions are added to old traditions, and judgment, mercy, and faith are forgotten amid tithes of mint and anise and cummin. Social combinations and ceremonial display become substitutes for practical virtues; and formularies of faith and prayer render thought and investigation unnecessary. An ecclesiastical legislation of this kind, small in its beginnings but fearfully rapid in its progress, has more than once held on its course, until a ritual has been established, so childish and burdensome, that revolution has become indispensably necessary.

On the other hand, many have rushed into the opposite extreme, and have cast off all religious forms. They would adore God in the great temple of nature, and laugh at all religious associations. In the outward ceremonies of divine worship—in the priestly functions, in the sacrificial institution, in evangelical ordinances—they can see nothing but the inventions of designing men. In the church itself, hundreds can hear sermons, and, out of respect to public opinion, seek baptism for their children; but perceive no beauty, and feel no attractions in the new testament passover. So mankind pass from one extreme to another, and in rejecting the superstition of the age in

which they live, lose sight of the elemental principles of their individual and social nature; and that too, while they can draw an accurate line in an analogous case; or can point out the difference between despotism and anarchy, politically considered. Sometimes these contradictory matters institute their rival pretensions;—ignorance presuming to be the mother of devotion, and infidelity running up her genealogy to superstition—until intelligent men are brought to live in fearful suspense, painfully prognosticating, yet afraid to meet, the disasters that are coming.

The promise given to our first parents, assuring them that “the Seed of the woman should bruise the serpent’s head,” was certainly not all that Jehovah gave, in order to set before them the remedial institute. The fate of the literal serpent, converted into a degraded symbol of Satan’s overthrow, which has been known in every age, and exhibited in every country—the remark of Eve on the birth of Cain, when she observed, “I have gotten a man, even Jehovah his very self”—the offerings which Cain and Abel respectively brought to the Lord—the official distinctions which were very soon so accurately defined, and so strongly marked—the prevalence of sacrifice all over the world, accompanied with the expectations of a mediatorial advent—these, and other matters of a similar kind which might be mentioned, certainly evince that fuller representations were made at the time, than Moses has recorded. He was writing to a people who were no strangers to the matters to which he so briefly refers; and he felt no occasion to write any fuller details for future generations, because the institutions, which he was commissioned to establish, would supply any deficiency which might be felt. The prophecies and promises which himself uttered, the types and ordinances, designed to prefigure the coming Messiah and his work, which belonged to the Sinaic ritual, clearly announced whatever was necessary to be known by us. For this reason Moses has not traced up sacrifice to its divine

origin, further than as it is implied in the history of the events he records; nor has he, any where in his writings, explained the nature of the cherubim. Both of these, however, appear to have been attached to the early system of worship, which Jehovah established when he expelled man from the garden. Neither of them was forgotten, either among jews or pagans, at the time when Moses wrote. They evidently distinguished the whole patriarchal dispensation, and were left among the heathen, at the very time they were renewed with such peculiar glory among the descendants of Abraham.—But they require some farther illustration.

The *cherubim* are not generally understood. “The common notion,” says Faber, “that they were little better than a sort of terrific scare-crows, employed to prevent mankind from approaching the tree of life, seems to me to be no less childish, than irreconcilable with other parts of scripture.” Under the levitical economy, the cherubim were placed first in the tabernacle, and afterwards in the temple. And if so, why should they not be considered as serving a corresponding purpose from the very beginning? If they were then, as well as afterwards, placed in a *tabernacle*, it would seem that no doubt should be left, either of their hieroglyphical character, or of their sacred intention. And that they were so placed, appears to be very distinctly implied in the following apocryphal text;—“Thou hast commanded me to build a temple upon thy holy mount, and an altar in the city wherein thou dwellest, a resemblance of the holy *tabernacle*, which thou hast prepared from *the beginning*.”* The “flaming sword which turned every way,” was “a bright blaze of bickering fire,” or “a fire infolding itself;” which was equally characteristic of the levitical cherubim, and the symbol of the divine presence. The jewish rabbins have called this display of the divine glory the *shechinah*: which is a term merely angli-

* Wis. of Sol. ix. 8.

cising, in its substantive form, the very word which Moses here uses, and which our translators have very imperfectly rendered *placed*. It ought to be—"Jehovah-Elohim caused to dwell, or put in a *tabernacle*, at the east end, or before, the garden of Eden, the cherubim."

When Moses gave his directions concerning the *tabernacle*, which was erected in the wilderness, he did not describe the *cherubim*. Neither were they described afterwards, when Solomon built the temple. No very good reason can be assigned for this repeated silence, unless it be that the people were well acquainted with their character and form: and this reason will be entirely satisfactory, if it is recollected that "the various consecrated utensils, and outer parts of the temple, were profusely decorated with these mysterious hieroglyphics." Ezekiel, however, has supplied the deficiency, when he details "the visions of God," which he saw by the river of Chebar. He saw *four* living creatures, which had the face of a MAN, the face of a LION, the face of an OX, and the face of an EAGLE."* Again he remarks—"I *knew* that they were the CHERUBIM;—every one had four faces apiece."† Of course the cherubim were well known, as having *four* faces, surmounted by a brilliant display, or ardent blaze:—"the cherubim of *glory*," or of manifestation, as Paul denominates them; though even he did not think it worth while to speak particularly about them.‡

Furthermore, the same prophet, referring to the king of Tyre, represents him as having been in Eden, the garden of God, and describes him as "the anointed cherub that COVERETH; that was upon THE HOLY MOUNTAIN OF GOD, that walked up and down in the midst of the stones of FIRE," and the Lord God said to him—"I will destroy thee O *covering* cherub from the midst of the stones of FIRE."§. The prophet, by his allusion, not only evinces

* Ezek. i.

† Ezek. x. 10—22.

‡ Heb. ix. 5.

§ Ezek. xxviii. 12—16.

that there were cherubim situated in connexion with paradise, or the garden of Eden, and that they were associated with a fiery display ; but he does this after having previously exhibited the cherubim with *four faces*, over which was seen “a fire infolding itself.” Nor is this all. The king is called a COVERING cherub ; a term which we cannot explain, unless we call up the fact that the cherubim shadowed, or covered, the mercy-seat, under the levitical dispensation. If this be the explanation, then so distinct a reference to the mercy-seat leads us at once to the idea, that there were not only cherubim placed in a tabernacle before the garden of Eden ; but that a ritual, large and varied, including all the different ministerial services attendant on its ordinances, was established from the beginning. The argument, therefore, which demonstrates the erection of the tabernacle, and its furniture, from the beginning, irrefutably proves the divine origin of sacrifice, or the enactment of that institution by divine authority.

The four faces which Ezekiel enumerates—the ox, the LION, the EAGLE, and the MAN, have been used as sacred symbols all over the world. “This uniform veneration of them,” as Faber remarks, “must have proceeded from a common origin. That common origin can only be found in a period, when all mankind formed a single society. The existence of that single society cannot be placed later than the building of the tower of Babel. Consequently, the first veneration of those symbols cannot be ascribed to a more recent age than that of Nimrod. But in that age, which was marked by the commencement of a mythological system, that was afterwards carried into every region of the earth by those of the dispersion, the form of the cherubic symbols must have been well known. Since the genuine patriarchism, and the rise of idolatry, thus chronologically meet together ; since the latter seems evidently to have been a perverse depravation of the former ; since the three animal figures, which entered into the compound

shape of the cherubim, are the very three animal figures which have been universally venerated by the gentiles, from the most remote antiquity ; I see not how we can reasonably avoid the obvious conclusion, that, in whatever manner the pagans applied the symbols of the bull, the lion, and the eagle, they were borrowed in the first instance from those animals, as combined together in the form of the *cherubim*."

You will no doubt have perceived, that, as the time of dispersion, referred to in the preceding extract, was that which occurred when Jehovah came down to confound the languages of mankind, at the building of the tower of Babel, the only cherubim, from which the gentiles could have derived their ideas, and have learned to venerate those animal figures, both conjointly and separately, were the paradisiacal cherubim. If so, then these *four faces* belonged to this great antediluvian symbol, before which Cain and Abel brought their offerings, as Moses informs us ; and when, probably, the question—who was to be the heir of Adam's official honors—was visibly and peremptorily decided. Nor have we the least reason to believe, that those cherubim, whatever they were, were soon withdrawn. Admitting that they were like the levitical symbols which were afterwards set up, and which were placed in the holiest of all, "shadowing the mercy-seat ;" while none but the high-priest could enter within the vail, and that only on one day in the year, their permanency was as necessary in the one case, as in the other. Indeed, the universality of the cherubic emblems argues as strongly in favor of their *permanency*, as of their *existence*.

Having, as I suppose, sufficiently elucidated the identity of the two representations, or the sameness of the intentions evolved in the paradisiacal and levitical cherubim, another question presents itself, and one which has been frequently and elaborately discussed. It is this;—what was designed by this exhibition? Some have supposed

that "created spiritual angels" were represented under these singular and peculiar emblems; and that as these faces were turned to one another, and towards the mercy-seat, the angels were exhibited thereby as intensely prying into, or studying, the mysteries of redeeming love. Others have considered the cherubim to be "emblematical of the ever blessed *trinity*, in covenant to redeem man, by uniting the human nature to the *second person*." These latter critics proceed to argue, "that the personality in Jehovah is in scripture represented by the material trinity of nature; and that the primary type of the Father, is *fire*; of the Word, *light*; and of the Holy Ghost, *spirit*, or *air in motion*. The *ox* or *bull*, on account of his horns, the curling hair on his forehead, and his unrelenting fury when provoked, is a very proper animal emblem of *fire*; as the *lion*, from his usual tawny, gold-like color, his flowing mane, his shining eyes, his great vigilance and prodigious strength, is of the *light*; and thus likewise the *eagle* is of the *spirit*, or *air in action*, from his being chief among fowls, from his impetuous motion, and from his towering and surprising flights in the air." Such speculations you may, perhaps, consider to be exceedingly fanciful, and to manifest a great deal more of doctrinal predilections, than of sound or profitable criticism. The whole may remind you that the heathen interpreted these emblems much in the same manner, considering that these four faces were symbolic of THE GREAT DEITY they worshipped; and that for this reason Paul condemns them—because they *changed the glory* of the incorruptible GOD into an *image* made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four footed beasts, and creeping things."

In the book of revelation, an apostle informs us, that—"in the midst of the throne, and round about the throne, were *four living creatures*, full of eyes before and behind. And the first living creature was like a *lion*, and the second living creature was like a *calf*, and the third living creature

had a face as a *man*, and the fourth living creature was like a flying *eagle*. And the four living creatures had each of them six wings about him; and they were full of eyes within: and they rest not day and night, saying, Holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty, which was, and is, and is to come." Again, it is said that these "four living creatures, with the four and twenty elders, fell down before the Lamb—and they sung a new song, saying—Thou art worthy to take the book, and to open the seals thereof: for thou wast slain, and *hast redeemed us* to God by thy blood out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation, and hast made us unto our God kings and priests: and we shall reign on the earth." Here then we have these same four faces which distinguished the cherubim; but instead of representing either *angels* or the *trinity*, they represent, in some view or other, the redeemed of the Lord, gathered out of every kindred and tongue, and people, and nation.

Again, it is said of the redeemed—"they are before the throne of God, and serve him day and night in his temple; and he that sitteth on the throne shall dwell among them." This latter clause would be more literally rendered—*shall dwell as in a tabernacle above them*. The same sort of phraseology is used in reference to the Redeemer—"The Word was made flesh, and *dwelt as in a tabernacle amongst us*." Once more it is said—"the *tabernacle* of God is with men, and he will *dwell with them*, and they shall be his people, and God himself shall be with them, and be their God;" even then, when "God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain: for the former things are passed away." It would appear that the *cherubim* and the *saints*, occupy a similar position, and the Lord God is represented to *dwell as in a tabernacle above both of them*. The cherubim then were emblematical of the saints; and "the fire infolding itself," which was a symbol of the

divine glory over or above the cherubim, was emblematical of God's dwelling with his people.

Such was not only the import of the levitical, but also of the paradisiacal, cherubim: or the cherubim at the east end of the garden of Eden, placed there in a tabernacle, with "a bright blaze of bickering fire," constituted the great antediluvian symbol of the mediatorial constitution; or of its happy issue, when the redeemed shall be brought home to glory. If I have rightly explained this matter, you may perceive what a happy and glorious illustration of the first promise these cherubim afforded. You can understand what is meant in the fourth chapter, when the two brothers are said to bring their offerings *unto the Lord*; and when Cain is spoken of as going *out from the presence of the Lord* to dwell in the land of Nod. You can readily conceive, not only that sacrifice was then enjoined, but that Adam must have been, by special appointment, the priest of the MOST HIGH God; and how the question of birthright, as involving the honors of the priesthood, might awake the jealous ambition of Cain, as he himself was declining, and Abel was advancing, in the excellence and integrity of personal character. And you can easily account for the well authenticated fact, that throughout the whole gentile world, the four faces were so highly venerated; while every where tabernacles, and mounts, and groves, were sacred to the worship of the gods. Such a splendid and magnificent symbol, permanently located so near the garden of Eden, and serving such peculiar and holy purposes, would be as reverentially regarded, as the corresponding levitical tabernacle was among the jews. The knowledge of its early erection by the divine hand, together with all its moral references, would be faithfully transmitted by Noah; and, acquiring new importance from the history of the judgments which overtook the world, the symbol itself might, and would, be preserved, even though its evangelical allusions might have become grossly perverted. Look at the analo-

gous history of the cross, which, as an emblem of christianity, has been so grievously abused.

The particular object which, it would seem from our translation, the cherubim were designed to serve, was to *guard* the way to the *trees of life*; or to prevent man from entering the garden, and living on the fruit of those trees. Of the importance of that object, no one, who has ever examined the philosophy of human life, or who has observed how little confidence can be reposed in the honorable feelings of human beings, can have any doubt. The last lecture has evinced the relations which that object sustains to the theory here advanced. But, certainly, it is not necessary that we should have a *flaming sword*, in order to sustain the political operation, and to hold man in perpetual and distressing fear. None of the jews, saving the high-priest, could enter within the holiest of all. The whole dispensation, under which they lived, was one that was characterized by bondage and fear. Were any invasions on the sacred symbols ever attempted? Give to the human mind the idea of a supernatural agency, and immediately its sense of guilt is waked, and all its fears are roused. The present emblem of the divine glory was, therefore, not to be slighted; nor could a trespass have been committed, or an invasion of the garden have occurred, without betraying a previous course of wanton violence, and debasing sensuality. All the fine feelings of the human heart must first have been desolated; and society, in view both of official and private character, must have become abandoned and dissolute. Ages must have rolled by, infidelity must have been triumphant, and atheism herself have risen in fearless and haughty triumph, before an act of rebellion, so daring and desperate, could have been attempted.

It is, however, by no means improbable, judging from some scriptural allusions which shall be stated, as well as from the legendary lore of the pagan world, that such an attempt was finally made, and that it became the ostensible

occasion of introducing the flood. But if that really was the fact, it verifies the statement I have made: for Moses informs us that—"God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually." The previous circumstances are very rapidly told. "THE SONS OF GOD," it is said, "saw THE DAUGHTERS OF MEN, that they were fair; and they took them wives of all which they chose." That is, the sons of Seth, or those who ministered before the cherubim, married the daughters of Cain; and were ultimately drawn into the apostacy, which the first born of our race had commenced. God, who had long forborne with the growing infidelity, at length proclaims—"My Spirit shall not always strive with man;" "I will destroy man, whom I have created, from the face of the earth."

Furthermore, we are informed, that "there were GIANTS in the earth in those days; and also mighty men, and men of renown." Whatever influence such individuals might wield, or for whatever high and lofty enterprise they were qualified, they took the lead in iniquity. "The earth was filled with violence," and "all flesh had corrupted his way before the Lord." Noah alone "found grace in the eyes of the Lord," being "a just man and perfect in his generations; and he walked with God."

The apostle Peter alludes to these melancholy occurrences in his second epistle, when he would forewarn the church of coming tribulations. "There were," says he, "false prophets also among the people, even as there shall be false teachers among you, who privily shall bring in damnable heresies, even denying the Lord that bought them, and bring upon themselves swift destruction. For if God spared not the ANGELS that sinned"—the *messengers*, alluding to the official men whom Moses calls THE SONS OF GOD—"but cast them down to hell, (it is *tartarus* in the original) and delivered them into chains of darkness, to be reserved

unto judgment, and spared not the old world, but saved Noah, the eighth person, a preacher of righteousness, bringing in the flood upon the world of the ungodly—he knoweth how to deliver the godly out of temptations, and to reserve the unjust unto the day of judgment, to be punished: but chiefly them that walk after the flesh in the lust of uncleanness, and *despise government*. Presumptuous are they, self-willed; *they are not afraid to speak evil of dignities.*”

Jude is even more explicit. He says—“And the ANGELS which kept not their first estate—*principality*—but left their own habitation, he hath reserved in everlasting chains under darkness unto the judgment of the great day. Even as Sodom and Gomorrah, and the cities about them, in like manner to THESE, giving themselves over to fornication, and going after strange flesh, are set forth for an example, suffering the vengeance of eternal fire. Likewise, also, these filthy dreamers defile the flesh, *despise dominion*, and *speak evil of dignities.*”

The phrase, which occurs in our translation—in *like manner*—does not accurately render the original; because the masculine pronoun, which has no antecedent but *angels*, is left out. The sentence ought to read—in like manner to THESE—meaning *these angels*; as any one may easily discover by turning to the passage in the greek testament. Of course, the angels, who kept not their first estate, could not be, as generally supposed, fallen spirits of the angelic hosts; but must necessarily be *the sons of God*, or the official men of the antediluvian age. The term angel must, therefore, be understood in its general sense, or merely means a messenger; a sense in which it is very often used. The reference to these individuals being thus plain, the description of their crimes is appropriate enough. They deported themselves like the sodomites, and were not only given up to the most debasing licentiousness, but were

presumptuous, despised dominion, and spoke evil of dignities; or they set at nought and resisted the political powers which God had “ordained” in connexion with the system of government previously established. They might, then, have grown haughty and insolent enough to have attempted an invasion of this hallowed spot, and the desecration of these hallowed cherubic emblems of the mediatorial constitution. And as *fire* was rained down from heaven upon the guilty sodomites, it is not at all improbable that some such fiery symbols of divine vengeance might have burst upon them, cleaving fissures in the ground, whence the waters of the flood issued.

Whether our conjecture be correct or not, the pagan traditions relate the story in that form. To give the account to you in the language of another:—“In gentile lore the TITANS or GIANTS, are described as being the offspring of HEAVEN and EARTH”—of the sons of God and daughters of men, as Moses would say—“but, plunging into the most audacious wickedness, they madly dared to scale the very mount of God, and to wage war against the high Majesty of the omnipotent. Their attempt, however, proved abortive: their ranks were broken by hot thunderbolts: and they were precipitated into the central TARTARUS where they lie bound with chains of brass in a dungeon of adamant.” And why should not such traditions be common? or why should they not be considered worthy of attention, and particularly as they so nearly correspond with the accounts given by Moses, by Peter, and by Jude? Gentiles and jews had a common origin; and Moses writes with such astonishing brevity, that we know not how to explain it, unless it be by supposing that he presumed upon the knowledge of the facts, carried by tradition through all the world. Putting all these things together, it would seem that the paradisiacal cherubim formed the permanent and chief antediluvian symbol of God’s gracious designs in behalf of the children of men; and that they served a purpose, anal-

ogous to that of the levitical cherubim, *placed in a tabernacle* among the children of Israel.*

What may have been the precise import of these *four faces*, I feel myself unable to determine. They certainly were expressive of some things which were characteristic of *mankind*. But whether they referred to certain attributes which belong to man in *general*, such as *labor, dominion, intelligence, immortality*; or whether they were intended to refer to certain *periods* in the history of man, and to describe the character of official men during those periods; as some think was the intention of the living creatures in the apocalypse;† or whether they were designed to portray the general character of official men in all ages, as guided by the providence of Him whom Ezekiel represents as enthroned above the firmament in “the likeness of a man,” I cannot clearly satisfy my mind. Mr. Faber supposes these symbols to have been altogether *arbitrary*. I cannot agree with his view; yet I can offer no reasonable conjectures, other than those which I have just stated, as to the individual signification of the animal figures, which were compounded together in this singular form.

If the hypothesis concerning the cherubim, which has been stated, and, as I think, *proved*, in the preceding paragraphs, be correct, it prepares the way for the consideration of SACRIFICE, as a divine institution. If there was such a permanent emblem of the divine presence, a patriarchal and antediluvian SHECHINAH; or, if God was pleased, in this symbolic manner, to tabernacle with Adam and his children; then some external services must have devolved on them, as they sought an audience before Jehovah. Call

* Any one who wishes to see the subject of the cherubim discussed at large, and with great variety of talent and literature, may consult Parkhurst's Heb. Lex. on the word: Faber's Orig. of Pag. Idol. vol. 1, pp. 403—464; vol. 3, pp. 602—661. In which works references may be found to others which I have not seen:—Bates, Sharp, Hutchinson, Spencer, Hales, &c.

† See Johnstone on the Revelations, iv. 7.

back our argument on the nature and necessity of religious FORMS. The cherubim, situated as has been described, only furnishes the *tabernacle* as inhabited by the divine presence. The *service*, appropriate, expressive, and familiar, must yet be provided. What was that service? What religious forms did it prescribe? Necessarily compelled to pursue this inquiry, we cannot be surprised to find frequent allusions and instances of a sacrificial kind; while yet the ordinance itself may not have been distinctly traced by the historian to its origin. Incidental cases are enough. The circumstance, recorded by Moses, that “unto Adam and his wife did the Lord God make *coats of skins*, and clothed them,” which has often given rise to the question, Whence were these skins obtained?—the facts which occurred in the history of Cain and Abel, and which are stated in the fourth chapter—the subsequent and universal practice of offering sacrifice—and the history of the Mosaic ritual—these things, combined with the erection of the paradisiacal tabernacle, produce irrefragable demonstration, that this propitiatory service was established by *divine authority*.

The apostle Paul affords a coincident view when, alluding to these early transactions, he avers that—“By FAITH Abel offered unto God a more excellent sacrifice than Cain, by which he obtained witness that he was righteous, God testifying of his gifts.” Sacrifice at that period, the sacrifice of life in the worship of God, is, by this inspired commentator declared to be the product of *faith*—to be a *righteous* act—to be *acceptable* to Jehovah—and to have obtained an immediate response from on high. God did take a *part* in these transactions, both Moses and Paul being witnesses. Such are the moral connexions which sacrifice holds, down through the whole biblical history. They appeared when Noah builded an altar, and the Lord “smelled an odour of REST;” as also when Abraham, on mount Moriah, received the approbation of the angel, and had the resurrection from the dead so beautifully por-

trayed to him. Both were official men, of high character and holy renown, and both are celebrated as being "the heir of the righteousness of faith." If sacrifice then has been so intimately and so constantly associated with the mediatorial system; if it has been uniformly recognised by God, and has ever distinguished holy men, any doubt of its divine original must be worse than fastidious.

But further. Sacrifice has been enjoined as necessary all over the world. It is evident, too, that the right existed in every nation before the commencement of authentic history; and the idea that the gods were to be appeased in this manner, was as general as the rite itself. These facts every one knows who has any acquaintance with pagan history, or gentile mythology. Certainly a practice so singular and yet so universal, must be traced back to some common origin; to a period and to circumstances such as these which Moses describes, when he relates that the first pair, guilty and wretched, approached to humble themselves before the Lord. No room is left for the ridiculous charge of *priestcraft*, seeing that Adam was priest in his own family; and, as other priests did after him, offered sacrifice at his own expense. Or, as Delany has observed—"After this, when fathers grew up into princes, by the increase of their families, the priesthood, we know, became an appendage of royalty: and sacrifices were then at the sacrificer's expense.

"We also know that libations and offerings of several kinds, were the constant practice of private men in their own families, and that priests had no perquisites from them: nor can they, with any color of reason, be suspected to have had any emolument of any kind from this practice, in any region of the earth, till more than two thousand years from the first institution of this rite; though if they had, it is evident that the advantages derived upon any particular set of men, from any practice, are far from being a proof that such a practice had no original founda-

tion, but in the subtlety and interest of that particular set of men. In truth, the supposition is as absurd as any thing can well be imagined to be; and will affect every profession under heaven, as well as the priesthood; from the prince on the throne to the meanest officer and artisan in the commonwealth; nay, in truth, will affect every profession in the world much more than the priesthood; because that is the only profession which was originally disinterested in the discharge of duty proper unto it.”*

We shall reach the same conclusion if we inquire into the *nature* and *design* of the sacrificial rite. Its wisdom and propriety will be no inconsiderable adjuvants in sustaining the inference drawn from its universality, and from the impossibility of tracing its origin, without following mankind up to a common parentage. But, if I mistake not, the general opinion is that the institution is altogether *arbitrary*; that it results neither from the light of nature, nor from the principles of reason; and that there is no discernible connexion between the blood of a slain animal and the pardon of an offender's sin. From this view of the divine ordinance, though advanced and defended by men of high literary character, I am constrained to dissent. I do not think that any religious institution which Jehovah has established, is *arbitrary*. There is a reason, good and sufficient, for every such institution; a reason too, which results from the object to be gained, and which is very near:—oftentimes so near that it is not perceived, merely because we are ever looking after something distant and mysterious. All the different systems which God has created, and all the different parts of each system, are accurately adjusted, and sustain reciprocal relations most happily arranged. In the operations of established law, both physical and moral, the highest confidence may be

* Delaney's Rev. Exam. vol. 1. p. p. 129—30. See also Faber's Orig. of Pag. Idol, vol. 1, p. p. 465—496; and Faber's Orig. of Exp. Sac.

reposed. God acts upon them, and men must reason and decide in consistency with them.

The particular institutions which belong to the paradisaical state, were all enforced by good and apparent reasons. The sabbath was intended to record and memorize the creation of the world, and to wake up in the bosom of man all those feelings with which that subject should inspire him. The social relations were formed because it was not good for man to be alone. Man was entrusted with dominion, because the intellectual powers with which he was endowed, qualified him for such an extended sphere of action; because he acts by means of secondary agents; and because he was made in the image of God, whose high prerogative it is to govern his creatures, and whose glory consists in conducting his administration upon the wisest and most benevolent principles. The institutions after the fall must be equally well sustained. The cherubim, the tabernacle, and the accompanying ritual, must all be commended to the human mind as needful and salutary. Their propriety must be perceived, and be sufficiently obvious to meet every objection which reason could suggest, or unbelief advance. So God defended them in his argument with Cain, appealing to his own good sense, and comparing the evangelic provisions along with the ill-humored complaints of the haughty and discontented rebel.—“If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted? And if not, a sin-offering coucheth at the door.”

In like manner some subsequent changes in the number or the appendages of the divine institutions, are explained by a reference to circumstances. The growth of society rendered it more difficult of management, and required some new and appropriate regulations; which regulations, however, were neither proposed nor authorized, until the necessity for their symbolical action had occurred. Within given periods excitement seems to expend itself; and

while the principles of moral science must remain the same, yet the outward forms, under which they are expressed, or with which they are associated, must be modified. Both God and man seem, by providential experiments, to have ascertained the necessity for such periodical revolutions—or AGES, as they have been called in both the pagan and *elect* worlds. Read the antediluvian and postdiluvian histories; analyze the Mosaic law, which is so full of corrections of the prevailing corruptions of the nations, and of allowances on account of jewish obstinacy. Look at the occurrences under the christian dispensation; call up the reformation to view, and witness the present perplexity and disquietude when the church has outgrown, and seeks to throw off, the forms of past ages. There is always sufficient REASON for such ritual and political changes; and while they have been foretold by him who sees the end from the beginning, they are ever ushered in by *signs*, competent and distinct.

The reasons for sacrifice are not very difficult of discovery. Deny its primitive enactment, and no other ordinance appears to take its place; while yet the nature of man, and the uniform mode of the divine proceeding with him, argue the necessity of, and call for, some religious forms, by which men should visibly profess their faith and their feelings, and which would be acceptable with God. The accompanying facts, developed in the history of Adam's family, as well as that of all other ages, become entirely unaccountable; or exhibit man acting consistently with his own constitution, while God himself wholly disregards it. Nor only so. But Jehovah had put man under the mediatorial government, by declaring that "the Seed of the woman should bruise the head of the serpent;" and yet enjoined no duties in connexion with the gracious system. All other things are shadowed out by external ceremony; and their knowledge is both preserved and disseminated, by being associated with the actions of

mankind. As far as I can perceive, there is no subject in reference to which the sceptic's fears, or the critic's literature, has been more entirely at war with the elements of society, or the facts which fill up the history of the world.

The sacrificial institution consisted in the offering up of life, with a view to the pardon of sin. By SIN death had just been introduced. Scarcely had the matter been adjudicated, when the Lord HIMSELF clothed the transgressors with coats of skin. The facts connected with the fall, the remedy, the divine actions in setting up the tabernacle and clothing our first parents, are all crowded together, as belonging to the same general concern, and leave us no alternative. We must interpret the ordinance as a divine enactment, and explain it by the associations in which it is found. Its character is obviously mediatorial. Its reference is evidently, on the one hand, to the sin of Adam, by which death had been incurred; and on the other, to the death of Christ, by which life should be restored. And it would, therefore, readily serve as a divine comment upon the present state of the world, by tracing up all our sufferings to SIN as their cause; while it would be equally explanatory of the official relations of the promised "Seed of the woman." There is, under such a view of the ordinance, nothing forced, nor far-fetched, nor arbitrary about it. It is evidently natural, appropriate, and expressive; and on the supposition that moral truth must be symbolized to the human mind, it was necessary, by such an institution, to explain the moral circumstances of mankind, as well as the remedial provisions of divine grace.

Certain it is—while Moses appears to take it for granted, that the nature of sacrifice, as it had existed before the Sinaic ritual was enacted, was fully understood in its reference to the practical consequences of sin, and in its alliance with the doctrine of the righteousness of faith—certain it is, I say, that he, and all the subsequent scriptural writers do place the Mosaic sacrifice in those connexions.

Under the law, "without the shedding of blood there was no remission." Yet it never was pretended that the blood of bulls and of goats could take away sin ; or that Jehovah had any pleasure in burnt-offerings, on their own account. All these things were merely *figures* for the time then present. The Holy Spirit, who, as the Spirit of prophecy, is the testimony of Jesus, did thereby "signify," or exhibit in typical form, "better things to come." With this intention, these sacrificial services resembled, in appearance, that of which they were the shadow. The offering of life, and that for sin, whereby the captain of our salvation was made perfect, could not have been otherwise symbolized ; nor could the nature of the divine government, as connecting sin and death on the one hand, and righteousness and life on the other, have been otherwise significantly set forth. The reason of the Redeemer's righteousness, as including his sufferings, is very plain ; and that of the previous emblem could not be occult.

But the grand reason of any institution, is to be found in its adaptation to produce a desired effect. If there is no practical efficiency exerted, if as an actively operating cause it accomplishes nothing, the ordinance is useless. In the present case, legally speaking, righteousness secures life. Accordingly, as we have seen, by the righteousness of Christ all men are brought into a justification of life ; and his righteousness is preached to mankind as the object of their FAITH. Could sacrifice then, or did it, so prefigure the finished work of the Son of God, as to serve this practical purpose, and lead men to *believe* ? If it did, the reason, and a sufficient reason, for the institution, immediately presents itself to every one. Accordingly the old testament saints, including the early patriarchs, are distinguished by their faith in the promised Messiah. They looked forward to the Redeemer's day ; sung of his priestly character, of his sacrificial sorrows, and of his glorious triumphs ; and endured as though they were fully persuaded that he would

appear as their deliverer. All this they did, in connexion with the offering of sacrifice.

But again. The object of the Redeemer's righteousness was to place mankind in a situation where they might meet their personal responsibilities; and to furnish them with all necessary facilities, considering "the weakness of their flesh." Their obligations would then call upon them to forsake sin, and do that which is right. This end being accomplished, the designs of Jehovah, in view of the existence of man, are answered. Could the ancient sacrifice, typifying Christ, and eliciting the operations of *faith*, exert any agency in instituting, or sustaining, this progressive sanctification? If it could, then again the reason, and a sufficient reason too, for this institution, appears with great distinctness. If any symbolic rite shall accomplish the most valuable purposes, and present the very similitude of the object desired, what more can be demanded in legislating for MAN? He obtains his ideas by means of his senses; and the exhibition which is capable of affording to him, through those senses, the very ideas which he needs, accords precisely with the peculiarities of his nature. That the sacrificial ceremony did occupy this very place, and serve this very purpose, is evident on its face; is distinctly unfolded in history; and is officially announced in the scriptures. How then can biblical critics or moral philosophers assert that, this rite results neither from the light of nature, nor the principles of reason? They might as well represent the whole mediatorial system to be unnatural and irrational.

Pardon of sin was confessedly connected with the sacrificial ordinance. And why should it not be so connected? If its legal associations, its emblematic allusions, and its practical operations, were such as have been described, pardon might well be extended. What more could be desired than faith in the Saviour, and the sanctification of the human spirit? Call the institution by what name you

please, apply any term that may be employed to express its relations, the moral is very plain. The difficulties which critics may suggest, or philologists exaggerate, are superficial.—The sanctification of the human mind is the paramount object of concern. All the claims of the divine law quadrate with it, and every perfection of Godhead is displayed in its own untarnished glory, when the reconciled man is brought home to heaven, redeemed and blessed. If pardon of sin shall correspond with the requisitions of the law, and with sanctified and glorified humanity, no reason can be assigned why pardon should be withheld.

Accordingly, while the typical sacrifice is represented as an *atonement*, it is sustained in that view, only because it is associated with the reconciliation or sanctification of the human mind. Burnt-offerings, presented as a mere formality, Jehovah again and again most indignantly rejects.—“Your new moons and your appointed feasts my soul hateth : they are a trouble unto me ; I am weary to bear them. And when ye spread forth your hands, I will hide mine eyes from you : yea, when ye make many prayers, I will not hear : your hands are full of blood. Wash you ; make you clean ; put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes ; cease to do evil ; learn to do well ; seek judgment ; relieve the oppressed ; judge the fatherless ; plead for the widow.” Let your own good sense decide ;—of what use can a sacrifice, or prayer, or any other form be, where the moral attributes, which should distinguish a thinking spirit, are wanting ? But if such forms lead man to think, feel and act correctly ; if as outward means they represent to him moral things under visible symbol ; if they become the occasion and opportunity of his expressing his own desires and intentions, or of his exemplifying before others that which is right—what rational objection can be urged against them ? Or if, when they are rejected, the very principle of human action, and of social intercourse, is abandoned, by what argument can such dereliction be justified ?

The idea of MERIT figures so largely in religious controversy, and is so distinctly discerned at every turn we take; that it is very likely it may have distorted the views which anxious moralists have formed on the subject of sacrifice. What *merit* can there be in a burnt-offering? Hecatombs might smoke, and rivers of oil might flow, but what *merit* would be evinced? An ordinance, constructed on this principle, cannot be traced to reason, nor to the light of nature. The practical effect on the spirit of man, produced by an excitement that is created, and under which his own powers are called out into action—an effect which elevates while it sanctifies, which controls the lusts of the flesh, overcomes the world, and enables the believer to rise superior to temptation—is the only object which regeneration can contemplate. This effect constitutes the worth of the righteousness of Christ, as well as of its various emblems, both ancient and modern. Discarding this theological figment of *merit*, or substituting the loftier thought of practical agency acting consistently with our intellectual nature; any ordinance might command confidence, and recompense the heart that devotedly ministers under its direction. This idea, duly appreciated and conscientiously sustained, can alone guaranty the contemplated benefits of religious forms.

With all the light that the new dispensation affords, the nature of its ordinances, simple and expressive as they are, has been misapprehended. Theologians have commenced their argument on erroneous principles; and those principles throw their shade over every matter belonging to the systems, of which they are a part. By Adam's sin, all men are brought into temporal, spiritual, and eternal death, we have been taught. Consequently all personal responsibility is absorbed in the *imputation* of that sin. Then again, a corresponding operation is predicated of Christ's righteousness in relation to the *elect*; and personal responsibility is merged in a *second imputation*. Many, it is true,

have condemned this doctrine ; but I do not see that they have fairly and fully met the argument of its advocates. How should they? Both parties start from the same point, and carry with them the same original principles ; and the doctrine referred to, casts its gloom over every theory with which it is brought into contact.

Look at the facts. BAPTISM has been represented by some to be REGENERATION. By others, it has been declared altogether irrational to administer that ordinance to INFANTS ; because, it is said, they cannot understand the objects proposed. A type or symbol cannot be *the thing*, which is typified or symbolized ; and methinks, any one might discern that it is therefore utterly impossible, that baptism should be *regeneration*. And if the *blessing* symbolized by baptism, may be brought to infants, there can be no impropriety in administering the *symbol*, which is nothing more than an outward exhibition of that blessing.—“The promise is to you and your *children* ;”—“of *such* is the kingdom of heaven.” Thus the scriptures often speak, endeavoring to impress on the minds of the religious community, a sense of the interest which Jehovah takes in their offspring. On what principle then, can an outward symbol of that interest be rejected as improper and absurd?—Without touching the question, whether baptism has been a designed substitute for *circumcision*, I yet call up the fact that jewish children were circumcised ; while it was utterly impossible that they should understand its import, as a “seal of the righteousness of faith.” But *circumcision* was a *symbol*, shadowing out certain blessings, as constituting an inheritance in which parents and their children had a common right. If one instance of such a use of an external religious form, has occurred, and that under the positive direction of Jehovah himself ; surely they have gone far astray, who pronounce a *second* instance to be *absurd*. But that instance stands not alone. All our children live under the light of sun, moon and stars ; they en-

joy the protection, and feast upon the bounties of a divine providence, most profoundly philosophical in all its operations ; while, perhaps, neither they nor their parents understand any thing of the accurate and varied connexion between cause and effect, which is so constantly and minutely exhibited. This dogma, if carried out, would stop the course of nature, and leave mankind to starve and die, unless they should become philosophers. It is mournful to observe how inconsiderately men reason on religious subjects, when they have some sectarian trifle to sustain. They forget the analogies of nature, and drop entirely the most familiar principles belonging to physics, the moment they enter the region of morals. It is no wonder there are so many sectaries, and so many controversies. Thus men close their eyes on the constituent elements of the divine works, and then undertake to explain them. These two views of baptism, which I have quoted, seem to me to be very much alike. They both mistake the type for the thing typified.

The LORD'S SUPPER has been treated in the same manner. The BREAD has been represented to be the literal FLESH, and the WINE to be the literal BLOOD, of the Redeemer. Here the misconstruction is so palpable and egregious, that it is matter of wonder, that christian ears should ever have heard it uttered. But, even those, whose prejudices call for no such impropriety, and who instantly reject it when stated, feel all the superstitious awe which that view of the ordinance would inspire. Many have refused to commemorate the Saviour's death through a long life, who have mourned over and anxiously sought to correct their error, when on a bed of death ; as though the elements really possessed some intrinsic virtue to save the soul, in the last extremity. Others comply with the injunction ; but year after year they approach the table with trembling steps, and handle the symbols with fearful hearts, as though they were about to "eat and drink damnation"

to themselves. Their single inquiry is—"am I a christian?" A very important question, it is true. The ordinance should certainly be observed in a becoming manner, and with proper views and feelings. But an inquiry, embracing such like matters, belongs to every duty we perform, to every trial we endure, and to every privilege we enjoy. Man, as personally responsible, should possess a spiritual mind, sanctified affections, and a good conscience in all things. The question here is, wherein is the Lord's supper *distinguished*? or what is its *peculiarity*? That PECULIARITY should be the special matter of thought, when we consider the obligation which the ordinance imposes on us. Therein the Lord Jesus symbolically exhibits *himself* as crucified for us, as loving us unto the death, and giving himself for us. There is nothing so alarming in this, that the people should be afraid to draw nigh, and contemplate and enjoy the testimony, or representation, of his love." On our part, he requires, that we should "show forth," proclaim, herald, or preach, his *death*; with a view of exciting the attention, and achieving the reformation, of those who are around us. What is there either painful, or forbidding, in a ceremony which looks to such results? Are you a patriot, and do you love your country? Are you a father, and do you love your children? Are you a friend, and do you love your companions? Would you not seek their welfare? Are you afraid to let them understand that Jesus is the Son of God, and that he died for you? Or would you lead them, by absenting yourselves on such occasions, to suppose, that you do not believe in the Saviour of the world? Or as long as you do not keep this sacramental feast, do you not feel that the obligation, to live a holy life, is comparatively light?

But the view of the Lord's supper, implied in the preceding observations, is too simple for the popular feeling on the subject. It is not *mystical* enough to be acceptable, where early impressions and sectarian prejudices reign, with their supreme and desolating sway. The *bread* must

be the literal *body*, and the *wine* the literal *blood*, of our crucified Redeemer, some how or other : not admitted, but most positively denied, in *words* ; yet in practical effect most deeply, however unconsciously, felt. To inspect the real feelings of the heart, and be aware of all the subtlety of the motives it may secretly recognise, is a process of self-examination, which few have either moral vigor or discrimination enough to carry fairly out. If the fact be not as I have stated, the remark must have so much verisimilitude, that it would be difficult to distinguish its difference from any other view which can be truly asserted.

A similar misinterpretation of an outward ordinance, or an official agency, attends the ideas which have been indulged in relation to the ministry of reconciliation. They have been invested with the power to forgive sins, and absolve the ignorant, but troubled, offender. A beautiful official gradation has been invented, which conducts the eye of an admiring and unsuspecting professor up from a simple *deacon*, by a race of bishops and archbishops, until you reach the pope himself. The most splendid revenues have sustained a most heartless sinecure ; and a priestly domination has beggared the conscience of the saints. Even where such proud pretensions have been courageously assailed, still a fragment, if not the whole, of the wilting policy has been preserved. The sectary follows the dictation of the councils that belong to his party ; and views their books as the consecrated relics of gigantic and saintly minds. It has not been long since it was thought a sin, worthy of exemplary discipline, for a member of one denomination to *hear* a minister belonging to another. And even now, it may be viewed as extremely hazardous to *listen* to, or to *read*, an argument, which may have been prejudged, and censured as aside of ordinary rule or a prescribed and idolized formularly. How important, but how completely misplaced, are external ordinances ! How can the human mind enlarge, or the human conscience acquire vigor, under such

an ecclesiastical administration? Personal responsibility is the costly sacrifice, which multitudes have offered on this altar of idolatrous ceremony. If no warning can obtain an audience, why—be it so. Under such circumstances—Jesus wept.—Ere long the WORLD will weep.

If we interpret new testament ordinances on such principles, it is no wonder, that a difficulty has been felt on the subject of the early *sacrifice*; or that a discussion, in reference to it, should have assumed the form of an inquiry—whether it corresponded with reason? or whether it could be derived from the light of nature? But literary and liberal men would have saved themselves from a mere verbal argument, and would have rendered a more substantial service to the religious community, if they had expended the effort, which they have made in a half-religious and half-literary controversy, on the original sacrifice, or on the mistaken views of christian ordinances, that have rendered us all so superstitiously timid.

One question more remains. Jehovah-Elohim is represented to have created this paradisiacal tabernacle, in which the cherubim were placed, at the east end of the garden; and to have made the coats of skin, in which our first parents were clothed. In what FORM—the form of GOD, or the form of MAN—did he officially act at that time? It may readily be answered, that if the curse had not yet been executed, though it had been pronounced; or if the *ground* had not yet been thrown under that physical influence which rendered it an instrument of death; Adam might have still beheld *the original form*, under which Jehovah was manifested unto him. But whether the curse had then been executed or not, it has been already observed, that *change* is the property of *form*; that Christ was *transfigured*, changed his form, or was metamorphosed, before his disciples; that Eve said—I have gotten a man, Jehovah his very *self*; and that such appearances, in *human* form, were afterwards presented to the early patriarchs, in Jehovah's

official transactions with them ; as well as that the ideas of a *virgin-born* Saviour, or various *emanations* from the gods in the *form of man*, were common among the heathen—all which no one can trace up, more than he can trace up *sacrifice*, or explain the cherubic symbols, and the sacred mounts and tabernacles, without arriving at this early scene that has given rise to our present question. The ordinances *then* created, gave to religious services all the character and peculiarities they sustained, throughout the world till Christ came.

In either case, it appears to me, that every difficulty is removed ; and that the direct agency, attributed to Jehovah-Elohim in these matters, is satisfactorily explained.

CONCLUSION.

I have finished the proposed analysis of the first three chapters of Genesis ; and have discussed the various general principles of the government of God, which those chapters present to our view. If you have carefully attended to the doctrines I have advanced, you must have discovered that no essential evangelical truth has been questioned. The FORM, in which the subjects belonging to both LAW and GOSPEL have been stated, may be very different from that, with which you are familiar ; but THE THINGS THEMSELVES have been very distinctly asserted, and very earnestly advocated.

My only crime is, that I have attempted to EXPLAIN the system of christianity, by going back to “the beginning” as the great prophet himself did ; and to offer some argument in elucidation and defence of its doctrines, which I have thence derived, and which I have supposed to be rational and demonstrative. A mighty offence truly, that the abandonment of christianity should be inferred ! God forbid, that I should not “HOLD THE HEAD.”—“God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus

Christ, by whom the world is crucified unto me, and I unto the world.”—God forbid that I should “know any thing among you save Jesus Christ and him crucified.” “For I am not ashamed of the GOSPEL of Christ; for it is the POWER of God unto salvation, to every one that BELIEVETH; to the JEW first, and also to the GREEK.” Any accusation, which would rapidly and harshly arraign my ministrations, and condemn my well intentioned efforts to explain “the truth as it is in Jesus,” would be both unkind and unrighteous. “But with me it is a very small thing that I should be judged of man’s judgment.” Long since have I committed myself and my ministry to the providential care of the Master himself: and with him am I still willing to leave the high official interests, which have assigned the present task. But it has become, by a vast deal, too common for professors to criticise the personal religion of those around them; and by doing it, they have but too often, and most unwarily, exposed their own gross deficiencies.

Had I supposed, however, in framing and delivering such a systematic arrangement of scriptural subjects, as has been pronounced in your hearing; about which there is a great deal of *seeming* novelty; and which, step by step, conflicts with *so many sectarian prejudices, and long established maxims*—had I supposed, that the whole should have been at once fully apprehended and accurately repeated, I should have betrayed my utter ignorance of the intellectual and moral character of religious society. Living in an age when an old excitement has run down, and when a new one, whose causes and extent are scarcely perceived, is carrying forward the human mind to act under a different social organization—undertaking a serious discussion of elemental principles, when so many others are seeking to control society by reiterated appeals to FEELING, or are inducing an expenditure of public zeal in social combinations—and even questioning the wisdom and policy of many of the popular movements, from which almost every one tells me

so MUCH GOOD is proceeding—the most I could expect would be attention, toleration, and candor. How far even these have been, or may yet be awarded, in response to a course of lectures, which possibly might be prejudged and unhesitatingly condemned, even while they were unheard, I shall leave to your own judgment to decide. Read society for yourselves. The principles of sectarian policy are not very deep. Its story is too old, and has been too often recited on the theatre of ecclesiastical strife while its advocates have too frequently outwitted themselves, and too visibly desolated the high and holy interests committed to their charge, for any reflecting man to be deceived. Harsh and cruel, disingenuous and uncandid, imperious and unrelenting, it shall have its own reward; and, sooner or later, be overtaken by a retributive providence. The Lord himself will institute a righteous inquisition; when, as Jesus said to his disciples, in reference to the envious pharisees—“Every plant, which my heavenly Father hath not planted, shall be rooted up.” In all our collisions, or in the excitement of temper and the crimination and recrimination to which they may lead, we should every one habitually recollect, that the Lord himself is judge over all the earth.

If, in the course of the discussion which I have pursued, any remark has escaped me, which may be justly censured as giving unnecessary offence, or wantonly inflicting pain; if I have proved myself reckless of any brother's feelings or interests, and thus swerved from the integrity, or corrupted the purity, of the ministerial character, I am not above craving pardon. He who was “in the form of God and made himself of no reputation, but took upon him the form of a servant and was found in the likeness of men,” thus humbled himself, on purpose to teach us—“That nothing should be done through strife or vain glory; and that in lowliness of mind, each should esteem others better than themselves.” If truth be severe, and reflections on the

character and tendency of public doings, uttered for the sake of needful and seasonable illustration, be considered offensive; I can only reply, that while the sense of duty was thus evinced, and an appeal, unreserved and fearless, was thus made to your understandings, nothing unkind was intended. If I were conscious of the power to avenge any supposed, or real, offence, yet I should consider the opportunity that invited its exercise, as a loud and peremptory call scrupulously to analyze the feelings of my own heart. A more salutary or important lesson has not been taught us, than that which the Redeemer thus pointedly expresses—"If ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses." No intention, not even the slightest, has been cherished, throughout the preceding observations, to wound any man's feelings, to injure any man's standing, to curtail any man's influence, or in any way to indulge in unhandsome and fretting personalities. My contest has been with *principles*, and not with *men*: and if I have spoken of *theologians*, I have merely used a general term, without designing to make personal allusions.—Though utterly unconscious that such an apology for any hasty expression of feeling is necessary; yet, if it be necessary, I cheerfully make it.

Again, dear brethren, suffer me to remind you, that I am not attempting, by any show of artful reasoning, to make a stealthy approach to a lordship over your consciences. I covet no influence, but that which TRUTH awards; or which the Master, in his own holy and condescending providence, would sanction and bless. "A man," said John the baptist, when certain disputants would rouse his jealousies on account of his Master's apparent popularity—"a man can receive nothing, except it be given him from heaven." I have no secret policy to sustain, nor painful misgivings to conceal. Your submissive credence is not asked to any thing of which you are not *personally convinced*. When Noah, Job, or Daniel, could save neither son nor daughter

by their righteousness ; it would be the height of folly and impiety, for any man, to decoy you from a distinct and lofty sense of your personal responsibility, by setting forth his own vicarious pretensions ; or to seek to convert your love of truth into an idolatrous confidence in himself. No, brethren, no. You must search the truth for yourselves ; and, by individual fellowship with the Father, and his Son, Jesus Christ our Lord, become *conscious* of the evangelic realities which have been set before you. If any respect or affection, which you may have invariably extended to me for my work's sake, should avail to rouse you to deliberate and prayerful THOUGHT ; and, if the truth as it is in Jesus should leave its hallowing and heavenly impressions on your own SPIRITS, I could neither ask, nor desire, more. The services I render, are purely ministerial ; preparative to higher relations in glory ; and without the most distant desire after artificial importance, or ghostly power. I beseech you, in the language of our beloved Lord—" Call NO MAN your FATHER on the earth : for one is your Father, which is in heaven. Neither be YE called MASTERS ; for one is your MASTER, even CHRIST."

I may be wrong. The theory that has been exhibited to your view, may be very defective. Should such be the fact, the investigation which has yielded the principles of christian philosophy here carefully developed, has distinctly taught me, that a christian man should ever preserve his mind open to conviction ; and be ready to receive *truth* from whatever source it may be derived. Progress in knowledge is as much a characteristic of christian living, as progress in holiness can be. The controvertist, who—"muffled in the zeal and infallibility of his own sect, will not touch a book nor enter into debate with a person that will question any of those things which to him are sacred"—who boasts that he has passed from childhood to a man's estate, without ever changing his views—who thinks that the mere *fact* of such a change is a disgraceful dereliction—and who

solemnly determines that he never will, while he lives, alter his ideas—may have learned his catechism well, and may have received a very distinct impression from the signet of sectarian authority; or, with peculiar accuracy, and enthusiastic fondness,

“May grind divinity of other days
Down into modern use :”

but he is the mere child of early prejudice. He has not reviewed the course, nor ascertained the value, of ever-changing circumstances, under which God himself may have modified all his providential proceedings. A higher service could not be rendered to such a man, than to induce him carefully to examine his CREED, and diligently to study HIMSELF: or to apprise him that he has taken on *trust*, what he supposes himself to *know*. He mistakes his talent; overrates his strength; finds fault without the power of defending his inconsiderate remarks; becomes “exceedingly mad” when he cannot answer; and gets rid of his difficulties, by refusing to look at them. Minds, thus unhappily drilled, were readily preoccupied by false views mistaken for vital religion, and crucified their long-promised Messiah. Such minds revolted from the simplicity of the gospel, and succumbed to papal jurisdiction, when the REFORMERS called them to contemplate and confide in the righteousness of the Son of God. Such minds are never prepared for the revolutions through which society must necessarily pass; nor have they grasped the political principles on which society is constructed. And if they are now mingling in the controversies which are abroad in the earth, the millennium itself, as the coming period of intellectual, but earthly, glory, is often denominated, will lose its beauty and interest in their eyes. I pray you, look well to this matter; personally and honestly investigate it, as though it could not require too great an expenditure of thought, or be too often associated with humble and anx-

ious prayer. To repeat it—I may be wrong; and, if so, should be thankful to be corrected. But more will be necessary to produce this, than mere dictatorial assertion, or authoritative criticism. These are very common in theological circles, and can affect no one who understands his subject, or has any respect for himself. On such high concerns no man may be magisterial.

Yet even if the theory advanced be inaccurate, there is no principle urged, nor doctrine stated, about which christian men and ministers, both good and intelligent, have not differed in opinion. In every age, almost, have these subjects been freely canvassed; and different sects have never gained any thing by their long cherished hostilities. Calvinists and arminians, established and dissenting churches, have alike to look back with complacency upon a long line of revered and holy men, who lived like saints; and died like soldiers of the cross, reposing in the arms of the great Captain of their salvation. And why may not men differ now, as well as heretofore, and still be loved and hailed as brethren? Why all this contention? On what moral principle is it, I pray you, that a man may not utter and maintain his sentiments, because his brother, frail and fallible like himself, happens to espouse different sentiments? Is it really a fact, that a professor, who, thinking for himself, cannot coincide with the *majority*, has therefore abandoned the gospel, and turned traitor to the Prince of peace? Is MIND to be scorned and scouted, when, appearing near the altars of the Son of God, she asks after the REASON of his institutions? Are immortal spirits, on their way to an everlasting communion with intellectual beings, to be condemned as criminal, because they would learn to *think* under the superintending care of the Holy Spirit? Are we to be told in pettish and angry tones—“all these topics, which are necessarily deeply mysterious, have been examined a thousand times before; and no one may be pre-

sumptuous enough to hope that he shall throw the smallest portion of light on the interesting but perplexing themes?" Shall the promise of divine teaching inspire no confidence? and is every one bound down under an irreversible fate, which renders it impossible for the human mind to apprehend, or explain, that which God has professedly *revealed*? If certain premises infallibly lead to unhappy and distracting conclusions, shall we be forbidden to inquire after the accuracy and wisdom of those premises? Or, finding that they have been unquestioned and unexamined, down through a long line of theological writers, and multitudes of generations, who were prohibited the use of every guide save some artificial system, or "permanent creed," shall the mighty aggregate of tremulous and submissive disciples foreclose inquiry, and compel us to receive what we do not understand, and dare not investigate? They who can abide such intellectual vassalage, must be left to enjoy their unenvied immunities; and to nurse their prejudices, and sustain their personal religion, by an overaction both imprudent and hurtful. Every pure and holy mind would long to enjoy a better companionship, and a holier intercourse among the ransomed of the Lord; and desire to show to the world, that different opinions on the philosophy of morals, like different opinions on the philosophy of physics, may only argue a variety of intellectual powers, and of the circumstances under which those powers are developed.— This promised and prescribed *uniformity* in the perceptions of religious truth, is purely chimerical. Theologians, in expecting it, have *necessarily* been disappointed; and sceptics, in demanding it, or calling for a unity which admits of no versatility of general character, have condemned the purest philosophy, when they supposed themselves to be assailing christianity.

Having yielded to a request, often and kindly urged, to prepare these lectures for the press, I now lay my publica-

tion on the altars of the sanctuary, and before him, to whom every christian, and every minister, should be able to appeal for the purity of his motives. Nor would I cherish any other anxiety about it, than that it may do GOOD and not EVIL; and more particularly, that YOUNG MEN, who are in great danger of mistaking the present agitation of society, may be led to the only refuge—the Lord Jesus Christ. THEY may not be aware, how far the influence of past ages is in conflict with the advance of science, or opposed to the strong sense of PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY, which is pervading both church and state. Ardently should we all desire that THESE may not be driven into infidelity; and, to the utmost of his power, every one should labor to explain to them the *principles* of the christian system. Young ministers might be the sympathizing counsellors of the companions of their youth. But, perhaps, even some of them, distracted by the multitude of systems, which theological seminaries are very tenderly rescuing from the grave, may be helplessly hanging on the arm of some ecclesiastical father, who can scarcely realize that his son has become a MAN. Or, it may be that, confiding in the strength of their position, or complacently reposing on the promises of an evanescent popularity, or fearing some inquisitorial outrage to which the law of their party may subject them; they may not have forecast enough to divine, nor courage enough to prepare for any probable changes.—May God save our young men from the impending ruin! Should my volumes fall into their hands, may he so sanctify the general discussion, as to lead them to estimate their PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY, and to induce them to THINK FOR THEMSELVES.

Dear brethren—I often look forward to the coming times, with a feeling that is painfully intense, and in the anxious musings of my own heart, ask myself, how our children shall fare amid the religious distractions and political turmoils, which have commenced their apparently ill-omened

career? The ancient mode of religious instruction, by which the memories of children were stored with the abstractions of a heavy catechism, and under the imposing but deceptive idea that it was A FORM OF SOUND WORDS, has sunk into disuse, as it ought to have done. The substitute which should have been adopted, or a prayerful parental effort diligently to teach "the statutes and commandments of the Lord" as they are distinctly stated in his own bible, has not been faithfully employed. The rising generation are growing up in comparative ignorance of divine truth, to betray, I fear, their moral imbecility or perverseness, when their fathers shall be lying in the dust. Great reliance is reposed in some periodical excitement, to produce which much undignified and violent effort is made; and religious ceremonies are increasing, while spiritual intelligence is becoming more and more defective. The christian, who loves the church, and yearns over the souls of men—the moralist, who can scan human character, or estimate the worth of causes by the effects which are produced, cannot *calmly* look at the scene that is spread out before him.

I speak to you with all the candor and frankness of one who has nothing to fear, excepting that he may go wrong; and nothing to desire, but his Master's approbation and blessing. I pray and beseech you to bring your children to the mercy-seat, and importunately to implore the glorified Saviour to bless them. Unfold to their view the treasures, the exceeding riches of grace and glory, which the bible conveys to your fire-sides and to your bosoms. Teach them to plead for the Spirit of the Lord to rest upon them. And when you die, leave them the blessings of your FAITH, and charge them never to forget that the BIBLE—THE BIBLE—is the charter of their heavenly hopes, and the counsellor in their earthly sorrows.

May God give his Spirit to you and your children! and discover to you and them the unutterable value of his BIBLE! May the light of his countenance guide and cheer

you throughout your earthly pilgrimage ! and bring you at last, regenerated, redeemed, and glorified, to dwell with him forever, in his high and holy habitation !

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